Civic Patronage in the Roman Empire

MNEMOSYNE SUPPLEMENTS HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

JOHN NICOLS

BRILL

Civic Patronage in the Roman Empire

Mnemosyne

Supplements

History and Archaeology of Classical Antiquity

Edited by

Susan E. Alcock, Brown University
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VOLUME 365

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mns

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By

John Nicols

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LEIDEN · BOSTON
2014

Cover illustration: Pentagonal bronze tablet (roughly 37 × 25 cm) celebrating the establishment of *hospitium* and *clientela* / *patrocinium* between the Roman municipality of Munigua, the client, and Curvius Silvinus, a Roman pro-magistrate in the province of "Further Spain" during the Early Principate. It is an excellent example of the practice of *patrocinium publicum* in the Roman Empire. Publication: *AE* 1962, 287; *AE* 1972, 263.
The use and publication of the cover image was made possible through the generosity of the German Archaeological Institute, Madrider Abteilung. I am grateful to Michael Kunst for completing the arrangements. Access number in the Madrid archive is:
D-DAI-MAD-WUN-PLF-0544 (Fotograf R. Wunderlich).

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nicols, John, Ph.D.
Civic patronage in the Roman Empire / by John Nicols.
pages cm. – (Mnemosyne supplements, ISSN 0169-8958; volume 365)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 978-90-04-21466-8 (hardback : acid-free paper) – ISBN 978-90-04-26171-6 (e-book)
1. Patron and client–Rome–History. 2. Community life–Rome–History. 3. Power (Social sciences)–Rome–History. 4. Exchange–Rome–History. 5. Rome–Social conditions. 6. Rome–Politics and government. 7. Rome–Antiquities. I. Title.

DG83.3.N52 2013
305.5'220937–dc23

2013033852

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual "Brill" typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 0169-8958
ISBN 978-90-04-21466-8 (hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-26171-6 (e-book)

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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

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FOREWORD

I first began to comprehend the nature of patronage while working as a *wissenschaftlicher Assistent* in the Seminar für Alte Geschichte at the Universtität Freiburg im Breisgau. I was very fortunate to be able to work under an *optimus patronus*, Professor Walter Schimitthenner. Not only did he stimulate me to explore the working of patronage in the ancient world, but also to see it as a device for understanding and succeeding in the German university system. I remain very grateful to him for the many insights he shared with me.

A stipend from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation took me to Munich to work with Professor Dieter Nörr. The chapters that deal with the legal evidence for civic patronage owe much to him and to Professor Michael Crawford. A Fulbright Fellowship allowed me to work on the epigraphical evidence with professors Werner Eck in Cologne and Géza Alföldy in Heidelberg, and also with Dr. Armin Stylow at the Kommission für Alte Geschichte in Munich and in Madrid.

I have also benefitted greatly from my discussions and exchanges with professors Jens Uwe Krause and Claude Eilers whose books on Roman patronage in Late Antiquity and in Greek Cities respectively complement this volume. While we do not agree on a number of critical issues, their suggestions and insights improved the argument.

Student assistants also made it possible to move forward with the project. Ashlie Crawford worked on the database; Kaitlin Hoffman, Taylor Smith and Garrett West helped with corrections to the text. Peter Kinzig corrected the Bibliography.

I owe a particular debt to Professor Wim Jongman (Groningen) and to the Humboldt Foundation. Without their support this book might never have been published. I am also grateful to the staff of Brill, and to Johannes Rustenburg and his colleagues at TAT Zetwerk who did the typesetting.

The gestation period of the book was long, and in part due to my uncertainty about how to publish the epigraphical database. "Too big to print", one university press told me with regret. But then again I realized that printing the data would also make it impossible to supplement, correct and keep the information up-to-date.

I cannot claim to have found the ideal solution, but the epigraphical material will appear as a set of PDF files on the Scholars Bank of the

University of Oregon. For those who wish to work more intensely with the data, a spreadsheet with all the data is also available on request. This database is neither perfect nor complete; indeed when I compare my calculations of any one phenomenon I do not come to the same result twice. There are too many uncertainties. Given these uncertainties no one should reckon that the tables and data represent anything more than a momentary reality. In this contribution the focus is rather on patterns and the conclusions are, I believe, reasonable allowing for some error on either side. Nonetheless scholars are invited to send me suggestions additions, corrections and improvements. I will happily review them and update the PDFs mentioned above.

The database and additional images and other material may be found at the Companion Web Site (= CWS) for this project that has been posted on the Scholars Bank at the University of Oregon. This CWS includes a database of known patrons, low resolution images of many inscriptions mentioned here, and other supplementary material. The URL for the CWS is http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jnicols or https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/13015.

The book is dedicated to Marianne S. Nicols. I am grateful for her support and patience over the years.

John Nicols,
Eugene, Oregon, July 2013

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SOME REPRESENTATIVE TEXTS

(A.) Diodorus Siculus on the trials of cities during the civil wars of the late republic:

> *City by city and nation by nation harsh tests were applied, and attempts of many sorts to find out where men stood in regard to them* (the dynasts). *Of necessity the people were constrained to shift the pretended loyalty that they assumed from one side to the other, and to incline toward whichever party was at hand. For representatives of the opposing belligerents assigned to the task of enlisting recruits kept appearing in person, and since they were striving to outdo one another, their highly exacting investigations brought the preference of the cities into the open.* (Diodorus 38/39, 13)

(B.) On the *mos maiorum.*

1. Cicero notes one form of patronage: *Our leaders have always been careful in this respect* (showing mercy to the defeated) *so that those who received into our alliance those states or nations defeated in war have been called 'patrons' in accordance with ancestral tradition* (= *patroni essent more maiorum*). *de off.* 1 35.
2. This concept is also stated by Sallust who, in describing the role of the Gallic Allobroges in the Catilinarian conspiracy, writes: *They accordingly divulged the whole affair, just as it had come to their ears, to Q. Fabius Sanga, whose patronage that nation sought especially* = *itaque Q. Fabio Sangae, quoius patrocinio civitas* (the Allobroges) *plurumum utebatur ... Cat.* 41.
3. Appian also mentions this case: *The Allobroges communicated the matter* (the conspiracy of Catiline et al.) *to Fabius Sanga, the patron* (*prostates*) *of their state; for it was the custom of all states have a patron* (*prostates*) *at Rome* (*BCiv.* 2, 4).

(C.) Patron of Rome?

1. Dio's version of Antony's eulogy to the dead Julius Caesar: *For these and for all his* (Caesar's) *other acts of legislation and reconstruction, great in themselves, but likely to be deemed small in comparison with those others which I need not recount in detail, you loved him as a father and cherished his as a benefactor, you exalted him with such honors as you bestowed on*

no one else and desired him to be continual patron (*prostates*) *of the city and of the whole domain.* (44, 48.2).

2. Velleius Paterculus uses similar language to describe Tiberius's status in the last years of the Augustan principate: *On hearing of the these events* (the defeat of Varus), Tiberius *Caesar, the constant patron of the Roman empire* (*perpetuus patronus imperii Romani*), *hurried to his father.* (2. 120).

(D.) On the attitude of the Roman elite:

1. Fronto to the council of his hometown of Cirta in Africa proconsularis: *... I should much prefer the guardianship of our native country* (*patria*) *to be strengthened than my own interests. Wherefore my advice to you is to choose for your patrons those who now have the highest stature in the courts and to send them resolutions to that effect.* (*ad am.* 2, 11).
2. Pliny on continuity of benefaction: *... past benefits cease to count unless confirmed by later ones; for if a single thing is denied people who have every reason to be grateful, the denial is all they remember.* 3.4.6

(E.) The Flavian municipal law:

Rubric: Concerning the coopting of a patron. No one on behalf of the community is to coopt a patron for the municipes of the municipality ... or to confer the status of patron (*patrocinium*) *on anyone except by a decree of the majority of the decurions which has been passed when two thirds of the decurions are present and they have cast their votes by ballot on oath ...* (*Lex Malacitana*, c. 61).

(F.) A bronze tablets recording the agreement between patron and client community (*tabulae aenea*)

1. From Banasa in Mauretania records the agreement between patron and client community: *In the sixth consulate of Vespasian and the fourth of Titus* (AD 75). *The colonists of Colonia Julia Valentia Banasa of the province of Mauretania coopted Sex. Sentius, the son of Sextus, Caecilianus, legatus Augusti ... and consul designate to be patron to them, their children and their descendants. Sex. Sentius Caecilianus received the colonists ... their children and descendants into the fides and clientele of himself and his descendants ...* (*AE* 1941, 79).
2. A bronze table from Ferentinum in honor of T. Pomponius Bassus: *Whereas they* (the members of the town council) *all as one man declared that the illustrious Titus Pomponius Bassus, in accord with the policy of the most indulgent emperor Trajan, was organizing the task*

> *assigned to him by him* (*the emperor*), *whereby he* (Trajan) *has provided for the endless duration of his Italy, in such a way that each generation should properly give thanks for his* (Bassus's) *administration, and that a man of so much merit is bound to be of assistance to our town; as to what it was pleasing should be done about this matter, they voted that it pleased the senators that representatives from this body be sent to the illustrious T. Pomponius Bassus to persuade him to deign to receive our town into the patronage of his great house and to allow himself to be chosen as patron and a tablet with this decree to be set up in his house … CIL* 6, 1492 *ILS* 6106.

(G.) Two inscriptions from Herculaneum document and allude to the patronal relationship and benefactions.

1. The first is a *tabula* now on display in the National Museum at Naples: *Marcus Nonius, the son of Marcus, Balbus, Proconsul* (built) *the basilica, city gates and wall with his own money. CIL* 10, 1425
2. The second is from the base of an equestrian statue and is in the form of a municipal decree: *As Marcus Nonius Balbus, as long as he has lived here has, in the spirit of a parent, demonstrated his enormous generosity to one and all, the decurions have decreed that an equestrian statue should be set up at public cost in a much frequented place with the statement: For Marcus Nonius Balbus, son of Marcus, from the tribe of Menenia, proconsul, patron; the town council of Herculaneum voted unanimously to set up this monument in return for his services* (*merita*). (*AE* 1947, 53)

(H.) Pliny to Calpurnius Fabatus, the grandfather of his wife, about a proposed visit to Comum:

> *One thing will delay us, but not for long: we shall have to turn off to my place in Tuscany … to perform what we feel is a necessary duty. Close to my property is the town of Tifernum Tiberinum which adopted me as its patron when I was scarcely more than a youth, its enthusiasm outrunning its discretion. The people always celebrate my arrivals, regret my departures, and rejoice in my official titles, and so to express my gratitude, for to be outdone in affection is disgraceful, I am defraying the cost of building a temple in the town.* (4.1.3–5).

(I.) That formal *patrocinium* was the highest honor a community might bestow is demonstrated not only by the fact that it alone is regulated in the municipal charters, but is also confirmed in a number of documents.

1. A bronze decree honoring Nummia Varia and coopting her as patron of Peltuinum states the civic patronage is the most prestigious title the council can confer *aput nos potissimus* (*ILS* 6110 *CIL* 9. 3429).
2. Epictetus comments to a certain rheorician on his way to Rome to pursue a case involving a disputed cooption as patron: *And now you are sailing to Rome so as to become patron of the men of Cnossos, and you are not satisfied to stay at home and keep the honors which you had, but you desire something greater and more conspicuous* (i.e., the honor 'patron'). (Arr. *Epic*. 2 9.6).
3. Note also the primacy of position given to the civic patrons on the *album Canusinum* (*ILS* 6121 *CIL* 3, 338; discussed in Ch. 8).

(J.) How Q. Oppius became patron of Aphrodisias in 88 BC.

> *The same ambassadors begged that you too should be allowed to enjoy my patronage* [πατρωνήᾳ]. *I accepted them because of my regard for your city and undertook the position of patron* [πάτρωνα] *of your people*. Oppius continues: *For these reasons,* [*I shall take every*] *care both in office and as a private individual to do whatever I can, while preserving my good faith, to help you and your public affairs, and always to procure your advantage* ... J. Reynolds, *Aphrodiasias and Rome, JRS Monographs 1*, London, 1982.

(K.) What Caesar says about his benefactions at Hispalis:

> *He reminded them that at the outset of his quaestorship he had made the province* (Further Spain) *above all others his special concern, and had liberally bestowed on it such benefits as lay in his power at the time* ... (as praetor) *he had asked the Senate to rescind taxes ... and had secured the province immunity ... and having undertaken the role of patron* (*patrocinio suscepto*) *he had defended the province, not only introducing numerous deputations into the Senate ... and undertook legal actions both public and private* ... (BHisp., 42)

These texts, fully discussed in the following chapters, epitomize the attitudes of the ancients and the nature of the evidence on Roman civic patronage. Regarding the nature of the evidence, patronage of communities is mentioned in three different yet complementary forms. First, it is a fitting subject for the major literary figures of the Republic and of the Principate. Second, the patronage of communities is one of the few forms of public honor to be officially regulated in Roman law (in municipal charters and decrees, in imperial edicts and in senatorial *consulta*). Third, patronage is most vividly represented on the monuments of the Roman world, on statue

bases and on public buildings. These distinct forms represent the legitimate concerns of the patrons (the literary evidence), the central government (the legal material) and the clients (the epigraphical and monumental).

One may conclude this impressionistic section by noting how two Camden professors have assessed the working of patronage: Ronald Syme writes: "Benefactions anticipated were more important than benefactions conferred". Peter Brunt, echoing the same sentiment, notes that "Influence derives as much from the hope of future benefits as from obligations incident to those previously received." Both of these statements, as will be seen, help to explain the elusive character of patronage and why the sources have relatively little information about the specifics of exchange.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Scholarly interest in patronage in the ancient world has been primarily directed at understanding the role of dependency relationships between individuals. What was the role of patrons and clients in terms of the political struggles of the late Roman Republic and how did the great dynasts such as Caesar, Pompey and Octavian exploit the resources of their clients in their competition for power, prestige and wealth? For the Principate, scholarly interest has focused on similar questions, but with important variations: What was the new role of personal patronage in the establishment and maintenance of order? And how did patrons act as intermediaries between the central government and citizen/subjects?[1] This study begins from a different perspective. First, the emphasis is on that form of patronage (*patrocinium publicum*, or civic patronage) in which the patron was an individual and the client a civic community. This emphasis is consistent with the pattern of the ancient evidence in that references to patronage in the ancient sources are often concerned with civic patronage.[2] Second, the evidence on which this study is based covers both periods, from 70 BC to AD 200 and beyond, and emphasizes the changes in the exercise of civic patronage as Rome emerged from the civil wars of the Late Republic and became a Principate.[3] Third, though it is not possible to specify the exact nature of exchange, I will argue that civic patronage was valued by both parties and that it played an important and enduring role in the establishment of prosperity, order and urbanization.

---

[1] The overwhelming number of references in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, volumes X, XI and XII, refer to personal patronage.

[2] On the distribution of references in Latin literature, P.A. Brunt, *Clientela*, in *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 382–442 esp. at 391 ff.

[3] Badian terminates his discussion of *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1958) in 70 BC. Though his work and this one represent different kinds of studies, the chronological arrangement not incidental.

1.1. *Varieties of Patronage*

Though elements of patronage may be recognized in human society everywhere, scholars both ancient and modern tend to be inconsistent in their vocabulary and in their perception of its moral excellence, or lack thereof. To what extent, for example, do the words *patrocinium*, *patronatus*, *fides* and *clientela* describe different aspects of the same phenomenon?[4] Do *beneficia* and *officia* and *merita* have fundamentally different meanings? Or reflect different perspectives of the same underlying institution? Moreover, there is the difficult question of whether the English word "patronage" is an adequate label for the institutions described by these Latin words.[5] Indeed, the very word "patronage" has for modern tastes a slightly negative or at best, a neutral force, which was not the case for the Roman.

Patronage has been defined as "a reciprocal exchange relationship between men of unequal status and resources."[6] I would like to expand this definition and, at the same time, to incorporate some of the ideology associated with the institution: Patronage is a mutual, continuous and generally extra-legal or morally based relationship between two parties of unequal status and resources. That is, the relationship is between parties who are involved in some kind of exchange of goods and/or services; these need not be of the same order or variety nor need they be "equal" in a way which would satisfy a bookkeeper. Second, the relationship is a continuous one and, indeed, the formal arrangement (contract is too strong of a word) between the two parties routinely mentions descendants; patronage then assumes long-term relationships. Third, the exercise of obligation by the two parties is not formally regulated by law; disappointed patrons and ungrateful clients could not bring their claims to any court of law. On the other hand, there is a signif-

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[4] For a discussion of the latter two and of entry into the relationship, see Badian, 1 ff. No article on *patrocinium* has appeared in *RE*. Though various studies of patronage in the late Republican and Augustan eras exist (cf. A. von Premerstein, Art. "Clientes", *RE* IV, 23 ff.; *Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats*, Abh. München 1937, Heft 15, 113 ff.), they tend to be political in orientation. N. Rouland, *Pouvoir politique et dépendance personnelle dans l'Antiquité romaine*, (Bruxelles / Aix en Provence: *Latomus*, 166) 1979, devotes relatively little attention to developements in the Principate.

[5] On the vocabulary, J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république*, (Paris, Societé d'Adition Les Belles Lettres; 1963), and R. Saller, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*. (Cambridge: University Press, 1982), Chapter 2.

[6] Peter Garnsey & Richard Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University of California Press; 1987). This definition is very similar to that given by other scholars. How the general definition applies to civic patronage will be discussed at the end of this chapter.

icant moral element, a sense of the sacred (*sacer* or *pietas*), terms that served to ensure that most parties did their duty most of the time (e.g., Tac. *Hist.* 1. 2–3). More pragmatically, the ancient writers agree, the two parties were bound by the fact that the abandonment of one party in time of need was embarrassing and undignified.[7] Alternatively, such relationships prospered because respecting obligation brought prestige, and dignity to both parties; the relationships were a visible manifestation of the power and influence of each. Fourth, the parties (whether individuals or groups) formally recognized some kind of inequality of status in the relationship. These elements of patronage can be recognized at all stages of Roman history and, indeed, as many anthropologists and sociologists readily admit, in many modern societies.[8]

Historians have traditionally discussed the phenomenon of "patronage" under four headings.[9] In personal patronage, both parties are individuals and the client is free born and of lower social standing than the patron. This category generally remained outside Roman law except that patrons and clients did not testify against one another; that is, "exchange" between the two was not regulated in the legal sense. Romans did regulate in law one important variant on personal patronage, namely the relationship between the patron and his former slave, or *libertus* and, because it is so important, it receives its own heading. The third category is the patronage acquired by the advocate / orator, *patronus causae*, in respect to his client especially when the services of the former were nominally provided without fee.[10] Finally, there is the patronage of communities, which is the subject of this study. These categories are, however, not rigid. Even the ancients writers tended to

[7] Cf. *FIRA*^{2} Vol. 1, page 62, nr. 21; Gellius (quoting Cato) 5.13.4 and Dion. Hal. 2.10.3. In practice, the system could tolerate a considerable degree of "disconnectedness"; that is, no one could be expected to meet all obligations all the time. Even so the sources do not yield many examples individuals losing *fides* because they neglected obligations.

[8] In general, by S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society*, (Cambridge: University Press; 1984) and by E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (edd.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Society*, (London: Duckworth; 1977).

[9] These are the categories discussed by M. Gelzer, "Die Nobilität der römischen Republik" (1912), in *Kleine Schriften* 1, 68 ff. (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1962) = *The Roman Nobility*, tr. by R. Seager, (New York, Wiley, 1969), cited here by note number rather than page number; note 50 ff.

[10] In the Principate, fees became was a major problem, Tac. Ann. 11.4–7. Brunt, *Clientela*, 405, believes that when *patronus* means pleader "it is not correlated with *cliens*" and doubts that *cliens* is normally used, as client is in English, to refer to the person represented by an advocate in court.

assume that the personal patronage that Pompeius exercised over members of the local elite was similar to the formal patronage of the collective. So, too, do we find that civic patrons also had personal clients and freedmen in the community.

What does *formal* civic patronage involve?[11] Here we are on firm ground. The *tabulae patronatus*, the contracts / agreements between patron and client community are quite specific: To become a civic patron, an individual was formally coopted (*patronum cooptare*) by a decree of the decurions (*decretum decurionum*); in doing so he or she received the community into his or her *fides clientelaque*.[12] Noteworthy is the fact that the word *clientela* occurs in inscriptions only in the *tabulae patronatus*. In literary texts the word is avoided in reference to the community. That is, both patrons and communities frequently refer to the fact of *patrocinium*, but only rarely to the fact of *clientela*. In this respect, the usage of *clientela* in regards to communities is parallel to that for individuals in that the emphasis is on the power and prestige of the patron and not on the lower status of the client.[13] Finally, as will be argued below, the use of the word *cooptare* was deliberate and meant to suggest that the patron in some unspecified way became a citizen of the town and a member of the council.

The ancients also identified another form of civic patronage that modern scholars label as patronage by 'ascription'. This form of patronage is found particularly in the Late Republic and took two forms. First, there was the traditional patronage ascribed by the Romans to the general who had received a defeated foreign state and accepted it into alliance (Representative Texts, B, page xiii). Second, there is a distinct tendency for Cicero and his friends, when calculating political resources, to ascribe functional or *de facto* clientele to one prominent Roman or another even though the connection was most tenuous and may not even have been known to the alleged client. Third, there is a tendency to assume that the patronage exercised by a Roman magnate over the leading men in a community meant that the latter [the community] was a formal client of the former. That is, the Romans

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11 *Cooptare* is not the only verb used; see below Ch. 6.2, on the use of *adoptare*, etc.

12 For an example of the language of the *tabulae*, see Representative Texts E, F, and I. Note that *clientela* is not the exact counterpart of *patrocinium*, but requires the additional notion of good faith on the part of the client. Note also the statement of Gellius, 5.13.2: *clientes, qui sese in fidem patrociniumque nostrum dediderunt*. The usual formula, however, is the one linking *clientela* and *fides*, J. Nicols, "*Tabulae Patronatus*, A Study of the Relationship between Patron and Client-Community", *ANRW* 12 (1980) 535–561, esp. at 548 f. For other examples, see Gelzer, text at note 71.

13 This was especially true of individuals, Brunt, *Clientela*, 395 ff., and Saller, 9 f.

themselves assumed that *patrocinium* and/or clientele existed, or should exist, even though the two parties had not made an explicit agreement.

1.2. *On the Theory and Practice of Patronage in Modern Scholarship*

The study of civic patronage over the last century begins with M. Gelzer's *Nobilität* (1912), building on the earlier work of Th. Mommsen, J. Marquart and others.[14] In the 1950s, a number of monographs were published on the subject, including Badian's *Foreign Clientelae* and L. Harmand's *Patronat*, the former limited primarily to the late Republic, the latter a grand synthesis of civic patronage covering all periods of Roman history.[15] *Patronat* remains the most widely cited study despite its limitations.[16] Less well known is the unpublished Freiburg dissertation of F. Engesser (1957).[17] This study is more accurate, but because there is no index and little cross-referencing, also very difficult to use. Both Harmand and Engesser tend to be descriptive and to overlook, among other important issues, the role of patronage in Romanization. The works of several other scholars deserve to be mentioned. B.H. Warmington published an important survey of municipal patronage in North Africa and Robert Duthoy, in a series of articles, has reviewed evidence for the institution in Italy and attempted to provide some general categories to explain the basis of cooptation.[18] Jens-Uwe Krause has published an analysis of civic patronage in Late Antiquity.[19] Three dissertations, one by Peter Wilkins on civic patronage in North Africa (University of Tasmania), Claude Eilers on *Roman Patrons of Greek Cities in the Late Republic and Early Empire* (Oxford, 1993) and F. Canali de Rossi, *Il ruolo dei patroni nelle relatiozioni*

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14 Th. Mommsen, "Das römische Gastrecht und die römische Clientele", in *Römische Forschungen*, (Berlin; Weidmann; 1864), 1. 319 ff. and J. Marquardt, *Das Privatleben der Römer*, Leipzig, 1886, 195 ff.

15 L. Harmand, *Un aspect social et politique du monde romain: le patronat sur les collectivités publiques des origines au Bas-Empire*, (Paris, Presses universitaires; 1957).

16 Note Badian's review in *Latomus* 17 (1958) 774, and Saller's use of this study in *Personal Patronage*.

17 *Der Stadtpatronat in Italien und in den Westprovinzen des römischen Reiches bis Diokletian*.

18 Warmington, "The municipal patrons of Roman North Africa", *PBSR* 22 (1954) 39. Duthoy, "Scenarios de cooptation des patrons municipaux en Italie", *Epigraphica* 46 (1984) 23–48 and "Sens et function du patronat municipal durant le Principat", *AC* 53 (1984) 145–156. See also, Nicols, "Prefects, Patronage and the Administration of Justice", *ZPE* 72 (1988)201–217. This problem will be discussed thoroughly in Chs. 6, 7, and 8.

19 *Spätantike Patronsformen in Westen des römischen Reiches*, (Munich; Beck; 1987 =*Vestigia* 38).

politiche (2002) have recently been published. So too have books by Brenda Longfellow and Arjan Zuiderhoeck, though they focus on Asia Minor, contributed to the understanding of the practice of civic patronage.[20] In general, these works have not only collected and structured the large number of inscriptions, but have also revealed how difficult it is to connect honors and actions. The reason for this state of affairs is clear enough: inscriptions and literary texts only rarely make direct connections between specific benefactions and *patrocinium*. The case of Nonius Balbus (Representative Text G) illustrates the nature of the problem.

Richard Saller's study of personal patronage, though not directly concerned with civic form, nonetheless suggests a different perspective on the problem. The members of the Roman elite, he argues, were expected to confer favors (benefactions) on kin, friends, *patria* and clients. The rule was: benefactors were pre-disposed to reward those like themselves. Hence, the distributions were not based on impersonal, objective or "universalistic" considerations, but rather on the personal or "particularistic".[21] The same considerations, as will be shown, may have led patrons and governors to favor the more Romanized cities over the less Romanized; in doing so, the Roman elite encouraged the latter to become more like the former.

A number of scholars are skeptical of the value of patronage as an institution and of its use as an explanatory concept. Fergus Millar, to quote one recent formulation of the problem, notes: "… the extensive evidence for city *patroni* in Italy does not contain many instances of effective intervention by well-placed patrons from the locality" and concludes that "… the real significance of the patronage system is not at all clear."[22] Peter Brunt believes that patronage certainly existed at all periods of Roman history, but that its value for explaining historical problems especially those of the late Republic has been exaggerated by modern historians beginning with Gelzer.[23] The ambiguity in the sources about the nature of exchange, as noted above and will be argued below, is a consequence of an ethic that deliberately avoided specificity. In general, the evidence recognizes obligation, but does so without itemization.

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[20] Respectively, *Roman Imperialism and Civic Patronage: Form, Meaning and Ideology in Monumental Fountain Complexes*, Cambridge (University Press, 2010) and *The Politics of Munificence in the Roman Empire, Citizens, Elites and Benefactors in Asia Minor*, Cambridge (University Press, 2009). In both these books, the authors use the term 'patronage' in their title, but focus more generally on civic benefaction.

[21] Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 30 ff., discusses the problem more fully.

[22] "Italy and the Roman Empire", *Phoenix* 40 (1986) 315.

[23] *Clientela*, op. cit.

Patronage has also been discussed from other perspectives. Sociologists and anthropologists have analyzed the kinds of goods and services the patron provides.[24] "True" patrons allocate to clients goods and services over which they (the former) have direct control, "resources of the first order"; these, like water, pasturage and protection from violence, tend to be critical for the survival of the client. Patrons can also function as "brokers" in that they may mediate between their clients and the true patrons. Their resources are then of the "second order". In Roman history, the broker might negotiate with the central government to gain, for example, market privileges or citizenship for his clients. Whether a patron allocates first or second order resources depends of course on the situation. During the Principate, a local magnate in southern Italy or Africa might be a true patron in that he allocated his resources to build city gates or provide grain in time of famine. Should he petition the emperor to construct an aqueduct or to advance the status of his client community, he would also serve as a broker and the emperor would be the true patron. These categories then are not mutually exclusive. Such distinctions are critical for understanding the role of patrons in the process of urbanization and Romanization

Sociologists have also established categories and terminology that allow them to define the degree of "clientelism" in a given society.[25] A true "clientelistic" society is one in which status differentiation is manifest and all 'goods and services' are distributed through personal connections; clients have no access to impersonal markets and exchange is generalized. That is, clients deliver their goods and services to particular patrons and receive other goods and services in return. Specific prices, as determined by supply and demand, are not negotiated, but a generalized obligation is thought to exist between the two parties.[26] In societies in which clientelism is an "addendum" to the main social system, such as at Rome, status differences may be manifest but the markets are to some degree open. In these "ascriptive-hierarchical" societies, clients have some autonomous access to markets where they can indulge in "specific exchange" and convert at least some of their resources freely (that is, they can negotiate a price). There are other "addendum" models including the "universalistic" but they are not relevant to the ancient Mediterranean world.

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[24] In particular, Eisenstadt and Roniger and in the collection by Gellner and Waterbury, both cited above.

[25] The following owes much to Eisenstadt and Roniger, Chapter 5.

[26] Free markets and public goods might exist, but clients have access to them only through their patrons.

All of these anthropological studies provide useful models for the study of ancient patronage and for civic patronage in particular. For example, the ambiguity about the exchange of goods and services is not restricted to the experience of the Romans, but appears to be characteristic of patronage in general. Hence, even though there is little evidence linking patronage to specific benefactions, we should not conclude then that civic *patrocinium* was an empty formality. Nevertheless, these studies must be used with some caution. First, there is no opportunity to cross-examine our witnesses; this is especially a problem when it comes to understanding the nature of exchange between patrons and client communities in the ancient world. Second, though evidence on municipal patronage is rich, it is rich only by the standards of the ancient historian. The surviving epigraphical evidence represents by best estimates and in the most favorable locations between 1 and 5% of the total ever inscribed.[27] Inscriptions relating to municipal patronage make up about 1% of the surviving texts. Third, many of these anthropological studies fail to consider the implications of multiple *patrocinia/clientelae*, e.g., there is little recognition of the fact that patrons had many clients and that client communities had a number of patrons and that both spent considerable time and effort coping with the problems of competing claims on their goodwill.[28] It takes only a cursory reading of the correspondence of Cicero, Pliny and Fronto to see the magnitude of this problem. In sum, this kind of comparative material, both vocabulary and theory, may be suggestive in re-constructing but cannot serve as a substitute for unavailable data.

1.3. *On the Nature of Exchange*

One of the great difficulties in discussing patronage is understandable failure to distinguish between patronage and benefaction. The Romans appear to have made, however inconsistently, some distinction between the two, a distinction that is often ignored in English. While both ancients and

[27] On the survival rate of inscriptions, R. Duncan-Jones, *The Economy of the Roman Empire*, (Cambridge, University Press; 1974), 360 ff. and S. Mrozek, "A propos de la réparation chronologique des inscriptions Latines dans le haut-empire," *Epigraphica* 35 (1973) 113–118. More generally, R. MacMullen, "The Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire," *AJPh* 103 (1982) 233–246, and E.A. Meyer, "Explaining the Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire: The Evidence of Epitaphs", *JRS* 80 (1990) 74–97.

[28] I have discussed this problem in my review of Eisenstadt and Roniger in *Gnomon* 59 (1987) 657–659.

moderns agree that the bestowal of a benefaction created moral obligation on both sides, on the side of the beneficiary to reciprocate and on the side of the donor to support his or her first benefaction with other ones, they disagree that a benefaction automatically created formal patronage—*patrocinium*. That is, to the modern observer patronage is indeed created by a benefaction, while to the Roman obligation may have been generated, but formal *patrocinium* may not have been.

Some examples illustrate the nature of this problem. Richard Saller's discussion of personal patronage in the Roman Empire assumes that where benefaction exists, so too does patronage.[29] Indeed, he provides a list of fifty-three epigraphically attested patrons of North African individuals, but of that total, only twenty-nine inscriptions, or some 55%, actually specify that one party is a patron. The remaining cases are included on the list because the parties are of different status and because they employ the associated vocabulary of patronage: *merita*, *amicitia* and/or *beneficia*.[30] While this may work for patronage in the sociological sense, and indeed may be the case for Roman personal patronage, it cannot easily be extended to civic patronage for two reasons. The extension of title or honor, *patronus* or *patrona civitatis*, was regulated by law not by whether a benefaction had been conferred (indeed, as will be argued, benefactions anticipated may have been more important); and, furthermore, it is clear that we have many individuals who were public benefactors but are not known to have become formal patrons of communities.[31] Sherwin-White assumes, for example, that Pliny, because he bestowed benefactions on his home town, was indeed the patron of Comum, despite the fact that the ample epigraphical or literary evidence lends no support to that notion. In sum, the relationship between the two remains fraught with difficulties in that all benefactors did not automatically become the formal civic patrons (*patrocinium publicum*) and all formal patrons cannot be assumed to have already conferred benefactions (that is, the relationship may have been based on benefactions anticipated).

Despite this ambiguity, patronal systems do assume that there has been or will be a continuous and regular exchange of goods and services over time, indeed over generations.[32] Consequently, though one benefaction may

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[29] Saller, id., p. 6, writes: "We should not jump to the conclusion that patronage existed only where the terms *patronus* and *cliens* were used" also argued on p. 15. As applied to civic patronage, this formulation must be used with care.

[30] Saller, 195ff. The argument is modified slightly in Garnsey and Saller, op. cit., 148ff.

[31] These issues will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

[32] Inter al., Brunt, "*Clientela*", 390ff.

initiate the relationship, no single refusal of a benefaction could terminate the obligation felt by both two parties. In the Roman ideology the exchange of 'goods and services' could not be counted and weighed in way that would satisfy an accountant; such a balance-sheet would serve to terminate a relationship that was based on goodwill and theoretically continuous. Infrequency of exchange, not one-sidedness, was more likely to cause the demise of the relationship.[33]

Moreover, when benefactions are mentioned in the literary and epigraphical evidence, the text does so in the form of generalities, *ob merita* being the most common designation. An example illustrates the problem dramatically. On the one inscription from Herculaneum we read that Nonius Balbus was patron of the town but nothing is said about any of his benefactions. On another inscription, however, we learn that he had given Herculaneum its gate, walls and basilica, significant benefactions by any standard, but the text does not refer to him as *patronus*.[34] There appears to be a tendency to avoid specific reference to benefactions in connection with inscriptions referring to *patroni*. We may guess at a reason: Because the title was prestigious, communities did not want to suggest that it could be had for a specific price, for example, for building the city gates. Rather, they wished to stress the continuing nature of benefaction and obligation. If this pattern has any general validity, then we may have to conclude that at least some of the many benefactors recorded on Latin inscriptions may also have been formal patrons; at the same time, we must also be aware that the reference to benefactions and achievements does not alone demonstrate the existence of formal patronage.[35]

Even with this caveat, some categories of action can be identified. Patrons were especially concerned to provide urban centers with the amenities of civilized (Roman) life. Hence, they constructed buildings both public and religious; they also mediated internal disputes, defended the community and enhanced its status before both emperors and governors. Indeed, the ability of a community to improve its status, to defend its interests and to

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[33] As Saller put it, *amor* continues and grows without tending, but *amicitia* requires "constant nourishment of new *official*", p. 13, based on Fronto, *ad M. Caes.* 1, 3.4. This principle, though used to describe *amicitia*, applies equally to the exercise of municipal patronage. That services cannot be equated or balanced in a manner that would satisfy a bookkeeper, turn to the discussion of Seneca's *de ben.*, in Ch. 4.

[34] Texts are provided in Representative Texts, Section (G).

[35] It is of course somewhat unusual to have the combination of texts given here in E, F, G and I.

enjoy fiscal stability depended upon the effectiveness and resources of its patrons (and other benefactors).[36] In return, the client community provided the monuments to display its gratitude and to celebrate the generosity of the donor. In some cases, an embassy to the Senate or Emperor would also perform this service (that is, to celebrate the patron) in Rome, itself.[37] The size, quality and rhetoric of the embassy could reflect positively not only on the patron but also on the community. In general, the evidence is consistent in that the community was the recipient of benefactions which might be measured (and sometimes were) in personal effort or in material form or monetary units, while the patron generally received honors, like statues and decrees, the cost of which might be only a fraction of the value of the benefit conferred. Admittedly, the evidence is usually incomplete in respect to cost and value: a benefaction might have been conferred not only to acquire a public honor, but also to gain access to other resources ("public goods"), that is, to goods that simply are not mentioned in the evidence.

Also critical to our understanding of exchange is the question of the long or short term nature of the relationship. In some cases, the title or honor was conferred because an individual held a certain office and through that office could allocate resources. When the magistracy ended, there might be no more reason for the community to continue the relationship. As Brunt states, we must then distinguish between hereditary patronage and *gratia* acquired through office.[38] According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, short-term relationships generally worked to the advantage of the client, long term relationships to the advantage of the patron.[39] For example, a local landowner's control of water might lead to a long-term relationship that placed the client at greater disadvantage. A patron who owed his status to his office might be in a position to allocate significant resources during his (short-term) governorship, but might have more difficulty providing or securing services to / from that client after his term of office.[40]

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36 Among the benefactions that might be provided, we also find legal services, the securing of market privileges, the award of the Latin right, child support programs (*alimenta*), support for education etc. All these will be discussed in the following chapters.

37 Hence, there is considerable legislation on embassies both in the municipal charters and in the *Digest*. This material will be discussed in Ch. 6.

38 "Clientela", 427. Nonetheless, the epigraphical evidence indicates that many communities conferred formal patronage on their governors, on men who might not be ready or able to continue to provide the same kind or level of benefaction after the end of their time in office.

39 250–251.

40 Brunt, "Clientela", 196, on the problem a noble had confirming his ancestral patronage referring to Cic. *Fam.* 13.64.

The members of the Roman elite, both in their public and in their private capacities, were expected to confer favors (benefactions) on kin, friends, *patria* and clients. Plutarch advises a young man who enters office not to detach himself from his friends, but to call on them to help with public business and, in return, to help them to acquire honor and wealth (*Moralia* = *Praecepta ger. reip*, 808F). Pliny speaks of the appropriateness of aiding friends and provided many of them with benefactions (Romatius Firmus is a good example, *Epp*. 1.19 and 4.29). When recommending a friend, Marcus Aurelius tells Fronto, then governor of Asia: "For you will, I know, be always most ready to do what is just and proper by all Asians, but counsel (*consilium*), companionship (*comitatus*) and whatever else is for friends which is allowed by honor (*fides*) and conscience (*religio*), these I ask you to extend freely to Themistocles" (*ad M. Caes*. 5.36). These distributions, Saller argues persuasively, were based on personal or "particularistic" considerations rather than on the universalistic or impersonal.[41] The same considerations, as will be shown, led patrons and governors to favor the more Romanized cities over the less Romanized. This kind of favoritism was possible not only because it was deemed morally correct, but also because emperors and governors had considerable discretion in the allocation of the public goods attached to their offices and presumably want to reward the cooperative.

Sociologists have developed a complementary explanation. In clientelistic systems, the weak attempt to impose moral obligation on the strong through petition or application, that is, the public admission of inferiority imposes obligation on the stronger not to abuse that power. By this means, the weaker party secures protection and gains favors. In exchange, the client lends prestige through a show of deference and through the active advertisement of the patron's liberality (in some cases he may also provide labor). The ideology, and indeed hope itself, encourages the client to have an overly optimistic view of the patron's actual or potential performance. This attitude allows, as Saller notes, the latter to maintain his position at minimal personal cost.[42]

Throughout the literary and epigraphical evidence there is an implicit assumption of moral equality of services, one that is quite different from the usually explicit references to status inequality. That is, regardless of differences in status, both parties are presumed to share the same degree of

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[41] This paragraph is, in part, based on Saller's discussion of the problem, *Personal Patronage*, 30 ff.

[42] *Personal Patronage*, 38, also later in this chapter.

moral commitment to the contract. Contemporary anthropological studies make frequent reference to the phenomenon; regrettably there is little ancient evidence that directly supports this notion.[43] This is a good example of an aspect of ancient patronage which may be presumed (on the basis of comparative studies) to have been relevant but for which we simply lack the supporting documentation. Even so, as will be argued, the evidence, indirect though it is, suggests that it was more important for communities to have formal patrons than it was for senatorial patrons to have client communities. On the other hand, the sense of moral equality in obligation appears to be more relevant when the patron is of equestrian or decurial status rather than of senatorial.

In sum, it is misleading to place too much emphasis on the identification of specific benefactions as a means to explain how the empire functioned administratively. Alternatively, the lack of specifics on exchange should not be construed to discount the significance of civic patronage as an institution that facilitated the administrative process. Surely important to the client, though not always manifest in the sources, were the vague promises of protection and the possibility of benefactions. So, too, was it of some importance to the patron that the client would provide assurances that the patron's generosity would not be forgotten.

1.4. *Concerning Evidence and Methods*

This study of civic patronage is based on the recognition that distinct varieties of evidence describe distinct perspectives or manifestations of the phenomenon. The concerns of the central government are expressed in the legal evidence, in the laws of the late Republic, in the municipal charters, in the *consulta* of the Senate, edicts of emperors and in statements of the *iurisprudentes* of different eras. The concerns of the senatorial patron may be found in the literary evidence, especially in the writings of Cicero and the letters of the younger Pliny; those of decurions and equestrians as well as of the community have to be deduced from the monuments, i.e., from inscriptions, public buildings, statues, etc. that refer to the actions of the civic patrons. As can be seen in the discussion of the epigraphical evidence in Chapter 7, the monumental evidence is particularly rich, providing details on the names and benefactions of over eight hundred patrons and on the

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[43] On this issue, Eisenstadt and Roniger, 2 ff. On the ancient evidence, Ch. 4.

status and expectations of as many communities. It is particularly in the epigraphical material that we will find the evidence relating to urbanization and Romanization.

Even so, the ground is treacherous and a word of caution is appropriate. In the literary evidence, conscious discussions of benefaction and of patronage, like Cicero's *de officiis* or Seneca's *de beneficiis*, represent institutions in an idealized light very much influenced by Stoic notions of governance and behavior. They illustrate the manner in which the literary elite thought benefaction should be practiced. When, however, one compares the theoretical treatise of the former with his more candid observations in his (Cicero's) correspondence, one sees that there are important differences.[44] Moreover, as will be shown, if one collects the various statements on patronage from the many different works of Cicero, one will also find inconsistencies, even contradictions. Finally, the literary evidence can also be misleading in that the writers confer or describe benefactions that are oratorical and rhetorical and say little about benefactions of a more material nature. This evidence is not representative because it relates to the activities of only one element of the elite, the senatorial, and reveals little about the concerns of the decurial or equestrian orders.

Legal evidence may also be of limited value because it is primarily concerned with the procedures surrounding initiation of relationship, not with the exercise of *officium*. That is, the laws, charters, *consulta* and edicts do not regulate the exchange of benefactions or protect one party when the other fails to fulfill his or her duty.[45] The epigraphical material, it may be argued, represents no more than banal formalities and has no more significance than the contemporary practice of giving someone the keys to a city. Moreover, it cannot be said to represent any meaningful statistical sample (see below Ch. 7; Latin inscriptions mentioning patronage of any sort represent only about 1% of those that survive).

Nonetheless, some procedures minimize the methodological dangers. First, in regard to the literary evidence, we need to distinguish between statements that are theoretical in nature, statements that idealize, and those that describe patronage in practice. What do the authors assume to be normal? What do they take for granted? A second method is to examine usage in single works with a clear context (e.g., as is done in the discussion of

[44] Discussed in Ch. 2 and 4.

[45] Note the statement in the XII Tables: *patronus si clienti fraudem fecerit, sacer esto*. The *Digest* 1, 16,6.3, does regulate the kinds of gifts that might be given, for example, to governors but the governor is not always a patron (see below). See also, Saller, 165.

Cicero's *Verrines*, Ch. 5). In this case, Cicero is writing for a known public audience and we may assume some consistency in usage. Third, in regard to the legal evidence, it is, indeed, limited to the initiation of relationship, but the regulation of municipal patronage in the charters of the Caesarian and Flavian eras, the *alba* of Canusium (Severan) and of Tamgad (Dominate), despite the different political situations, suggests that the institution continued to be important throughout Roman municipal history and that the appointment of civic patrons was taken very seriously. Fourth, in regard to the epigraphical evidence, the inscriptions on stone and bronze were simply too expensive to be dismissed as rhetorical formulas. The overwhelming majority of these texts that mention patronage are monuments of one form or another. Duncan-Jones has collected the prices known for these items and many of them cost at least a half-year's salary for a centurion.[46] Moreover, as will be shown in Chs 5, 7 and 8, these public inscriptions, which advertise the generosity and stature of the patron, constitute a major element of the client's *officium*.[47] That is, clients felt or should have felt (as Seneca indicates) an obligation to advertise the patron's benefactions, and that these advertisements should be displayed in a public and prominent place in the client community, in the *patria* and even in the home of the patron.[48] Regardless of who actually wrote the inscribed text, it is clear that both parties considered the mention of the honor to be an important component of the career description and fitting for mention on an epitaph.[49] Finally, and difficult to demonstrate from the sources themselves, the public inscriptions served as highly visible reminders to potential donors that their benefactions would not be forgotten and to potential exploiters that the community enjoyed the protection of some powerful individuals.

The most important method for overcoming the limitations is, however, to integrate the various forms of evidence and expose their complementary aspects. In some cases, the epigraphical can serve as an important corrective of and balance to the literary. For example, the construction of public

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46 *Economy of the Roman Empire*, 75 ff. (for Africa) and 124 ff., for Italy. These figures must be used with caution, but they do reflect a range of real costs.

47 Note how Martial celebrates benefactions and benefactors, *Ep*. 7, 36; 8, 51; 10, 57; 11, 18; 12, 24 and 36 and Quintilian's statement that the person in debt has the responsibility to display his gratitude, *Inst*. 12, 7.12. For more examples, Saller, 29.

48 Seneca's argument is discussed at length in Ch. 4. Note Representative Texts F, H and I.

49 In the High Principate, senators may have had so many clients that the honor lost its significance and was not recorded on epitaphs; that communities sought more and more patrons (Canusium had over 30 in AD, 223), suggests that the honor remained significant especially to the town councilors.

buildings is a much more frequent benefaction in the former than the latter would lead us to believe; so too can the literary provide insights into attitudes we can only guess at from the inscriptions alone.

In sum, to demonstrate many significant propositions quantitatively may not be possible; qualitatively, however, the evidence is suggestive of a number of consistent patterns. Hence, this study has been developed around the complementary divisions of the evidence. In such a strategy some concepts will be treated in several places. The repetition in the patterns found in different forms of evidence constitutes one of the most important supports for the general conclusions of this study.

1.5. *Redefining Civic Patronage and* Patrocinium Publicum

Earlier in this chapter, patronage was defined as a mutual, continuous and generally extra-legal or morally based relationship between two parties of unequal status. This definition may now be expanded here, but with a promise of further discussion in the succeeding chapters.

In civic patronage, at least one party must be a public community. In the overwhelming number of cases, an individual is the patron and the community is the client. There are some cases however, in which both parties are communities or even more rarely in which the community is the patron and the individual the client.

Given the personalities of the two parties, the use of the term "unequal status and resources" should not be pushed too far. Individuals and communities are not comparable on the same scale; moreover, individuals of the highest senatorial rank may be members of a community that was in the clientele of a member of the equestrian or decurial order. Because Senator X was a citizen of Community A did not mean that he automatically became the personal client of the Decurion Y simply because Y was the formal civic patron of A. Moreover, the aggregate resources of the community may well have exceeded those of the patron.

The formalization of patronage involved some public and official act, on the part of the client to ask to be admitted into the clientele of the potential patron and of the latter to acknowledge his acquiescence. This formal process of cooption was regulated in Roman administrative and municipal law. Some Romans, and especially during the late Republic, were also ready to ascribe at least informal patronal or clientelistic status to individuals and communities even when no formal relationship existed. That is, they made assumptions about the way they thought individuals and states

would behave even when no formal relationship influenced their actions. Such assumptions constituted an important aspect of political calculation and expectation.

As noted above, vigilance is required that we not assume that what moderns mean by 'civic patronage' is identical to Roman *patrocinium publicum*. There is of course significant overlap, and I am not immune to the temptation to conclude that the two are identical. Nonetheless, this study focuses primarily on the latter. There is surely much in common between public benefaction (*euergeteia*) in the Greek speaking cities of the eastern part of the Roman Empire and the practice of *patrocinium publicum* in the Latin speaking cities of the western part, but the roots of the former might be considered legacies of the Hellenistic period, and in that sense differ from the Roman and Latin tradition.

Finally, in the formalization of civil patronage, there is also an explicit statement defining "continuous" to incorporate generations to come. Whether or not the relationship flourished over generations cannot usually be verified, and, despite the initial intention the disappointed party could not seek redress in the courts. That is: the cooption of a patron was a generally legal act of a community, but the actual details of exchange remained outside Roman law, regulated only by the good will and moral commitment of the two parties. We also need to bear in mind that the relationship between patron and client was not an exclusive one. Patrons had many clients; client communities had many formal patrons.

1.6. *On Cause and Effect / Mutual Reinforcement*

Since Herodotus first articulated the issue, historians have believed that their discipline is ultimately the study of causes. In a famous passage (1, 22–23), Thucydides made a sharp distinction between the cause that people believed to be defining (*prophasis*) and the true reason for events (*aitia*). The former are those most widely and openly discussed; the latter are those known and understood only to the more thoughtful members of society. By nature and training, historians claim to elucidate the *aitiai*, the true causes of events. Indeed, they take particular pleasure in noting how their own insights focus on *aitiai* while those of other scholars sometimes fail to rise above the level of *prophasis*.

The study of patronage in general and of civic patronage in particular is complicated by such considerations. Many Romans, and especially those of a Stoic persuasion, believed that an ordered and benevolent society

depended at least in part on how well individuals and collectives met their obligations. There were (then as now) good and practical reasons for individuals to respect most of their obligations most of the time. Under the influence of Greek and especially Stoic philosophy, Romans imposed on this system an elaborate set of ethical considerations and indeed used the new vocabulary to provide a "higher" moral justification for their behavior. One consequence of this development was that the expectations about how patrons and clients would or should behave entered more emphatically the realm of *prophasis*, where they nonetheless played a significant role in political calculation and civic behavior.

In this study we will find examples of what might be fairly described as wishful thinking and hypocrisy. Though patrons and clients may have been realistic about their expectations, they typically framed the discussion in terms of moral obligation. Though disappointments surely occurred and were perhaps inevitable, it is nonetheless remarkable how rarely the sources chastise patrons or clients for their failure to fulfill their expected obligations. Hence, some modern historians tend to dismiss patronage as useless for identifying it as the cause of an event. The important point here is not so much that the vocabulary of patronage can often be relegated to the category of *prophasis*, but that we need to understand that the vocabulary was in fact a part of the political calculation of both patrons and clients and certainly affected behavior.

1.7. *Central Issues and Questions*

The discussion of civic patronage revolves then around the following questions. How did civic patronage function in the Late Republic? How was it altered by Augustus? How did it evolve in the Principate? How pervasive was civic patronage in these periods?

What was the role of civic patronage in the process of urbanization and Romanization especially in the western provinces?

How were relations between the two parties established and maintained? What were the expectations of each? What is the relative importance or value of benefactions anticipated or conferred? On what basis did communities select patrons; on what basis did patrons admit communities to their clientele?

Why are the ancient sources so ambiguous about the specifics of exchange? That is, though exchange did take place, the parties to the process typically declined to specify what was given and what received. To what

extent did philosophical concepts affect the theory and practice of exchange and obligation civic patronage?

1.8. *On the Organization of This Monograph*

This monograph is organized in the following manner. The Introduction, Chapter 1, is followed by a narrative and analytical history of civic patronage (Chapters 2, 3, 4) from about 70 BCE to 200 CE. The next part (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) is a set of four studies of civic patronage incorporating detailed analyses of Cicero's *Verrines*, of the legal, and of the epigraphical evidence on patronage. The final section (Chapter 9) summarizes the conclusions reached in the various chapters. Though it is not possible to specify the exact nature of exchange, it will be argued that civic patronage was valued by both parties and that it played an important and enduring role in the urbanization and, hence, in the Romanization of the west.

CHAPTER TWO

CIVIC PATRONAGE IN THE LATE REPUBLIC

> *City by city and nation by nation harsh tests were applied, and attempts of many sorts to find out where men stood in regard to them* (*the dynasts*). *Of necessity the people were constrained to shift the pretended loyalty that they assumed from one side to the other, and to incline toward whichever party was at hand. For representatives of the opposing belligerents assigned to the task of enlisting recruits kept appearing in person, and since they were striving to outdo one another, their highly exacting investigations brought the preference of the cities into the open.* (Diodorus 38/39, 13)

During the crisis of the very late Roman Republic, the *fides* of patrons and of client communities was frequently tested and frequently found wanting … or so it would appear. The function of this chapter is not to provide a concise history of civic patronage or to list all the known patrons of the period, though the latter is provided in an online appendix = CWS, and in several appendices (2.3, and 5) prepared by Claude Eilers. It is intended rather to define the expectations both positive and negative associated with civic patronage and to measure the performance of the two parties against those expectations.

It was a period in which we find the greatest diversity in the exercise of the institution. Client communities might be Italian or provincial; citizen or peregrine, made up of veterans, allies or *deditii*. Patrons were party leaders, governors and generals, orators and lawyers, landowners and local magistrates. There was intense competition among patrons to control resources including clients. Clients perceived that protection (in so far as it could be achieved at all) could only be secured by having a multiplicity of patrons. It was also in this period that we see most clearly the two complementary forms of patronage of community in operation. On one hand, there was formal *patrocinium* which encompassed the whole community; on the other, there was an informal or ascriptive patronage by which a Roman might be said to have a community in his clientele when the leading citizens (*principes*) of a community established with him a personal relationship of a clientelistic character. In the first case, some kind of collective act, a decree or a *deditio* or *applicatio*, provided the basis. In the latter, there was no official act of the community, but rather benefactions (actual or anticipated or

potential) of the patron conferred on his personal clients the aura of power and influence, and allowed them to control local politics and to determine the political orientation of the community in reference to Rome and to other members of the Roman elite. Some communities formally adopted a patron; other communities may not have even realized that the Romans perceived them to be *clientes* of a Roman politician. In either case, however, the ability of the respective parties to influence one another depended upon the personal connections between the Roman patron and the members of the local elite.

There was a symbiotic relationship between the two parties. Patrons and clients had expectations about how the other party would perform or how the other might be manipulated to perform. As will become clear in the discussion of the evidence, *patrocinium civitatis* (and well as some other forms of patronage and dependency) is best understood as an index of expectation and potential about the future, and not so much about performance in the past. Expectation and potential were meaningful to the extent that they might find expression in the calculation of political influence or of military power. For example, many Romans, Caesar included, recognized that the formidable *clientelae* of Pompeius might be converted into a military asset. Many communities (and individuals within those communities) expected their patrons to guarantee their safety, to protect and enhance their status and prosperity or, at the very least, not to exploit them excessively. Hence, it is important to understand not only the actual performance of the two parties, but also to understand what each party expected of the other and, more significantly, what third and fourth parties expected of the relationship. In the latter case, what was *expected* may have been more important to political calculations of the competing parties even if those expectations were unrealistic. Moreover, the performance of a client community was limited by the fact that the local elite was often divided: one faction hoped that its dominance would be guaranteed by allegiance to a Pompeius, another that that dominance might be broken by allegiance to a competitor like Caesar. Finally, the performance of the patron was limited by his actual resources and by competing obligations to other clients and friends.

The patronage of communities also played an important, though probably not a central role in the political propaganda of the period. At a time when constitutional procedures were followed irregularly, the competitors, to judge by their actions, sought to 'legitimize' their authority by becoming patrons of Italian communities. Did they believe that such authority enhanced their power? The evidence suggests rather that in making their political calculations, Roman politicians tended to over-estimate the alle-

giance of clients and/or their ability (or willingness) to provide the men and material necessary for the military struggle. That is, they tended to act as if clients had an exclusive relationship with a patron and, hence also, they failed to recognize that clients too had multiple allegiances, conflicts of interest and especially that self-preservation was paramount.

The patronage of communities was not, however, a monopoly of the *nobiles* or reckoned solely in terms of how many soldiers might be mustered or voters delivered. It is in this period that that we find the first instances of patrons who were municipal magistrates and benefactors of their own and other communities in Italy. This development is especially important for this form of benefaction will become a central feature of patronage in the post Augustan Roman Empire.

There are two methodological difficulties in assessing this material. First, as Brunt has argued, the raw number of references to patronage and *clientela* in the sources does not suggest that such relationships were central to Roman political equation.[1] In terms of number of references, this claim is defensible. When one considers the character of the references (as will be done here), however, it is manifest that clientele and patronage generated expectations about how individuals and communities should behave. That patrons and clients were occasionally disappointed by the behavior of their partners should not be construed as evidence that the institutions were insignificant either politically or socially.

The second problem is that of hindsight. To subsequent historians, ancient and modern, the clientele of Pompeius was enormous and appeared to have provided a precedent for that of Augustus. To late republican politicians and to communities faced with the decision to open their gates to the rival of their declared patron, the monolithic and uncompetitive system of the Principate could hardly be imagined at all. On the other hand, thoughtful observers must have been sensitive to the fragility of the alliances created by the great men of the period [the late Republic]. The *clientelae* of Livius Drusus and of Sulla had dissolved as quickly as they had been put together; Pompeius was never able to bring his resources to bear against Caesar and that of the latter fragmented on his death. Intimidating and pervasive they certainly were, but enduring? What we find is an elaborate network of shifting alliances where, as Syme says, "benefits anticipated were more potent

[1] *Clientela*, sections I and II. Epigraphical supplements for this chapter may be found in Eilers, Appendices 2, 3 and 5 especially. Other lists may be found in Canali de Rossi, *Il ruolo*. Note that the totals will not agree as each scholar employs somewhat different criteria; indeed most inscriptions have uncertainties, sometimes fewer and sometimes more.

than benefits conferred."[2] This re-construction may be too negative: It is not so much that the allegiance of a client was 'fragile', but that the competitive nature of the system allowed or compelled communities to seek the best arrangement those individuals [patrons] who were at any one time best positioned to reward or punish the community. The two parties may have desired the stable arrangements mentioned in the *tabulae patronatus*, but the rapidly changing situation made it difficult to achieve such a goal.

The arrangement of the material presented in this chapter is only loosely chronological, from the Gallic War to the Civil War and then to Actium. The actual focus, however, is on the status of the client communities; it begins with a discussion of the patronage of Romans over communities that had surrendered (*deditii*), proceeds to a discussion of the patronage of a (Massilian) *socius*, to that of Spanish communities of mixed citizenship, and concludes with an analysis of patronage of Italian / citizen communities. In this period, as in others, there were patrons who were loved and who were feared, *clientelae* that were gained and lost, inherited and squandered.

2.1. *Patrocinium and Clientela in Caesar's Bellum Gallicum*

> *... ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent earum patroni essent more maiorum.* (Cic. *de off.* 1, 35)

In the *bellum Gallicum*, Caesar consistently applies words like *patronus* and *patrocinium*, *cliens* and *clientela* to Gauls and to Gallic customs and avoids applying them to Romans and to Roman institutions. As he does employ these terms in respect to Romans in other works, the pattern in the *BGall* appears to be deliberate.[3] Even if Caesar intentionally avoided the formal vocabulary of patronage in respect to the relations between Romans and Gauls, it is legitimate to ask whether in fact patronal relations were established between Caesar and the Gallic communities, that is, to what extent did Gallic communities become, or were perceived by other Romans to have become, the clients of Caesar?

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[2] *Roman Revolution*, Oxford, 1939, 74. I have not attempted to footnote these generalities here. Brunt provides an extensive critique in '*Amicita*'; what is appropriate for this discussion is provided in the footnotes relevant to the following discussion.

[3] In doing so, he may be showing respect for his law of 59, discussed in Ch. 6. Brunt, *Clientela*, 392 ff.

Caesar employs Latin words, like *patronus* and *cliens*, to describe Gallic social institutions.[4] Note, for example the statement that *more Gallorum nefas est etiam in extrema fortuna deserere patronos* (7, 40) is very close to the language used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch to describe patronage in the Early Republic (*Ant. Rom.* 2, 10 and *Rom.* 13.3–6, respectively). Moreover, and again this corresponds with Roman practice, the Gallic *equites* measured their importance in such terms:

> … *omnes in bello versantur, atque eorum ut quisque est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet. hanc unam gratiam potentiamque noverunt.*[5]

There were, of course, some differences. Caesar does note that it was not very long before his arrival in Gaul that the most beloved slaves and *clientes* of an illustrious *paterfamilias* would be burned together with the corpse at the conclusion of the funeral.[6] Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that these disparities in the working of patronage in the two societies tend to reflect different stages of development and to be more superficial than real.[7]

In respect to the patronage of communities, Caesar notes two related forms, the patronage of an important Gallic noble over a loosely defined group of individual warriors and, second, the patronage of specific *oppida*. Regarding the former, there are two noteworthy cases in the Gallic Wars. In the first, Orgetorix, on the day of his trial collected at the place of judgment his whole clan, ten thousand of them alone, plus all his *clientes obaeratosque suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat* (1, 4). With their help, he was able to escape.[8] Vercingetorix became a force to be reckoned with simply by summoning his *clientes* (7, 4). Whether these were all Arvernii is not clear from the text, but, as his father had aspired to the hegemony of all Gaul (*principatum Galliae totius*), his dependents may well have belonged to many

4 Only very occasionally does he employ a Keltic word, like *obaerati* to describe these institutions, e. g., *BGall* 1,4.

5 6, 15 (perhaps ironical), 7, 4 and 32. Note also Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2, 10.4: it was a matter of pride not only to preserve hereditary patronages, but to acquire new ones.

6 On the close connection between *patronus* and *paterfamilias* in early Roman tradition, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2, 10; Plut. *Rom.* 13. Caesar's conquest cannot be construed as the cause of this change.

7 On the development of patronage in Gaul, J.F. Drinkwater, "Patronage in Roman Gaul and the problem of the Bagaudae," (ed.) A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Patronage in Ancient Society*, op. cit., 189–193, with bibliography. Also Brunt, *Clientela*, 329.

8 Note the parallel case of Valerius Asiaticus: He could be considered a danger to Claudius because of his extensive Gallic connections, Tac. *Ann.* 11, 1.

different *nationes populique*.[9] Caesar does not indicate to what extent clients, individuals or collectives, might have more than one patron at any one time. Implicit in his account however is the fact that the size of *clientelae* waxed and waned. That is, changing political realities inevitably meant that clients would seek (or fall under) new protectors, that they would loosen (though probably not formally abandon) ties that no longer functioned or, as the case may be, renew old ties when that was expedient.[10] Indeed, the fact that they were able to do so may be the underlying theoretical basis for Caesar's decision to use the vocabulary of Roman patronage to describe the relationship.

More interesting for this discussion is the story of Lucterius, who had always enjoyed considerable authority among the Cardurqui of central Gaul. He and Drapes occupied Uxellodunum, *quod in clientela fuerat eius*, and added the *oppidani* to their forces (8, 32). Here we have a clear case of what a Roman writer felt was *patrocinium civitatis*. It is interesting to note that the Cadurqui are also mentioned on one of the rare references to civic patronage in the Gallic inscriptions of the Principate.[11] The evidence does not allow us to determine whether this connection is causal or casual.

The more common form of patronal relationships among Gauls in the *BGall* is the patronage of one Gallic state over another.[12] Caesar is not always specific about the identity of the clients. The Arverni, Sequani and their German allies fought against the Aedui and their *clientes* (1, 31). These may be the same *clientes* mentioned later at 7, 75, including the Segusiavi, the Ambivaretri, the Aulerci, the Brannovices, the Blannovii. There are other cases: the Eburones and the Condrusi were the *clientes* of the Treviri (4, 6) and the Carnuntes were in *clientela* of the Remi (6, 4).

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[9] Note also the case of the two contenders for the annual magistracy of the Aedui. Each is said to have a *clientela* (7, 32).

[10] Brunt, 392, suggests that the Gallic client was entirely subordinated to his 'lord', that is that the relationship was exclusive.

[11] *AE* 1981, 640 = here no. 679 = M. Sedatius Julius Rufinus Severianus, cos. suff 153. As there are so few cases of patronage of Gallic communities in the Principate, one may well wonder whether this form was not a particular phenomenon of the Cardurqui. The epigraphical evidence on the patronage of communities in Roman Gaul is, in absolute terms, rather meager but this should not be taken as proof that it was rare. Indeed, as will be shown in Ch. 7, the incidence of epigraphical attestation is consistent with other epigraphical patterns.

[12] For the Roman attitudes to patronage of one state by another, see J. Rich, "Patronage and Interstate Relations", in (ed.) A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Patronage in Ancient Society*, op. cit., 118 ff., especially at 127. *Tesserae hospitalis* found in Spain and recording agreements between Keltic groups also provide examples of this variant. See below, note 13.

The most interesting aspect of this phenomenon may be seen in Caesar's discussion of the changing fortune of the Aedui at 6, 12. When Caesar arrived in Gaul, the Aedui headed one Gallic *factio*, the Sequani the other. The strength and *auctoritas* of the former depended on their *magnae clientelae*. With the aid of the Germani and Ariovistus, the Sequani had defeated the Aedui on several occasions, killed a number of the nobility and been able, as a result, to transfer to themselves *magnam partem clientium*. Through Caesar's efforts, however, the Aedui regained their old *clientelae* and had new ones added. The revival of the Aedui at the expense of the Sequani allowed the Remi to extend their authority, for those states which, on account of their old hatred for the Aedui, *se Remis in clientelam dicabant. hos illi diligenter tuebantur: ita et novam et repente collectam auctoritatem tenebant*. Just as individuals measured their *gratia* and *potentia* by the number of clients, so too did states; moreover, clients may have had exclusive relations to one patron, but could and did shift their allegiance from one to another. At Rome, in contrast, the notion of choice had long since been extended to allow a client to have multiple patrons at the same time (discussed below, Ch. 2, 2.4).

There is no reason to doubt Caesar's account. Indeed, the epigraphical evidence from other Keltic areas, especially from northern Spain, indicates that this tendency for one state to incorporate another one into its clientele was not unusual.[13] For Gaul the epigraphical evidence is much weaker, but it may be presumed that similar devices and instruments were used to formalize the relations between the more powerful states and their dependents.[14] It should also be noted that Romans, Gauls and Gallo-Germans used patronage and *hospitium* in similar ways. Caesar, for example, uses the term *hospitium* to describe the relations between Gauls, both individuals and states. Hence, the Bellovaci sent men to Alesia because Commius, who enjoyed *hospitium* with them, requested interaction (7, 75; also 7, 5). Even the underlying theory is similar. Caesar writes: *hospitem violare fas non putant; qui quacumque de causa ad eos venerunt, ab iniuria prohibent, sanctos habent* (6, 23). Note Cicero's statement in the *Verrines* about *hospitium, quod sanctissimum est* (2, 2.110). Most significant, however, is the repeated and unambiguous suggestion that military power was based (among other factors) on

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13 On the credibility of Caesar's account, Drinkwater, op. cit., 190. On the Keltic pattern of patronage when both parties are states, Nicols, Indigenous Culture, *AJPh* 108 (1987)129 ff., and *ILS* 6101.

14 Professor Jürgen Untermann, Cologne, has informed me of a still unpublished silver *tessera* that may document this relationship in Gaul.

the number of clients one had, an assumption that, however unrealistic in practice, permeates the literature of the civil wars.

Romans also participated in these relations. Caesar regularly employed as legates individuals in his army who had already established *hospitium* with the Gallic and German opponents. Hence, Marcus Mettius is sent to negotiate with his *hospes*, Ariovistus (1, 47). Cicero comments that his brother, Quintus, was the *hospes* of Divitiacus, a Gaul and druid (de div. 1, 41.90). Valerius Procillus was the son of an enfranchised Gaul and *familiaris et hospes* of Caesar (1, 53). Moreover, the Aedui are described as being in the *hospitium atque amicitia populi* Romani (1, 31).

In interstate relations, however, Caesar does not once employ words like *patronus* or *cliens* to describe the connection between Rome and any of her allies. The Aedui are said to enjoy *hospitium* and *amicitia* with Roman people (1, 31, 43) and may have felt insulted had they understood that Caesar referred to their state as a client of Rome. Indeed, the perception that this was the case led to the final revolt (discussed below). Hence, Caesar found it useful to perpetuate the myth of formal equality despite the fact that no one could really have been in doubt about the true nature of the relationship. John Rich has recently suggested another reason. Romans may have avoided such terms in interstate relations because they (the words) were appropriate only in a world where there could be a multiplicity of patron-states, that is, Roman patronage assumes choice. Where there is no choice, there can be no true patronal relationship. Because the Republic did not recognize the standing of any competing, independent states in respect to her own allies, the vocabulary of patronage could not be applied.[15]

In other respects, the relations between states tended to be defined by the relations between the representatives of each state. Cicero discusses the underlying theory in *de officiis* (2, 64).

> *Est enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, valde decorum patere domos hominum inlustrium hospitibus inlustribus idque etiam rei publicae est ornamento homines externos hoc liberalitatis genere in urbe nostra non egere. est autem etiam vehementer utile iis, qui honeste posse multum volunt, per hospites apud externos populos valere opibus et gratia.*

In 59, Ariovistus, at his own request and on Caesar's recommendation, had been named *rex atque amicus* by the Senate and the Roman people (1, 35,

[15] Rich, op. cit., 127. The status of Armenia during the Julio-Claudian period would in this scenario be clientelistic as Armenia clearly had two patron states, Parthia and Rome. It might be argued that choice existed even when one had an exclusive relationship; i.e., one was free to seek a new patron.

40, 43). Should Ariovistus respect the independence of the Aedui, he would retain the *perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam* of the Roman People and of Caesar himself (1, 35). This final statement is particularly important for two reasons. First, it sums up what is implicit in other places; namely that when *amicitia* is offered on behalf of the Roman state, the agent of the state also appears to share the benefits of the alliance in his own right. Second, it should be noted that Ariovistus, in Caesar's representation, saw through the apparent equality of *amicitia* with Rome: *Amicitia populi Romani* ought to be, he says, an *ornamentum* and a *praesidium*, and not a disadvantage (1, 44).

Gallic states and individual Romans also entered relations that might be described as "clientelistic". Caesar's relations with the Aedui constitute an instructive example. By his victories, Caesar was able to restore to the Aedui their traditional patronage of smaller *civitates* and *nationes*, clients they had "lost" to the Sequani and to Ariovistus. Moreover, Caesar had allowed them to extend their patronage to new communities. Their prestige then had been enhanced (6, 12). Now Caesar does not claim that, as a result of his benefactions, he became the patron of the Aedui, but to judge by his actions his Roman contemporaries may well have come to this conclusion. This hypothesis is attractive for several reasons. First, when the Aedui were thereafter divided about the annual magistracy, the *principes Aeduorum* came to him and asked that he intervene—exactly the kind of service patrons, like P. Sulla at Pompeii, traditionally performed.[16] Second, by performing similar services at Massilia, Caesar had become the formal patron (*BCiv* 1, 35), and, third, the *principes* of the Bellovaci claimed that the Aedui had been reduced to slavery, *in servitutem reductos* (2, 14), an exaggeration to be sure, but one which reflects the degree of perceived dependence and not inconsistent with the Gallic perception of clientele as akin to 'entire subordination'.[17] To perform such services, it was, of course, not essential to be the patron. In Caesar's case, he could have acted through his imperium, but he expressly says that he was moved to act by virtue of his *diligentia* and *auctoritas*.[18] Caesar may well have intended that his Roman reader should reach the obvious conclusion that he was *de facto* if not *de iure* the patron of the Aedui. Such perceptions must have infuriated those of his rivals and enemies who, like Ahenobarbus, felt they had a claim to this clientele.

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16 Cicero, *pro Sulla*, 61. Discussed below, 2.4.2.
17 Brunt, *Clientela*, 392.
18 7, 32. This is not the only case of intervention. Note, for example 5, 3, 25; 56.

This point raises the more general issue of how a community might enter the clientele of a Roman general like Caesar. In the Gallic Wars, two related forms would be particularly relevant, *deditio* and *applicatio*. The classic case of *deditio/applicatio* will be discussed at length below (Ch. 5, 1) in reference to Claudius Marcellus and the Syracusans. Here, too, in coming to terms, the Gauls, Caesar says, employed the language of patronage. Caesar, for example, says he received the Suessiones *in deditionem* (2, 13). After being defeated, the surviving Nervii *se ei* (Caesar) *dediderunt* and he promised that he would protect them, their borders and towns (2, 28). In accepting the *deditio*, Caesar repeatedly stresses his moral obligation to be clement and to protect what remained of the lives and property of those who surrendered. As Badian neatly puts it, "by accepting it (*deditio*), he (the general) morally binds himself not to make extreme use of it".[19] Hence, though Caesar does not call himself the *patronus* of even one Gallic community, his Roman contemporaries probably perceived him to be the patron of many Gallic *civitates* just as, for example, Fabius Sanga was considered to be the patron of the Allobrogi or Pompeius of many communities in Spain.[20] In sum, Gauls and Romans perceived those who made a formal *deditio* to have become the dependents of the Roman state and the clients of the conquering general.

What Badian calls "the most obscure form of clientship", namely *applicatio* may also be recognized. Caesar does not use the word (in any form) to describe how Gauls initiated relations with him. He does, however, describe cases in which *civitates* voluntarily (?) sent legates to him and asked to be admitted to his *fides ac potestas*. For example, the *maiores* of the Bellovaci beg that they might be admitted to his *fides ac potestas* and claim to have done nothing to harm Rome.[21] Caesar, at the request of Diviciacus, *sese eos in fidem recepturum et conservaturum dixit* (2, 15).

The most interesting case, and an excellent example of how alliance and subjugation were conflated, is that of the Ubii. When they first appear in Caesar's commentaries, they are described as the *vectigales* of the Suebi (4, 3). They sent *legati* to Caesar, established *amicitia*, gave hostages and, apparently, asked for aid against the Suebi (4, 19). In recollecting these events thereafter, Caesar claims that the Ubii had given hostages and had been in the state of *deditio*—so much for the meaning of *amicitia*. Once again, Gallic states appear to have something like an exclusive relationship

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[19] *Foreign Clientelae*, 6–7.
[20] Discussed at length by Badian, id., p. 264, and below.
[21] 2, 13; cf. Cic. *Q. fr.* 1, 1,27.

with one patron at any one time, but the relationship was not so exclusive that they could not seek out other protectors.

In sum, virtually every Gallic state at one time or another provided Caesar with hostages. Caesar and his Roman contemporaries appear to have understood the giving of hostages as *deditio*. Through *deditio* states were also perceived to have entered the clientele of the conqueror. Hence, Caesar's Roman audience was led to believe that those Gallic states that had given hostages had also entered Caesar's clientele *more maiorum*. Becoming a *patronus more maiorum*, that is through *deditio* and/or *applicatio*, did not necessarily secure the affection and respect of clients. Only time and mutual services could achieve for Caesar the status the Marcelli enjoyed in Sicily (Ch. 5, 1).

How Caesar set about to gain the firm support of the Gallic states is not recorded in detail, but his settlement of the two Spanish provinces suggests some strategies. He certainly used gifts and concessions to strengthen those communities and individuals whom he thought would at least maintain peace if not actively support his cause. Candidates for such positions of trust were to be found among the many hostages Caesar had with him. Taxation was not set at an extortionate rate. The more spirited young men were taken on as auxiliaries (or hostages). Some of the latter would have returned wealthy and at least somewhat Romanized, others even with citizenship, as the high number of Gallic Julii suggests.[22] Most important must have been his decision to guarantee the status and wealth of the Gallic nobility. Indeed, it must have happened frequently that the *principes* of the Gallic states came to Caesar and, in exchange for their cooperation, asked that for such assurances (*principes … ad Caesarem venerunt et de suis privatim rebus ab eo petere coeperunt*, *BGall* 5, 3). By securing the personal allegiance of the *principes*, he hoped to secure for himself the allegiance of the states they controlled. Though Caesar certainly initiated the process, it is clear that his adoptive son and heir made the Gallic communities and individual Gauls his special concern and completed the process.[23]

22 It is, of course, not easy to distinguish between the Julii, of Caesar and those of Augustus. Caesar's generosity with citizenship is well know and suggests that a good proportion received the franchise from him, Drinkwater, 19, 123, 192 f.

23 On the settlement of Gaul and the activities of Octavian, J.F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 B.C.–A.D. 260*, 19 ff. On Caeser's use of Gauls in Spain and elsewhere, BC 1, 39 and 51, on the settlement in Corduba and Tarraco, see below section 2.3. This account of Caesar's settlement may strike some readers as too positive; indeed some scholars, including W. Dahlheim, *Gewalt und Herrschaft*, Berlin & New York, 1977, 167–168 stress the devastation of Gaul, but that devastation could also have been specific to certain areas.

Caesar himself was aware of the fragility of his situation and was as anxious about the *magnae clientelae* of Pompeius in Spain as he was that the Pompeians would undermine his settlement in Gaul (*BCiv* 1, 29). Massilia and the Tarraconensis, both under Pompeian influence (see below), offered easy access to Caesar's province. To his Roman opponents, however, Caesar's Gallic resources must have appeared substantial and intimidating. The threat was real; indeed the Catilinarians had recently attempted to secure Gallic aid in subverting the Roman state. Though expectations about how *clientelae* might be employed frequently appear in hindsight to be unrealistic, they had, nonetheless, a distinct effect on political calculations of contemporaries.

In sum, because Caesar uses the Latin words of patronage to describe certain Gallic social practices, it follows that he believed there was sufficient similarity with Roman customs to merit the identification. Generally, Caesar chooses his words carefully. Where necessary, he qualifies and points to differences. In most cases, however, he uses the words in an unqualified way, suggesting a complete identification of institutions. Indeed, the similar social structures may explain in part how Gaul became integrated into the Roman Empire during the Augustan and Julio-Claudian periods.[24]

In no case here does Caesar ever claim that a community requested him to become its formal patron. This does not mean that such requests were not made and accepted, or that the Romans did not recognize that a clientele in fact existed. Indeed Cicero provides two relevant formulae. Caesar might be recognized as *patronus more maiorum* of those states he had conquered and spared (*de off.* 1, 35), or as *quasi patronus* (by ascription) of those states that had voluntarily entered relations with Rome through his mediation. That is, the Romans of the Late Republic recognized that a clientele might exist even when the "client" had never formally requested it. There was then still considerable flexibility in the formality with which the connection might be established.[25]

From the Gallic perspective, the attribution of clientele suggested *auctoritas* and *potentia*, that is military power, the ability to organize fighting units. The position of Caesar had then some important implications. First, Caesar had realized for himself the *principatus Galliae totius* envisioned by

[24] Brunt argues that Caesar is explaining the differences, *Clientela*, 392, but there must have been sufficient similarlity or he would not have used the Latin words. Also, Drinkwater, *Patronage*, 189–193, with bibliography.

[25] The manner by which the Claudii Marcelli became *patroni Siciliorum* is comparable, see Ch. 5.

the father of Vercingetorix. In Gallic terms, this meant that states and individuals were to be connected to him (Caesar) by patronal bonds. Second, though some states, like the Aedui may have found it difficult to accept their client status in respect to Rome and to Caesar, many, if not most of the others already had considerable experience in the role. Hence, when the leading states had been defeated, Caesar could bring all into his clientele by guaranteeing the status and wealth of the *principes*. In sum, the patronage of communities evolved around traditional perceptions, both Gallic and Roman, governing the relations between individuals and communities of superior and inferior status and in that sense helps to explain the success that Caesar had in maintaining order in Gaul even when absent for long periods of time, and in the long run also the transformation and Romanization of the region.

2.2. *Caesar, Pompeius and the Patronage of Massilia*

At the outbreak of the Civil War, a Massilian embassy of *nobiles adulescentes* happened to be at Rome. As Pompeius was a patron of the town, it was only natural for him to meet with these young men. He took the occasion to urge them not to let the memory of his earlier benefactions be overwhelmed by Caesar's more recent ones.[26] At the end of the meeting, Pompeius gave them his *mandata*; that he would do so suggests that he had specific expectations about how his earlier benefactions to the Massilians would or should affect the response of the Massilians to the crisis of the civil war. Having received the instructions, the Massilians returned home, made preparations to defend themselves, and closed their gates to Caesar.

After Caesar had gained control of Italy, he returned to the Gaul, summoned the Massilian governing board, 'The Fifteen', and asked that they not do anything that might provoke an armed conflict with his legions. They ought rather to follow the example of all of Italy. After further consultation among themselves, the Massilians responded that they understood that the Roman people were divided into two parties (*duas partes*), but that it was not within their judgment or power to decide which of the two had the

[26] ... *ne nova Caesaris officia veterum suorum beneficiorum in eos memoriam expellerent*, *BC* 1, 34. What was Caesar's source for this discussion? Was he simply giving what he thought would have been appropriate? The most recent discussion of the area and the evidence, literary and archaeological, is by A.L.F. Rivet, *Gallia Narbonensis: Southern Gaul in Roman Times*, London, 1988, 1, 3–5.

more just cause. Moreover, because both Pompeius and Caesar were their patrons (*patronos civitatis*) and because both had conferred equal benefactions (*paribus ... beneficiis*), it would be unseemly to help or to admit either side into their city. While these negotiations were in progress, Domitius Ahenobarbus, an ally of Pompeius, arrived at Massilia, was received into the town, and given control of the war effort, an act that was distinctly anti-Caesarian.

If the earlier preparations for defending their neutrality had given Caesar concern, they still did not constitute a *casus belli*. The Massilian decision to admit Domitius, one of Caesar's most energetic and active enemies, and to transfer the control of the war to him constituted a provocation that Caesar could not overlook. A conflict that might have been avoided became then the first test of the provincial strength of the two party leaders.

To judge by the outcome, the decision to resist Caesar was a serious mistake. Massilia was besieged and taken; its citizens lost lives and property, and the city its special status and privileges. Given the fact that Italian cities, even those like Auximum that had close connections to Pompeius (discussed below), had reached an understanding with Caesar, we may well ask why Massilia decided on open opposition? And what role did *patrocinium publicum* play in the events?

The official reason for not admitting Caesar was the inability (or unwillingness) to offend one of their patrons by appearing to evaluate as superior the cause or the benefactions of the other. The reception given Domitius Ahenobarbus and his recruits showed how specious the claim to neutrality was, and suggests that the *mandata* and benefactions of (or alternatively the expectations associated with) Pompeius, carried more weight with the Massilians than did those of his rival.

Before considering the patronal relations more closely, it is worthwhile to consider what other factors may have affected the Massilians. Perhaps Greenhalg is right that the Massilians were making a claim to an autonomy that some Romans, like Caesar, were not ready to recognize.[27] Moreover, though both Domitius and Caesar could claim authority, even legitimacy in Gaul, it was perfectly clear how delicate the latter's constitutional position was, and that thoughtful men might perceive the party of Pompeius to be not only the more honorable but also the more probable victor.[28] They had

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27 Greenhalg, *Republican Prince*, 173.

28 Caes. *BCiv*. 1, 6; Suet. *Jul*., 34; App. *BCiv*. 2, 32. Note too that Caesar had left his province and for that reason his legal status in the province may have been in doubt. On the Pompeian

seen the latter triumph in two areas of concern to them, in Spain and against the pirates. Did they hope that a strong show of support now would gain them additional privileges after the expected victory had been won? Had Pompeius at the time he gave his *mandata* made promises to that effect? Despite Pompeius' withdrawal from Italy, they may well have believed that help (the Pompeian legions in Spain or even the rumor that Pompeius was already marching through North Africa[29]) was not far away. The arrival of Ahenobarbus may well have reinforced this belief. Finally, and perhaps most important, Caesar may have tended to favor the Gauls over the Massilians in the competition for privileges; Pompeius, on the other hand, may have been remembered as someone with the "right" priorities.[30] The fact that Caesar claims no supporters in the town, as he does in Spain (section 2.3), suggests that the Massilian may have already been predisposed to support Pompeius.

In defense of the claim to neutrality,[31] the Massilians argued that, because both Pompeius and Caesar were their *patroni* and because they had received equal benefactions (*paribus beneficiis*) from both, they should show good will to both, help neither nor admit either into their city. The Massilians expected then that the appeal to higher values of *patrocinium publicum* would serve as the appropriate public justification for their actions.[32]

Several important points need to be made. First, though this is one of the very few unambiguous attestations in the literary evidence of the Republic of a client community with multiple patrons, the phenomenon must have been more common than is recorded in our sources.[33] Second, regarding the language, this is the first instance in Caesar's writings when the word *patronus* is associated with a Roman; that is, throughout his *Commentaries* on the Gallic Wars, Caesar had used the word only to refer to the relations

claim to being the more honorable cause, e.g., Cic. *ad fam.* 6, 2,14.2–3 and Vell. Pat. 2, 49.3: *vir antiquus et gravis Pompei partes laudaret magis … illa gloriosiora*).

29 On the former, App. *BCiv.* 2, 38; on the latter, Caes. *BCiv.*1, 39.

30 In the trial of Fonteius, the cities of Massilia and Narbo had supported the defense against the claims of the Gauls, Cic. *pro Font.* 14. On the divisions between the Gauls, on one side, and the Massilians and Italians on the other, Rivet, op. cit., 59.

31 The situation is comparable to that in Auximum, but the Auximates, despite their close ties to Pompeius and non-existent ones to Caesar, opened their doors to the latter. This incident in particular may have been in Caesar's mind when he says that the Massilians should follow the example of Italy, *BCiv.* 1, 13.

32 In a parallel case, Octavian was ready to exempt Bononia from the oath of allegiance demanded during the war ending at Actium on the grounds that Bononia was long in the clientele of the Antonii, Suet. *Aug.* 17.

33 Note that Cicero's claim to be sole patron of Capua (*pro Sest.* 9) indicates that communities normally had more than one (discussed below).

among Gauls and in all cases, the *patronus* is a Gallic nobleman. Furthermore, in arguing his case before the Massilians, Caesar does not specifically claim the rights of a patron or point to particular benefactions. There is then a definite tendency for Caesar not to employ the word directly in reference to himself or to other Romans.[34] This pattern is consistent with what can be demonstrated about Cicero (Ch. 5.1). Third, it was the Massilians (as Caesar represents them) who made a direct connection between the title, *patronus civitatis*, and the benefactions conferred. Hence, Caesar may be writing in a deliberately tendentious manner, designed to portray the Massilians in a negative light by showing that while he represented the highest ideals of the Roman patronal tradition, the Massilians acted contrary to that tradition by openly siding with Pompeius and Ahenobarbus,

Three issues need to be addressed here: What were the benefactions of each? Were there other patrons of Massilia whom Caesar does not mention? How were political decisions affected by the fact of *patrocinium publicum*?

The Massilians argued that of the two *principes*, one (*alter*) had officially granted to them the lands of the Volcae Arecomici and of the Helvii; the other (*alter*), having conquered the Sallyes, placed the latter under their control and increased their revenue.[35] These need not be the only benefactions. Pompeius spent almost seven years in the area. He faced heavy fighting in Gaul in 77 and could later state that he had "recaptured Gaul" (Sall. *Hist.*, 2, 98M). Altogether he claimed to have taken 876 towns between the borders of Hispania Ulterior and the Alps, many of these must have been in Gaul.[36] Just as later in Bithynia, he may well have been responsible for the *lex de provincia* of the Narbonensis. If so, he may have codified and perhaps expanded the various rights and privileges enjoyed by the Massilians. Moreover, and to judge by the substantial number of Pompeii in the province, he must have been generous in the award of citizenship to the leading men in the province, among them, Massilians.[37] There were then ample opportuni-

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[34] Brunt notes. 392, that the Caesarian *corpus* 'never expressly mentions Italian clients'.

[35] There has been much dispute about whether the *alter* ... *alter* ... should be understood as "Pompeius ... Caesar ...", or as "Caesar ... Pompeius ..." Here it matters not what the specific benefactions were so much as that both, in their official capacities, had conferred similar benefactions and both had become the formal patrons of the state. On the issue, see Ch. Ebel, "Pompey's Organization of Transalpina", *Phoenix* 29 (1975), 369–370, and Rivet, 65–66.

[36] Pliny, *NH* 3, 18; Ebel, 367; E. Badian, "Notes on Provincia Gallia in the Late Republic", *Mélanges Piganiol*, Paris, 1966, 901–918.

[37] Badian notes, *Foreign Clientelae*, p. 309, 223 plus 2 *incerti*; the next highest figure, excluding imperial *nomen* and the Valerii, and Cornelii, is the Aemilii, 107 + 6; the Licinii, 102 + 1; and the Domitii, 80 + 1.

ties for the exchange of *beneficia* and *officia*. That relations continued to be friendly is confirmed by the fact that the Massilian legation visited Pompeius on the eve of the civil war and received his *mandata*.

Caesar, too, spent many years in the area and, though the Narbonensis does not appear prominently in his *Commentaries*, his victories in Gaul did as much as Pompeius to bring peace and security to the area. In patronal relations duration and propinquity bring advantages.[38] His campaigns into the northern parts of Gaul required a secure base; hence, he may well have been willing to make concessions to the Massilians to secure their active cooperation. Cicero, for example, notes that without the help of Massilia, Rome would never have triumphed over the transalpine Gauls (*de off.* 2, 28). Though this statement surely refers to the many Roman campaigns in the area, it clearly does not exclude those of Caesar. Nonetheless, as Massilia is not mentioned in any respect in the Gallic Wars, it may be that Caesar put the words into the mouths of the Massilian envoys in order to exaggerate his claim to the equality of benefaction with Pompeius.[39] In support of this proposition, it is noteworthy that Caesar nowhere claims that there were any of his adherents in the city, something he regularly claims during the campaigns in Spain.[40]

As we have seen above in Section 2.1 of this chapter, there are two models for the patronage of the governor-general over a client community. In the first instance, and the patronage of Claudius Marcellus over Syracuse is the classic example (discussed also in Ch. 5.1), there is the form of *patrocinium* acquired by the victor over a defeated state (*deditio, in fidem, applicatio* are the key expressions). This clientele might be formally defined or be ascribed *more maiorum*. In the second category and surely the most common, we have patrons who, having augmented the territory and revenues of faithful allies, may have also been formally proclaimed patron (the actual order of events may not have been as important as the understanding about mutual services). This division raises the question of whether Massilia had other patrons besides Caesar and Pompeius?

The Romans had been continuously active in southern Gaul since the second Punic War and consistently in alliance with Massilia; it is to this period that we have the earliest indication of a patronal relationship between the

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38 Syme, *Roman Revolution*, 74.

39 In both cases, it would be most interesting to know whether the title *patronus* was extended before or after the benefactions mentioned. Unfortunately, Caesar provides no indication of the sequence of events.

40 Discussed below in section 2.3 on Spain.

city and a Roman aristocrat: Cicero, thinking perhaps of the activities of the Scipiones during the 2nd Punic War, allows Scipio Aemilianus to claim the Massilians as *nostri clientes*.[41] It was, however, not until the last quarter of the second century, when Narbo was founded, that their governing of the area began to take any permanent form. When exactly Transalpina was organized as a formal province is not clear, certainly though this process, culminating in a *lex de provincia*, had been completed at the latest by Pompeius and during the war against Sertorius.

During this fifty-year period, a number of Romans had been active in Gaul. In 122, L. Sextius Calvinus (cos. 124) had given the Massilians a strip of territory along the coast from the border of "Italy" to the Rhone (Strabo 4, 180). Fabius Maximus (cos. 121) had fought the Gauls and won the cognomen, Allobrogicus. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 122) had won several engagements and, though he had not been able to pacify the area, had nonetheless built the *via Domitia*. Marius won decisive victories that protected not only Italy but also Massilia. He also assigned to the Massilians a canal he had built at the mouth of the Rhone, a valuable benefaction as it turned out (Strabo 4, 183). Other consuls had fought there between 100 and 77.[42] Even Fonteius, who had effectively administered the area during the Sertorian War, had received the highest honors, probably including *patrocinium publicum*, in Massilia.[43] Any one, or even all of these men or their descendants, might also have become formally or to have been reckoned among the patrons of Massilia.[44] Though the exact nature of these ties may not always be prominent in the sources, they nonetheless persisted and often emerge as vital as ever in startling ways. Appian relates, for example, that the Allobrogi brought decisive information about the plans of Catiline

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41 *de re publ.* 1, 43. Rich has questioned whether *nostri* refers to the Romans or to the Cornelii, op. cit., 125. By his own admission, the claim is unique in Latin literature. Gelzer, *Nobility*, at note 228, and Harris identify *nostri* with Cornelii, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C.*, Oxford, 1979, 135, n. 2. This family was to be found among the enemies of Caesar, perhaps because it (the family) felt their traditional *clientelae* in the area to be threatened by Caesar's benefactions. Note the actions of the Domitius, described below.

42 Ebel, 382 ff., and Rivet, 1, 3–4.

43 *Pro Font.* 14: *Hunc praesentem eis adfecit honoribus quos habuit amplissimos*. The expression is vague, but must refer to the highest honors Massilia could bestow on a non citizen. Cicero's usage is quite clear that only honors like that of the consulate are meant, e.g., *pro Milo* 42, *pro Sulla*, 49. Inscriptions of the Principate expressly refer to patronage is the highest honor they could confer, *ILS* 6110 cited in Representative Texts, F.2 and I.1, 2, and 3.

44 Q. Fabius Maximus, *RE* 6, 1791, No. 108 and one of Caesar's legates during the civil war and consul in 45, may also have been one.

to their patron/*prostates*, the otherwise unknown and unimportant senator, Fabius Sanga. Critical here is that Sallust and Appian emphasize the continuing *officia* of the Fabii toward the Allobrogi despite the fact that the family was hardly prominent in the politics of the 60's.[45] Family members, regardless of Sanga's true identity, must be reckoned as patrons *more maiorum* of the defeated Allobrogi.[46]

The interest of the Domitii in the area is well established. Cn. Domitius (cos. 96) tried to avenge an insult to his Gallic *hospes*, Aegritomarus (Cic. *Verr.* 2, 1, 118). Badian notes the frequency of the *nomen* Domitius in the epigraphical record of the province, which might be understood as an indication of the family's continuing benefactions. After reviewing the evidence, Syme suggests the hostility of Domitius to Caesar may well have been due to the conviction of the former that the latter had "robbed him of a province to which he asserted a hereditary claim."[47] Unfortunately, we know of no specific benefactions that might have connected any members of the family to Massilia, but hereditary ties to the city and to individuals may have eased Domitius' entry into the town.

Massilia occupied a special place in Roman foreign policy in the Western Mediterranean. In this capacity, she had had extensive and profitable dealings with numerous Roman governors. We know that Pompeius and Caesar had become the formal patrons of the community. The Scipios also reckoned the people of Massilia in their *clientela*. Probably Fonteius, the Domitii and the Fabii could make the same claim. During the Civil War, members of most of these families served with Pompeius in part because they may have perceived Caesar to threaten their traditional *clientelae* in this area. That Massilia had acquired a number of Roman patrons over many generations

45 Sall. *Cat.* 41; App. *BCiv.* 2,4. Badian suggests that he was probably the senior Fabius alive (*paterfamilias*??) at the time, *Foreign Clientelae*, 264. Eilers, 56 ff., argues that this Sanga was not at all connected with the Roman Fabians, was not even a senator, but probably a native Gaul who had achieved some status as an equestrian. It is not particularly important for the argument here as to the exact identity of this Sanga, but rather that the Allobrogi and the Massilians had a variety of patrons. Eilers argument is well made, but some doubt remains: it would in this age be a very unusual honor for a non Italian to be the patron of a Roman ally. Cornelius Balbus, discussed below was a native of Cades and enjoyed *hospitium publicum* with his *patria*.

46 There is no evidence that this Fabius had been formally coopted, he was prabably *patronus more maiorum*.

47 Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 264 ff. and 313, and Syme, *Roman Revolution*, 44. The latter insinuates that Domitius claimed an exclusive patronage of the province. More precisely, he may have resented the fact that the local elite increasingly looked to Caesar for support.

suggests that she and other important Roman allies in the West, like Gades, had multiple rather than exclusive relations with Roman noble families.

In sum, this episode has a number of aspects that need to be stressed. First, in the voice of the Massilians, Caesar expressly mentions the fact of *patrocinium publicum* and states that benefactions, though undefined, had been conferred. This claim is most unusual in that the sources demonstrate some reluctance to list such specifics; indeed Caesar may want to show that the Massilians were demonstrating a lack of tact to mention them at all. Second, unlike other communities that had strong ties to Pompeius, Massilia, when confronted by Caesar's army, refused to open its gates. Other clients of Pompeius were more accommodating.[48] Third, unlike other cities during this crisis, we learn nothing about a Caesarian faction in Massilia or even of *prudentes* who might seek some form of accommodation.

The decision of the Massilians to deny Caesar entry into their city and to proclaim openly their allegiance to Pompeius (and the Optimate faction) was probably based on a number of considerations. What is important here is not that *patrocinium publicum* was a significant factor in the decision of the Massilians (it probably was not), but that it could be used to justify (or could serve as a public justification for) actions of political significance. Moreover, civil war at Rome could and did make life extremely difficult for client communities in that they had to negotiate, as the case of Massilia illustrates, between two competing patrons. Finally, the manifest desire of an important Roman ally to secure the formal patronage of their most important Roman governors is understandable in terms of specific and significant benefactions granted to the client. Here, indeed, there is no ambiguity in the actions of the Massilians: They expected their patrons to show them preference.

2.3. *The Spanish* Clientelae *of Pompeius and Caesar*

During the century and a half of Roman rule, many senators acquired *clientelae* in various communities of the two Iberian provinces. In the discussions above, three forms of Roman patronage were discussed, that of the conquering general over the defeated community, that of the benevolent governor to privileged allies and states, and a de facto patronage when the leading men of a community became clients of a leading Roman. All three of these

[48] The one exception being Mytilene, which persisted in its support after Phasalus.

forms are found in Spain and all three played important roles in the conflicts of the period. As in Gaul, the leaders of local factions tended to call on patrons, both personal and communal, to resolve their internal problems; so, too, did the patrons have expectations about how their clients would respond in a crisis. It is, however, especially in the Iberian provinces that we see how the continuing competition at the imperial level, both in the courts and on the battlefields, intensified and aggravated the struggles at the local and regional.

2.3.1. *The Clientele of Pompeius*

> *Animadvertis, Cn. Pompeium nec nominis sui, nec rerum gestarum gloria, neque etiam regum ac nationum clientelis, quas ostendere crebro solebat, esse tutum ...* (Dolabella to Cicero in May, 48, ad fam. 9, 9.2)

The most famous, enduring and feared of all the *clientelae* of the late republic, and the one most regularly cited by modern scholars as characteristic of late Republican politics, is the Spanish clientele of Pompeius. A first step in the establishment of this clientele was taken by Pompeius Strabo, the father of Magnus, when he gave citizenship to the Spanish cavalrymen in the *turma Salluitana*, a unit which had fought with him during the Social War of the 80's. By the end of the Sertorian War of the 70's, Pompeius himself had been able to attach many others to his cause especially in Citerior. During the late 50's he had the opportunity to build on this base in his capacity as governor (albeit *in absentia*) of the two provinces. During the late 40's, his son of the same name was able to raise an army that gave Caesar his greatest challenge at Munda. In the 30's, Sex. Pompeius, the other son of Magnus, found there a refuge and a secure base for operations against the 2nd Triumvirate.[49]

There is a negative side to this clientele. Magnus was never able to use it effectively and his elder son derived his support not in Citerior, where one would expect it, but in Ulterior. Moreover, the support that he did enjoy may be ascribed as much to failures of Caesar's legates as to the durability

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[49] For the *turma*, *ILS* 8888 and N. Criniti, *L'Epigrafe di Ausculum de Gn. Pompeio Strabone*, Milano, 1977. On the gains made by Pompeius during the Sertorian War, Caes. *BCiv*. 1, 29 and 61. On the sons of Pompeius, Dio 43, 30; 45, 10. 1–2; Appian, *BCiv*. 2, 87 and 103; 4, 83, 350; 5, 134, 556. On the clientele of Pompeius, Gelzer, *Nobilität*, 76; Syme, *Roman Revolution*, 75; Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 278 ff. Seager, *Pompeius*, 17–21; 59–60; 130. On Sex. Pompeius, E. Gabba, "Aspetti delle lotta di Sesto Pompeo in Spagna" in *Legio VII, Gemina*, Leon 1970, 133–155 = *Esercito e società nella tarda repubblica Romana*, Firenze, 1973, 473–520, especially, 505. This subject has been discussed more fully by M.S. Nicols, *Appearance and Reality: A Study of the Clientele of Pompey the Great*, Diss. Berkeley, 1993.

of the Pompeian connections. Two issues require closer examination: First, the nature of the Pompeian clientele must be defined and its "failures" explained and, second, the construction of the Caesarian clientele should be examined more closely. It will be argued here (as elsewhere) that: first, the clientele of the Pompeians was one of individuals, individuals who were the leading politicians in their communities. These individuals were not, however, without enemies in their communities. Second, the ideology of patronage consistently led Pompeius, his legates and allies to over-estimate the ability and willingness of his clients to risk their lives and property on his (or any other patron's) behalf. The proper understanding of the role of patronage in the history of this period requires a careful distinction be made between clients as communities and clients as leading individuals within those communities. The miscalculations by both ancients and moderns are usually based on a conflation of the two. Third, miscalculations among the ancients were also based on the ideology, more accurately on wishful thinking, that clients were not only to be protected, but could also be expected to render support when summoned.[50]

Caesar provides the key information about the Pompeian clientele at the outbreak of the Civil War. On three occasions, he states that Pompeius' strength, *magnae clientelae*, was especially to be found in Citerior. These *clientelae* are not defined in specific terms, but the use of the plural is suggestive that both communities and individuals were meant. That 'communities' were included is confirmed by Caesar's statement, ascribed to the legates of Pompeius at Ilerda, that in Celtiberia, the north-central part of the Meseta, roughly equal to the later *conventus* of Clunia, the Pompeians would find *civitates* who would support them with large re-enforcements of cavalry and *auxilia* and would, thereby, allow them to extend the war.[51]

The implications could hardly be clearer: Caesar feared that the *magnae clientelae*, cities and individuals, could be translated into military assets. What is implicit in so many other places in the ancient sources is here stated unambiguously. Indeed, and to generalize from this example, all of Caesar's campaigning through Picenum and Spain appears to be designed to deny to Pompeius the opportunity to convert his clients into a military force that could threaten his own [Caesar's] power base.

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[50] Brunt, *Clientela*, 435 ff., notes that "allusions to the enlistments of clients in the armies are extremely rare".

[51] ... *magnas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat*, *BCiv*. 2,18; also, 1, 29 and 61; on the *civitates*, *BCiv*. 1, 61.

The sources of these *clientelae* are known or may be deduced. In terms of individuals, the descendants of the above mentioned and enfranchised members of the *turma Salluitana* may constitute one group. More important, numerically were the individuals on whom Pompeius had conferred Roman citizenship at the end of the Sertorian War. To judge by the epigraphically attested Pompeii in Spain, Pompeius used this device freely to enhance his personal clientele there. Thanks to a reference in Cicero's *pro Balbo*, we even know the name of the enabling law, the *lex Gellia Cornelia*, which confirmed these benefactions. These clients were considered sufficiently dangerous that, when the quaestor Piso, a personal enemy of Pompeius, was murdered in Spain and by one of the latter's clients, many believed it had been done to please the patron.[52]

For this discussion, the *civitates* are more important. Caesar, as noted above, explains that the legates of Pompeius, Afranius and Petreius, thought that they would find the *civitates* of Celtiberia ready to provide the resources they needed to continue the war. Pompeius, they thought, had, at the end of the Sertorian war, made a lasting impression in that area. Those who had supported Sertorius had been conquered, and they would respond because they feared Pompeius' name. Those who had remained in friendship had been rewarded with great benefactions and for that reason would support the Pompeian cause. We have some idea how many states were in the former category. When returning from Spain, Pompeius had erected a trophy in the Pyrenees on which he claimed to have captured 876 towns between the Alps and the border of Citerior (with Ulterior?). Most of these must have been in Citerior rather than in Gaul.[53] Hence, Pompeius was perceived to be the patron of a mixed group of client-states, some of them, like the clients of Caesar in Gaul, were, as a consequence of *deditio* or alliance, clients *more maiorum*. For the others it is not clear that benefactions led to the formalization of the relationship though this, given the repeated references to *clientelae*, would appear likely in at least some cases. During the late 50's, when Pompeius was at the height of his power and reputation and

52 Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 313 and S. Dyson, "The Distribution of Roman Names in the Iberian Peninsula", *AncSoc* 11–12 (1980–1981), 257–299. This problem is discussed below in another context. On the *lex Gellia Cornelia*, *pro Balbo* 19, 32 ff. 38, 51. On Piso, Ascon. p. 92 (*in toga cand.* 83) *Piso autem … in Hispaniam missus a senatu per honorem legationis ut avus suus ablegaretur. Ibi quidem dum iniurias provincialibus facit, occisus erat, ut quidam credebant, a Cn. Pompeii clientibus Pompeio non invito*.

53 Sall. *Hist.*, 3,89; Strabo 3, 4.1, 7, 9; 4, 1.3; Plin *NH* 3,18. On this issue, Ebel, *Transalpine Gaul*, 367. As with Caesar in Gaul, there may be some tendency to conflate *deditio* and *amicitia*, discussed above.

governing Spain in absentia, many embassies must have been sent to Rome, and to secure his favor. These embassies may well have brought with them honorary decrees that were designed to win his goodwill and surely served also to enhance the perception that he had acquired an extensive clientele in Spain.[54] Note that it was at this time that Pompeius was co-opted patron at Ausculum. Shortly thereafter, he may have received the embassy from Massilia discussed above and below. The successful management of clients, communities and their leading citizens, the reception and display of the *tabulae patronatus* [discussed below in Ch. 6.2] in his atrium all contributed significantly to his reputation.

Given the advantages, why did Pompeius and his legates fail to mobilize a military force to oppose Caesar? That the former had failed to make good use of his resources in Spain is obvious and was recognized by Appian (*BCiv*. 2, 87 and 103). Certainly a great deal of the blame may be assigned to the inertia of Afranius and Petreius. The Pompeians had an army, but not one with recent fighting experience. Caesar may also be thinking of the recruitment of native forces serving under their own commanders on the model of the *turma Salluitana* or of the Illurgavonenses (discussed below) or, alternatively, of the resources needed to secure the loyalty of the legions serving under Pompeius' auspices. But, whatever the strategy, Caesar was constantly able to frustrate it by moving more rapidly than expected.[55] Moreover, Pompeius' strength in Spain was also undermined by the questionable loyalty of his legates. Varro, for example, the governor of Ulterior, had his doubts about Pompeius and contemplated joining Caesar. When, however, the latter appeared to be in distress, he resolved to remain true to Pompeius. Caught in his own miscalculation, he eventually capitulated to the Dictator. Outmaneuvered at Ilerda, Afranius and his son were also ready to come to terms with Caesar without a battle. Of Pompeius' legates, only Petreius remained loyal to the bitter end.[56]

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[54] This phenomenon is discussed at length in Ch. 5.1 and 6.2.

[55] On their competence and considerable experience, Syme, *Roman Revolution*, 396. The strategy of the Pompeians is very similar to that employed by Sertorius against Pompeius: Hold a strong position on the coast, exhaust the enemy and then slip away to the interior where one had access to reserves. The superiority of Caesar's generalship to that of Pompeius in the same landscape is instructive.

[56] Varro was *diffidens Pompeianis rebus*, Caes. *BCiv*. 2,17. Caesar must have got this self-serving claim from Varro himself. On the Afranii, *BCiv*. 1, 74–75. In respect to such men, Syme notes that Pompeius did not have a good reputation for loyalty to his followers, as is reported about Labienus, 123–124.

But these considerations are only part of the explanation.

As a result of his early campaigns and triumphs, of his victories over the pirates and subsequent march through the eastern Mediterranean, Pompeius had acquired, or sought to project, a reputation as a military genius of the same order as Alexander. At least some of the residents of Spain, both citizen and peregrine, knew better than most how shallow that reputation was. During the 70's, Appian notes that Sertorius had repeatedly out-maneuvered, embarrassed and actually defeated Pompeius. Note especially the latter's failures at Lauron and Sucro.[57]

After the assassination of Sertorius and the dissolution of his army, Pompeius settled Spain in a way that produced two distinct groups, at least in Celtiberia. States loyal to Rome had benefited through his generosity; those that had supported Sertorius were given cause to fear him (*BCiv*. 1, 61). Caesar notes that at least some Spanish *principes* were present in the Pompeian army at Ilerda under duress, as hostages. Unfortunately, he does not indicate whether these individuals were representatives of those states who had cause to fear Pompeius, or those who had lost to the clients of Pompeius in local political struggles. Significantly, they [the *principes*] had *noti et hospites* in Caesar's camp (1, 74). There were then individuals among the nominally Pompeian communities who could look to Caesar as a potential patron, as someone who might maintain, extend or re-establish their fortunes. Traces of this anti Pompeian resentment may also be found among the *civitates* of Citerior. Caesar's legate, C. Fabius, and later Caesar himself, had some success securing first their neutrality and then gaining their active support (*BCiv*. 1, 40, 48, 52) and did so even at a time when the outcome of the campaign was still uncertain. Moreover, when news of the fall of Massilia reached Spain, a number of important states including Tarraco and Osca made their peace with Caesar and promised to support him. The most interesting case in point is that of the Illurgavonenses. When an auxiliary cohort from this *civitas* serving with the Pompeians learned that their state had transferred its allegiance to Caesar, it too followed (1, 60)—an interesting example of the indifference of individuals to the claims of either Caesar or Pompeius and, at the same time, an indicator of the power of the communal statements on important political issues. The decisions of states could have a definitive effect on the actions of their citizens, and on the military equation. Significant, too, is the fact that during the twenty-five years following

57 *BCiv*. 1, 109–110; Plut. *Pomp*., 18.3; *Sert*. 18.3. On Pompeius generalship and failures against Sertorius, Greenhalgh, *Roman Alexander*, 43 ff.

the Sertorian war, Pompeius had failed to reconcile his former enemies in the area and to convert the *patrocinium more maiorum* he had acquired over the *deditii* into a more substantial relationship based on mutual trust and *officia* (admittedly, this did not prevent Romans from believing that he had been successful in doing so!). The clientele remained more potential than actual, more fictional than real. Moreover, the agents of Pompeius in place were not noted for their political acumen and apparently failed to make use of coercive power to organize the resources. Indeed, it is possible that Afranius' actions during his five years as Pompeius' legate may not have done much to maintain, much less to develop good will. Q. Cassius Longinus undermined Caesar's settlement of Ulterior in much the same way (discussed below). In sum, the expectations associated with the *clientelae magnae* of Pompeius could not be realized because of the incompetence of the patron's agents and/or because the communities or their elites were frequently divided. Indeed, factional politics at the local level (as will be argued below) may have been more significant to the actions of individuals than loyalty to Pompeius.[58] Caesar, of course, faced the same problem in Gaul. There must have been elements in each community that he could not reconcile, who would readily take up the cause of the Pompeians if for no other reason than to win back their independence. It was critical then for Caesar to control access to Gaul and to deny the discontented a leader.

That the Spanish clientele of Pompeius was not as reliable as Pompeius and his allies wished to believe also finds support in the epigraphical evidence. Dyson's survey, more detailed than that of Badian, concludes "In general, in an area where Pompey was known for the quantity of his clients, the harvest of Pompeii is surprisingly small."[59] These calculations can be misleading in that the *nomen* chosen by the new citizen could reflect the name of only one patron. Even so, the plurality of sponsors probably served to weaken the sense of obligation to any one man. Hence, it may be that several Romans shared the credit for the benefaction of citizenship and that the influence of Pompeius thereby diluted. Note, in this respect, that Cornelius Balbus did not take the *nomen* Pompeius.

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[58] It cannot be claimed that the words *mittunt legatos seseque imperata facturos pollicentur* demonstrate that Caesar now became the formal patron of these states, but, if he valued these moves as much as he claimed, then we may well believe that some kind of 'special relationship' was indeed initiated.

[59] Article cited in full above at footnote 52, this reference is to p. 289. Though more cases are now known, the distribution is not significantly different.

The most critical aspect of Pompeius' failure to mobilize his clients, both in Italy and in Spain, was his own inability to summon his clients personally to face a rival army. Both of his sons would demonstrate on different occasions that the personal appearance of a Pompeius could produce an army in Spain (see below). Pompeius himself might boast of his many clients but their support in the military sense, increasingly the only one that mattered, remained potential. His legates did indeed begin with a considerable army, some elements of which included individuals and/or contingents from client communities, but without Pompeius' personal presence, they were hard put to keep the *clientelae* in line in face of a determined attack by Caesar. It is in this respect significant that the clients, states and individuals, were less responsive to the Caesarians when it was believed that Pompeius was marching through Africa and would soon arrive. When, however, these reports appeared to be no more than rumors, many went over to Caesar (1, 60).[60] In sum, the fact that Pompeius was not physically present in Spain allowed his clients considerable flexibility in the interpretation of their responsibilities, and allowed their local enemies the opportunity to develop connections with a powerful rival. Even so, Pompeian officers continued to have expectations, indeed unreasonable ones, about how these clients might be mobilized.

Caesar knew he was at a disadvantage in Spain and for a variety of reasons. He may also have assumed that the Pompeian military strength beyond the existing legions was more potential than actual. After the collapse of the Pompeian defense in Italy, his actions indicate that he well understood that swift and decisive military action before the arrival of Pompeius himself might yet prevent the organization of the Pompeian clientele, citizen and native, into a significant military force.

2.3.2. *The Clientele of Caesar*

The Caesarian *corpus* indicates that Caesar had good relations with both individuals and communities in Spain. The author of the *Bellum Hispaniensis* allows Caesar to claim in a speech given at Hispalis (c. 42) that all through his career, he, Caesar, had had a special relationship to Ulterior and had

[60] On Pompeian strategy in this respect, Greenhalgh, *Pompey: Republican Prince*, 175. Regarding contact between Pompeius and his clients, embassies might serve to reduce the effect of distance, note the case of the Massilians, but it is unlikely that all the clients would have been in regular contact with him.

conferred liberally on individuals and collectives whatever benefactions he could: Taxes had been rescinded, embassies introduced into the Senate, public and private interests had been defended in the courts, and other *commoda* had been bestowed through his intercession.[61] The most intriguing phrase in this statement of *officia* is the ablative absolute that occurs half way through this recitation, *patrocinio suscepto*, "after he had accepted the patronage". As the phrase occurs as part of a recitation of benefactions in chronological order, the force of the construction must be temporal. Hence, some time after his governorship he became patron. The questions are in what capacity and of whom? As the language of the author of the *BHisp* is notoriously difficult, we should not press any interpretation too far, but there are three possibilities: Caesar was patron of the province of Ulterior, of several communities and/or individuals (local elites) in the province or was simply *patronus causae*.

The first alternative is unlikely, the sources nowhere indicate that there was universal support for Caesar in Ulterior or that such a title, *patronus provinciae*, was formally conferred. Indeed, such an important fact would surely have been mentioned at some point in the sources.[62] The use of the plural, *multis legationibus in senatum inductis* and *publicis privatisque causis ... defendisse* seems to suggest that Caesar was the patron (or at least the *necessarius*) of at least several / many communities and that he had helped his clients, individuals and communities, on numerous (?) occasions in their dealings with the Senate and in the courts. This interpretation is supported by the report that Varro imposed burdens on those communities thought to be friendly to Caesar.[63] *Amicitia*, which Caesar acknowledges in the *BCiv.*, is not, however, the same as the *patrocinium* alleged by the author of the *BHisp*. Moreover, there may be some exaggeration in the latter's words. The introduction of embassies and the support in court might really refer to two phases of one event: the embassies came to lay a charge

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[61] It is not possible to date these benefactions exactly. I assume that the relationship began with his governorship (as proconsul) in 61. Hence, his activities on their behalf, introducing embassies and defending them in court, would date to the period between his return to Rome in 60 and his departure for Gaul. The *commoda* might have been bestowed at any time through the 50's. Note that these activities generated at Rome the impression of clientele, cf. Ch. 5.

[62] Note that the patronage that Cato minor acquired over the Cypriots at this time is mentioned in several sources, e.g., Cic. *ad fam.*, 15, 4.15; *de fin.* 4, 56, but that does not mean that he was the patron of the province.

[63] *Quas Caesari esse amicas civitates*, Caes. *BCiv*, 2,18. That is, some or many were not.

against someone before the Senate and subsequently Caesar was asked to participate in the prosecution on behalf of many public and private interests. In support of this interpretation are two points: First, the two years between his governorship and departure for Gaul do not leave much time for many cases involving the "*Ulteriores*" to be tried, and second, the same words might be used to describe many of Cicero's actions on behalf of the Sicilians.[64] Whichever interpretation is preferred, that Caesar was *patronus civitatis* or *patronus causae* of many towns and individuals, there can be no doubt that he enjoyed good relations (perhaps even formal *patrocinium*) with at least some communities and with some individuals in Ulterior.[65]

One other group of *clientes* may be identified. He had, as praetor, governed Ulterior and won a sufficient number of victories to qualify for a triumph. The Romans might have counted the defeated *nationes et populi* in his clientele *more maiorum*.

In sum, Caesar's name may not have been quite as obscure as he allows the Pompeian commanders to claim, but he still had no significant clientele to mobilize in Citerior.[66] In Ulterior, his support was more visible but probably of the same order as that of other members of the Roman nobility who had governed the province. In a military sense, it was significant only in so far as the Pompeians found it necessary to leave Varro there with two legions (Caes. *BCiv.* 1, 38). It is manifest, however, that no city identified itself as a client community of Caesar and expressed itself ready to act on his behalf. Moreover, Caesar, unlike Pompeius, never issued an appeal for help from his clients, though he could be critical of those who did not come forward.[67]

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64 Discussed in Ch. 5; no such trials involving Caesar and the provincials of Ulterior are known.

65 Among the individuals, Cornelius Balbus. As will be shown below, there were also Caesarians in many towns of Ulterior. I do not know what to make of Dio's statement that Caesar's governorship of Ulterior was thought to be hard and cruel, 37, 52–53; cf. App. *BCiv.* 2, 2.8, where Caesar is accused of neglecting business and the administration of justice. Reality may be that he helped some and offended others.

66 The people of Citerior were surely well informed about what had been happening in Gaul; note that Spanish *principes* had *noti et hospites* in Caesar's army, 1, 74.

67 This can be seen in the differential treatment accorded Deiotarus and Pharnaces. The former first claimed to have aided Pompeius because of obligations conferred, but then admitted that he had been compelled by the Pompeiun army as he was now by the Caesarian (*BAlex* 68–70). Pharnaces tried to win Caesar's favor claiming he had not provided resources for Pompeius, though had been obliged to do so. On this issue, see the discussion in M.S. Nicols, *Appearances and Reality*, 183 ff.

2.3.3. *Caesar's First Settlement of Spain*

Once the Pompeian forces in Citerior had been reduced,[68] Caesar proceeded to the Further Province. An edict was sent to all *civitates* of Ulterior summoning the magistrates and leading men to a meeting at Corduba. His policy in respect to both individuals and communities was much more conciliatory than had been practiced by the Pompeians. He cancelled the financial claims Varro had imposed on citizens and returned the property of those who had lost it for speaking (on behalf of Caesar?) too freely. He was also generous to certain communities on behalf of the state (out of public funds?) and others on his own behalf (out of his own pocket?).[69] The others he filled with hope (of benefactions in the future?).

Caesar's strategy in respect to communities is of considerable interest for this study despite the fact that he is not known to have become the formal patron of any community. Major advantages were gained by some states. From Dio, we know of one such benefaction: Gades received Roman citizenship that was later confirmed at Rome (41, 21). In doing so, he may have become a founding patron of the now Roman community (below, 2.4.2). Most interesting of all, and in contrast to the decisions of Pompeius at the end of the Sertorian War, no states (Caesar claims) were punished and no one given cause to fear him. From Corduba, Caesar proceeded to Tarraco where embassies from almost all communities in Citerior met him. Once again, he conferred honors on certain *civitates*, both in name of state and in his own name. Again, no state or individual, even if a client of Pompeius, is known to have been punished.

Note also that Caesar actively cultivated individuals who were able to keep a town under control (2, 21: *quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere*). Caesar's policy, and it was hardly original to him, was to control an area by controlling certain towns and to control those towns by gaining the allegiance of certain individuals. Access to Caesar and the perception of his dominance were the sources of power for the local elites; their [the

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[68] For the details of the campaign, T. Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire*, Oxford, 1923, 3, 51 ff.

[69] These benefactions should not be construed to mean that communities had been Caesar's formal clients. The benefactions may have been given to secure their goodwill. The manuscripts are not consistent at this critical point, some read *tributis quibusdam populis privatisque praemiis*, others read *tributis quibusdam publicis privatisque praemiis*. Given that Caesar's language is vague on this point, I take it to mean that the awards were made out of public funds and out of his personal resources. Cf. Dio 41, 24.1, which is consistent with this interpretation.

elites'] loyalty and potential for service to Caesar were the sources of the latter's perceived strength imperially. The implication is of course that not all the members of a local elite shared the same enthusiasm for Caesar or for one another. There were winners and losers. Pompeius and his sons found willing recruits among the latter. Such a policy encouraged the factionalism that was already rampant in many of the communities of both provinces.

It is in these local conflicts that we see most clearly the overlap of personal and communal patronage. Personal clients sought to gain local advantage over their rivals by securing a public resolution honoring a Roman politician as patron. Patrons used such declarations as indicators of their prestige and power. Like their Italian counterparts, the majority in any one town preferred peace and neutrality (the *prudentes*). The latter, the *prudentes*, were ready to shift allegiance as external pressure changed. By tolerating, if not actually protecting the partisans of both Caesar and Pompeius, the *prudentes* ensured that they had a spokesperson in each of the opposing camps. It is then no wonder that municipal charters sought to regulate the process by which patrons were coopted (below and in Chapter 6.2).

2.3.4. *Caesar and the Spanish Communities after Ilerda*

Though Caesar is not known to have become the formal patron of any Spanish community after either Ilerda or Munda, the situation there merits a closer examination because it is in Baetica/Ulterior that we find the first attempts to regulate the adoption of patrons. Caesar's settlement was designed to ensure the maximum in cooperation, or at least neutrality for the duration of the war against Pompeius; it failed primarily due to the inadequacies of Caesar's legate, Q. Cassius Longinus.[70] In this respect, Caesar and Pompeius suffered the same fate at the hands of their legates. That is, subordinates could easily squander the good will a party leader had won. One of the great achievements of Augustus as a statesman was that he, unlike Caesar and Pompeius, was able to transcend the inadequacies of his subordinates and to maintain the loyalty of his subjects. The lack of a credible rival (after 31) in the case of Augustus was certainly an advantage in that there was no one else to turn to.[71]

Four points need to be stressed about the campaign leading up to Munda. First, it was essentially a war in and around the towns of Ulterior. Second,

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70 Caes. *BAlex.* 48–64, esp. 53; Dio 43, 30.

71 In this respect, Augustus was much like Hitler. Ian Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich*, Oxford (University Press; 1987) especially Ch. 3 "Führer without sin".

though many of the local elite might be described as *prudentes* Caesar did claim to have partisans in most if not in all of these towns. Third, the conflict was intensified by the fierce internal struggles among the local nobility. It was not only a war about who would dominate the Roman Empire, but about which family or families would control any town. Fourth, the physical presence of both patrons/party-leaders was a critical factor in converting a clientele into a military asset.[72]

The case of Corduba illustrates how fluid the situation was, and how easily a town could change sides. Whatever its previous relations to both Pompeius and Caesar, this town accommodated itself to Caesar after Ilerda and earned his praise. The maladministration of Cassius, however, made it strongly anti-Caesarian and a willing follower of the younger Pompeius (*BHisp* 1–2, Dio 43, 30). What is remarkable is that even after the defeat of Pompeius at Pharsalus and of his adherents at Ilerda, in the East and in Africa, one continues to find local resistance to Caesar's rule organizing itself around the name of Pompeius. For example, debates between the two factions, the Caesarians and the Pompeians, were so intense and loud that Caesar's army outside the walls could hear them (c. 34).

At Ursao, the Pompeians treacherously murdered many Caesarians and brought the town into their control. At Ucubi, Cn. Pompeius checked to see who was loyal; 74 men said to favor Caesar were beheaded. An additional 120 managed to escape, but many Roman *equites* were killed. Even after Munda had been fought there were problems. As Caesar approached Hispalis legates were sent to beg his pardon. That these legations represented only some of the factions is clear from subsequent events. Philo, who was *defensor acerrimus Pompeianarum partium* and his followers took control of the city, and renewed hostilities. At Carteia disputes over Pompeius led to civil discord.[73] Especially in the latter two cases, local issues would appear to be more important than party labels. The impression one has is that the various communities each had elements among the local elite who were attached to one or another of the dynasts.

Why then was Pompeius not able to utilize effectively the support that he apparently enjoyed in Spain? The answer is complex. Some may never have been reconciled to his primacy or to that of his more immediate local supporters; others may have been opportunists. That is, the support may never have been very deep or broad. Some supporters may have been discouraged

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72 *BHisp* 1–2, 16–19, 21–26 34–37; Dio 43, 30–39.

73 *BHisp*. 21, 22, 26, 35 and 37.

by the inability of his legates to lead effectively. Still others may have been influenced by Pompeius' distance and by his record of retreats before Caesar, by his apparent inability to protect his clients. Finally, Caesar's energy and personal charm, re-enforced by the legions, may have served to neutralize, if not actually to win over, some of those who did not wish to become involved.

Beyond the partisans of each, there was in all or most Spanish communities a third group labeled by Caesar as *prudentes* (perhaps again a euphemism for "opportunists"); men who, depending on the circumstances, were ready to support whichever side could most immediately guarantee life and property, or enhance rank (cf. Caes. *BGall.* 5, 3: *principes … ad Caesarem venerunt et de suis privatim rebus ab eo petere coeperunt*). When pressure was applied from outside, the *prudentes* allowed the local Caesarians or Pompeians to speak for the town. Given the intensity of these local struggles, it is hardly surprising that the formal cooptation of a patron, especially of someone with dynastic potential, might be fraught with difficulties. Such a statement put a community "on the record" and could lead to embarrassments or worse. Is it any wonder then that the charters of these towns, like that of Urso, set standards for official action in respect to the appointment of patrons?[74]

It is instructive to examine how communities recovered from their miscalculations in this period. Consider the case of Ategua. Caesar was determined to take this Pompeian stronghold. Under pressure a division developed between the townspeople and the Pompeian soldiers that led the former to negotiate with Caesar (*BHisp.* 16–19; Dio 43, 33–36). What is interesting in this section is the manner in which the Pompeians justified their decision to seek peace with Caesar: We may surrender since Pompeius has abandoned us … *relicti et deserti a Pompeio* (17). The same justification is used later by an individual, *quoniam ab Cn. Pompeio sum desertus* (19). Pompeius must have been sensitive to this argument. In a letter to the people of Ursao, he stresses that he takes his responsibilities in this respect very seriously: *civitates nostrarum partium conservabo* (26). The argument is an important one for it indicates that the arrangement between the two parties might be rescinded, if one party or the other felt it had been deserted.[75]

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74 Note the statement of Diodorus quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The provisions in the charters that regulated patronage will be discussed in Ch. 6, especially 6.2. Note also, Nicols, "Zur Verleihung öffentlicher Ehrungen in der römischen Welt", *Chiron* 9 (1979) 243–260.

75 Note the statement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that the Romans considered it improper for one party to desert the other in time of need, *Ant. Rom.*, 2,10. If asked, this must

Hence, by appearing to abandon his Spanish clients, Pompeius gave them the moral justification to seek peace with Caesar. In general, this argument appears to have been accepted by all sides in that the sources rarely mention perfidious clients.

Dio gives some details of Caesar's second settlement of Spain (43, 39.4–5). This time, and without any new Pompeian challenges to contend with, Caesar took a harder line. He levied heavy tribute on those who opposed him and confiscated land presumably from both communities and individuals. To his allies, both communities and individuals, he variously gave land, exemption from taxes, citizenship and status of colony. Again, these benefactions did not secure the loyalty of communities in either province as Sex. Pompeius was to demonstrate later.

Pompeius began the war in Spain with an untested army and with a clientele that included both *civitates* and individuals. The *clientelae magnae* represented a reserve, the military value of which was potential, not actual. In the event, neither he nor his legates proved capable of carrying through the transformation. There are several reasons for the failure. First, the passive response of his legates and, conversely, the speed with which Caesar acted, did not allow for the time to call in and organize the potential. Second, there were structural problems among his clientele at all levels: The legates of Pompeius wavered in their loyalty to him, some communities feared him and may have looked to his rival to improve their status, and, finally, individuals and factions may not have shared the commitment to Pompeius which Romans thought existed. Third, Pompeius was not physically present to summon his clients. All these uncertainties about Pompeius aggravated local rivalries and allowed clients the opportunity to interpret their obligations as they wished.

Caesar did not begin the struggle with extensive resources in Spain and, despite the *beneficia* he conferred selectively after his victory at Ilerda, he was no more successful than Pompeius in creating a stable clientele in the area. Only peace could provide an enduring setting for such a development.

To understand the situation in Spain it is essential to understand that there were two important variants on the patronage of communities. The one

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have been the justification that the Auximates, for example, would have given for the fact that they, the clients of Pompeius, went over to Caesar, discussed below in Ch. 2.4, and in reference to events at Auximum.

involved the formal conferral of the honor, the other resulted from the fact that the *principes* of the town were the personal clients of a dynast.

The Pompeii and Caesar were all hindered in their attempts to mobilize their clients by the intense struggles among the *principes* of the various communities. Three groups, and they could probably be found in every community in the two provinces (and probably also throughout the Empire), have been identified: the Pompeians, the Caesarians and the *prudentes*. To the first group belong those who had benefited by close ties with Pompeius perhaps since the Sertorian War. To the second may be reckoned those who were friends of Caesar at the outbreak of the Civil War and whom Varro had made to suffer. As Caesar's cause prospered in Spain and throughout the Mediterranean, their numbers probably grew to included those who hoped for rewards from the party in power. The *prudentes*, who may have constituted the majority in any local senate, include those whose main concern was the preservation of life, property and rank. They were ready to reach an accommodation with whomever appeared to be the most threatening. How the clients of other Roman senators aligned themselves in these struggles is not at all clear: some probably followed the lead of their patrons, others were more opportunistic. Though the actions of communities may appear inconstant, they actually follow a consistent pattern of self-preservation and opportunism.

However individuals and communities aligned themselves, their main concern may have been the struggle for dominion within their own community. Thucydides' analysis of sedition and civil war at Corcyra provides a model for what was happening here (3, 82 ff.). In order to overcome the opposition, a weaker faction would seek the assistance of a Roman party leader thereby encouraging the other local faction to seek the patronage of a different Roman. It is reasonable to conclude that adoption of a patron may have been a usual method by which clients, in their role as magistrates, either secured the support of or expressed their gratitude to their personal patrons. Note, for example, that Caesar intervened in the selection of magistrates in Gaul [§ 2.1]. The more intense the struggles were at the imperial levels, the more intense they became at the local one. Hence, it is not surprising that the *lex Ursonensis*, dated to the period immediately after Caesar's death, specifically forbade local magistrates to extend the honor of patronage without a *decretum decurionum*.[76]

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[76] Discussed fully in Ch. 6.

Patronage was intended to protect the person and property of the client. Because patrons were not always able to provide what was expected, it was prudent, even proper, for the client to have more that one protector and to employ one or the other as the circumstances dictated. The efficacy of the relationship depended then on the perception that both parties stood to gain by perpetuating it. The ideology suggested that a client was tied primarily to one patron; the reality was that patrons competed for clients and that clients had choice, and that both let circumstances dictate whose services were to be preferred.

There were, however, dangers. Because the title of patron conferred prestige and legitimacy, it could call down the wrath of the opponents of the person honored (discussed below). Hence, the vote to adopt a patron became a political statement.[77] Caesar and his advisors recognized the problem. The charter of Urso forbade individual magistrates to "coopt" patrons on behalf of the community. Moreover, a senator might become a patron, but only if he was without imperium and in Italy. Theoretically, this regulation made it much more difficult for the competing *principes* to use the prestige of civic patronage to involve senators in local struggles. It also should have made it more difficult for senators with imperium to secure the public recognition they needed to augment their status and power.[78]

2.4. *Italian* Clientelae *in the Late Republic*

In this section, the pattern of civic patronage in late Republican Italy (70–30 BC) is examined. What one expects to find, and does find, is that many of the recorded municipal (this adjective may now be used) patrons were indeed the leaders of the various parties and factions that dominated the politics of the period. The title was not, however, restricted to this narrow group. We find some patrons who were relatively unknown or unimportant senators, like Minucius Basilus, and others, like Quinctius Valgus, who were not even senators at all. Understandably, it is the literary evidence, especially Caesar and Cicero, that concentrates on senators as patrons; that we know of the patronage of a man like Valgus depends on epigraphical evidence, too little of which survives.[79]

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[77] It is not certain that a vote was usual or required at this time. The *lex Ursonensis* expressly forbids magistrates to act unilaterally to confer the title, suggesting that they may well have done so. Details are discussed in Ch. 6.2.

[78] These regulations will be discussed in Ch. 6.2.

[79] Eilers provides a list in his Appendix 6. It is a collection of the epigraphically attested

As earlier, the focus of the discussion is on the pattern of expectation and performance, in particular, on patronal activity in Capua and Pompeii, in Aeclanum and Cingulum, in Bononia and Puteoli, and in districts like Picenum. Though the discussion proceeds by examining particular cases, they must be seen as instances of a larger network of patronal ties.

2.4.1. *Quinctius C. f. Valgus and Aeclanum*

One of the earliest epigraphically attested cases of municipal patronage involves C. Quinctius C. f. Valgus of Hirpinian Aeclanum. An inscription from the town records that he re-built the gates and walls apparently after the Social War:

> *C. Quinctius C. f. Valg. patron. mun., M. Magi. Min. f. Surus, P. Patlacius Q. f. IIIIvir de senatus sententia portas furreis moiros turreisque aquas cum moiro faciundum coiraverunt, ILS* 5318 = *ILLPR* 523.

Because of this inscription and because Cicero intimates that Valgus was a large landowner in the area, Aeclanum may have been his *origo*.[80] He probably joined the colonists whom Sulla settled at Pompeii and there became *duovir quinquennalis* and built the amphitheater sometime after 80 BC.[81] He was clearly a figure of prominence, one who probably had extensive contacts within the Roman elite.

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patrons of Italian communities in the period. Gelzer, Harmand and L.R. Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949, Chs. 2 and 3, provide the most important literary references. The latter must be used with care. The institution was by later standards still fluid and the language of the sources is often ambiguous. Hence, it is not clear that every claim to a client community (in the writings of Cicero, for example) was a consequence of a formal, municipal decree. No attempt has been made here to relate municipal patronage to the elections of Roman magistrates. The role of the patron in elections has been extensively discussed by others, especially by Taylor, op. cit., and is of less importance for the very late Republic and Principate.

80 On his holdings in the *ager Hirpinus*, *de leg. ag.* 2,69, 1, 2,3 and 8; it was frequently the case in the Principate that men of equestrian/decurial status, like Valgus, became the patrons of their *patriae*, see Ch. 7. On his equestrian status, C. Nicolet, *L'Ordre équestre à l'epogue républicaine*, Paris 1966, I 414.

81 That the inscriptions from Pompeii, *ILS* 5627 and 5636, and from Aeclanum refer to the same man has been generally accepted. Dessau's article, "C. Quinctius Valgus, der Erbauer des Amphitheaters zu Pompeii" *Hermes*, 18 (1883) 620–622, is the basis for all subsequent discussion. Also Gundel *RE* 24, 1104, Quinctius 56; P.B. Harvey, "Socer Valgus, Valgii, and C. Quinctius Valgus", in *Classics and the Classical Tradition*, Phila., 1973, 79–94; H. Galsterer, *Herrschaft und Verwaltung im Republikanischen Italien*, München, 1976, 199; and D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature*, NY 1976.

This case is important for several reasons. First, it is the earliest example of a man of decurial/equestrian status serving as patron of a community (admittedly, the inscription does not make an explicit, causal connection between the status of patron and the benefaction, but benefaction is not in doubt). Second, in terms of his patronal activity, he is the first epigraphically attested patron who is known to have made significant contributions to the physical appearance of his client-community. That is, this benefaction was not based on brokerage with the central government, administration or legal representation, but was significant monument in the community. Third, his patronal status may represent an attempt of the community to provide a formal position in its organization for non-residents whose property holdings in the area were significant and perhaps of critical importance to the well being of the town. In all respects he anticipates what will become a common practice in Italy and the Empire during the Principate.[82]

The location of the two cities, Aeclanum and Pompeii, suggests that this transformation of patronage, both in terms of status of the patron and type of benefaction, may have been influenced by the *euergesia* as practiced in the many Greek cities of the Empire. That is, the widely attested Hellenistic practice of public honors for significant benefactions was being absorbed as an aspect of *patrocinium publicum*.[83] This is an attractive theory, but some caution is required. Aeclanum was not Greek community but Italic/Samnitic, nor is it located in southern Italy where contact with Greeks was more intense. Whatever the influences might have been, the idea that patrons, regardless of rank, might or should confer major material benefactions on their client communities seems to have been established as early as the end of the Social War.

Valgus represents then the earliest case of municipal patron who unites equestrian/decurial status, large landholdings in an area, significant material benefactions, and perhaps, too, brokerage with the central government.

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[82] Senatorial patrons of the very late Republic do appear as benefactors of cities, note the cases of Labienus at Cingulum (discussed below), Q. Numerius Rufus, who as patron built a *porticus* at Issa, *ILLRP* 389, and the Scribon2, at Caudium, *ILLRP* 567–568. On the cooptation of non-resident landowners, Chapter 8.3, especially 8.3.5 and 8.3.6.

[83] Harmand, 83ff., discusses the problem more fully. In general I am inclined to see an influence of Greek urban customs here, but Roman patronage probably encompassed this form of benefaction. On this subject A. Zuiderhoek, *The Politics of Munificence in the Roman Empire*, Cambridge & New York (Cambridge UP, 2009). The author is concerned with the Principate and the Hellenistic tradition of benefaction.

2.4.2. *Sulla and Pompeii*

A second form of patronage, one that may also owe some debt to Greek institutions, is the idea that the founder (*oikist* or *ktistes*) of a city became ipso facto the patron. This idea is firmly rooted in the municipal charter of the colony of Urso in Baetica during the late 40's BC. The *lex Ursonensis* specifies that he who had founded the colony (*qui eam coloniam deduxerit*), and/or who had assigned land to the colonists, were patrons ipso facto (*FIRA*[2] 21 = *ILS* 6087, c. 97). Livy indicates that this tradition dates back to the foundation of Rome's first colony at Antium (9, 20) and Cicero confirms that it was still viable in the early 70's. P. Sulla, whom Cicero defended in the year 62, is expressly said to have been involved in the foundation of the colony of Roman citizens (including the above-mentioned Valgus) at Pompeii: *cum ab hoc* [Sulla] *illa colonia deducta sit*.[84] What was the extent of the debt to Greek institutions? Again, it is important to bear in mind that the Romans found the services of the founder (*conditor*) were sufficiently close to those of the patron to make an identification of the two institutions reasonable. On the other hand, the Romans did not, at least not in the Republic, adopt the same kind of veneration of the *oikist* that one finds in the Greek world.[85]

More important than the roots of the practice were the expectations regarding mutual services. Certainly the original act of foundation was an immense benefaction on a grand scale. Responsibilities, however, did not cease with the first settlement. Cicero says:

> *Primum omnis Pompeianorum colonorumque dissensio delata ad patronos est, cum iam inveterasset ac multos annos esset agitata; deinde ita a patronis res cognita ut nulla in re a ceterorum sententiis Sulla dissenserit* (*pro Sulla, 60*).

This passage is particularly important because it confirms in detail the statement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, that is, it represents an instance when the ideology and the practice of patronage coincide.[86] At *Ant. Rom.* 2, 11, the historian writes that the senate often asked senatorial patrons to resolve controversies involving their client-communities and regarded their

84 Münzer, *RE* 4, 1581–21, Cornelius No. 386.

85 On the changing role of the *oikist*, A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother-City in Ancient Greece*, 2nd Edition, Chicago, 1983, 29 ff. On the *oikist/ktistes* as a figure of veneration, Prehn, *RE* 11, 2083–2087. Note that Pompeius was considered a hero and *ktistes* at Mytilene and as such had a cult and priests, *IG* 12,2.140/1.

86 On the issue, A. Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: from Republic to Empire" in *Patronage and Ancient Society*, op. cit., 65–68.

decisions as binding. In this case, the older Pompeians and the newer colonists among them clearly had serious disputes about a number of issues.[87] The patrons of the town investigated the complaints and issued a unanimous opinion. Again, it is not specified, but it is reasonable to believe that these *patroni* were not residents of Pompeii, if they were, their credibility as mediators might have been severely compromised. The point here is that communities did have multiple patrons and that it was proper for them to resolve internal disputes, and that they acted with the authority of the Senate.[88] Cicero's use of the plural, *patronos*, is indisputable evidence that communities had more than one formal protector to whom they might turn.[89] Italian communities enjoyed considerable choice.

2.4.3. *Cicero and His Clients in Capua and Reate*

It is not possible to give a concise account of the municipal clients of Cicero in Italy.[90] In this study, the emphasis is rather on those cases that are in themselves suggestive of the general situation and where we are reasonably certain that Cicero was in fact the formal municipal patron.

In two of his public speeches, *in Pisonem* of 62 and *pro Sestio* of 56, Cicero claims to have been the sole patron of Capua.

> *in Pis 25: me* (*Cicero*) *inaurata statua donarant; me patronum unum asciverant; a me se habere vitam, fortunas liberos arbitrabantur …*

> *pro Sestio 9: qua de causa et tum conventus ille Capuae, qui propter salutem illius urbis consulatu conservatam meo me unum patronum adoptavit.*

Because Cicero had discovered the conspiracy of Catiline and preserved the state, the *conventus* of Capua had adopted him as sole patron. Capua's status in the 60's was unusual in that it did not have a formal municipal structure; hence, the decree of cooptation was passed by the *conventus* of Roman citizens.[91] The stress on the fact that Cicero was the sole patron (*unum*)

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87 … *de ambulatione ac de suffragiis*, Cicero tells us, *pro Sulla*, 61.

88 Claude Eilers notes that *Syll.*^{3} 656 has an embassy appealing to several patrons of Teos in Rome. He discusses other examples in his book.

89 On the question of exclusivity, Saller, "Patronage and friendship in early imperial Rome: drawing the distinction" in *Patronage in the Ancient Society*, op. cit., 53–54.

90 Harmand, 132–133, provides one.

91 In 58, that is, after the cooptation but before the delivery of the speeches, Capua had received a colony, *pro Sest.* 9. On its status, M.W. Fredricksen, "Republican Capua: A Social and Economic Study", *PSBR* 27 (1959) 80–130, esp. 82–93. Fredericksen argues that Capua, despite the lack of an administrative structure, found ways to accomplish what other communities were doing, p. 93.

confirms the argument above that Italian communities usually had several patrons. After 59, when Capua had become a *colonia*, this number would have been increased at least by the number of 'founders'. Hence, Caesar and Pompeius may then have been *patroni ipso facto*.[92] In the winter of 49, the senate sent Cicero to Campania to levy troops. His relationship with Capua may have been the reason for the assignment; it may also have encouraged him to make the town his base.[93]

Cicero's relationship to another community, Reate, is more complicated. In the *pro Scauro*, he states:

> *ego, nuper cum Reatini, qui essent in fide mea, me suam publicam causam de Velini fluminibus et cuniculis apud hos consules agere voluissent, non existimavi* ... (27)

The key expression is *in fide mea* and here there is good reason to believe that Cicero does indeed mean that formal *patrocinium* existed. In his *Philippics*, *in fide recepit* is equated with *patronum adoptarunt* and is related to a public corporation (6, 12). Moreover, Sallust indicates that Cicero had a bodyguard of clients during his consulship, among whom were young men of Reate.[94] The problem with this passage is that the context and the grammar might be taken equally to indicate a genuine *patrocinium civitatis* or a one-time *patrocinium causae* which Cicero undertook as an orator/lawyer.[95] If the former be accepted, then we would have an excellent example of how municipal clients could be mobilized in a paramilitary manner. At the very least, the statement in the *pro Scauro* indicates how ambiguous Cicero's language can be in reference to municipal patronage. That is, it may well be that Cicero is, for reasons outlined in Ch. 5.3, deliberately vague about his clientele.

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92 The foundation was the responsibility of a board of *vigintiviri*, including Pompeius (Varro, *de r.r.*, 1, 2.10); all of these twenty men and Caesar, as the author of the enabling law, may well have become patron ipso facto. In inscription dated to after 40 BC, records that Caesar's friend, Cornelius Balbus, was also patron of the colony (*ILLRP* 425). The date of cooptation, as distinct from the date of the inscription, is not noted, but it is unlikely that it would have been before 48.

93 *Ad fam.* 16, 11.1; *ad Att.* 8, 11. Holmes, 3, 365–368.

94 *Phil.* 6.12 (on the patronage of the tribes), Sall. *Cat.* 26 (on the bodyguard of clients); Cic. *Cat.* 3.5 (on the fact that the bodyguard included Reatini). Pompeius also used municipal clients in this way (Cic. *ad Q. fr.* 2, 3.4), discussed in the following section.

95 Gelzer, *Nobilität*, 80, thinks Cicero meant a *patrocinium publice*; Hellegouarc'h, *Vocabulaire*, 29, concludes that it was a *fides defensionis*.

2.4.4. *The Clientele of Pompeius in Picenum*

The sources agree that Pompeius inherited an important clientele in the area. Plutarch explains that he had estates there and that he liked the cities in the area which were dutiful and kindly disposed to him on account of his father (*Pomp.*, 6). Velleius notes that Picenum was full of Pompeius' clients (2, 29.1). These clients formed the basis of the army he mustered and brought to Sulla. Their descendants may have enrolled in his forces at the outbreak of the Civil War (*ad Att.* 8, 12B–D). Gelzer, in reviewing the evidence, concludes that his father, Pompeius Strabo, already owned significant property in the area and was patron of several communities there even before the Social War.[96] He improved his situation in both respects thereafter.[97] How Pompeius used this clientele in the 70's and 60's is not recorded, but Picentine soldiers may well have formed part of his forces in Spain and latter in the East. In 56, we have something specific: Cicero wrote to his brother that Pompeius was expecting help from Picenum against Clodius (*Q.fr.* 2, 3.4); that is, Pompeius was expecting the same kind of assistance as Cicero had received from Reate.

Auximum was an important town in Picenum and also a center of Pompeian support. It was here, for example, that the young Pompeius had enrolled his first troops (Plut. *Pomp.* 6.3) and it is here that an inscription survives recording the fact that he was patron of the town:

> [*Cn. P*]*ompeio Cn.* [*f.*] [*Mag*]*no, imperatori consuli ter,* [*pa*]*trono publice ILLRP 382 = ILS 877.*

The inscription, on a *basis magna*, may be dated to the period between Pompeius' third consulate in 52 and the outbreak of the civil war. As is so often the case, there is no mention of any specific benefaction that might have led to the honor.

In light of his strong ties with this area and perhaps too recalling the outbreak of an earlier civil war, Pompeius had sent Attius Varus to Auximum to garrison it, senators to levy troops there, and Vibullius Rufus to confirm the loyalty of the men in Picenum (*BCiv.* 1, 12 and 15). This would have been in the early winter of 50–49.

[96] Strabo had a reputation for cruelty. Note the case of P. Vettius Scato, mentioned by Macrobius, *Sat.* 1, 11.24; Sen. *de ben.* 3, 23.5, and of Ausculum where the civic leaders had been beaten with rods and then killed, Flor. 2, 6.15; Oros. 5, 18.26. Discussed with implication by M.S. Nicols, *Appearances and Reality*, 34 ff.

[97] *Nobility*, text near note 288.

In late January/early February, Caesar, having already crossed the Rubicon, advanced from Ancona to Auximum. Learning of his approach, the decurions met with Varus and explained that they were not free to act for themselves (*sui iudicii rem non esse*, Caes, *BCiv*. 1, 13), and that they would not close the gates to Caesar.[98] Once Auximum went over to Caesar, the rest of Picenum followed without incident: *cunctae earum regionum libentissimis animis eum recipiunt exercitumque eius omnibus rebus iuvant* (*BCiv*. 1, 15).

Among the towns in Picenum was Cingulum, *quod oppidum Labienus constituerat suaque pecunia exaedificaverat*, which also sent legates who promised that they would happily do whatever Caesar commanded.[99] Caesar does not say that Labienus had founded Cingulum, but *constituo*, *exaedificio* and *pecunia sua* suggest that he must have completed something like a deduction (in about 63, according to Hülsen) and, therefore, may have been, ipso facto, the *patronus* of the town (cf. P. Sulla). By the time that the decurions went to Caesar, they must have known that their benefactor, Labienus, had left Caesar and formally joined the party of Pompeius.[100]

The value of client communities lay in their ability to provide men and material. Pompeius was able to raise 19 cohorts in Picenum in the months before the outbreak of the Civil War. These units, which Pompeius valued so highly, came under the command of Domitius Ahenobarbus, surrendered at Corfinum, and were dissolved (*ad Att.* 8, 12B–D). Whether individuals from these units later served Pompeius is not recorded.

What we see then are two cases, Auximum and Cingulum, in which the communities easily abandoned their well-established patrons. Moreover, in both cases, there appears to have been extensive and recent contact between both patron and client. The conclusion is obvious: faced with compelling necessity, the communities, and indeed the whole region of Picenum, generally placed its immediate safety before any ties of personal allegiance.

Cicero's judgment on these events in Picenum is telling. Already before Caesar reached Auximum, the former knew that there would be problems. Pompeius, he thought, simply did not know what was happening in the area.

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98 The contrast to Massilia, which was also in the clientele of Pompeius, is surely deliberate.

99 On the town, Hülsen, *RE* 3,2561. This case too offers another example of the ambiguous language of patronage in the literary evidence of the period. Romans, knowing the details, may well have concluded that he was at least de facto, if not de iure, the patron.

100 For the details, R. Syme, "The Allegiance of T. Labienus" *JRS* 28 (1938) 113–125.

After the loss of Picenum, he wrote to Atticus that Pompeius had acted in a criminally irresponsible manner.[101]

Syme has pointed out forcefully that there were significant problems in the clientele of Pompeius.[102] A good example of the problem may be seen in the career of M. Satrius = L. Minucius Basilus, from Picenum and a man whom Cicero calls *patronus agri Piceni et Sabini*.[103] Basilus came from Picenum and, like Labienus, may have become one of Caesar's legates in Gaul on the recommendation of Pompeius. Frustrated that he had not received a province to govern, he joined the conspiracy against Caesar (in 44). Thereafter, he appears to have found his way back to the Caesarian party, for he is next described acting with Antonius against Puteoli.[104] Basilus is important for this study because his career indicates that there were Picentines who, regardless of their earlier connections to Pompeius, took the side of Caesar during the Civil War and may have helped him to undermine the Pompeian position in their homeland.[105] He is also important because he would appear, as the *patronus agri Piceni et Sabini*, to be the political heir of Pompeius in the area.[106]

One may reconstruct the situation in Picenum. The Picentine communities, with many of their young men already serving Pompeius elsewhere, may not have been able to defend themselves or, alternatively, the more reliable Pompeians were already serving, leaving the balance of power in the hands of those who preferred neutrality and/or hoped through Caesar to improve their status at the expense of their local rivals.[107] Moreover,

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[101] On the former, *cui ne Picena quidem nota fuerint*, *ad Att.* 7, 13 = Shackelton-Bailey, 136; on the latter, 8, 8.1 = 158.

[102] "Labienus," 123–124.

[103] Cic. *de off.* 3,74; on his career, Münzer, *RE* 15, 1947, No. 38; R. Syme, "Senators, Tribes and Towns", *Historia* 13 (1964) 121, Wiseman, *New Men*, p. 259, No. 379; Shackleton-Bailey, *Two Studies*, 53–54.

[104] Shackleton Bailey, noting that these shifts in party allegiance in 44–3 are very abrupt, concludes that there must be two men, one is the Picentine, legate of Caesar, ally of Antonius in *Phil* 2, 107, and patron of Picenum; the other is the assassin. I do not find the argument to be compelling, for other Caesarians, including both Antonius and Octavian, compromised their party affiliations and worked with the Assassins during this period. Whether there were one or two does not affect the argument here. On Puteoli, see below.

[105] One may wonder whether he had connections among the opponents and victims of Strabo.

[106] How he acquired the title, and through what agency is unknown. A commune consisting of these elements is not known. These issues are discussed below.

[107] It is conventional to speak of Pompeius solid control of the area, but there were many who had suffered at the hands of his father. On this subject, M.S. Nicols, *Appearances and Reality*.

Pompeius was already making plans to abandon Italy and, by implication, to "abandon" his supporters. Some Picentines may have been motivated to come to terms with Caesar out of respect for the latter's achievements, as Caesar in a self-serving way suggests they were. Others may have viewed the cause of Caesar as being, for the prudent man, the more compelling (*terribiliora*, Vell. Pat. 2, 49.4). Both groups could agree that Pompeius would not or could not protect them and that they were therefore free to seek an accommodation with Caesar.[108] The last explanation is, I believe, to be preferred because it is most consistent with the practice of patronage in other areas. Considering themselves to be abandoned by their traditional patron, they were then "free" to take advantage of Caesar's moderation.

It is not clear what Pompeius had in mind. As noted, Cicero claims that Pompeius acted in a completely irresponsible way, but he may have been realistic about his chances against Caesar in central Italy and perhaps concerned about the fate of his clients should they oppose. He may even have given a tacit blessing to those communities that sought to preserve themselves. Alternatively, there is some indication (e.g., his well known boast about stamping his foot and legions forming) that he had completely deceived himself about how well his patronal ties would hold up against the formidable presence and legions of Caesar.[109]

Again, it is remarkable that the sources never accuse the Picentine communities of treachery or question their *fides*. So, in sum, once a patron was unable to provide resources, the client was not bound by 'loyalty' or obligation to continue the relationship, but was seen as free to make new arrangements? If this interpretation is accepted, then it follows that Cicero, Pompeius and their contemporaries indulged in a considerable amount of wishful thinking in making their political calculations.

2.4.5. *Patrons and Client Communities After Caesar's Death*

In the last days before his death, the Senate and People had conferred on Caesar honors of considerable symbolic value and still others were under consideration. Dio mentions that, among the latter, the People also wished him to become patron (*prostates*) of the City and of the whole Empire. The context, Antonius' speech over Caesar's dead body, and the language leave

[108] Note that communities themselves felt that they had little choice, cf. Cic. *ad Att.* 9, 5. Similar considerations affected the outcome in the Spanish provinces.

[109] Plut. *Pomp.* 57 and 60. Seager, *Pompey*, 157.

some doubt as to whether or not he actually was so honored.[110] Dio devotes considerable attention to the collection of honors, usual and unusual, and we may assume that Caesar's willingness to accept some or all of them may be related to a need to legitimize his still uncertain constitutional position.

After his death, both the Liberators and the Caesarians found themselves in similar constitutional difficulties and for that reason may have been motivated to accept or claim honors which might serve to legitimize their positions and actions. Consider the case of L. Antonius. Cicero says:

> *Sed redeo ad amores delicasque vestras, L. Antonium, qui vos omnis in fidem suam recepit. negatis? num quisnam est vestrum qui tribum non habeat? certe nemo. atqui illum quinque et triginta tribus patronum adoptarunt. rursus reclamatis? aspicite illam a sinistra equestrem statuam inauratam, in qua quid inscriptum est? "quinque et triginta tribus patrono." populi Romani igitur est patronus L. Antonius ... non modo hic latro, quem clientem habere nemo velit, sed quis umquam tantis opibus, tantis rebus gestis fuit qui se populi Romani victoris dominique omnium gentium patronum dicere auderet?*[111]

The title, *patronus quinque et triginta tribus*, that is, *patronus populi Romani*, reminds one immediately of Antonius' claim that the People wished Caesar to be "*prostates* of the City and the Whole Empire" and would appear to support the hypothesis that these titles were, at the very least, the subject of public discussion. That they were viewed as offensive to Roman tradition is manifest in Cicero's words, but may also be deduced from the fact that Augustus did not assume them (the title was ascribed, perhaps only rhetorically, to Tiberius. Equally interesting is Cicero's notice that L. Antonius, or his associates, had simply claimed the title and set up the inscription in the Forum. In this sense, the case is fairly similar to what Verres had done earlier.[112]

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110 44, 48.1–2. Note that Velleius calls Tiberius *patronus perpetuus Romani imperii*, 2,121. Dio is not always reliable about honors for the Caesars.

111 *But I return to your* [*i.e., the people's*] *favorite, your darling L. Antonius, who has taken you all under his wing. Oh, you say not? Is there any of you who doesn't have a tribe? Certainly not! Well, the thirty-five tribes chose him as their patron. More protest? Look at that gilt equestrian statue to the left. What does the inscription say? "The thirty-five tribes to their patron." So: L. Antonius is patron of the Roman People ... Who ever had so great a position, such a record of achievement as to dare to call himself the patron of the Roman People, conqueror and lord of all nations?—let alone this brigand whom nobody would want to have as a client*" Shackleton Bailey, *Phil.* 6, 12.

112 *On Tiberius* as *patronus perpetuus Romani imperii*, Vell. Pat. 2, 121. See below, Ch. 5. As a consequence of his collection of extraordinary taxes in 49, L. Antonius had become patron of a number of communities in the province of Asia.

In an earlier *Philippic* (2, 107), Cicero relates another episode that characterizes the situation at that time in much the same way:

> *quid ego illas istius minas contumeliasque commemorem quibus invectus est in Sidicinos, vexavit Puteolanos, quod C. Cassium et Brutos patronos adoptassent? magno quidem studio, iudicio, benevolentia, caritate, non, ut te et Basilum, vi et armis, et alios vestri similis quos clientis nemo habere velit, non modo illorum cliens esse.*

In the days following the death of Caesar, at least two communities coopted Cassius and the two Bruti as patrons. Moreover, Cicero suggests that Antonius and Basilus (mentioned above) also became patrons of communities at this time and did not hesitate to use the force of armed men to secure the honor.[113] This may be the means, or "agency" by which Basilus became the *patronus agri Piceni et Sabini*; that is, because no such *conventus* is known which might have conferred the honor, it is probable that he simply claimed the title and held it by force.[114] It is in reference to this fact that Cicero makes his famous remark: *o turpem notam temporum*. The meaning of the phrase has been disputed, but the disgrace cannot refer an innuendo involving Basilus' name nor to the possibility that it was shameful for citizen communities to have a need for patrons (as some commentators have suggested). The disgrace lies in the fact that Basilus claims to be patron of a region, as L. Antonius was patron of the 35 tribes, and in the manner by which he claimed the honor. Cicero also notes that the fact of clientele or *hospitium* might be used to extort a favorable *decretum decurionum* (*pro Sest.* 10.) However one interprets the evidence, it is clear that the function of these "cooptations" must have been to legitimize the respective claims to authority.[115] It is, then, comprehensible that Antonius and the Caesarians, including the above-mentioned Basilus, would seek to punish the indiscretion of Puteoli. To generalize: Because the adoption of a patron served to legitimize his power and authority, that action was considered a political statement of some significance. Hence, the cooptation placed the community, willingly or unwillingly, in the forefront of civil strife and it carried with

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113 Regarding the Antonii, it needs to be said that their patronage of Bononia does not fit this category. According to Suetonius it was *antiquus* and sufficiently honorable for Octavian to release the city from the oath that all Italy swore to him (Octavian) before Actium, *Aug.*, 17.

114 Cicero, *de off.* 3,74.

115 Without giving much detail, Münzer comes to the conclusion that, after the Ides of March, many communities coopted, or found it necessary to coopt, new patrons, *RE* 15, 1947.

it consequences, desirable and undesirable.[116] Note, however, that while the community had to bear the undesirable consequences, it was the successful partisans of a Caesar or a Pompeius who stood to secure the advantages.

That the title *patronus civitatis* or *municipii* could confer legitimacy and that it could be perceived as a challenge to the established order may be deduced from the case of Amatius (= Herophilus = Pseudo Marius). He was, according to Valerius Maximus (9, 15.1), a fugitive and with some training in ophthalmology who claimed to be a descendant of the great Marius. In this capacity, he even wrote to his 'relatives', including Cicero, Octavian and the women in the latter's family. While Caesar was in Spain campaigning against the sons of Pompeius, Amatius won considerable popularity and was adopted the *patronus* of various *municipia* and veteran colonies of Italy. When Caesar returned from Spain he had Amatius relegated. After the Ides of March the latter returned to Rome, collected a group of supporters, threatened the Senate, and initiated divine worship of Caesar. Antonius eventually had him arrested and executed.[117]

The significance of this event, even if Valerius Maximus exaggerates the number of *colonia* and *municipia* involved, is that even an imposter was able to secure a measure of legitimacy by becoming the patron of an Italian community.

As is apparent in some of the earliest inscriptions honoring him, Octavian was sensitive to the advantages and disadvantages of *patrocinium publicum*. An inscription from Saticula in Samnium (*CIL* 9, 2142 = *ILLRP* 416 = *ILS* 76) dating to 43–41 BC, reads:

> *C. Julio C. f. Caesari/imp triumviro r. p. c./patrono/d. d.*

This text is important for two reasons. First, it indicates that Octavian too sought legitimation through the patronage of an Italian community. Indeed, three other inscriptions dating to the period 43–28 mention his patronage of Italian communities and none of them indicate that the position was inherited.[118] Second, this is the first time, Géza Alföldy informs me, that the

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116 This passage is also significant because Cicero provides here a list of "virtues" which could be used to justify cooptation: *studium, iudicium, benevolentia, caritas*, virtues that regularly appear in the inscriptions of the Principate. See Ch. 7.5.

117 The best account of his career is Münzer's in *RE* 15, 1815, Marius No. 16. Less satisfactory is Shackleton-Bailey's discussion at *ad Att.* 13, 49 (= 292).

118 *CIL* 9, 1330 = *ILS* 78 (from Luna), 10, 3826 = *ILS* 79 (from Capua), and 11, 5642 (from Prolaqueum). *CIL* 1^2 2969 also dates from this period and reads: *C. Julio C.* [f. Cae]- / *sare pat*[......] / *imperato*[re IIIvir] / *rei public*[ae con] / [stitu]*endae* [-] / -----. The issue is whether one should read *pat*[.....] as "*patre patr.*" or as "*patrono*". Against the first is the fact that the

formula *decreto decurionum* appears on a "Baudenkmal". Octavian then recognized the value of *patrocinium publicum* in the competition for authority, but he also recognized that his rivals were simply assuming the title. To distance himself from such excesses, he may have encouraged towns like Saticula to confirm the legality of the title and the honor by adding the statement that the monument and its contents had been approved by a decree of the local senate. His rivals were quick to see the advantages of the new formula: An inscription honoring Aemilius Lepidus as patron of Thabraca in 37/6 notes that the monument was authorized *ex decreto decurionum* (*ILLRP* 1276). Hence, there can be little doubt about the fact that the formal patronage of communities played a significant role in the pursuit of legitimacy and that this struggle was contested on the public monuments of the many cities of the empire.

One final category of municipal patronage in Italy during this period needs to be mentioned, one which might be described as 'wishful thinking'. Cicero, in a letter to Cassius (*ad fam.* 12, 5.2), mentions the *clientelae* of the Liberators. Included in this group is the one Cassius had in Transpadania. The statement is probably factually true; Transpadani had a number of patrons. Given the fact that Caesar had done much for the Transpadanians, as individuals and as collectives, and that he was in total military control of the area one may well wonder about whether there could be any realistic expectation that they, as collectives, would or could side with the Pompeians (this is not to claim that not one of the Transpadani took up arms in support of Cassius). Nonetheless, the statement is indicative of the kind of calculations Roman politicians made and how readily they deceived themselves about the ease with which a patron might convert the potential resources of a clientele into an actual political or military asset of significance.

In Italy, the forms of patronage were in some ways similar to, in other ways different from, what was observed in the provinces. After the end of the Social War, the patronage of the conquering general or benevolent governor became anachronistic, though relationships established earlier on this basis remained vital. In general, all the communities of Italy probably had patrons of senatorial rank and increasingly were ready to find them in other ranks. Though it is not clear to what extent communities were legally bound to adopt their patrons by a formal decree of the municipal council, the

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title was not conferred on Augustus until 2 BC, long after he had caesed to style himself *IIIvir r. p. c.* Against the latter is the position: the reference to patronage on these texts usually comes at the end of the inscription (e.g., *ILLRP* 416 and 1276 and many others).

evidence indicates that this pattern was increasingly common. After the death of Caesar, the protocol associated with the institution began to change: The search for legitimacy in an increasingly uncertain constitutional situation produced some remarkable and unprecedented cases of civic patronage.

The reasons for coopting a new patron are reasonably clear. Patrons were expected to provide a range of services: To mediate when dissension broke out, to defend the interests of the town before Senate and magistrates, to provide significant material benefactions. Some were involved in the foundation of the community; others were coopted because they owned significant estates in the territory of the client. In return, patrons expected their clients to support them at elections, to enhance their prestige, to serve as a base for recruiting soldiers and to provide a bodyguard in emergencies. It is, however, essential to bear in mind that a community represented a variety of interests and factions. To be patron of a community meant that an individual enjoyed the support of a dominant faction and that that faction, acting with at least the acquiesce of the *prudentes*, was willing to make a public declaration (i.e., a decree) in his honor. In times of peace, such declaration was both sincere and self-serving; but with the army of an opponent at the gates, the unprotected *prudentes* felt free to accommodate themselves to the most immediate threat.

2.5. *Patronage of the Greek Cities of the East*

The evidence on civic patronage in the Greek speaking part of the empire is in this period largely epigraphical.[119] To begin with we need to recognize the obvious, namely that the Greeks adapted a Latin word, *patronus*, to create a new Greek work, πάτρων, That is, both Greeks and Romans assumed that using near Greek equivalents like *prostates* and *euergetes*, did not adequately describe what had been established; it reveals that the Greeks at the very least believed that the Roman patron had a particular understanding of what was involved.

[119] As Claude Eilers, Roman Patrons of Greek Cities, op. cit. and Fillippo Canali de Rossi, *Il ruolo dei patroni nelle relazioni politiche fra il mondo Greco e Roma in età repubblicana and ed Augustea*, Munich/Leipzig (Saur, 2001) = Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, Band 159, my comments are limited to generalities and points of comparison with the West. I am in substantial agreement with Eilers and with Canali de Rossi on how one became a patron and that scholars asses the evidence on practice with considerable flexibility and subtlety. There are generalities, but there are also many variations.

Regarding the numbers, at least fifty inscriptions datable to the period, 89–31 BC, mention that one Roman or another was the formal patron of the city.[120] In contrast, inscriptions in Latin for the same period total are significantly lower. The differential is not significant when one considers the epigraphical habit was not yet well established in many parts of the western empire.

The pattern of civic patronage in the East offers some parallels and some striking contrasts with what has been observed in the West. Geographically, the overwhelming majority of the attestations pertain to cities of mainland Greece, the Aegean islands and those of western Asia Minor, that is, to those areas that had had the longest and most intense contact with Romans and /or achieved provincial status earlier than those states in the non Anatolian Levant, and finally had a well-developed epigraphical habit. Chronologically, the incidence of attestations increases dramatically from the two or three cases per decade to over ten. This increase may well be associated with the rise of Pompeius and with his known pride in his many *clientelae* among the *nationes populique* of the empire.[121] It is relevant that there are a number of inscriptions bearing his name as patron, indeed he is second only to Julius Caesar in attestations (Eilers, Appendix 2) but, considering that many cities would have discretely removed such monuments in the aftermath of the Pompeian defeats, one may well believe that the trend toward the title was indeed stimulated by Pompeius.

The title 'patron' occurs sometimes alone and sometimes in association with similar titles. Most frequently, as noted as several places above, it is closely associated with the more common Hellenistic titles *euergetes*, *soter*, etc.[122] Characteristically, inscriptions are quite un-informative about what the person honored had done to merit the titles, though as noted below in reference to the case of Oppius, the legation asking for admission to his clientele might well have explained how it was deserving of this protection. In most cases, however, there is no indication whatsoever; in others vague and grandiose formula stressing the *eunoia* and *arete* are used. Significantly, and again in the case of Oppius and Aphrodisians, the proconsul does mention specifically that what his obligations as patron were to the community: "I shall take every care both in office and as a private individual to do

120 Eilers, Appendix 2 and 3.

121 See above, section 2.3 on the Spanish clientele.

122 Canali de Rossi, especially at p. 127 f. The sentiments expressed here are similar to those offered by Caesar in discussing his benefactions to his clients in Further Spain, Section 2.3.2.

whatever I can, while preserving my good faith, to help you and your public affairs, and always to procure your advantage; and when I am in Rome I shall make clear to the senate and people how you have conducted your affairs."[123] Here protection, goodwill and action are all promised, but promised critically only to the point that doing so will not conflict with other obligations. Oppius is then explicit that assuming a clientele also involves reconciling competing demands for services.

How does one enter into the relationship? As noted in the Chapter One Introduction, and above in this chapter, the usual procedures were conquest *more maiorum*, application, judicial services, and descent. Here in the Greek East as in the Latin West these categories are not mutually exclusive. Even in cases when a connection is inherited the relationship may need to be formally confirmed and the renewal commemorated by some process of application. Defending a community might also lead to patronage or proceed from a patronal relationship. Moreover, the formal patronage of a community and the more specific defense of a community in court [*patronus causae*] are not always distinguishable in the sources. Rather the Romans appear to have ascribed patronal status whenever there was exchange of services and honor over time. Hence, in many of the cases discussed by Eilers and Canali de Rossi, the text makes a generalized statement about services rendered or anticipated.[124]

One particular case does deserve discussion here. In a letter dating to the mid 80s BC, the city of Aphrodisias sent ambassadors who approached the Roman proconsul, Q. Oppius [Eilers, C 107, pp. 241–242; 23–24]. The city recounts the services it performed for Rome and for Oppius himself and concludes by requesting him to accept the patronage of the city. Oppius, in replying to the request, mentions: "The same ambassadors begged that you too should be allowed to enjoy my patronage [πατρωνήᾳ]. I accepted them because of my regard for your city and undertook the position of patron [πάτρωνα] of your people."[125] There is general agreement that the text illustrates that the initiative in such cases typically came from the potential client, that a formal application was part of the process, and that it was up to the prospective client latter to provide supporting arguments for being received into the clientele of the patron. The whole process is consistent

123 Eilers, C 107, ibid.

124 Eilers, Chapters 2–4 and Canali de Rossi, Chapters 3–5 discuss the options.

125 Eilers has the full bibliography and there has been extensive discussion of this important text. I mention here R. Sherk, *Rome and the Greek East*, Document 59b and J. Reynolds, *Rome and Aphrodisias*, Document 3.

with what we know from the *tabulae patronatus* [Ch. 7], though in this case we have Oppius' version of what considerations the legation believed would influence Oppius to accept. Implicit here is the notion that *patronatus* was a burden, a burden that was undertaken response to a specific request of worthy communities and individuals.

Several inscriptions (e.g., one to L. Valerius Flaccus on Klaros[126]) mention that the title was inherited, διὰ προγόνων [*patroni ab maioribus*; 'through ancestors'].[127] We should not push the concept too far. The extralegal nature of the patronal relationship meant that the intensity of the interactions varied enormously over time, and though one party or the other might find it convenient to revitalize the services, it surely also happened that many relationships ended in neglect.

As the overwhelming majority of the patrons of communities in the Greek East had some official function that touched on the client community, it may be deduced that administrative benefactions, conferred or anticipated (or maybe even the benefaction of being left alone!), were significant factors in the decision to offer the title.

One may speculate that Pompeius may have been honored out of genuine gratitude for his role in the war against Mithradates, the foundation of cities, or the suppression of the pirates. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that Pompeius may have been consciously or unconsciously modeling the traditional Roman notion of patronage around the Stoic ideal of responsible government.[128] The same ideology cannot be said to have been employed during the Civil Wars. L. Antonius, for example, had become patron of a number of communities in the province of Asia in 49, his service: the collection of extraordinary taxes! Either the honors were extorted, or they were conferred to encourage restraint or to thank him for not taking more than he might.[129]

As M.S. Nicols has persuasively argued, the fact that Pompeius' many clients abandoned him so readily after Pharsalus suggests that many had

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126 Tuchelt, 164 = Robert, *Le Carie* II, 1954, 210 and *MRR* Suppl. 65. Note that the Marcelli of Cicero's day also inherited the title in Syracuse and the Fabii among the Allobrogi.

127 Discussed at length by Eilers in his Ch. 3, The Inheritance of Patronage, 61f.

128 This theme is developed more fully by M.S. Nicols in *Appearances and Reality*, Chapter 7.

129 References are given by Eilers, Appendices 2, 3, and 5, and discussed by R. Merkelbach, *ZPE* 19 (1975) 39–42 and 31 (1978) 36–37. It is possible that Antonius, as a way of helping Caesar and his brother, deliberately failed to collect the extraordinary tax. If there was doubt about him, it is peculiar that he was left to govern the province by the two Pompeian superiors.

come to his aid not to fulfill their patronal obligations, but because the presence of Roman provincial magistrates and their armies may have provided a clear and direct incentive to act. Indeed of the many client states attributed to Pompeius in the ancient sources and modern scholarship, only two, Massilia and Mytilene maintained their loyalty through adversity. In the latter case, the pro Pompeian sentiment of one local, Theophanes, was certainly the determining factor, and an important reminder that the perspective of a community on its obligations may more accurately be described as the perspective of its leading citizens.

It is, of course characteristic of the period that after the defeat and death of Pompeius the Greek states immediately turned to Caesar and extended to him an array of honors that had formerly been extended to other powerful figures. No one could have been under any illusions about what those honors would mean in another civil war or that Caesar, when informed of them, cared much whether one or one thousand communities called him benefactor and patron of all the Greeks. The fact that the testimonials continue to be delivered by the communities indicates that the latter believed it necessary to provide a statement of loyalty to the powers that could affect them and that the words themselves, patron and benefactor, would encourage Caesar to treat them in a manner outlined in the Stoic tradition.[130] The fact they continue to do so suggests that they were not consistently disappointed or at least were not ready to risk the consequences of offending by failing to offer the appropriate honors.

Though formal patronage was certainly becoming more common in the Greek East during the Late Republic, it still was not as commonly attested as the more traditional Hellenistic titles. Whether this pattern reflects the wishes of the communities or of the Romans cannot be determined. The personal proclivities of Pompeius may well have been the stimulus that led to the rise in the number of attestations. Indeed, as M.S. Nicols has argued, the reworking of Stoic philosophy seems to have connected the ideals of good governance and the Roman patronage.[131]

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[130] The Stoic model of governance is outlined in various places in Cicero, *de off.*, in his letters, especially *ad fam.* 9, 9.2, to his brother, *Q.fr.* 1.1, in *ad Att.* 5, 13; 15, 16 and in Seneca's *de ben.*, discussed in Ch. 4.1.

[131] Gelzer, *Nobilität*, 98, Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, Princeton 1950, 402, R. Seager, *Pompey: A Political Biography*, Oxford, 1979, 55; M.S. Nicols, 173 ff.

2.6. *Conclusion*

For the Late Republic, there is no evidence that Romans practiced a strict clientelistic system as defined by sociologists.[132] Economically, clients were generally free to exchange all or part of their produce at market prices and without the mediation of their patron. On the other hand, some communities and individuals may well have yielded some of their autonomy to a local magnate in exchange for access to critical resources that he alone controlled. That this was the case in Italy and other Romanized areas must, however, be deduced from comparative studies of other Mediterranean societies.[133] Politically, client communities did have direct access to administrative centers and to public goods, but having a patron, formally or informally, certainly helped. All commentators on civic patronage are in agreement that the establishment of patronage created at the very least the illusion of protection for the client and of assets of a political and military character for the patron.

Four forms of civic patronage have been identified in this section. In three categories, a prominent Roman (usually a senator) became the patron of a community (either citizen or peregrine); in the fourth, different communities functioned respectively as the patron and as the client. To a certain extent, these categories reflect developmental stages in Rome's relationship with various states.

What distinguishes the first three from one another is the degree of choice available to the client. Newly conquered peoples and nations (e.g., the Gauls) formally entered the clientele of their conqueror, or were perceived by the Romans to have done so *more maiorum*. The fact that Caesar makes very limited use of the vocabulary of patronage to describe his relations to the Gallic communities may be due, as Rich has indicated in another context, to the fact that while patronage assumes free will and choice, the client had little of either in such situations. Nominally the relationship may be analogous to patronage, in fact, it was a more restrictive form of dependency. It was in these situations particularly that the dependent party was weakest and could be most easily exploited by the dominant.

The second category involves peregrine communities with long-standing relations with Rome and Romans. Some states, like Syracuse or others in Spain, had originally entered the clientele of a Roman senator in the manner

[132] Eisenstadt and Roniger, chapter 5.
[133] Gellner and Waterbury provide many examples.

described in the last paragraph. Over the years such states had established connections with a number of Roman administrators without, however, terminating their relationship to the descendants of their patron-conqueror. The Allobrogi, for example, had been defeated both by a Fabius and a Domitius and probably reckoned both families among their patrons.[134] Other states, like Massilia or those of Greece and Asia Minor, had never been defeated by Rome. By cooperating with many Roman governors they had acquired a number of friends and benefactors (as with Massilia and Caesar, Pompeius and the Cornelii). As Oppius promised in accepting the patronage of Aphrodisias: "I shall take every care both in office and as a private individual to do whatever I can, while preserving my good faith, to help you and your public affairs, and always to procure your advantage." In such cases, the communities prospered (or could be less easily exploited) because they were able to secure the formal or informal protection of *several* patrons. The more patrons they acquired, the greater the security (or, more cynically, the greater perception of security).

The third category involves Italian communities (formerly in the second category). The distinction between this category and that described immediately above is in some aspects not significant. In both cases, the client communities had a number of patrons, some of whom had been formally coopted by a decree of the town council. The major distinction is of course in status. Citizen communities had access to institutional alternatives not readily available even to the more important of Rome's allies.

As noted, these categories might also be considered stages in the development of relations between Rome and her subjects. Especially in the West, the ability of a community to acquire more patrons and, thereby, more effective protection, went hand in hand with the process of Romanization. This is not to claim that patronage caused Romanization, only to illustrate that the two were mutually re-enforcing.

The fourth category involves patronal relationships between states. The most important Gallic communities, Caesar says, competed among themselves for the clientele of smaller states and reckoned their status to depend on the number of dependents. While Caesar is not explicit on the issue, his description indicates that while a client maintained an exclusive relationship with its patron, it was to some degree free to change allegiance. That

[134] This is certain for the former. On the role of two families in the conquest of the Allobrogi, Rivet, 40–42. The *nomen* Domitius is more common in the Narbonensis than is that of Fabius, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 309.

Caesar does not make the Roman people the patron of any state confirms Rich's theory that, because there could be no alternative patron to Rome, the words *patronus* and *cliens* were not considered appropriate to describe the relationships.[135] Nonetheless, states that were *deditii* and had been received *in fidem* of individuals were considered to be in the clientele of their conqueror. In such cases, the use of the terminology of patronage suggests that the community was also in a position to seek out and attach itself to other individuals.

As each community acquired more patrons it also found itself part of an increasingly complex network involving not only the availability of alternatives, but also conflicting interests. As Chr. Meier has argued "Bindungen" during the Late Republic, his third phase, became more formal and multiple (even competitive), leading to a much more dense structure of obligations.[136] In respect to the patronage of communities, this is largely true. The epigraphical evidence indicates that relations between patrons and client communities were becoming more formal (at least in the initiation of the relationship), that communities had multiple patrons, that the civic patrons themselves had a variety of connections with other powerful individuals, and that the parties often faced difficult choices when their obligations conflicted. Implicit in the *lex Ursonensis*, a chapter of which regulates the manner in which one might become the formal patron of a town, is the fact that towns did indeed adopt patrons and that the process could be controversial.[137] Massilia had at least two formal patrons; Pompeii and probably Urso had more. The frequency of the *nomina* Aemilius, Fabius, Licinius, and Sempronius in Spain suggest which families might have been involved.[138] While patrons from these families might once have served as the principal protectors of a client community, they themselves came to share their *clientelae* with other members of the elite and later found themselves and their clients incorporated into the parties of the dynasts. With multiplicity came stratification. The Licinii and Fabii, for example, now had to serve the interests of their clients by representing their causes before the Senate, a Caesar, a Pompeius or the current governor, just as Oppius promises to do ("… and when I am in Rome I shall make clear to the senate and people how you have conducted your affairs"). Moreover, just as individuals might be clients

135 Rich, op. cit., 125–127.
136 *Res publica amissa*, 24 and 30–31.
137 Discussed in the following Ch. 6.2.
138 Data collected by Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 309 ff.

to superiors, and patrons to inferiors, so too do we find states that were the patrons of weaker communities, but themselves in the clientele of (for example) a leading Roman like Caesar. Brokerage was also made complex by divisions within a community. Some *primores* might appeal to Pompeius, others to Caesar, and to act in a way contrary to official policy of the community.

There are some important inconsistencies in the theory and practice of civic patronage. Dionysios suggests that the relationship between the two parties was exclusive and that the two competed with one another to perform services. The reality is that clients made best use of the system when they had more than one patron—which may explain hostility of traditional patrons (as Ahenobarbus in Gaul) as new competitors (like Caesar) began to undermine their exclusive claims. In theory too clients could always be counted on to defend the interests of their patron; in reality, clients changed their allegiance in the face of compelling necessity or when they felt that their patron had abandoned them. Clients could be expected to respond positively, but not unconditionally. If Pompeius could not keep them safe, then they were not obliged to defend his interests. Indeed, they owed it to themselves to find someone who could. In theory, the number of clients served as an indication of potential strength; in reality the expectations about how that potential might be actualized were generally higher than could be delivered in practice and could not be delivered without the coercive powers of the state.[139] Moreover, there is nothing in the literature of the period that indicates that clients were held to be treacherous or perfidious for doing so. In theory, clients expected their patrons to provide protection and represent their interests; in reality, patrons were not always able or willing to act in any given situation and clients may have deceived themselves about what the patrons could actually deliver.

During the Late Republic, at a time when other forms of clientele appear to be strengthening, the ties that bound patron and client community frequently appear to be weak or ineffective. Nevertheless, because the literary and epigraphical evidence indicate that the expectations associated with this form of patronage remained high, it would be a mistake to evaluate the role of the institution solely by the performance of the two parties. Indeed, the *lex Ursonensis* makes it abundantly clear that the decision to adopt a patron of senatorial rank and with imperium was a controversial issue in any community. As communities acquired more patrons with diverse agen-

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[139] This theme is explored by M.S. Nicols, *Appearances and Reality*, in various contexts.

das, and as the political struggles of the Late Republic became increasingly violent, so too did both sides find it difficult to perform consistently at the level of expectation.

The expectations of patrons and client communities were conditioned by a number of factors. The status and reputation of both parties were clearly central considerations; it made a difference whether the community had been recently conquered, was a trusted ally or a community of citizens, whether the patron was a senatorial governor or a local landowner. Expectations were also conditioned by the nature of the previous relationship but perhaps more so by the hope of future services. Inter alia, these included military and legal protection, mediation both at the local and at the imperial level, guarantee of property and status, civic improvement. Especially in the Late Republic, however, client communities, both citizen and peregrine, also represented potential military assets to the patron. Though the Romans frequently underestimated how long it might take to realize these assets and that the role of the Roman governing magistrates acting in the area was critical, they nonetheless made their plans as if the process were instantaneous.

The decisions made by communities in response to the demands of a patron were often conditioned by the state of their own internal struggles; that is, factions within the cities summoned the forces of one patron or another in order to advance their agenda. Just as at Corcyra during the Peloponnesian War, the level of violence at the imperial level aggravated the level of violence on the local level. Communities, or more properly the *prudentes* in the communities, were also more responsive to the needs of a general who was physically present with his army than they were to an absent patron however extensive and recent the benefactions of the latter may have been. So too did patrons sometimes find it necessary to abandon their clients. These observations suggest that self-interest conditioned the expectations and performance of both parties in respect to the initiation and the maintenance of a relationship.

Public display is a characteristic feature of the more developed form of patronage. Pompeius' monument in the Pyrenees, nominally a list of conquered states (i.e., *clientes more maiorum*) and the statue base to him at Auximum are but two examples. More generally, clients made vows and set up monuments of all sorts on the assumption that the public recognition of a special relationship lent weight to the attempts of one party to manipulate the other, they contributed to the creation of belief, to the perception of power and influence of both parties. Nonetheless, the monuments and the ascription of a clientele represented a political bluff. Under ordinary

circumstances both parties might take pride in the name and successes of their partners and wanted to believe that their expectations would be fulfilled or at least convince others that they would be. In other words, the bluff was credible. In warfare, the risks were much higher and the bluff was more likely to be called, the illusion more likely to be exposed. Pompeius was certainly the most successful player of the peacetime game and against a less formidable opponent might well have succeeded in giving substance to the illusion. When, however, his clients, formal and informal, were faced with the reality of putting their lives and property on the line for him, some (including the *prudentes*) chose safety and justified the decision by claiming that they had been abandoned. Dolabella noted that Pompeius was not protected by all his clients; the inverse was also true and known to all. Indeed, Cicero provides a philosophical justification for the actions of the clients of Pompeius: the basis of civilized life was the protection of life and property; if Pompeius could not provide that protection, then the obligation to support and cooperate dissolved.[140]

In Italy there were both formal and informal *clientelae*. Pompeius Magnus and his father, for example, were perceived by ancients and by modern scholars to have Picenum in their clientele. This clientele consisted of informal and formal relations with both individuals and communities. The basis of the relationship was twofold. Pompeius Strabo had been active militarily in Picenum during the Social War and the family owned large tracts of land there. The latter item especially assured that both the Picentini and the Pompeii had a common interest in the prosperity of the region. As patrons, the Pompeii expected men there to follow their recommendations in elections and to respond to their requests for recruits. In their turn, they certainly advanced the careers of promising Picentines in the army and in the government and probably also represented the interests of the area at Rome. But not all Picentines were equally well disposed toward the family.[141] Those who had suffered at their hands and the *prudentes* may have been ready to work with Caesar. Finally, Italian communities, especially through the conferral of the title *patronus*, became increasingly important as sources of legitimate authority in the midst of a constitutional crisis.

In the provinces, the situation was somewhat different. Prospective patrons, with the exception of enfranchised dignitaries like Cornelius Balbus, probably did not own large estates in the territory of their client commu-

140 The theory is elaborated at the beginning of *de off.* 2.
141 On this subject, M.S. Nicols, *Appearances and Reality*.

nities.[142] This meant that the two parties did not have a strong, common interest in the prosperity of the area. Because the relationship was inevitably more tenuous, communities and individuals may have preferred to formalize the connection. A public commitment recorded on an inscription at Rome provided the client with at least some assurance that the person honored would indeed act on its behalf. Indeed, one may well believe that the formal relationship was devised to overcome the problems of distance and minimal common interests. From the perspective of the patron, there can be no doubt that that members of the Roman nobility competed for honors and for clients. The former enhanced one's reputation; the latter, by their very number and reputation, legitimized authority and suggested a level of support that might be mobilized for both civic and military purposes. The disadvantage of formal clientele was that the patron assumed responsibilities some of which could become burdensome. For the government, the *clientelae* of leading senators were variously reckoned as advantages for the administration of the empire and as dangers to the political order.

The efficacy of patronage depended on the perception that both parties stood to gain by perpetuating it. The ideology suggested that a client was tied to one patron; the reality was that patrons competed for clients and, because of competing obligations, were not always able to act as expected. Clients could then best protect their interests by having a number of patrons, by developing choice. Patronage was intended to protect the person, reputation and property of both parties. If the patron was able to provide what was expected, it was reasonable and proper for the client to maintain the relationship. If the circumstances changed and the patron was perceived to be weak or to be unable or unwilling to provide protection, then the client could turn to other (and sometimes new) alliances.

142 I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*, Bruxelles, 1965, 34: "The paucity of evidence is no proof that there was little senatorial property in the provinces; on the other hand, because we know that 23 senators owned property in the provinces (from Sulla to Augustus, inclusively), we cannot conclude that such ownership was common." Shatzman's Table 7, (460–461) indicates that there are only eight cases that can be securely dated to the period between 80 and 28 BC.

CHAPTER THREE

AUGUSTUS AND CIVIC PATRONAGE

Augustus claimed to have restored the republic. To Tacitus this meant that he restored the facade of constitutional government, specifically, that he restored the annual consulate and made access to the office easier for the aristocracy. The critical word is facade: The corporate prestige of the Senate was guaranteed, but the range and nature of its *auctoritas* diminished; leading senators were allowed to gain the prestige of the office, but found the exercise of their *imperium* to be constrained formally and informally. The reasons for this new contract, one that transferred legitimacy to Augustus in exchange for the guarantee of status for the aristocracy, are well known. To rule the empire the Princeps needed the cooperation of that quintessentially aristocratic body (the Senate) because it incorporated the administrative tradition and the experience of all individual magistrates. Augustus was, moreover, an aristocrat and naturally looked to aristocrats for support and honor. Finally, the very propaganda he had employed in his war against Antonius had stressed the triumph of Italy and of Italian political values over those of Egypt and the monarchic. Hence, the municipal elites of Italy, who had supported Octavian and who were organized in local senates, expected the Princeps to re-establish at least the appearance of traditional constitutional government, senatorial authority and aristocratic privilege.[1]

For historians, there have been two complementary questions associated with this process. How did Augustus and his successors extend and wield imperial power? And how were the collective prestige and authority of the Senate honored publicly, yet eventually undermined? Tacitus provides a detailed commentary on both aspects of the problem. What is easily overlooked is that individual senators continued to find opportunity to satisfy their ambitions for honor and status and did so despite the fact that the Senate collectively saw its authority and prestige reduced.

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[1] On these issues, R. Syme, *Roman Revolution*, esp. Chapter 22. and K. Hopkins, "The Senatorial Aristocracy under the Emperors", in *Death and Renewal*, Cambridge (University Press, 1983, 2, Ch. 3). I am very much indebted to Claude Eilers for his extensive comments on this chapter. I know he does not agree with all the conclusions.

Titles associated with magistracies continued to be central this competition for honor. They were not, however, the only ones. Indeed, the cooption of a civic patron, which suggested the very best of republican tradition and virtue, not only survived in the Principate, but also remained one of the most prestigious honors a community could confer.[2] Moreover, patrons contributed directly and indirectly to the process of urbanization of the western provinces of the Roman Empire.

Patronage had played a critical role in the administration of the Empire during the Republic. As Badian writes: "The mystery of the cohesion of the Empire through successive civil wars, and despite manifest misgovernment, now becomes intelligible. The Empire was based on the personal loyalty of leading men throughout the provinces to the leading families at Rome, and this attachment proved to be independent of political vicissitudes and … on the whole unaffected by the fortunes of those families. It was the foundation on which the emperors were to build."[3] As has been argued above (Ch. 2.3 and 2.4), the notion of 'personal loyalty' may be exaggerated; we might more accurately label it a 'marriage of convenience' in that both parties calculated the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining the relationship at any one time. Because the structure of these mutually beneficial relationships continued to be useful, such connections persisted through the Republic and into the Principate.[4] Specifically, patronage [in its many forms] allowed the Romans to maintain an administrative system that was minimal because it was supplemented by a set of personal relations between the rulers and the ruled. This dual system also functioned because the subjects were able to select whom they wished to have as their brokers with the Roman state. Hence, when Augustus decided to perpetuate and perfect the minimalist administrative system of the Republic, he also accepted the continuation of the formal and informal system of patronage. Because patrons often served as intermediaries between the cities of the empire and the provincial and imperial government, they were very much in a position to affect the overall pattern of imperial administration.

It was, however, an institution with potential for both good and evil; that is though *patrocinium publicum* complemented the formal administration

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[2] Note that the civic patrons stand at the head of the *album Canusinum*, discussed more fully in Chapter 8. Also: *CIL* 11, 3429 = *ILS* 6110 … *honore qui est apud nos potissimus*.

[3] *Foreign Clientelae*, 262; cf. Brunt, '*Clientela*'.

[4] On one aspect of the phenomenon, A. Wallace-Hadrill, The Structure of the Roman House, *PBSR* 56 (1988) 43–97, especially 88, also Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 7 ff.

of the Roman Empire in a critical way, its beneficial and protective aspects might be abused by an unscrupulous governor. Verres is, of course, the prime but not the only example of the latter.[5] Moreover, patronage had played a central role in the political and military struggles of the Late Republic. Rightly or wrongly, it had been associated with dynastic wars, sedition, and with the quest for legitimacy during the constitutional crisis. The restoration of the Republic, however, had its roots in tradition. No one wished to see destroyed an institution that, it was believed, owed its origin to Romulus and had the potential to serve the public good (discussed in Chapter 1). Civic patronage should survive, but expectations associated with its benefactions and services had to be adjusted to serve the needs of the *pax Romana*.

To resolve the problem Augustus had to satisfy three competing interests. The communities saw the advantages of patronage both in the form of protection / mediation and public benefaction (the epigraphical record is absolutely clear on this point), but wanted assurances (we may assume) that unscrupulous governors would not exploit them, that they would no longer be compelled to choose sides in Roman civil wars nor find that their own internal dissensions were aggravated by imperial struggles. For his part, Augustus wished to use the talents and resources of the privileged classes to further his urban and imperial program. The alternative, to become the direct benefactor of all communities himself was impossible: to do so would mean confiscating the wealth of the nobility, both imperial and local. Though allowing the nobility their traditional honors and wealth, he could not, however, tolerate the leading senators/patrons to constitute a danger to himself or to the public order (consider the perceived threat posed by Valerius Asiaticus, his wealth and his clients during the reign of Claudius, Tac. *Ann* 11, 1). For their part, the members of the elite, or would-be-elite, needed an incentive to act, they needed a setting to display their achievements and honors. During the Principate, the public places of Rome could no longer serve as a stage, but the communities of Italy and the provinces offered alternative venues.[6]

The analysis of the institutional structure of *patrocinium publicum* during the transition from the late Republic to the Principate is complicated by

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[5] Note the examples discussed in Ch. 2, especially L. Antonius in Asia, the False Marius and Basilus, also Ch. 5.1 discusses the case of Verres in more detail.

[6] For the theory from the Roman perspective, Tac. *Ag*. 21. On the connection between benefaction and self representation; Eck, Senatorial Self-representation, 113 ff., and G. Alföldy, "Euergetismus und Epigraphik in der Augusteischen Zeit", *Actes X^e congr intern d'epigr*, 1997, 293–304, esp. 303.

a number of factors. First, the nature of evidence on patronage changes radically. No literary source for the Principate provides anything like the breadth and depth of information found in the writings of Cicero and to a lesser degree in those of Caesar. Pliny, Tacitus, Fronto and Arrian, for example, discuss episodes involving civic patronage during the Principate, but the statements seem to take the fact and prevalence of civic patronage for granted. The first systematic treatment of patronage in Greek does not appear until the second half of the 4th Century, when Libanius circulated his treatise '*On Patronage*'.[7] In contrast, an enormous amount of information of a personal and legal character may be gained from the more than one thousand Latin inscriptions referring to a wide variety of patronal activities in the Principate, yet relatively few in Greek. By way of contrast, we have for the Late Republic only a handful of Latin inscriptions yet dozens in Greek.[8] The critical point here is that the perspectives of the literary sources of the Late Republic are different from those of the epigraphical sources of the Principate; the former reflect the interests and prejudices of the senatorial elite; the latter those of client communities and to a certain degree also those of individual patrons half of whom were not senators. Moreover, for the Principate we are best informed by the epigraphical sources, and less so by the literary; the exact opposite of what had been the case in the Late Republic. Inevitably there remains some uncertainty as to whether or not the different patterns reflect fundamental differences.

Second, during the Late Republic, the relations between patrons and clients had been tested under the harshest conditions. Client communities, like Massilia, argued that they were unwilling to be exploited in a struggle that was not their own. Yet the Massilians were not able to sustain that strategy, made the wrong choice and paid the price. Moreover, both patrons and clients might claim to have been abandoned in times of crisis. That both parties in the relationship were sometimes disappointed that their expectations about benefactions and services were not met should not be taken to mean that patronal relations were perceived to be shallow or

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[7] Patronage had taken on a somewhat different meaning by this time. J.B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, 1923, p. 57.

[8] Eilers includes a total of 163 patrons of Greek cities in his list, but the list covers cases that extend back into the Middle Republic, his Appendix 1. As will be seen in a later chapter, changes in the epigraphical habit and urbanization account in part for these raw results. Ch. 2 with Tables 5.1 and 5.2, in Ch. 5 below. Cicero was of course very sensitive to their use, as will be argued in Ch. 5.3 especially. The large number of epigraphical references is related to the development of the epigraphical habit in the Principate.

useless. The institution survived *because each party wanted to believe that it might be able to manipulate the other*. Clients continued to believe (or at least to hope) that they might find protection and/or benefactions by securing one or more powerful Romans as their formal patrons; patrons believed that their claims to political authority and respectability could be legitimized by the accumulation of ever more civic clients and ever more extravagant claims (as patron of the '35 tribes' mentioned in the last chapter); they wanted to believe that they might obtain "men and material" for their "cause" from their clients, they feared that their enemies might actually do so.

Augustus generally allowed Republican institutions to continue until it was demonstrated that they could not function peacefully and successfully in the new age.[9] Expectations about some aspects of patronage had to change, of course, and Augustus employed a variety of strategies to insure that civic patronage would serve the common good. First, he set the tone through his personal example by employing his private wealth to enhance the cities of the empire and the capital itself, and expected his associates to follow that example.[10] Second, and to judge from the record, he eventually declined to accept the title of patron in peregrine communities, suggesting thereby that *patrocinium* was appropriate only for citizen communities. Third, he allowed, perhaps subtlety even encouraged, citizen communities to adopt multiple patrons, a device that provided the former with greater options for mediation and benefaction and may also have diluted the potential power of ambitious individuals. Fourth, there is reason to believe that he established criteria that gave at least indirect guidance about the status of the participating parties in the relationship. In the early part of his Principate, the charters of the various citizen communities (Caesarian in character) defined the conditions for adopting a patron;[11] in his last years he appears to have established guidelines that at least served to discourage *peregrine* communities from formally adopting their senatorial governors as patrons. So, too, did the realities of power encourage peregrine

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9 On this issue, W. Eck, "Augustus' administrative Reformen: Pragmatismus oder systematisches Planen", *Acta Classica* 29 (1986) 105–120.

10 Liberality and patronage are not synonymous. Nonetheless, the two are often associated especially in the epigraphical evidence of the Principate (Ch. 7). More generally, on these subject, G. Alföldy, Euergetismus, 300–305.

11 The details of the regulations are discussed in Ch. 6. None of the surviving charters dates to the Augustan period, though c. 130 of the *lex Ursonensis* may date to his Principate.

communities to look to Augustus for the kinds of benefactions that had once been expected of governors. In general, his strategy was successful: members of the elite *voluntarily* used their wealth in support of imperial policy and, thereby, civic patronage. Hence, patronage, which had during the civil wars been more closely associated with the support of armed retainers, came to serve the more peaceful interests of the Empire and its inhabitants.

The material for this discussion is divided into several categories. We need to understand:

- the literary evidence of the Augustan Age, especially that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and also (though less significantly and somewhat later) Velleius Paterculus, provides some indication of the role and significance of patronage (here and in Ch. 4).
- the pattern of civic patronage as it is revealed in the epigraphical record, the major source of information on patronage in the Augustan Age (also in Ch. 7).
- the function of legal constrains on civic patronage (Ch. 6),
- the role of *aemulatio principis* in the exercise of civic patronage.

3.1. *The Theory and Practice of Civic Patronage in the Age of Augustus*

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the Greek rhetorician and historian, worked in Rome between 30 and 8 BC. Though he does not appear to have had regular access to the inner circles of power, his *Roman Antiquities* does reflect contemporary attitudes toward early Roman history and institutions.

In a frequently cited passage, Dionysius describes how Romulus devised patronage and the central role it played in the social cohesion of early Rome.

> *After Romulus had distinguished those of superior rank from their inferiors, he next established laws and defined, what each was supposed to do. The patricians were to be priests, magistrates and judges, and to assist him in the management of public affairs, devoting themselves to the business of the city. The plebeians were released from these duties because they were not familiar with them and because their poverty did not allow them the necessary leisure ... He entrusted the plebeians to the care of the patricians, allowing each plebeian to choose for himself a patrician whom he wished to have as a protector* (προστάτην) *... Romulus not only selected a gracious term to designate the relationship, calling this protection* (προστασίαν) *of the poor and lowly a 'patronage'* (πατρωνείαν) *but he also assigned kindnesses to both parties, thus making the connection between them a humane bond befitting fellow citizens*
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> *The traditions which he then defined concerning patronage* (πατρωνείας) *and which long continued in use among the Romans were as follows: It was the duty*

> *of the patricians to explain to their clients the laws, of which they were ignorant, doing everything for them that fathers do for their sons ... to bring suit on behalf of their clients ... to defend them ... and, to put the matter briefly, to secure for them both in private and public affairs all that tranquility of which they particularly stood in need. It was the duty of the clients to assist their patrons in providing dowries ... to pay their ransom ... to discharge out of their own purses their patrons' losses ... not as loans, but as thank-offerings, to share with their patrons the costs incurred in their magistracies and dignities and other public expenditures, in the same manner as if they were their relations. For both parties neither lawful nor pious to accuse each other in law-suits or to bear witness or to give their votes against each other or to be found in the number of each other's enemies; and whoever was convicted of doing any of these things was guilty of treason by virtue of the law sanctioned by Romulus, and might lawfully be put to death by any man who so wished as a victim devoted to Jupiter of the infernal regions ... Accordingly, the connections between the clients and patrons continued for many generations, differing in no way from the ties of blood-relations and being handed down to their children's children. And it was a matter of great praise to men of illustrious families to have as many clients as possible and not only to preserve the succession of hereditary patronages but also by their own merit to acquire others. And it is incredible how great the contest of goodwill was between the patrons and clients as each side strove not to be outdone by the other in kindness, the clients feeling that they should render all possible services to their patrons and the patrons wishing by all means not to occasion any trouble to their clients and accepting no gifts of money. So superior was their manner of life to all pleasure; for they measured their happiness by virtue, not by fortune.*
>
> *It was not only in the city itself that the plebeians were under the protection of the patricians, but every colony of Rome and every city that joined in alliance and friendship with her and also every city conquered in war had such protectors and patrons as they wished. And the senate has often referred the controversies of these cities and nations to their Roman patrons and regarded their decisions as binding ...* (2, 9–11).

There is much in this account that can be dismissed out of hand: Patronage hardly needed to be 'established' by a king; the account of the resulting social tranquility is hopelessly idealized. The passage makes more sense when it is understood as a reflection (however inexact) of how the educated classes of the Augustan Age perceived the past and how they wished to construct the future. In the New Order (just as in Romulan Rome), harmony (i.e., the creation of mutual dependence) could be secured when rank was respected and individuals and collectives knew their duties to one another.

Though this account does not devote substantial attention to civic patronage specifically, it is significant for this investigation because of the emphasis that Dionysius places on the working of patronage. He may well have speculated about the quality of patronal relations between the

patricians and plebeians in Romulan Rome, but he surely was familiar with the widespread practice of civic patronage involving the Roman elite and the peregrine cities of Asia Minor.[12] Hence, though he does not attempt to extend this usage of civic patronage back to the regal period, his comments may be understood as a reflection of contemporary experience. It is also noteworthy that he departs from his previous model of explaining the mutual responsibilities of both parties and concentrates specifically on the duties of the patron. To Dionysius, the patron was depicted primarily as a protector and as an intermediary between the client and the central government.[13] That later sources, both literary and epigraphical, also concentrate on the duties of the patron may well reflect the same perception. Finally, there is no indication in this account that the patronage a Roman senator might exercise over peregrine communities was in any way objectionable. This perspective is consistent with the epigraphical evidence that suggests that, though Augustus eventually declined to accept the formal patronage of a peregrine community, he did not yet (i.e., at the time that Dionysius completed his Book 2) expect the same of the members of the senatorial order.[14]

Notably absent from the discussion is the image of the patron as the *material* benefactor of the community, that is, material benefaction is not listed among the promises make by Q. Oppius at Aphrodisias or for that matter by Caesar at Urso (Representative Texts, J and K). Perhaps this is because such benefactions may never have been associated with civic patronage in the East and hence Dionysius, as other Greeks, reckoned such gifts as appropriate to *euergesia*. That is, the *euergesia* and *patrocinium* might yet be construed as complementary, indeed overlapping, but nonetheless not identical institutions.

Livy, writing in about the same period and about a similar subject, does not specifically mention the creation of patronage as an institution. The first reference to the existence of patrons and their functions dates to ca. 316 when he reports that the Antiates complained to Rome that they were living

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12 The numerous inscriptions are discussed in Ch. 7. Diodorus may have known Q. Aemilius Lepidus, cos. 21 BC, and also a patron of his Halicarnassus as perhaps was his father. Eilers, C 116.

13 These roles are prominent in the *Verrines* and are discussed in Ch. 5. Notably absent is any reference to the patron as a mediator in local disputes.

14 Eilers notes that Dionysius' account is a mixture of 'myth and social engineering', 62. Certainly the statement that patronage 'worked' until the time of the Gracchi supports that hypothesis. Even if he is following some optimate crank on failure of patronage in the late republic, his words may still reflect a perception of patronage in the Augustan Age.

without laws or magistrates. The Senate's response was to direct the *ipsius coloniae patroni* to establish the appropriate laws (9, 20). What is significant about this passage is the fact that Livy writes as if it were self-evident that colonies of Rome routinely enjoyed the protection of patrons (plural). In respect to interstate relations, the historian appears to have preferred to use the concept of *hospitium*. Bolchazy notes that the word appears 129 times in the first seven pentads and is heavy with moral overtones.[15] Most of these cases refer, as will be argued in Ch. 5, to *hospitium privatum*, and not to *publicum*. That is, the vocabulary of *patrocinium* and *hospitium* are complementary and overlapping institutions, and they are concepts that make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens, between individuals and collectives.

Some support for the notion that the public patronage had become common no later than the end of the third century, BC, may be deduced from the notice of Valerius Maximus, a contemporary of Livy, that C. Fabricius *Samnitos universos in clientela habebat* (4. 3.6). In this case the clients are not citizens, but the defeated. That is, Valerius accepts the concept of *clientela* deriving from conquest *more maiorum* (discussed at length in Ch. 2.1).

Velleius Paterculus, a contemporary of Tiberius, enunciates a variant on this related theme. After the destruction of Varus and his army, Tiberius Caesar, *perpetuus patronus Romani imperii*, was dispatched to the north where, significantly, he reassured Gallic provinces, distributed his legions, and fortified garrisons (2, 120.1). The only parallel for this usage has already been mentioned: L. Antonius is called the patron of the Thirty-five Tribes (i.e., of Roman citizens, Ch. 2.4.5). Notable is the fact that the word is applied to Tiberius in the period when Augustus was still alive, that is at a time when Augustus too might have been so described. If so, the expression suggests that Velleius understood that Empire might have more than one patron, just as Augustus could share his power with a colleague. Such an interpretation is consistent with Roman notions of patronage in that it allowed clients to have multiple patrons.

In sum, Dionysius and his contemporaries may be presenting an idealized vision of patronage past and present, one that held that the proper exercise of the institution was a vital instrument in the maintenance of social peace and imperial power. Livy, for example, rarely uses *patronus* and when he

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15 L. Bolchazy, *Hospitality in Early Rome*, Chicago, 1977, 61, based on the incidences recorded in David Parkard's Concordance to Livy, Harvard (Cambridge MA; University Press) 1968.

does, it is significant that it occurs in relation to Roman senators and communities; *hospitium*, in contrast (but consistent with Cicero's usage), occurs between individuals of different states. That is, the dominion of Rome in interstate relations is recognized in the use of the vocabulary of patronage, while the theoretical equality of leading men of all states is confirmed in the use of *hospitium* to define personal connections. Velleius, in contrast, extends the meaning of the patronage, but still appears to be working in the tradition developed during the late Republic. These patterns are, as will be shown, also recognizable in the epigraphic record.

3.2. *The* Princeps *and the Imperial Family*

The evidence on Augustus (and on the members of his immediate family) as patrons of communities is almost entirely epigraphical.[16] As the patterns in the sources are reasonably clear and consistent, it is arguable that the Princeps had specific ideas about the institution and about his function as civic patron; it is also arguable that these ideas changed over the course of his public life. Specifically, Octavian readily entered numerous relationships with Italian communities in his early career when legitimation was a major concern. As Augustus, he regularly became *ipso facto* the patron of colonies he had founded and of the municipalities whose status he had enhanced. Epigraphical references to his formal patronage decline and cease altogether by 2 BC, at the latest. At that time, the record shows that Augustus had a clear preference for the cognate title, *pater*. Most notably, and in sharp contrast to republican practice, he did not become the formal patron of peregrine communities, though the title might have been ascribed to him in the traditional way (*more maiorum*) as the victor who had received the surrender of a defeated state.

Inscriptions confirm that Octavian became patron of at least six Italian communities.[17] To judge by his nomenclature and titles, Saticula, Larinum and Tarentum adopted him as their patron before 37, Prolaqueum by 33, Capua by 31, and Luna by 28 BC. As these inscriptions are all of the standard

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16 See Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and Eilers, Appendix 5. Note that "members of the immediate family" is loosely defined. Hence (for example), Claudius Marcellus is included, but not Sex. Appuleius.

17 Table 3.2. The inscription of Interamna (*CIL* 10, 5332) is very fragmentary and it is not certain that it refers to Augustus and to his patronage. It is not included in the following discussion.

honorary variety, that is, they were not authorized specifically to record the fact that he was adopted patron, they can only suggest terminal dates for the establishment of the connection. Because Italian communities were particularly ready to take patrons during the tumultuous years following the assassination of Caesar (recall the cases of the False Marius and L. Antonius discussed in the previous chapter) and because no Italian community can definitively be said to have extended him the title dated after 27 BC, I suspect that Octavian, like his rivals, actively pursued the honor early in his career (i.e., he entered most of the relationships before 40 BC) and did so because he recognized that the title conferred at least the appearance of legitimacy. Given the fact that such dubious figures as the False Marius were able to become patron of many towns, one may well wonder how much legitimacy was actually acquired. Even so, perceptions, as the case of "Marius" demonstrates, had a force of their own.[18] Down to 30 BC, he employed the title in the standard manner, and communities (where it was relevant) continued to include '*patronus*' to his titulature until it became apparent that *pater* was preferred, or until they were discouraged from doing so. The transition latter is best dated to the 20's.

The provincial cases may well date as late as the 20's.[19] In the East, it is striking that, with all the dedications to Octavian-Augustus and with the frequent references to Roman senators as patrons during this period (see Table 3.1), we know of a few cases (Ilium and Plataea) in which the Princeps accepted the title in a Greek community. As Ilium had a special status in Roman and in Julian history, the exception is easily understood.[20] In general, however, he acted in a manner that differentiated himself from other leading senators and provided a guide for a new set of preferences that may be dated to AD 11–12 (discussed below).

18 Harmand, 158, stresses that patronage served primarily as an instrument of political power in this period, a formulation that is too vague.

19 Attempts to relate the epigraphical occurrence of the title to his travels are neither necessary nor convincing.

20 For Plataea, *IG* 7.2505. It should be noted that these two cases should not lead to the conclusion that Augustus regularly accepted the honor. A community, unaware of his preferences, may have conferred the title and sent him notice of that fact. Even if Augustus responded that he declined the honor, the community would not necessarily remove the inscription. Note what happens when Tiberius declines divine honors, *AE* 1929, Nos. 99–100 (= E–J no. 102).

Table 3.1: The Eastern Client Communities of Caesar, Augustus, and the Imperial Family (For the references, see Eilers, Appendix 5 and the Companion Web Site = CWS)

Cities in the eastern provinces	
? C. Iulius Caesar	Thespiae?
C. Iulius Caesar	Chios
C. Iulius Caesar	Pergamum
C. Iulius Caesar	Alabanda
C. Iulius Caesar	Cnidos
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Ilium
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Plataea (?)
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Corcyra
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Calymna
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Corinth
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Ilium
Ti. Claudius Nero	Elis
Ti. Claudius Nero	Epidaurus
Nero Claudius Drusus	Epidaurus
Nero Claudius Drusus	Myra
? Nero Claudius Drusus	Samos
Nero Claudius Drusus	Cnidos
C. Iulius Caesar	Ilium
Agrippa Iulius Caesar	Patrae
Germanicus Iulius Caesar	Patrae

In the West we have four examples of Augustus as the civic patron. Aleria and Ulia were citizen communities, the former a *colonia*, the latter a municipality whose status had been enhanced by Caesar.[21] The third and fourth cases involve Alpine peoples who had been conquered under the auspices of Augustus. Three considerations suggest that these two peregrine communities (the Nantuates and the Seduni) may have claimed his patronage by ascription (that is, that they did not seek the formal approval of Augustus to do so, but felt they enjoyed it by virtue of Roman custom). As the conquest and organization of the Alpine regions was completed in 14 BC, the hypothetical cooptation probably could not have taken place until about, or even after, that year. We have, however, no other formal cooptation that can be dated so late. These are the only *peregrine* communities (except for Ilium) that claim Augustus as patron.[22] Third, though inscriptions are dated

[21] Vittinghoff, *Kolonisation*, 1321.

[22] Eilers, p. 285 notes the Salassi incolae in Augusta praetoria *ILS* 6753 also claimed Augustus as patron, presumably a connection established by virtue of membership in *Augusta praetoria*.

to 6/5 BC at the latest, one does name Augustus as *pater patriae*, a title he did not officially accept for another few years.[23] There then is good reason to believe that these communities were capable of ascribing to Augustus honors he had not formally accepted. Hence, it is likely that the two tribes may have claimed the relationship *more maiorum*.[24]

Table 3.2: The Italian and Western Client Communities of Caesar, Augustus, and the Imperial Family (For the references, see Eilers, Appendix 5 and the Companion Web Site = CWS)

Patron	*City*
C. Iulius Caesar	Bovianum Und.
C. Iulius Caesar?	Interamna Lir.
C. Iulius Caesar	Alba Fucens
C. Iulius Caesar	Vibo Valentia
C. Iulius Caesar (Octavianus)	Saticula
C. Iulius Caesar (Octavianus)	Tarentum
Imp. Caesar (Octavianus)	Larinum
Imp. Caesar (Octavianus)	Prolaqueum
Imp. Caesar (Octavianus)	Capua
Imp. Caesar (Octavianus)	Luna
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Grumentum
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Salassi
M. Claudius Marcellus	Pompeii
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Claternae
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Cubulteria
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Gnathia
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Reate
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Rufrae (vicus)
Ti. Claudius Nero	Amiternum
Ti. Claudius Nero	Lucus Feroniae
Nero Claudius Drusus	Lucus Feroniae
C. Caesar	Rusellae
L. Caesar	Alba Fucens
L. Caesar	Aesis
L. Caesar	Cosa
L. Caesar	Pisa
Germanicus Caesar (?)	Fanum Fortunae

23 *ILS* 6755. Dio seems to know of the practice 55.10.10.

24 That is, they could justify the claim to his patronage on the grounds that Augustus had conquered them. On this issue, see the previous chapters. Eilers objects that the tribes could not have been familiar with Roman practice of designating someone as patron *more maiorum* by conquest. This part of the Alps had, however, had extensive contract with a number of Romans for over a century. I agree with Eilers this is a good example of a phenomenon that was probably more widespread than historians admit, namely provincial cities may not have known all the rules or etiquette governing civic patronage and other honors.

Patron	*City*
C. Iulius Caesar	Hispalis
C. Iulius Caesar	Massilia
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Aleria
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Seduni
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Nantuates
Imp. Caesar Augustus	Ulia
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Ulia
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Carthago Nova
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Gades
M. Vipsanius Agrippa	Emporiae
Ti. Claudius Nero (?)	Tarraco
Ti. Claudius Nero	Italica
Ti. Claudius Nero	Ulia
Ti. Claudius Nero	Carthago Nova
C. Caesar	Nemausus
C. Caesar	Salaria
C. Caesar	Aleria
C. Caesar (?)	Emporiae
L. Caesar	Aleria
L. Caesar	Lugdunensis
L. Caesar	Ulia
Drusus Caesar Germanici f.	Metellinum

Augustus' formal patronage of communities was not, of course, restricted to those communities mentioned on Table 3.2. Indeed, he must have been recognized as patron of many other individual communities whose status he had enhanced.[25] In addition, he must have been, or was at least perceived to have been, the formal patron of communities in three other groups:

– by descent, of all the civic clients of his father by adoption,
– *more maiorum*, of those *populi nationesque* conquered by him or in his name, e. g., of the Alpine Nautuates.
– *ipso facto*, of all the colonies he had established in Italy and in provinces and of all municipalities whose status he had enhanced.

Groups (1.) and (2.) represent the Republican tradition that was still valid for much of his Principate. Patronage by descent is specifically mentioned

[25] For a list of provincial cities receiving Roman citizenship in this period, see F. Vittinghoff, *Römische Kolonisation und Bürgerrechtspolitik unter Caesar und Augustus*, Wiesbaden, 1952 (= *Akad. der Wiss. und Lit.*, Mainz, Abhandlung 1951, No. 14), 96 f. 100 f. in other places.

in the both Greek and Latin inscriptions of the Late Republic and persisted over generations under the emperors.[26] As to patronage by conquest, this was now possible only for the emperor. All military successes were achieved under his auspices; triumphs were reserved for him and for the members of his immediate family.

That he was *de facto* and *de iure* patron of the colonies he had established has been questioned, unnecessarily I believe, by Engesser and Harmand. Chapter 97 of the lex Ursonensis specifies that the *deductor* of a colony, the person who assigned land, and his descendants were *ipso facto* patrons of the community. While it may be true that Augustus was not in all cases literally the *deductor* (he is often referred to as *conditor*) and did not personally assign land, can there be any doubt that he was perceived to be both *de iure* and *de facto* the patron of a *colonia Augusta*?[27] That inscriptions in the colonies do not regularly refer to him as *patronus* suggests that the cities of the Empire understood his preference for other titles including that of *pater*.

Why, however, did he refuse a title which had strong roots in the Republican tradition and one which he apparently considered appropriate both for members of his immediate family and for leading senators? First, Augustus was no longer involved in the traditional activities that were during the Republic associated with the acquisition of *clientelae*. After 6 BC, he no longer personally campaigned against foreign foes nor was he physically present in a province. Moreover, he no longer founded colonies as a means to settle veterans, another traditional source of civic patronage. Second, Engesser is certainly right when he observed that Augustus would have been confronted with potential conflicts between his role as ruler and as patron. It would, for example, have been impossible for the Princeps as patron to intervene between a client community and his own legate.[28] Moreover, there was no way the Princeps as the formal patron of each community could fulfill the expectations, material and legal, of all communities of the Empire.

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[26] References to descendants are a regular feature of the *tabulae patronatus* and are also rendered in Greek διὰ προγόνων: e.g., Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus as reported by P. Herrmann, *ZPE* 14 (1974) 257 and those cases cited in the last chapter. Note the presence of at least two generations of senatorial patrons at Canusium, see Ch. 8.

[27] Harmand, 161 ff.; Engesser. 12–14. Note the so-called "*lex Julia de agris adsignandis et coloniis deducendis*" (*Acta Divi Augusti*, p. 111), of Hyginus, *Grom. veteres* (ed. Lachmann) 201.7, and Suet. *Aug*. 46. Augustus as *conditor*: *CIL* 3, 3279; *AE* 1938, 40; *ILS* 6779. Augustus as patron/founder, Vittinghoff, 51; Premerstein, 169. Admittedly we do not know that he was the legal *deductor* of his colonies or that the charters had the clauses similar to those of the *lex Ursonensis*, c. 97.

[28] Engesser, 12.

Third, and in contrast to his status in the 40's BC, his *auctoritas* and legal position were established and widely recognized in the citizen communities of Italy and the provinces. Nonetheless, he continued to recognize the value of civic patronage as a means to legitimize. As will be demonstrated below, Agrippa, C. and L. Caesar became the patrons of citizen communities at a time when their status as the heirs of Augustus was the subject of a deliberate propaganda campaign.

Fourth, we know from several statements of Tacitus, that Augustus deliberately avoided the use of traditional titles, like *rex* and *dictator*, titles that held some negative implications. Hence, *princeps* was preferred because it was not a regular office, because it possessed a private character, and because it enhanced personal prestige. Just as Augustus preferred the use of *princeps* to (for example) *rex*, so too, and for the same reasons, does he appear to have preferred *pater* to *patronus*.[29] The former suggested qualities that were censorial and affectionate, beneficent and mild.[30] The word *patrocinium* (and its cognates) suggests similar qualities, but, to judge by the words of Dionysius of Halicarnasus, also implies the performance of particular kinds of mutual services. Just as with the decision to abandon the consulate, but to persevere with *imperium maius*, Augustus abandoned the claim to a title he could have had but felt could be constraining and adopted a related title with essentially the same authority but without the constraints.

Sixth, and perhaps most significant, the Roman notion of formal patronage assumed client choice and there could be no alternative to Augustus (a limitation which did not of course apply to *pater*). Hence, just as Rome herself was not assigned the title patron in interstate relations with (client) communities, so too the words *patronus* and *cliens* may also have been deemed inappropriate when applied to relations between Augustus and the cities of the empire.[31]

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[29] On *princeps*, Tac. *Ann.* 1, 1.1; 9.5; 3, 28.2; 56.2. On the meaning of *pater* and *parens* in the Republic, A. Alföldy, in *Mus Helv.* 9 (1952) 209–214. Also: Premerstein, 167, 175; Béranger, 276; Weber, 222.

[30] On these qualities, note, for example, the denarius of 18 BC, with the legend: *S.P.Q.R. PARENT*(*i*) *CONS*(*ervatori*) *SVO*. C.H.V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, London 1951, 38–39; also, Cicero, *Att.* 9, 10.3: *quem nonnulli conservatorum istius urbis, quem parentem esse dixerunt.* Also, Plin. *pan.* 53: *parens noster reformet et corriget*; Cic. *de domo sua* 35, 94: *mitissium parentum omnium civium*; Sen. *de clem.* I 10.3: *bonum fuisse principem Augustum, bene illi parentis nomen*. Keppie, *Colonisation and Veteran Settlement in Italy*, 47–14 BC, Rome, 1983, 114, discusses the use of the word in Augustan colonies.

[31] Rich, Patronage and Interstate Relations, op. cit., 123–125.

That *pater* (or *parens*) was designed as an alternative to *patronus* can not be formally demonstrated, though the pattern of the evidence suggests that this was indeed the case. As noted above, *pater* is found with increasing frequency just as references to *patronus* become more seldom. Moreover, inscriptions refer to Augustus as *pater* where we might expect *patronus*. For example, he was described as *pater patriae et municipii* at Falerii (*CIL* 11, 3083) and an inscription found at his colony of Jadar notes: *Imp. Caesar divi f. Augustus parens coloniae murum turris dedit.*[32] As its founder Augustus was surely also its patron as well as its principal benefactor. Both the benefactions recorded and the language of the dedication are parallel to those found in inscriptions in honor of the *patronus* Nonius Balbus at Herculaneum (*AE* 1976, 144). There is then some equivalence between such expressions as *patrocinium orbis terrae* (Cic. *de off.* 2, 27), *parens omnium civium* (Cic. *de domo sua* 35, 94), *pater urbium* (Hor. *carm.* 3, 24, 27), *pater orbis* (Ovid, *trist.* 3, 8.19) and *patronus imperii Romani* (Vell. 2, 120). Finally, there is no inscription referring to Augustus (or any of his imperial successors) as patron that can be dated after 6 BC.[33]

Augustus was of course not the only member of his family to have become the formal patron of a community. M. Claudius Marcellus, his nephew and heir apparent, was patron of three communities, two in Greece and one in Italy.[34] It is remarkable that there is not one surviving reference to a civic clientele in the western provinces, despite fact that he campaigned there with Augustus and was frequently compared with Tiberius who was so honored in several places.[35] Although the Greek inscriptions do not claim that the relationship was inherited, I suspect that his ancestors had acquired these *clientelae*.[36] That is, the inscriptions do not demonstrate new

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32 *CIL* 3, 2907. Also *CIL* 9, 540* (probably genuine, see Keppie, 114, 181), *CIL* 11, 720 = *ILS* 5674.

33 Harmand believes that the emperor Nerva became patron of Teos, but the inscripition refers to the lieutenant of Antonius, *AE* 1927, 43, and Nicols, Patrons of Greek Cities, 98. On Augustus as *parens*, Mommsen's second edition of the *Res Gestae*, 154; M. Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas*, 265, 318; C.H.V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, 38.

34 Eilers has suggested that the two Greek inscriptions refer not to Augustus' nephew, but to M. Claudius Marcellus, cos. 51 = *RE* Marcellus 229, who was murdered in Laconia. An inherited connection is equally reasonable.

35 On these points, note the discussion of C. and L. Caesar and of Tiberius and Drusus Claudius Nero below. If Marcellus was honored along the same pattern used for the young Caesares, then one ought not to expect him to be honored as patron in the same community as Tiberius. What is significant though is that there is not even one epigraphical reference to Marcellus anywhere in *CIL* 2.

36 I do not claim that clientele by descent was automatic. The Latin inscriptions suggest

connections but confirm old ones. The suspicion is supported by the fact that of the members of the more immediate family of Augustus, the only ones to have such ties with peregrine communities in Greece were the descendants of the Republican Claudii.

Although M. Agrippa became patron of many communities in his lifetime, we cannot be certain that he entered even one of the relationships before 21 BC. The best candidates for an early connection are Gnathia and Corcyra, both of which may have adopted him as their patron in about 40 (see next paragraph). My sense is that Agrippa deliberately avoided those ties that might he deemed appropriate for his friend and colleague alone.[37] This attitude changed after 21 BC (that is at a time when the honor ceased to reference Augustus even in citizen communities), and especially after Agrippa became the son-in-law and heir apparent of the Princeps. It is to this period that I would date all of the other fourteen relationships Agrippa entered.

As with Augustus, almost all of his [Agrippa's] client communities were citizen communities especially in Italy and Spain, but also in Greece at Corinth. The exceptions are the peregrine cities of Ilium, Calymnos and Corcyra. The former, in light of its role in Julian tradition, is perhaps not an exception and, indeed, Agrippa is referred to as *suggenos* [= relative]. Nothing is known of the background or the date of either of the other two connections. In the inscription from Corcyra, he is called M. Agrippa *autokrator, soter* and patron. The use of *autokrator* (= *imperator*) is suggestive. It could refer to any one of the three triumphs he was offered (in 38, 19 and 14) but declined to celebrate. Because no consular designation is given, I date this text to the period between the salutation of 38 and his first consulate in 37. Similar considerations lead Roddaz to date other inscriptions in honor of Agrippa to the same period.[38] The claim might also have been occasioned by Agrippa's naval activities in the area leading up to the battle of Actium

that this was indeed the intention, but the strength of connection might wax and wane over generations and be celebrated only when there was advantage to be gained; Greek inscriptions sometimes refer to the connection as an inherited one (... πάτρωνα καὶ εὐεργέτην διὰ προγόνων τῆς πόλεως, *OGIS* 460).

[37] For other examples, Syme, *Roman Revolution*, 231, 343. Most significantly in this respect, he probably declined to have cities named after him during his lifetime, M. Reinhold, *Marcus Agrippa*, Geneva (NY), 1933, 115, n. 57, and 134, n. 44.

[38] J.-M. Roddaz, *Marcus Agrippa*, Rome, 1984, 301; on Agrippa as *autokrator*, Roddaz, 367. Roddaz suggests (440–441) that he (Agrippa) was also patron at a number of other towns in the East including Myra, Athens and Lesbos, but the texts cited do not support such a claim to a formal *patrocinium*.

(Orosius, 6, 19.7) or by a possible visit there in 15 on his way to the East.[39] They may also date to a period about 23: Frustrated by the preference being shown to Marcellus, he had put everything aside (Suetonius relates, *Aug.* 66) and gone off to the East. In this period, Agrippa may have been willing to accept honors that senators traditionally received, but ones that he had previously rejected out of deference to Augustus.[40] After the death of Marcellus and his marriage to Julia, he may have decided to abide by the informal policy Augustus imposed on himself and on the other members of his immediate family in respect to the patronage of peregrine communities. In short, communities did honor important Romans as patrons. Agrippa was a figure of significance. It is then striking that he is *not* routinely honored in peregrine communities. This pattern suggests that he deliberately avoided such honors.

Tiberius and his brother Drusus Maior are also attested as civic patrons. As all the inscriptions name the former Tiberius Claudius Nero, it follows that the relationships must have been established before Augustus adopted him in AD 4. Whether Tiberius inherited his Greek *clientelae* or assumed them himself cannot be determined, but the former (as will be argued below) seems more probable. In the West, the pattern of client communities is very similar to that of Augustus and Agrippa, that is, Tiberius Claudius Nero became patron of citizen communities in Italy and in Spain.

The circumstances surrounding the acquisition of his Spanish clientele are not clear. Tiberius served in Spain under Augustus in 26/5 and perhaps the relationship should be dated to that period.[41] Claudius Marcellus was also in Spain at the time and, though the two were often featured as a pair, Augustus consistently showed preference for Marcellus. Surviving inscriptions do not record a clientele for the latter or that mention him at all. If indeed relationships were established at this time, then it would appear that the monuments for Marcellus were re-used or were even discretely removed, while those for Tiberius were preserved and/or refurbished after he became heir apparent and emperor.

In the East, the pattern of civic patronage is parallel to that associated with Marcellus. Inscriptions from Epidauros and from Olympia indicate that Tiberius was patron of both cult centers. Bowersock has argued that during his 'exile' Tiberius was politically active in Greece, that he encouraged

39 As suggested by Reinhold, 107.
40 One should not make too much of Agrippa's alleged motivations.
41 M. Koch, "M. Agrippa und Neukarthago", *Chiron* 9 (1979) 208.

his supporters in the cities, and that he was always ready to show his phil-Hellenism. Hence, the ties may well date to that period.[42] In both cases, however, the connection may have been inherited.[43] The two inscriptions to Drusus and Tiberius at Epidauros assume that the former was still alive, which suggests the relationship was established before 9 BC rather than later. Moreover, we know that Tiberius, as a Claudian, inherited such *clientelae* in the Peloponnesus.[44] Tiberius must have been aware that Augustus did not wish to establish patronal relations with peregrine communities; for a member of his family to do so might have been reckoned as an affront. The Princeps could, however, hardly forbid peregrine communities to honor individuals whose patronage had been inherited. Finally, why would communities seek the support of a man whose status and future were uncertain? Hence, the dedications should properly be dated to the period before the death of Drusus, and are best understood as referring to an inherited relationship.

It is with the civic *clientelae* of C. and L. Caesar that the pattern becomes certain: With the exception of Ilium, the adopted sons of Augustus were patrons of citizen communities only. Though the epigraphical evidence is not definitive on the question of whether C. and L. Caesar were also the patrons of all communities in the clientele of their father (see above), so much may be reasonably assumed. Hence, scholars have frequently ascribed patronage to one member of an established 'pair' if the other one is known to have enjoyed it.[45] There is, however, some evidence of that the two brothers tended to divide responsibilities between them. Note for example that C. Caesar was pontiff and Lucius an augur. The resolution of the town council at Pisae recording the death of C. Caesar (*CIL* 11, 1421 = *ILS* 140) refers variously to Augustus as *custos imperii Romani* and *totius orbis terrarum*

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42 "Augustus and the East: The Problem of Succession" in *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects*, edd. F. Millar and E. Segal, Oxford, 1984, 177 ff.

43 As noted above, inscriptions sometimes, but by no means always, refer to the fact that an individual was patron or *euergetes* through his ancestors. Capua may also have been an inherited clientele, it was always a favorite city of Tiberius and he did dedicate a temple there in AD 26, B.M. Levick, *Tiberius the Politician*, London 1976, 20.

44 At Sparta, Suet. *Tib.* 6. Bowersock's argument does not depend on the date assigned to the initiation of the patronal relationships (in fact, Suetonius says *tutela*). Indeed the inherited ties might have made it easier for Tiberius to operate without appearing to assume new honors. It is also possible that the inscriptions were restored or given more prominence after Tiberius became emperor, but deliberately employed his birth-name. Whatever the case, the evidence of a broadly based clientele in the Peloponnesus is not definitive.

45 The evidence for duality is more common in the numismatic evidence, e.g., *RIC* 1, Nos. 155–158, 406 (Augustus and Agrippa) and 206 f. (C. and L. Caesar).

praesidium. So, too is Gaius called *unicum praesidium* of the colony, but not its patron. L. Caesar, already dead at the time, is however aclaimed as *patronus*. At Rusellae C. Caesar was definitely patron, but Lucius, though also honored, is not mentioned in this capacity. As both of these cities were Julian colonies,[46] one would expect that both would be patrons by descent. Instead, the two colonies appear to have had special relations with one or the other of the brothers. The most important text appears against this thesis is an inscription from the Roman colony of Aleria and is datable to between 12 and 9 BC (*CIL* 10, 8035). The monument consists of two inscriptions, one to Augustus and one, to its left, to C. Caesar. The use of the dedicatory plural *patronis* suggests that both father and son were patrons. On the missing right side of this monument Mommsen restored the name of L. Caesar and suggested that Lucius must also have been one of the patrons. As the inscription from Pisae indicates, Lucius might reasonably be restored, but it does not necessarily follow that he was also a patron.[47] In sum, the two may well have been patrons of all the communities already in the patronage of Augustus, but it seems likely that communities were encouraged to look to one or to the other of the two brothers as a special benefactor.

Augustus' intention in respect to the civic *clientelae* of his adopted sons is readily apparent. The wide distribution of the honor throughout Italy was intended not only to enhance the reputations of the young men as benefactors but, ultimately, to legitimize their positions as his heirs. In this sense the pattern is consistent with what has been observed before (Ch. 2.4.5), namely that the *patrocinium* of Italian cities was perceived to provide some sense of legitimacy.

Under Tiberius (if not earlier), there is a definite change in the pattern. The Julio-Claudians princes do not formally acquire the civic *clientelae* of their predecessors. Germanicus was patron to two citizen communities, one of which was established under Augustus, and Drusus, Germanici f., of one community in Spain. That Drusus, Tiberii f., is not known to have become patron of even one community may reflect his father's inclinations in this respect.[48]

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46 Keppie, *Colonisation*, 21–22.

47 It may be that both brothers were unilaterally claimed as patrons. But, even if Lucius were mentioned as patron, it would not present a problem for my argument.

48 For the evidence see Table 3.1. Note that Tiberius, in 24, still viewed members of his family as *privati*, Tac. *ann.* 4, 17.2 and Premerstein, 66, as such they would not have been bound by the restriction Augustus and Tiberius imposed on themselves. Under Gaius, the members of the emperor's immediate family acquired a new and public status.

In general, these patterns suggest that Augustus had concrete ideas about the function of civic patronage. From the very beginning of his career, he avoided such connections with peregrine communities (except for Ilium) and may have played down the perception of being *patronus more maiorum* of the peoples he conquered. He did, however, become the formal patron of Italian communities, but probably entered these relationships early in his public career when his legitimacy was most in question. As Augustus, the epigraphical use of the word *patronus* declined as his clear preference for the title *pater* became more evident. That he saw some connection between the two titles is demonstrated by the fact that no inscription dated to after 2 BC, mentions him as a *patronus* of a community. The evidence indicates that Augustus may have discouraged the members of his family from assuming the title in peregrine communities, but allowed it in citizen communities. This pattern suggests that he perceived formal patronage to be an institution designed to serve the needs citizens. In this sense, Mommsen's distinction between 'Clientel' for citizens and 'Gastrecht' (*hospitium*) for non-citizens, though somewhat of an over-simplification for the Augustan period, nonetheless appears to describe the situation correctly.[49]

A final word of caution is appropriate here. It is very risky to assume that all communities were equally well informed about the wishes and expectations of Augustus, or even about every edict. Exceptions to the patterns mentioned here, and the anomalies mentioned below must then be weighed against the general pattern.

3.3. Aemulatio principis: *Civic Patronage and the Urban Policy of Augustus*

Between the late republic and the early Principate, the expectations about civic patronage were transformed. Not only did the tendency to correlate civic patronage with military assets and civil war have to be constrained, but also the constructive and peaceful aspects encouraged. This transformation did not depend entirely on formal, legal constraints (discussed in Ch. 6). Indeed, if civic patronage was to survive with its traditional dynamics, it was essential that the voluntary aspects of the relationship be preserved (i.e., clients might choose patrons; patrons had some discretion about what benefactions they conferred). Hence, while Augustus might constrain the

[49] Mommsen, *Gastrecht und die römische Clientel*, 1, 331–334. Mommsen does note that the Romans were not completely consistent.

freedom of communities to confer public honors, he could not force the members of the elite to use their time, energy and wealth to further his imperial program. In brief, he had to create a situation in which the elite would choose to support peaceful exchange and urban development rather than armed clients. To encourage voluntarism, Augustus and the immediate members of his family offered themselves as models both in respect to the nature of benefactions conferred and in respect to the kind of clients (citizen communities) they accepted into their formal clientele. If there were not enough senators to meet the demand, members of the equestrian and decurial orders might also be encouraged to follow the lead.

On the principle of emulation of the *princeps*, consider these passages:

> *Sed praecipuus adstricti moris auctor Vespasianus fuit, antiquo ipse cultu victuque. Obsequium inde in principem et aemulandi amor validior quam poena ex legibus et metus* (Tac. *ann.* 3, 55).
>
> *namque ut homines dispersi ac rudes eoque in bella faciles quieti et otio per voluptates adsuescerent,* [*Agricola*] *hortari privatim, adiuvare publice, ut templa fora domos extruerent, laudando promptos, castigando segnes, ita honoris aemulatio pro necessitate erat* (Tac. *Agr.* 21).

Both of these quotations from Tacitus emphasize the role of emulation and ability of the emperor (and his legates) to affect social behavior. Though Tacitus might have been reluctant to extend the compliments intended for Vespasian and Agricola to Augustus, it is manifest that the same phenomenon might also have worked well for the latter.

Though Augustus is not expressly referred to as patron of any community after he became *pater patriae* and seems to have discouraged the use of the word *patronus* long before that date, he made a close association between the two titles.[50] This is especially true when one considers his actions as a civic benefactor. His *Res gestae* (15–24) detail at great length the benefactions he conferred on the city of Rome including the senate house, temples and porticoes, restoration of the Capitol and the theater of Pompeius, aqueducts, basilicas, numerous buildings on the Forum Romanum and the new Forum Augustum.[51]

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[50] Discussed in detail above and below. *Patronus* is only used once in reference to an emperor, to Tiberius and by Velleius 2,121. Note that there might be several *patroni* of a community, there could be only one *pater patriae*. Keppie, *Colonisation and Veteran Settlement in Italy, 47–14 B.C.*, 116, notes that the title *pater* could be awarded to local citizens in return for munificence, e.g., *CIL* 11, 7993, but the connection is not demonstrable.

[51] D. Kienast, *Augustus*, 341 ff., has an excellent summary of the monuments and recent literature.

All the ancient sources agree that Augustus did not limit his generosity to Rome itself. Though the stress was on benefactions in the colonies he founded and of which he was probably *de iure* patron, many other communities, citizen and peregrine, received gifts in the form of public buildings too numerous to mention (Vell. Pat. 2, 89.6; Suet. *Aug.* 46; Dio 54, 23.8). This impression is confirmed in the epigraphical record: for example, to the veteran colony at Fanum Fortunae he gave the city wall (*murum dedit*).[52] Agrippa, certainly acting in close consultation with Augustus, implemented building programs in many colonies.[53] Moreover, during the Augustan period a number of peregrine cities were founded, improved, restored and/or rebuilt after natural disasters.[54] The traffic between Augustus and his clients was not all one way; Keppie reminds us that his veterans and other groups contributed to the re-building of his house on the Palatine after it had been destroyed by fire.[55]

These benefactions mark an important shift in perceptions in two important ways. The archaeological record indicates that there was, as Ward-Perkins notes, "remarkably little building of a specifically Roman character in these territories [the western provinces] before the Empire."[56] Indeed, Caesar, in his list of benefactions for individuals and collectives in further Spain, refers only to his legal and representational activities. Unlike the patrons of the Late Republic, Augustus and Agrippa appear primarily as patrons (in the general sense) who confer material benefactions, and not as defenders in court. Indeed, Augustus not only stressed the material and urban nature of his gifts, but preferred to avoid the legal and representational in respect to individual clients.[57] It appears then to be a deliberate

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[52] *ILS* 104. The details on Augustus' activities in Italy are collected by Kienast, 343 ff., and in the colonies by L. Keppie, 116–118. Other examples: *CIL* 11, 3594, aqueduct at Caere; and various projects at Cingulum and Tridentum, *CIL* 9, 5680 and *ILS* 86, respectively.

[53] E.g., at Emerita, J.C. Edmondson, "Romanization and Urban Development in Lusitania", in (edd.) T. Blagg and M. Millet, *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, Oxford, 1990, 168–169; also Kienast, more generally, 336–365.

[54] Many examples are given by Kienast, 349 f., 350 ff. The impact need not have been direct. Two good cases of this phenomena are Conimbriga and Idanha-a-Velha (Roman name unknown) discussed by Edmondson, 162 and 173. It is not recorded in either case that Augustus was a benefactor, but the development of Emerita was very important in providing the lead and encouraging urbanization in native communities.

[55] Suet. *Aug.* 57. Keppie, 114.

[56] "From Republic to Empire: Reflections on the Early Provincial Architecture of the Roman West", *JRS* 60 (1970) 1 ff. Confirmed by many local studies, e.g., Blagg and Millet, 40, 52 (Belgic Gaul), 136 (Hispania Citerior), 153 (for Lusitania).

[57] Caesar, *BHisp* 42; in contrast, his reluctance to appear in court for his clients is noted at Suet. *Aug.* 56.

policy to confer architectural benefactions not only on Rome—the traditional practice in the Republic—but now also on citizen and peregrine communities throughout the Empire.

The role of Agrippa in this process was central. The epigraphical record indicates an unusually frequent association of his name with construction projects in Rome and throughout the Empire. The construction of the Pantheon, of baths, gardens, temples and aqueducts is well known and the details need not be recited here.[58] It is significant for the understanding of *patrocinium publicum* that those inscriptions that refer to him as patron do not usually mention his benefactions while those that refer to his benefactions do not mention that he was patron; other examples of this phenomenon have been discussed above.[59] As civic patrons in the Principate are often associated with projects that enhanced the material conditions of urban life, it may be that Agrippa (and Augustus) deliberately encouraged the development of the perception of the *patronus* as an urban benefactor.[60]

That Augustus consciously set out to create a model for others to imitate is confirmed by Suetonius. Augustus, the latter writes, frequently encouraged the *primores* to show the same liberality in the adornment of Rome and many of them responded (*Aug*. 29), there and in other cities. The epigraphical evidence also confirms that his efforts were not in vain. Eck, who has collected the data, notes more examples of senatorial benefaction for the Augustan period in Italy than for all the other Julio-Claudians together.[61]

There are other factors that may have contributed to this decisive increase in civic and material benefactions during the Augustan Age. The establishment of peace and the curbing of brigandage made it possible for the state to use its revenues to build roads and bridges, to implement administrative reforms and to encourage urbanization. So too did the establishment

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58 Roddaz, 247 ff., for Rome; 299 ff., for Italy; 394 ff., for Gaul; 412 ff., for Spain; 431 ff., for the East. Also in Kienast, 345 ff.

59 The one exception is *CIL* 10, 4831, by the *Rufani vicani* which may in fact be post mortem, Roddaz, 303, R. Daniel, *Marcus Agrippa, eine Monographie*, Frankfurt, 1933, 100, No. 85. The *vicani* cannot be construed as the equivalent of a genuine municipality; hence, they were not bound by the charters discussed above. Nonius Balbus and Herennius Picens are two examples of benefactions and the title of patron appearing in mutually exclusive inscriptions from the same town. This problem is discussed in more depth in Chapter 7.

60 Eck on how Agrippa forced the pace of such activities and set the tone, "Administrative Reformen", 111 ff., and "Self-representation", 139.

61 "Tätigkeit", 296. Note two cases: Nonius Balbus in Herculaneum was patron and benefactor, but mentioned on separate inscriptions; and Herennius Picens, *CIL* 11, 7746, 7747 who gave Veii a *culina* and other buildings; like Balbus he may have owned land in the town.

of peace allow the members of the elite to display their wealth and to do so in a manner that would not endanger themselves or society. It was no longer essential to devote one's resources to the maintenance of private armies or to meet the demands of the dynasts. Under the new conditions, the natural competition between members of the local and imperial elite could, as Agricola realized, be channeled into projects of public utility. Such a policy would ease governance in that it facilitated self-government in communities and promoted cultural integration, namely the process of Romanization.

3.4. *Patronage and Urban Policy*[62]

What was the function of these benefactions? To judge by his actions, Augustus must have recognized that the administration and defense of the Empire had to be based on the cities and their prosperity. Hence, he adopted a policy of urbanization for all and Romanization for the peregrines. The unity and survival of the Empire depended on the development of a common, urban culture and identity. This, in turn, could best be secured if the cities of the Empire were prosperous (note Cic. *de off.* 2, 13 ff.). In short, the citizen communities needed to be nurtured, for they represented the backbone of the imperial system, and the 'conquered peoples' (especially the members of the elite) had to be given the incentives and opportunities to become productive and loyal members the new state.[63] In the East, of course, urbanization was already well advanced, but Roman civil wars and internal sedition had jeopardized the prosperity of the cities, and, by extension, their commitment to the Empire. In the West, degree of urbanization was uneven. Cities and proto-cities, villages and fortified sites of all kinds dotted the landscape of the Augustan Empire. Urban life already had a venerable tradition in the coastal areas of North Africa, southern Spain and the Narbonensis. In the interior, the hamlet and traditional tribal culture predominated. In both areas, members of the imperial and local elite conferred benefactions that enhanced urban culture, stimulated prosperity

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[62] By urban policy and urbanization I am referring to the development of urban centers. In some areas this growth would have involved the movement of people from the country to the city; in other cases it might have involved the migration from an established city to a developing one.

[63] Among other works, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 77–78, Ward-Perkins, op. cit., Kienast, 336 ff. and 386 ff., Blagg and Millet, inter alia, 37, 40, and Sherwin-White, *Citizenship*^{2}, chapters 8, 9 and 15. 367. The latter also believes that "Romanization ... was not positively encouraged by Augustus", Roman Foreign Policy in the East, Norman OK, 1983, 329.

of the Empire, and generally served the political policies of Augustus. The administration of the provinces was eased: cooperative local elites gained access to office and influence in the imperial government and for their part promoted pro Roman behavior in their cities. Loyal and effective service was rewarded with honors from grateful cities, and promotions in the imperial government. This theme will be developed more fully in Ch. 7.5.

The cities served other purposes, many of them complementary. Veterans, and to some extent proletarians, expected to be settled in an urban structure preferably in Italy, but increasingly also in the provinces.[64] The ability of Augustus and Agrippa to satisfy the demands of the veterans by giving them land in the provinces depended in part on their ability to create new communities in the Italian mode. Hence, he not only founded new citizen colonies and augmented others, but also supported the foundation of peregrine communities (like Oppidum Ubiorum) in the most distant parts of the Empire.

The Princeps may well have had a more immediate and traditional motive for subsidizing cities: The endowed cities constituted a secure base from which he might build his political power. His colonists and clients might serve to counter-balance the clientele of others. Hence, as Kienast suggests, Caesar's colonies founded in Asia Minor not only served to stabilize the frontier, but might also undercut the old Pompeian clientele in Bithynia. So, too, did the Augustan extension of municipal rights to communities in Baetica neutralize the 'Pompeians' there.[65] Moreover, because he often planted colonies on the best provincial land, he might retain the allegiance of the colonists even after returning the formal administration of a province to the senate. Africa is a notable example.[66]

Though this consideration may well have motivated Caesar and Octavian at a time when the competition for the resources and allegiances of the cities to fight a civil war was most intense, it cannot have been a major factor in Augustan planning after the 20's, BC. Indeed, as I have argued at length in the previous chapter (2.3), the *clientelae* of Pompeius and his sons may not have been based so much on loyalty and affection for the family or on a recognition of superior military ability, but rather were stimulated espe-

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64 On the settlement patterns in detail, Keppie and Vittinghoff; a more general survey may be found in Kienast, 386 ff.

65 'Pompeians' needs to be defined not as those old clients of Pompeius and his sons, but as those members of the local elites who had lost out to the supporters of the Caesars. On the nature of allegiance to the family of Pompeius, M.S. Nicols, *Appearances and Reality*, ad loc.

66 For Caesar, Kienast, 390; for Augustus in Baetica, 394; on Africa, 396–400.

cially by the intense struggle for power at the local level. That is, Pompeian strength in Baetica was a reflection of ardent factional strife within the cities of the province. By appealing to any one Roman dynast, each faction saw the opportunity to secure the outside support necessary to establish dominance at the local level that it might not be able to attain in more peaceful conditions. The dynasts themselves, always interested in undermining the influence of their rivals, eagerly played the same game. As the threat of civil war receded after Actium, the temptation to appeal to a potential rival of Augustus diminished.

The emphasis Augustus gave to himself as the material benefactor of cities rather than appearing as their *defensor* in legal disputes at Rome created a model for other members of the elite to emulate. He did succeed, as Keppie suggests, in re-establishing "the principle of giving"; moreover, "his initiatives might encourage the public spirited to resume their traditional role in promoting urbanization."[67] Eck provides some specifics: A. and C. Caecina built a theater at Volterra, Nonius Balbus the basilica, city gates and wall at Herculaneum.[68] The members of the elite no longer felt any need to compete by employing their income to support private armies (as for example Crassus had done). Prestige and influence were no longer measured by the number of soldiers one could support, but rather by the conspicuous monuments that bore one's name. Moreover, the fact that senators found it increasingly difficult to receive such monuments in Rome, demonstrates that they were forced to seek the traditional recognition in the cities of Italy and the provinces. As Eck has shown, after 20 BC, there is "no documentary evidence for a monument [at Rome] that by its proportions or even by the originality of its form, would have been lifted above the tedium of the average public honorific monument." It is significant that two of the last such monuments in the grandiose style date to the very last years of the Republic or the early years of the Augustan Principate (before 21 BC) and both honors involve senators who were patrons of peregrine cities. The first, an inscribed wall 10 meters long found in the Largo Argentina, was set up to honor Aelius Lamia by two peregrine communities in Spain, the Cari-

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[67] 115–116. The point is valid, but it is not clear how well established this "traditional role" was in the various communities of Italy.

[68] *AE* 1957, 220, *CIL* 10, 1425, respectively. The latter may date to the Flavian period. W. Eck, "Die Präsenz senatorischer Familien in den Städten des imperium Romanum bis zum späten 3.Jahrhundert", edd. W. Eck, H. Galsterer, H. Wolff, *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte* = Festschrift F. Vittinghoff, Köln-Wien, 1980, 295. Significantly, there are more cases in Italy of specific senatorial benefaction under Augustus than for the whole Julio-Claudian period.

etes and the Vennenses.[69] The second, to certain Rufus, lists him as patron of peregrine communities in Bithynia.[70] These dedications belong properly to the age leading up to Actium and would have been unacceptable thereafter.

Though Augustus and Agrippa were exceptional civic benefactors and set an example for contemporaries and succeeding generations to follow, they were operating in a tradition that was already well established in the cities of the eastern part of the Roman Empire. In Rome, there was also a well established native tradition: victors in foreign wars had celebrated their achievements with building projects designed to improve the lives of the citizens and more importantly to secure their reputations as benefactors; so too had individual senators and other members of the elite utilized their resources to encourage urbanization.[71] Augustus and Agrippa were innovators primarily in the magnitude and breadth of their benefactions.

That educated Romans were conscious of the plan of Augustus may be readily observed in the *Aeneid*. Few lines in the poem capture the sense of urban aspirations of the period as well as the famous scene (1, 419 ff.) when Aeneas ascends a hill and first sees Carthage in its glory. Law and order receive their due, but the emphasis is also on large scale construction in stone: the gates and citadel; harbor and theater, these are the activities which bring human happiness: *fervet opus redolentque thymo fragrantia mella. / "o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt*!"

For Vespasian, it was somewhat simpler to serve as a successful model because the old republican aristocracy, with all its pretensions and expectations had been tamed or replaced (Tac. *Ann.* 3, 55). Augustus' problem was more complex. In order to demonstrate the continuity of the Republic, he needed the prestige of the older families and their cooperation in government; to judge by his actions, he also wanted them to use their resources for the common good. Consequently, he had to tolerate the long established pursuit of honors and display. For the greatest part of his Principate he did indeed allow them to accumulate traditional honors including patronage of peregrine communities. He may, however, have hoped that others would follow his example and restrict their civic clients to citizen communities. To some degree he succeeded: The incidence of senators who became patrons

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69 *PIR*² A 199, governed 24–22 BC. Perhaps a single community rather than two.

70 Eck, Self-representation, 145–146. On Lamia, Alföldy, *Fasti Hispaniensis* 5 ff. On both, Eck 146–147. Eilers, 161–162.

71 For examples, see the preceding chapter. Note especially the cases of Labienus in Cingulum and Quinctius Valgus.

of peregrine communities does appear to decline during this period (down to the time that he accepted the title *pater patriae* in 2 BC).

The details of this change and their implications for civic patronage are discussed more fully in Ch. 6.1.3, on the regulation of patronage in Roman law. What is significant for this discussion is that at this time, Augustus issued an edict in 12 BC forbidding peregrine communities to honor their governors. Although civic patronage is not specifically mentioned, there is after that event a very decisive decline in the number of cases in which peregrine communities extended formal patronage (and several other honors) to their senatorial governors.

Why this 'edict' was issued at this time precisely remains, as noted earlier, somewhat of a mystery. One possibility is to see the 'edict' in connection with trial of L. Valerius Messalla Volesus who was prosecuted and convicted for crimes committed as governor of Asia at about this time.[72] Dio does not discuss the case in any detail nor does he make any connection between the trial and the edict, but the latter may well represent the reaction of Augustus to the former. More plausibly, the trial may have been the proverbial "last straw", or constituted the excuse for mandating what his own example had failed to bring about, namely: senatorial governors should not become patrons of peregrine communities or accept other honors from those communities when such honors infringed on his own uniqueness,[73] that is, the senatorial elite should not hold honors in peregrine communities that might challenge his unique position as mediator between the Roman and the peregrine.

In sum, Augustus had very distinct ideas about how Rome and the cities of the empire were to develop and, as is clear in the passages quoted from Vergil, Tacitus and Suetonius, the program was understood and supported by the educated elite of the empire. The monuments bearing his name and titles are testimonials not only to his liberality, but also proclaim his policy and set standards for others to emulate. Such display served to legitimize his distinctive status in the Roman government.

For patrons of senatorial and non-senatorial status, the situation was somewhat different. The title continues to be used (or at least appears regularly in inscriptions). The complication arises out of the fact that those

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72 *PIR*^{1} V 96; Kornemann, *RE* 8A, 170 f.

73 This problem has been discussed more fully above and in "Patrons of Greek Cities", 86–88. Claude Eilers and I agree on the pattern but differ on the reasoning. Eilers believes civic patronage was in decline and makes his case in his Chapter 7.

inscriptions that refer to the fact of formal patronage rarely mention benefactions conferred. There are several ways to understand this pattern. First, it is relevant that similar patterns are to be found in the Late Republic, namely there is rarely a direct connection between specific benefactions and the title of patron. Second, the inscriptions that mention patronage do not appear to have been erected to detail any one or all of the benefactions conferred by the patron. Recall that Caesar in reference to Further Spain and Q. Oppius in reference to Aphrodiasas mention benefactions that were more mediation than material (Chapters 2.3 and 2.5, respectively), and Representative Texts, J. Third, as the inscriptions may originally have been set up in close proximity to material benefactions of the patron, it might not have been necessary to refer to the obvious. Fourth, there is some reason to believe that the Romans considered it inappropriate to link benefactions with the title of patron. Hence, to take one very good case from the Augustan period, we have Nonius Balbus. He was, to judge by the several inscriptions found at Herculaneum, a major benefactor of the town, building the basilica, city-gates and walls (*CIL* 10, 1425). The inscription that mentions the fact of patronage stresses rather his singular liberality to all (*AE* 1976, 144) but provides no specifics. Other examples may be found and will be discussed more fully in Ch. 7.5. Some of these factors may have been operating at the same time. The monumental inscription to Nonius Balbus may well have been erected immediately in front of one of his more spectacular benefactions. The visitor to Herculaneum may have had no trouble associating the messages of the two structures. The critical point here is that the very title of *patronus* of a community in Italy and in the western provinces begins now to imply substantial material benefactions either conferred or anticipated. This observation should not be construed as a claim that mediation was unimportant, only that material benefaction has been added to the mix of benefactions.

There is not a great deal of evidence tracing such relationships and exchanges from local grandees upward to Augustus or down to native communities. There are cases whereby citizens of provincial capitals (like Emerita) conferred benefactions on neighboring native towns.[74] These individuals, and most were evidently not the formal patrons of the communities, clearly acted on the same model as Augustus in that they encouraged Romanization in communities of lower status than their own. One of the

[74] Edmondson, 162–173; *AE* 1967 144. On the problem in general in Spain, N. Mackie, *Local Administration in Roman Spain, A.D. 14–212 = BAR* 172, Oxford, 1983, Ch. 8.

reasons why the evidence is so sparse is that civic patronage was still a more fluid and evolving concept during most of the Augustan era and only later achieved its distinctive characteristics. Hence, for example, *hospitium* (and frequently associated with *clientela*) remained common in Spain long after it had faded in Italy. A good example is relationships between the family of the Cornelii Balbi and their *patria* of Gades. After gaining Roman citizenship the elder Balbus concluded *hospitium* with his former fellow citizens (indeed Cicero was ready to produce the *tessera hospitalis* in court) and he had become the most diligent defender of the city's interests. The younger Balbus had carried through significant building projects, the foundation of a new city and harbor. Note that the elder Balbus is still described by Cicero as acting as the traditional *defensor* and *hospes*; while the younger Balbus turned to material benefactions.[75] In the two generations following the Augustan edict of 11/2, the indigenous communities would have found it difficult to secure the aide of senators by bestowing honors on them, a fact which may have encouraged the communities to turn to wealthy locals of both citizen and peregrine status. There is however little evidence linking *patrocinium publicum* and peregrine communities during this period, but this is not to claim that material benefaction ceased. As we will see in Ch. 7.2, it did not. The lack of an epigraphical tradition in many of the communities may account in part for this pattern, but it is also likely that Augustus deliberately encouraged citizen communities to use the award of public honors to stimulate generosity.

Augustus also could and did advertise his liberality to cities as a dispensation given at the request of his loyal supporters. In such cases, he could bolster both his own image as well as that of his clients within the community. The activities of Q. Oppius in Aprodisias constitute a good example of how the system worked.[76] Though we might suppose the pattern was common, it is not frequently attested.

Equally important, though difficult to document, is that possibility, indeed probability, that benefactions may have been associated with services that did not lend themselves to specificity. The honoring of a patron may

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[75] Cic. *pro Balb.* 41, 43; Strabo 3, 169; for a more negative assessment of the latter's activities in Gades, note the words of Asinius Pollio in *ad fam.* 10, 32. The Balbi are repeatedly named as patrons of Gades (e.g., Groag in *RE* 4.1, Cornelius 69, referring to the *pro Balbo* 41 and 43). Cicero explicitly calls him *hospes*.

[76] J. Reynolds, *Aphrodisias and Rome*, Nos. 10, 33 ff., and E. Badian, "Note on Some Documents from Aphrodisias Concerning Octavian", 157 ff. Ellers, C107 his p. 241. Representative Texts, J.

have come as a consequence of many services over a long period of time, or alternatively, may reflect the expectations of a community about benefactions that were anticipated. As Syme has noted, benefactions anticipated were more potent than benefactions conferred.[77]

In general, Augustus may have been successful in stimulating generosity even at the peregrine level. Certainly many communities, like Conimbriga, initiated extensive building programs during his Principate and were assisted by the wealthier of the local elite. Even so, there is little evidence to support the argument that non-citizen communities successfully used the honor *patrocinium* to encourage benefactions of a material variety.

3.5. *Patronage in the Principate of Augustus: The Question of Status*

The epigraphical pattern of civic patronage in respect to individuals in these three groups changes significantly during the reign of Augustus. Generally speaking, the number of recorded equestrian and decurial patrons increases rapidly as a percentage of the total. Indeed by the end of the Julio-Claudian period the three groups provide approximately equal numbers of epigraphically attested patrons. Hence, though the absolute number of epigraphically attested senatorial patrons remains the same or even increases during this period, the share of the total declines. More dramatic, however, is the fact that peregrine communities, even those with a long history of patronal relations with prominent Romans, virtually cease to conclude such alliances with Roman senators after AD 12. Leaving aside Augustus and the members of his immediate family, approximately 80 % (48 of 58 cases) of patronage in the Augustan Principate involve senators.[78] Of the senators, over half of their civic clients were located in provinces. Of the provincial clients, the great majority were peregrine communities. Because the patterns in the eastern and western parts of the empire are distinct, these figures are, however, somewhat misleading. For example, when a senator became patron (or revived a relationship) in the East it was always of a peregrine community and one that was located in the province where he had some official

[77] *Roman Revolution*, 73.

[78] Because we do not in most cases know when exactly the individual became patron nor how long he lived, the figures must be treated as approximate, and different scholars will offer different numbers. Nonetheless, despite the variations in the count the pattern is not in dispute. Moreover, as senators were probably more likely to find epigraphic mention, the data recorded may not be directly relevant to the cooption. This subject is discussed in Ch. 7.0 and 7.1.

responsibility. That is, the pattern of senatorial patronage does not appear to have changed in the East as one moves from the Late Republic into the Augustan period: Peregrine communities continued to adopt and/or renew their senatorial governors as patrons and chose them presumably for their power to confer the same administrative benefactions as had Q. Oppius. In the West, the same pattern is especially noticeable in the provinces, i.e., senators did become patrons of peregrine communities in the provinces they governed. They were however far more likely to have received the honor from a citizen community and from ones located in Italy. In the latter case, administration may or may not have been the most important or relevant benefaction.[79] Indeed, it is much more likely that Italian communities chose as patrons individuals who owned land in their territory and who might be expected to have a natural interest in the well being of the community.

Table 3.3: Incidence of Epigraphically attested patrons from 31 BC–AD 12

	East		West		Total
Status	sen.	eques/dec	sen.	eques/dec	
Citizen			18	7	25
– (Italy)			(14)	(6)	
– (Province)			(4)	(1)	
Peregrine	23	2	7	1	33
Total	23	2	25	8	58

The relationship between property ownership and patronage, though attested more frequently and more explicitly later, is also affirmed for the Augustan period. The Calvisi Sabini, who owned property in Spoletium, were also patrons of the town.[80] Nonius Balbus surely owned property in Heculaneum, and Herennius Picens in Veii. The presumption that members of the equestrian and decurial orders became patrons of communities in which they resided or owned land is plausible; indeed, most patrons of these orders, like Holconius Rufus at Pompeii (*ILS* 6361a + b), were probably patrons of their *patriae*. Communities extended the honor also to senators

[79] On the administrative possibilities, Eck, Augustus' administrative Reformen, 109 ff.

[80] Wiseman, *New Men*, No. 96, and Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth*, No. 108. Shatzman deduces that this family also had property at Canusium because C. Calvisius Sabinus is mentioned as patron of the town.

and for the same reason. For a later period, Pliny's correspondence and the epigraphical evidence indicate that formal patronage based on landholding and residence was a common phenomenon.[81]

In general, there appear to be two models for patronal activities in the Augustan period. Provincial communities adopted their governors as patrons in order to secure benefactions that were primarily administrative in character, ones that only a governor could grant and could continue to provide after his return to Rome. The benefactions, similar to those promised by Oppius and claimed by Caesar (Representative Texts, J and K), may well have continued as promised or even developed beyond the actual term of office, but in most cases we may assume that the ability of the patron to provide the services the client sought declined after the end of his governorship. In most cases and despite the insistence on continuity, these connections were short-term and flexible, though they might be renewed should the descendants of the two parties again find themselves in the same situation. The second model, certainly most common in Italy, involved a community and wealthy owners of land within its territory. Because parties had a mutual interest in the prosperity of the community, benefactions in this model tended to be more material in character and patronal ties more long-term.[82] These two models are not mutually exclusive. As Rome expanded through Italy, the former model may well have allowed the development of the latter. Indeed, the two were mutually reinforcing. The interests of the emperor in respect to patronage may also have been served by encouraging communities to coopt several patrons. The more patrons a community had, the less likely (one might argue) it would be that any one of them might establish a clientele that would compromise the position of the emperor. This thesis is suspect. During the late republic, it was commonplace for both citizen and peregrine communities to enlist as many patrons in their service as they could. The case of Pompeii has been discussed in the previous chapter. Note, too, that Cicero took particular pride in the fact that he was *sole* patron of Capua, a claim that suggests that it was unusual for Italian communities to have only one patron. It is also manifest that the more important peregrine communities, like Pergamon in the east and Massilia in the west, were regularly able to claim their Roman governors as patrons and bene-

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[81] One may also note the cases discussed in the previous chapter. This issue will be examined more fully in the following chapters.

[82] On the nature of long and short term patronal relations, S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends*, Cambridge, 1984, 252–253. Because the evidence from the Augustan period is so limited, the more detailed study of these models will appear in later chapters.

factors.[83] The problem (from the perspective of Augustus) was that Romans tended to reckon each clientele claimed as if it were solely devoted to the interests of the patron. That is, the number and quality of clients a patron might claim was critical to the public perception of the patron's power and for that reason alone clients were sought by the ambitious politician; the fact that others claimed the same client was not immediately relevant. The same kind of 'double counting' may be observed in contemporary politics where many competing politicians claim the support of, for example, the teamsters or metalworkers union. Given the history of this political calculus in the Late Republic, there would have been little incentive for Augustus to encourage or discourage the practice.

Though not unknown in the late republic (recall the case of Quinctilius Valgus discussed in the previous chapter), there was during the Augustan Principate a dramatic increase in the number of attested patrons who were not members of the senatorial order. Of 34 epigraphically attested cases of civic patronage in west, at least eight, maybe nine (Marius Balbus is of uncertain status (see CWS for the data)) may be placed in this group and their percentage of the whole increased to 50% in the last decade of the Augustan Principate. These figures must, however, be treated with care as the differences may well reflect a changing epigraphic habit: Specifically, the incidence of inscriptions, the attestations of patronage, and the number of patrons of non-senatorial status all increase, but the latter does so at a rate faster than that of the first two. The conclusion to draw is that

- civic benefaction and formal patronage, if not increasing on an absolute scale, were at least relatively more likely to find their way into the public record,
- that wealthy individuals of non-senatorial status were increasingly considered to be the appropriate recipients of the title and the monument, and
- that the competition for honors and desire for display were well established among the elites of Italy and the provinces.

Augustus and Agrippa did succeed in motivating the members of the decurial and equestrian orders to cooperate in their urban development program.

[83] The evidence is best summarized in Tuchelt's catalogue: Pergamon Nos. 36, 41, 42, 45, and 47, for example all date top the 40s and 50s. On Massilia, shared by Caesar and Pompeius, see the preceeding chapter.

As the evidence on how the members of these orders functioned as patrons is far more substantial for the subsequent period, the discussion of performance is best reserved for later chapters. It is sufficient to note here that the rising numbers of non-senatorial patrons must inevitably have brought with it a new sense of the meaning of *patrocinium publicum*. These patrons, though perhaps well connected to senate and court and capable of defending the interests of their clients before a jury or in the Senate, were nevertheless expected to make their primary contributions in the form of material benefaction. The rising incidence of non-senatorial patronage must then be construed as a successful implementation of the urban plan of Augustus and of the change in the perceptions about the practice of civic patronage.

3.6. *The Fate of the Civic* Clientelae *of the Republican Nobility*

What, however, happened to traditional *clientelae* of the old Republican nobility during the Principate of Augustus?

Writing about the more general problem of clientele, Syme comments:

> At Rome the aristocracy demanded deference, and it was not denied, but their *clientelae* were lapsing to the *patronus* of the plebs, the dispenser of games and largess. Abroad, Caesar anxiously watched any attempt to attach the soldiers. Towns and whole territories, kings, tetrarchs, and chieftains had once owed allegiance to the names of ancient power. Those traditions and habits were curbed by the cult of the ruler. After a time cities in the Greek lands cease to honour proconsuls with the title 'saviour' and 'benefactor'.[84]

The epigraphical record on the survival of earlier clientele into the Principate is not extensive. There are some cases, primarily in the East, where it is expressly noted that a patron (usually a senatorial governor) inherited the relationship. Note in this respect the cases of the Domitii Ahenobarbi at Ephesus, the Valerii Messalae at Magnesia, and of the Claudii at Sparta.[85] Whether or not these relationships were formally renewed (or more simply 're-claimed') cannot be determined from the texts themselves.

In sum, the pattern of civic patronage continued without interruption from the Late Republic into the Augustan era. Senators (at least those who had the confidence of the Princeps or who could not be denied) generally

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[84] *The Augustan Aristocracy*, Oxford, 1968, 9. On this subject, Nicols, Greek Patrons, and below.

[85] Tuchelt, 143; *OGIS* 460; Suet. *Tib.* 6, respectively.

continued to pursue and to achieve the same kind of public honors that had been customary earlier; they not only became patrons of peregrine communities, but also they were acclaimed as benefactors and were the object of a variety of traditional religious observances as cult figures (that is they were honored as *theoi* or *soteres* primarily in the East). In both East and West, they continued to conclude *hospitium publicum* with many communities, just as they had during the Republic.

In respect to citizen communities, it was not so much that the relationships weakened, for others could be and were established to replace them, but rather that the expectations about the mutual services of patrons and client communities changed. The resources that clients might be expected to provide had been a critical component in the martial calculations of the dynasts of the Late Republic. After Actium and the re-establishment of order, however, clients (who were surely never eager to provide their resources for waging Roman civil wars) might now use the relationship to secure the blessings of peace. Moreover, the end of the civil wars also meant that the factional struggles in provincial cities would not be aggravated by the claims of competing dynasts.

Though traditional ties clearly persisted, it is unlikely that a man of questionable loyalty would have been sent to govern a province in which he had a large number of inherited clients. Indeed, by keeping such individuals physically separated from their clients, the formal and informal ties loosened and decayed naturally. The edict of AD 11/12 served to accelerate this process, at least in respect to peregrine communities.

3.7. *Mutual Obligations*

Patronage, whether the parties might be communities and/or individuals, assumes mutual obligations. Though specific data on benefactions and services are not extensive for the period, some conclusions regarding expectations and performance are possible. The most significant variants in the practice of civic patronage during the Augustan period (as distinct from the Late Republic) were two. First, though mediation between the community and the central government continued to be important, Augustus himself stressed the new emphasis on material benefaction. Second, the most important service a community could render to the patron, the public celebration of his benefactions and benevolence, could no longer be carried out at Rome, but now was virtually restricted to the public places in the community itself or, alternatively, to the privacy of the urban and rural villas of

the patron. The first of these two has been discussed at length above, the latter is treated here.

Throughout the Republic, communities had constructed all kinds monuments in Rome to honor their patrons, benefactors and protectors.[86] The function of the monuments was clear. They proclaimed the *fides* and *benevolentia* of the person honored, serving thereby to enhance the latter's reputation (it matters not whether they were honorably earned, consider the case of Verres discussed in Ch. 5.1 and 5.2). They also served the needs of the community in that they advertised at Rome the wealth, status and influence of the community. Especially in the Late Republic, these monuments, like the ones noted above to Aelius Lamia and to Rufus, had become conspicuous features of the urban landscape.

Under Augustus, as Eck has shown, monuments in public places required official approval: the permission of the Senate or of the Princeps. In was then inevitable that Augustus would use the process to limit the celebration of any potential rival. Just as the name and achievements of the Princeps were everywhere to be seen and on the most impressive structures, so too do the names, achievements and clients of senators begin to retreat from the public view at Rome. Such structures that were erected to honor senators tend to be funerary in nature and inconspicuous in character.[87] Nothing could have made the realities of power more clear than this transformation.

Communities do of course continue to celebrate their patrons, but now find that their efforts are restricted to the community itself. If this constituted the sole or most important service the client could provide, it must inevitably have also reduced the strength of the relationship: A conspicuous monument in the city of Rome might count as appropriate compensation for services rendered at Rome. A monument in the provinces might remind the client of a patron's benefactions and indeed encourage generosity from other locals, but it would not provide much incentive to those whose careers were based in Rome.[88]

Services varied with each situation. Should the client be a community in Italy, the benefaction might involve the simple good will of the powerful, a good will that might be expressed in a wide variety of ways involving not only material benefaction, but also representation of mutual interests at Rome or

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86 Discussed especially in Chs. 4 and 7; note also Eck, "Senatorial Self-representation".

87 Eck, id. p. 145.

88 On this subject, not especially the case of Pliny and his client, Tifernum. The honors he received in the latter stimulated his generosity, but only through his letter advertising the relationship could he enjoy the prestige. This issue is discussed more fully in Ch. 4.2.1.

the defense of the interests of the community at the court of the Princeps, in the Senate or before any one of the new administrative boards established by Augustus to govern Italy (as in Representative Texts J and K). Sometimes this might involve a formal and legal action on behalf of the client, but most often, as Pliny's letters indicate (discussed below in Ch. 4.2), the patron would intervene informally, and perhaps more effectively, by soliciting the good will of colleagues in the Senate or secretaries at the Court. In reality, this informal system might have been more effective than confrontation in a public context. It should be noted that effective representation on an informal basis might produce significant results, but ones that would be less traceable in the epigraphical record.

The willingness of an individual to enter a patronal relation and the readiness of a community to seek that individual as a patron may well have been conditioned by the fact that the former was also the owner of substantial property in the jurisdiction of the community. In such cases, there would have been a clear mutual advantage to the former to act on behalf of the latter. The case of Nonius Balbus and Herculaneum discussed above, and of Pliny's relationship with Tifernum (Ch. 4) offer good examples of how such contacts might develop.

In the provinces, there are a number of cases of formal patronage in which individuals entered the imperial service, rose to high positions and, in that process, transferred their residence (and assets) to Italy. In such cases, the community might secure the relationship by adopting the individual as its patron. If the *album Canusinum* (Ch. 8) be taken as a reliable guide for this period, too, then the patrons might well have been construed as (at least honorary) members of the local senate. This pattern was already established in the Late Republic, witness the relationship between the Balbi and Gades described above, and is readily observable in the post Augustan period.[89]

As to the formal patronage of subject peoples, it has been demonstrated above that there was no significant change in the pattern from the late republican period down to AD 11. Those areas (especially along the eastern shore of the Aegean) that had a lively tradition of according public honors continued to celebrate their governors in much the same manner and with the same vocabulary has they had employed for centuries. The motivations and the expectations that drove the cities to extend those honors probably did not change. Just as they had earlier, the communities not only hoped to establish a connection to power, but also hoped to secure the good will

[89] Discussed at length in Ch. 7.2 and 7.3.

of their governors generally, and, as the need arose, to affect to their own advantage the administrative process. It is difficult to be precise about how widely spread the interest in official patrons was during the Late Republic and Augustan periods. Pergamon, for example, regularly secured official patrons; other communities, though clearly ready to extend public honors, do not appear to have acquired (or alternatively to have proclaimed epigraphically) patrons with any consistency. All that can be said in this respect is that *patrocinium publicum* was not as frequently claimed as other more traditional honors. Whether this pattern should be attributed to the provincials (who might have preferred the traditional honors) or to the senatorial governors (who like Augustus may have felt the formal patronage was not appropriate for peregrine communities), or to a combination of the two, is uncertain. If, however, it is true that Greek communities sought patrons for the administrative benefactions they might confer, then the resulting relationship, insofar as it depended on the administrative position of the governor, might legitimately be labeled 'short term'; when, on the other hand, a community sought the patronage of a non resident landowner, the relationship had at least the potential for a 'long term' development.

Formal civic patronage may best be understood as one of the many devises available to communities for encouraging material benefaction. It may, however, have been even more useful in the undocumented area of brokerage.

CHAPTER FOUR

CIVIC PATRONAGE IN THE PRINCIPATE

The particular questions to be discussed in this chapter all relate to the senatorial perceptions of the institution during the developed Principate (up to and including the reign of Marcus Aurelius). What were the attitudes of the literary elite toward civic patronage during this period? And how did perceptions and expectations change after Augustus? What was the relationship between formal *patronatus* and benefaction? What were the conditions and circumstances surrounding the initiation of these relationships? The discussion begins with an analysis of the theoretical concepts of benefaction and patronage in the literary evidence and then turns to a number of specific cases. In general one may see a growing influence of Stoic philosophy, not so much directed toward the role of the patron/benefactor as an imperial administrator (as outlined by Cicero *ad Q.fr. 1, 1*), but now in the role of broker and material benefactor in an area of mutual concern to the two parties.

4.1. *Civic Patronage in the Literary Evidence of the Principate*

The volume of literary material directly or indirectly related to the theory and practice of benefaction and patronage is not as extensive in the Principate as it is for the Late Republic. The major sources are Seneca's *de beneficiis*, the correspondence of Fronto and especially that of Pliny, as well as occasional remarks in many authors including Tacitus and Epictetus. As with the literature of the Late Republic, it is the attitudes of the literary, senatorial elite that find expression. The exception is Epictetus whose discourses were selected, arranged and published by the consular historian Flavius Arrianus. The great majority of the passages that deal with patronage concentrate on personal relations between individuals, between leading senators and a wide variety of individuals including junior colleagues, members of the equestrian and decurial orders as well as freedmen and freedwomen. References to patronal action involving communities are a part of this mix. The range of activity, as documented most fully by Pliny and Fronto, is broad. Patrons and benefactors arrange marriages, provide their dependents with

material benefaction and legal protection; they also mediate disputes and secure honors and other advantages.[1]

Benefaction and patronage assume mutual responsibilities, as Pliny and Seneca claim in virtually the same words. The latter writes at the beginning of the third book of *de beneficiis*: *non referre beneficiis gratiam et est turpe et apud omnes habetur* (3, 1.1), and then later confirms the point, noting that there is a precept (*dictum*): *turpe esse beneficiis vinci* (5, 2.1). The former uses the same language. In explaining why he has conferred an exceptional benefaction, Pliny notes *nam vinci in amore turpissimum est* (4, 1.5). Significant here is that *turpe* can apply equally to both sides in the relationship. There is then a moral equivalency of obligation that transcends differences in status and services. This feature is characteristic of the patronal system in general.[2] The failure to respond is not only personally shameful, but is to be condemned because it undermines social and civic harmony (Sen. *ben.* 1, 3–4; 3, 6.2; 4, 18.1).

There is an important implication to this moral equivalency. By performing services, one party can impose obligation on the other to reciprocate. Seneca was aware of the problem and condemns those who give in order to get (4, 14.1; 6.20.2). True benefaction, he argues, is not what is given, but rather the goodwill demonstrated, it involves *magnitudo* and is (or more accurately 'should be') motivated by the interest of the recipient (1, 5.2; 4, 29.2–3; 5, 11.5). Moreover, the benefaction must be freely (voluntarily) conferred (*beneficium enim id est, quod quis dedit, cum illi liceret et non dare*, 3, 19.1). This apparent paradox, one must reciprocate but the benefaction must be voluntarily conferred, is characteristic of most systems of patronage.[3] At the purist and most theoretical level, reciprocity is essential but not mandatory; the benefactor does not / ought not to expect return; the beneficiary however should respond and do so in the appropriate manner.[4] The ambivalent nature of reciprocation may explain in part why inscriptions mentioning patronage are so unspecific about the actual nature of exchange (cf. Ch. 7).

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[1] On the range of activity in general, Saller, *Personal Patronage*. The activity is not much different from what Caesar and Q. Oppius indicate, Representative Texts, J and K.

[2] Eisenstadt and Roniger, 2 ff.; also discussed in Ch. 1.

[3] Eisenstadt and Roniger, 248 ff.; Wallace-Haddrill, 78 ff.

[4] Litigation involving the two parties is of course not compatible with this ideal. Indeed both Seneca (*ben.* 3, 7.1; 14.3) and Fronto (*ad am.* 1, 1) felt it was fatal to the relationship. Actions involving third parties also posed serious difficulties (Fronto *ad M. Caes.* 3, 3).

The character both of the benefactor-patron and of the beneficiary-client is also a matter of concern precisely because the debt of gratitude continues even after the 'gift' has been repaid; that is, one can return the *res* and be quit, but one can never repay the goodwill that prompted the gift.[5] Hence Fronto stresses that one must be selective in response to petitioners (*ad am.* 2, 8). Because obligation continues, both parties want to be secure that the other party shares the same values, that the beneficiary will not forget; that the benefactor will not expect to receive back what cannot be provided. Hence, considerable attention is given to the discussion of the worthiness (or merit) of the party in need, to shared values, and to physical proximity.[6] Such considerations, namely those that stress 'intimacy' actual or potential, made it easier to confer benefactions on citizens rather than on subjects (e.g., Fronto *ad am.* 1, 3).

To achieve its maximum positive impact, benefaction should be continuous and gratitude enduring. Regarding the former, the sense of continuity is reinforced by the frequent use of the plural (e.g., Sen. *ben.* 3,9.3; 4, 30.3), by the explicit statements about the importance of providing many benefactions great and small (Fronto, *ad Ver. imp.* 2, 7; *ad am.* 2, 7; Plin. *ep.* 5, 11; Sen. *ben.* 1, 3), and that benefits given must also be reinforced by others (*fovenda sunt*).[7] Benefits are wasted if one does not heap new ones on old, indeed multiple benefactions will eventually turn even the heart of the ingrate (Sen. *ben.* 1, 4.2–3). The converse is also true: According to Seneca it is human nature that, when the desire of new benefits has diminished the value of one that has already been received, the benefactor is also less esteemed (3,3.2; also Plin. *ep.* 3,4). In sum, the relationship depends upon continuing exchange of benefactions and/or services or at least the hope that more will be forthcoming. The fact that the exchange of benefactions was thought to be continuous suggests another reason why the epigraphical references to patronage are so unspecific.

Though both parties to the relationship have mutual responsibilities, they are not identical. Indeed Seneca stresses that, since benefits may be

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5 Sen. *ben.* 2, 17–18. There was, a Badian puts it in *Foreign Clientelae* (8–9), "… a tendency for a benefit conferred to establish a permanent obligation." Also Gelzer, *Nobility*, 69 ff. and P. Veyne, *Le pain et le cirque*, Paris, 1976, 74 ff.

6 E.g., Fronto *ad am.* 1, 8; 2, 11; Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 13.

7 2, 11.5. The notion of continuous benefaction in patronage makes it difficult to identify what specifically led to the relationship between patron and client community, and what maintained it. The inscriptions are perhaps deliberately ambiguous on detail.

given in one form and repaid in another, it is difficult to establish their equality (*ben.* 3,9.3). Hence, it is appropriate for the benefactor to give money or public honor, or to defend the other in court or provide testimonials, or to help someone find a position and/or improve his rank, or even to rescue a deserving person from poverty (Sen. *ben.* 1, 11.5; 2, 9.1; 5, 8.2; Fronto *ad am.* 1, 1; 7; 2, 7). The beneficiary, on the other hand, reveals his or her gratitude by honoring and celebrating the benefactor and benefit in a conspicuous and enduring way (Sen. *ben.* 4, 30.3; 2, 11.2; 5, 8.2, respectively). Characteristically, none of these authors suggest that the specific benefactions should be listed. The exchange is then, as Fronto puts it, between *gloria* and *suffragium*: The benefactor provides the latter, the beneficiary the former (*ad am.* 1, 6).

This equation has consequences. The greater the differential in status and resources, the less likely it was that the beneficiary would have the means to return in kind (*ben.* 5, 5.1) or in any other way beyond proclaiming publicly the resources, generosity and superior status of the benefactor. Hence, as both Seneca and Fronto explain, benefaction can assume the language and the characteristics of clientele. *Amicitia* (between and senior and a junior senator), Fronto says, could still include a relationship that is comparable to the one between a patron and his faithful, diligent and deferential freedman client (… *ut neque illum* [Gavius Clarus] *pigeret ne me puderet ea illum oboedere mihi, quae clientes, quae liberti fideles ac laboriosi obsequuntur, ad Ver. imp.* 2, 7). Not everyone would have felt comfortable with this relationship. Indeed, Seneca states that some ungrateful men shrink from discussing openly a benefit received because they fear that others may reckon that they owe their success to the assistance of another rather than to their own merit, or because they fear the reputation of a client (… *dum opionionem clientium timent, ben.* 2, 23.3). In sum, Roman ideology may have made a distinction between benefaction and formal patronage, and members of the elite may have been careful to respect such distinctions in their relations with their equals; in practice, however, the two were readily conflated.

In discussing benefaction, Seneca and Fronto emphasize especially the relations between individuals. Both, however, include observations about the benefaction and patronage of communities. Fronto notes that it was honorable for communities to accept benefactions in the form of property and money from donors, both native and alien (*ep. gr.* 4–5). Fronto himself was active on behalf of communities, delivering an *actio gratiarum in senatu* on behalf of Carthage (little survives beyond the title) and assisting his *patria*, Cirta, to identify and select *patroni munici-*

pii.[8] Tacitus records how successful Agricola had been at encouraging the British elites to support Romanization through benefactions to their native communities.[9]

The most significant theoretical passage on the subject may be found in a rhetorical debate in Seneca's *de beneficiis*:

> 'What then,' you say, 'if the Princeps should grant citizenship (*civitas*) to all the Gauls, and exemption (*immunitas*) from taxes to all the Spaniards, would the individual on account of that owe him nothing?' Of course he would owe something, but he would owe it not because of a personal benefit but because of his share in a public benefit (*non tamquam proprium beneficium, sed tamquam publici partem*). 'The Princeps,' he says, 'had no thought of me at the time when he benefitted us all; he did not desire to give citizenship to me personally, nor did he direct his attention to me; so why should I feel indebted to one who did not put me before himself when he was thinking of doing what he did?' In the first place, when he planned to benefit all the Gauls, he planned to benefit me also; for I was a Gaul, and under my national, even if not under my personal designation, he included me. In the second place, I shall, in like manner, be indebted to him as having received, not a personal, but a general gift (*commune munus*); being one of the people (*ex populo*) I shall not pay the debt as one incurred by myself, but shall contribute to it as one incurred by my country (*patria*).[10]

Seneca has provided a somewhat extreme example of the relationship involving the greatest benefactor and a very large collective (one in which intimacy would appear to be impossible),[11] but the underlying idea should be the same also for cases in which the benefactor was a senator or decurion, and the beneficiary a city or *collegium*. The question is: Can there be legitimate benefaction and obligation when the benefactor and the beneficiary did not know each other personally? or when the latter was a collective? Seneca's response is an important one. Not only does it assume that obligation exists, but it explains that individuals share the collective responsibility for celebrating the gift of the donor and do so without compromising their superior status. That is, it allows a decurion to become the formal patron of a community which includes within its citizen body also one or more senators. A senator could hardly allow himself to be identified as a per-

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8 *Ad am.* 2, 11, discussed below in detail.

9 *Ag.* 21, discussed below in this chapter at section 4.5.

10 6,19. This text is a modified version of the Loeb translation. Also on this passage, Miriam T. Griffin, *Seneca, A Philosopher in Politics*, Oxford, 1976, 222 ff., 237, 249–250; Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, 243.

11 As argued in Chapter 3.2, Augustus, his successors and immediate family avoided the use of the word 'patron' especially after AD 11.

sonal dependent of the decurion, but, such a 'stigma', Seneca argues, had no impact on senators as members of the larger group. Hence, the senator, as a member of the collective, could support the glorification of a decurion-patron and do so without suffering any decline in his own authority. So, too, the opportunity to be celebrated publicly might encourage the wealthy non-senators to use their resources in a manner that might benefit the community. There was then no sense that a powerful senator in his own right suffered any diminution of status when his *patria* adopted a decurion as its formal patron (certainly Pliny felt none when Comum, his *patria*, adopted Calpurnius Fabatus as its *patronus*; this case is discussed below in this chapter).

This passage also complements the statements of Pliny that, by conferring a benefaction on an individual, the donor also secures the goodwill and obligation of the beneficiary's collective (e.g., *ep.* 2, 9: *omnibus nunc ego in uno referre gratiam possum*; 4, 15: … *ut scias quam copiosam, quam numerosam domum uno beneficio sis obligaturus*). In sum, because the higher status of an individual was not compromised when his community entered the clientele of another of lower status, the honor could be used to encourage generosity among individuals who might otherwise not have contributed.

It is tempting to argue that Stoic thought decisively influenced Roman attitudes on civic benefaction and civic patronage. Zeno did compose his own *Republic*, the contents of which found a prominent place in the Hellenistic Stoa.[12] The effect of this tradition on Roman thinking was variable. Zeno's views on the state were extreme by Roman standards: Women to be held in common, coinage should not be introduced for purposes of exchange and, for this subject significant, that neither temples nor law courts nor gymnasia should be built in cities.[13] Stobaeus' account of Stoic ethics as recorded by Arius Didymus is more consistent with Roman notions. The good man (i.e., the Stoic) is moderate, orderly, good at recognizing the right moment, quick to see what is appropriate; having the skill to be a king, a general, a politician and an acquirer of property; grateful and law-abiding. All these qualities are prominent in the writings of Seneca, Pliny and Fronto

[12] Malcolm Schofield has discussed various aspects of Stoic theory in his *The Stoic Idea of the City*, Cambridge, 1991. I regret that Miriam Griffin's book on Seneca's treatise did not reach me until this manuscript was in production. *Seneca on Society. A Guide to de Beneficiis*, Oxford 2013.

[13] Schofield, 3–4, quoting and translating Diogenes Laertius, 732–734 (and correcting the Loeb text and translation).

and characterize the *civis bonus*.[14] This concept is somewhat different from the Stoic ideal articulated in Cicero *de off.* 2, and in *ad Q. f.* 1, l. In the latter cases, Stoic principles served to provide a model for governance; in this case the Stoic model defines the role of the good man.

In sum, benefactions to communities generated obligations and, depending on the circumstances, they also generated patron and client status. While benefaction and patronage may theoretically be distinct institutions, they do share the same language and, as Seneca indicates, were easily conflated. As to the formal patronage of communities, the literary and political elite of the Principate accepted the notion that, as members of such client communities, they too shared the responsibility to celebrate a donor, even if of lower status; they did not however feel that their personal status was in any way diminished in doing so. The de-personalization of the relationship may be one of the most important factors in accounting for the widespread epigraphical celebration of civic patrons of all ranks.

The discussion now turns from the general and theoretical to specific cases of civic patronage in the literary evidence.

4.2. *Pliny and His Client Communities*

Pliny included a number of letters about his activities as a patron of communities; in fact, they make up a good proportion of the large number of letters concerning the various forms of patronage. His relations to three towns in Italy (Tifernum Tiberinum in Etruria, Firmum in Picenum and his *patria* of Comum) and to the Baetici illustrate well the variable nature of the patronal relationship.

4.2.1. *Pliny and Tifernum*

Concerning his relationship to Tifernum, Pliny, in writing to his wife's grandfather about a prospective visit, comments:

> *erit una sed brevis mora: deflectemus in Tuscos, non ut agros remque familiarem oculis subiciamus (id enim postponi potest), sed ut fungamur necessario officio. oppidum est praediis nostris vicinum (nomen Tiferni Tiberini), quod me paene adhuc puerum patronum cooptavit, tanto maiore studio quanto minore iudicio* (4, 1.3–4).

[14] On the development of Stoic thought on Roman political thinking, Griffin, *Seneca*, especially Ch. 7.

There can be no question here about Pliny's status: *me ... patronum cooptavit* is the precise legal language for the cooptation of *patroni* known from municipal charters and from the various *tabulae patronatus*.[15] Moreover, the manner in which he writes of the event suggests that what was unusual was not the fact of cooption but his age at the time.

We do not know how many other *patroni* Tifernum might have had, but Pliny's age at the time of the cooptation was remarkable (even to himself!) and requires some explanation. Sherwin-White has suggested that he was, in fact, 17 or 18 years old at the time in question and that the occasion was his acceptance of the inheritance of his uncle, Pliny the Elder, who had died during the eruption of Vesuvius in 79.[16] In that year Pliny was 17. Though the evidence for the connection is not decisive, it is difficult to establish any other source for this valuable piece of property.[17]

The situation may be reconstructed as follows. The elder Pliny owned a large estate near Tifernum. On his death, the estate passed to his nephew, and now adopted son, Pliny the Younger. As the estate may have been one of the largest in the area and as Pliny, in combining the property of both his natural and adoptive parents, had become a very wealthy man,[18] it would have been desirable for the community to insure his good-will by coopting him as *patronus* immediately upon acceptance of the inheritance. The urgency would be especially pressing as Pliny had no other bond to the community. The language employed, *cooptare*, suggests that the decurions of Tifernum meant to assume Pliny as patron into their own order. The cooption made him, in essence, an 'honorary' decurion, a position that might have been useful to him in managing his estate and working with locals (discussed further in Ch. 8).

Two points are remarkable in this action. The first concerns the status of Pliny the Elder in Tifernum and the second the official justification for coopting his adoptive son. Concerning the first, it is manifest in the *tabulae*

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15 *ILS* 6089 c. 61 and *ILS* 6093 ff. They are discussed in Chs. 6.2 and 7. Elements of this section appeared in an article, Nicols, Pliny and the Patronage of Communities, *Hermes* 108 (1980) 365–385.

16 There were no restrictions on the number or age of *patroni*. The former is discussed in Nicols, 'Prefects, Patrons and the Administration of Justice.' On the question of age, Sherwin-White, *Letters*, 265.

17 This connection has been generally accepted, cf. R. Duncan-Jones, *The Economy of the Roman Empire*, Cambridge 1974, 19; the income from this estate was *HS* 400,000 per annum, *ep.* 10, 8.4.

18 On Pliny's wealth, see Duncan-Jones, *Economy*, 17–32.

patronatus that the *patronus* and all his descendants received the *clientela*.[19] There is no evidence proving that Pliny the Elder was a patron of this town, but if he were, then the formal cooptation of his adopted son would have been, though technically not necessary, all that more impressive for having taken place at all.[20] More interesting is the question of how the citizens of Tifernum justified coopting the young Pliny. The two surviving *tabulae* emanating from Italian communities are in the form of *decreta decurionum* and justify the cooptation by describing at length, though in vague terms, the merits of the patron.[21] This would have been difficult to do in the case of the young Pliny. But, regardless of the status of the elder Pliny or of the public justification for the cooptation of his nephew and heir, it is clear that the citizens of Tifernum were anxious to secure the goodwill of the new landowner. Hence, Pliny's wealth, and not his merits or still unproven talents, was the primary factor in the decision to coopt him.[22] For his part, Pliny not only received an honor of some distinction, but also secured a formal position in the community.

The importance of this letter then is that it clearly reveals the means that communities used in order to secure the goodwill of those who possessed wealth and influence in an area of immediate concern. Inscriptions protest (perhaps too much) that the honor had been won by merit, *ob meritis eius*,[23] but it was probably an all too frequent occurrence that communities bestowed the honor on senators as an incentive and with the expectation that honor would eventually yield a benefaction. Moreover, it indicates that the Senecan dictum, namely that it was inappropriate to give in order to get (4, 14.1; 6, 20.2) was in practice disregarded, that communities conferred honors and promised *gloria* as a means to encourage generosity. Pliny's account of the process suggests that it was normal and acceptable for beneficiaries and clients to act in this manner.

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19 The usual formula is: *sibi liberis posterisque suis in fidem clientelamque suam receipt*, *ILS* 6100. The same sentiment is conveyed in Greek by the expression πάτρων διά προγόνων τῆς πόλεως with variations, e.g., P. Herrmann, *ZPE* 14 (1974) 257.

20 The *tabulae* do refer on occasion to the *renovatio* or a relationship (e.g., *CIL* 2, 2598), but it is not clear whether the renewal signifies the re-establishment of a relationship that had become dormant or the symbolic renewal of an on-going relationship.

21 *ILS* 6106, 6110.

22 It is, of course, possible that Pliny did confer a significant benefaction at or before the time of his cooption, and that he neglected (deliberately?) to mention the fact in this letter. This is unlikely; Pliny may appear to be modest about his benefactions, but he regularly refers to them.

23 Cf. Harmand, 357, and Saller, *Personal Patronage*, 17. Discussed more fully in Ch. 7.

This letter is also of interest because it indicates the nature of the mutual responsibilities of both parties. Pliny comments further:

> *adventus meos celebrat, profectionibus angitur, honoribus gaudet. in hoc ego, ut referrem gratiam* (*nam vinci in amore turpissimum est*), *templum pecunia mea exstruxi* (4, 1.4–5).

The basis of the exchange is clear: in return for the acknowledgment of Pliny's superior 'status', he is prepared to assume financial responsibility for local projects, in this case for the building of a temple. That is, even though the benefaction, here a material one, was traded for prestige, the specifics and timing of the exchange remain vague. This is consistent with the argument made in §1 of this chapter, namely, as Fronto puts it, the parties exchange *gloria* and *suffragium*; the benefactor provides the latter, the beneficiary the former (*ad am.* 1, 6).

Though Pliny clearly feels the obligation to reciprocate, he does, nevertheless, seem to have taken genuine pleasure from the enthusiasm of the citizens of Tifernum. Even so, he is acutely aware of the reality: the costs of the project and the excursion to dedicate the building are assumed as a necessary burden / obligation, *necessarium officium*.[24] He has assumed them not merely because of the prestige he might enjoy in a small town, but because such *officia* belong to the responsibilities of all good citizens.[25] For public consumption then, Pliny built the temple because he felt obliged to render thanks to the community for the honors he had received from it (cf. 634), and because he accepts the notion that the patron must also be a benefactor. The Tiferni, on the other hand, clearly hoped to manipulate and influence a man whose wealth was considerable, one who owned property in the territory of the city, but one who had no other connection or sense of obligation to the community. Finally, it is implicit in this letter that communities took the initiative in these relationships, that they sought to acquire senatorial patrons and to stimulate benefaction.

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[24] 4, 1.3. On the significance of *necessarium*, cf. Gelzer, 72ff. There is some ambiguity, perhaps intentional, in Pliny's language. The *necessarium* might relate to the journey to dedicate the temple, or to the obligation to provide the gift of the temple. Eilers, p. 103–105, minimizes the connection between cooptation, *officium*, and benefaction (the construction of the temple), but I believe the three components are connected; here as elsewhere the ambiguity that Eilers recognizes is deliberate but consistent with the language of obligation.

[25] The notion of the *optimus civis* is discussed below; there is considerable data on senatorial activity in the municipalities of Italy, W. Eck, Präsenz (1980) 283ff.

4.2.2. *Pliny and the Baetici*

The situation described in 3,4 is more complex but well illustrates the characteristics of the institution in Pliny's day and the attitudes toward it among men of his standing. Unlike the situation described above, however, the benefaction here is one of a personal service. In this respect Pliny's actions against Caecilius are comparable to those of Cicero against Verres (Ch. 5) and parallel to the services offered by Caesar to the same Spanish province, Representative Texts L and Ch. 2.3. Indeed, Pliny himself may well have been aware of and have played on the parallels.

In this letter, Pliny describes how an embassy had arrived from the province of Baetica with the intention of indicting its former governor, Caecilius Classicus (*PIR*[2] C 32). The provincial legates request Pliny to lead the prosecution; he, however, wishes to decline, claiming other duties. Subsequently, he writes,

> *Factum est senatus consultum perquam honorificum, ut darer provincialibus patronus si ab ipso me impetrassent. Legati rursus inducti iterum me iam praesentem advocatum postulaverunt, implorantes fidem meam quam esset contra Massam Baebium experti, adlegantes patrocini foedus. Secuta est senatus clarissima adsensio, quae solet decreta praecurrere. Tum ego 'Destino' inquam, 'patres conscripti, putare me iustas excusationis causas attulisse.' Placuit et modestia sermonis et ratio* (3, 4.3–4).

As Pliny uses the vocabulary of patronage in an ambiguous manner, his relationship to the Baetici remains obscure. Nevertheless, this letter illustrates, as no inscription can, that there were tensions between the two parties, that client communities needed patrons, and that social pressure was an effective means to pressure their patrons for services, and that potential patrons were sensitive to the conflicts that might arise between themselves and their colleagues.

In form, this letter is consistent with the principles outlined by J. Béranger in his discussion of *le refus du pouvoir*, namely, that one generates legitimation, consensus and authority by initially refusing and then being 'persuaded' to accept a power or a responsibility which one has already determined to exercise.[26] Béranger is referring, of course, to the role of the emperor and how each successive *princeps* legitimized his position by appearing to reject imperial power only to have it 'thrust' upon him later. It is, however, interesting to observe how Pliny uses the same devices of *recusatio*

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[26] J. Béranger, *Recherches sur l'aspect ideologique du principat*, Basel 1953, 137 ff.

and *cunctatio* in order to secure prior approval for actions that, in the course of the long trial ahead, might be offensive to some of his senatorial colleagues. And, just as with the emperor, his apparent modesty is praised by the Senate when he finally accepts the contract. In this sense, indeed, the parallel between *optimus civis* and *optimus princeps* is not inappropriate, for in both cases the image is created of the modest and responsible individual serving the best interests of the state.[27] Indeed, the language of the passage is completely consistent with the concepts of voluntarism as outlined in § 1 of this chapter.

The critical question in this letter is whether Pliny's standing in reference to the Baetici was simply that of *patronus causae*, or had he been coopted as *patronus provinciae*?[28] The distinction between these two functions is not always understood. The former was appointed by the Senate to handle the prosecution of a governor, the latter was appointed by the provincial assembly and may never have served the province in any legal capacity. Nonetheless, communities clearly coopted patrons in order to secure the forensic services of senators on a permanent basis.[29]

In order to understand the nature of the connection between Pliny and the Baetici in 99, it is necessary to examine the previous relationship between the two parties. In the year 93, six years earlier, the Senate had instructed Pliny to act as counsel for the Baetici in the prosecution of another governor indicted for extortion. That is, he was to serve as *patronus causae* in accordance with the provisions first established by the *lex Acilia*.[30] This is what he says about the case:

> *Dederat me senatus cum Herennio Senecione advocatum provinciae Baeticae contra Baebium Massam, damnatoque Massa censuerat, ut bona eius publice custodirentur. Senecio, cum explorasset consules postulationibus vacaturos, convenit me et 'Qua concordia' inquit, iniunctam nobis accusationem exsecuti sumus, hac adeamus consules petamusque, ne bona dissipari sinant, quorum esse in custodia debent.' Respondi: 'Cum simus advocati a senatu dati, dispice num peractas putes partes nostras senatus cognitione finita.' Et ille: 'Tu quem*

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[27] Pliny develops the theme more fully in his *Panegyricus*; note above in § 1 of this chapter.

[28] Scholarly opinion is divided on this question. Sherwin-White, *Letters*, ad loc., and J. Deininger, *Die Provinziallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Munchen 1965, 129–130, consider him as such. Harmand does not include him in his list of provincial patrons, and leaves the question of his status open, 414–417. A fuller exposition of the argument against provincial patrons in this period may be found in 'Patrons of Provinces', *ZPE* 80 (1990) 101 ff.

[29] E.g., *ILS* 6106, and (what will be discussed below) Fronto, *ad am.* 2, 11. The latter suggests that those men should be elected patron *qui nunc fori principem locum occupant*.

[30] *FIRA*^{2} 1, p. 87; the *lex Julia*, discussed in Chapter 5, may in fact have been the legal basis.

> *voles tibi terminum statues, cui nulla cum provincia necessitudo nisi ex beneficio tuo et hoc recenti; ipse et natus ibi et quaestor in ea fui.' Tum ego: 'Si fixum tibi istud ac deliberatum, sequar te ut, si qua ex hoc invidia, non tantum tua.'* (7, 33.4–5).

As *patronus causae*, Pliny considered that his responsibilities to the province had come to an end when the case was over and Herennius accepted that interpretation. That Pliny continued to support the provincials thereafter was based not on his previous commitment to them, but on his friendship for his colleague. It is to be noted, moreover, that Herennius felt his own commitment to be continuous because, first, he had been born in the province and, second, because he had served there. These two facts establish a natural bond ('intimacy') between the two parties as distinct from the legally defined status of *patronus causae*.

In 99, however the situation was very different. The critical passage in the letter cited at the beginning of this discussion reads: *adlegantes* (i.e., the Baetici) *patrocini foedus* (3, 4.4). Pliny's language here is unambiguous: in order to support their request for the advocate's services, the *legati provinciae Baeticae* produced a formal treaty (*foedus*; cf. 8, 6.14, 24.2; 10, 93) of *patrocinium*, the validity of which Pliny does not question. Unfortunately, he does not explain whether, by *patrocinium*, he means the formal civic patronage such as he enjoyed in Tifernum, or the *patrocinium* of the *patronus causae*. In support of the second interpretation, it may be observed that on the occasions when Pliny does use the word *patrocinium* (6, 23.1; 9, 7.1; cf. *Cod. Just.* 2, 7.9), it refers to his services as an advocate (though these, too, might have been initiated under the more formal relationship). There are, however, several problems with this interpretation. If the *foedus patrocini* referred specifically to his role as *patronus causae*, then the whole *recusatio-cunctatio* motif becomes meaningless because a formal commitment to represent the interests of the Baetici already existed. This is, however, highly unlikely, for he had on at least one previous occasion (1, 7) refused to act for them in a similar case and can see grounds for refusing on still another (3, 4.8).

These considerations suggest that Pliny's *patrocinium* was the formal and civic variety.[31] This conclusion is, moreover, supported by his admission that he enjoyed the *iura hospitii* with some of these provincials (3, 4.5). This is significant because there are a number of bronze inscriptions from the

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31 Cf. Nicols, *Patronum cooptare, patrocinium deferre*, *ZRG*, and with many individuals and communities.

Spanish provinces (*tabulae patronatus*) which combine the cooptation of a patron with the extension of *hospitium*.[32] It is possible that the Baetici are referring to such a document when they mention *foedus patrocini*. There are, however, also problems with this interpretation. Only twelve provincial patrons are epigraphically attested.[33] The first, Nonius Balbus, the *patronus* of the *commune Cretensium* (*CIL* 10, 1430), probably received this honor in about 30 BC.[34] Of those remaining only five are senators, all of whom date to the mid 2nd Century or still later. This suggests that a great deal of caution is required if this honor is to be ascribed to Pliny. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that this honor too was not considered appropriate for senatorial governors in the 1st century; a pattern that is consistent with the general prohibition on honors for governors argued in Chapter 3 and 6.

The most satisfactory solution to this problem is to find some way of explaining the *patrocinium* without making Pliny *patronus provinciae*. The starting point must be the *iura hospitii*, as Pliny openly acknowledges this connection. It may be that Pliny had been extended such rights in one or more of the communities in Baetica or in the province at large after the trial of 93. That is, he could have been *hospes* and not *patronus*. Indeed, some of the tablets (*tesserae hospitalis*) mentioned above do extend *hospitium* without referring to *patrocinium* or to the cooptation of a patron.[35] It is notable, moreover, that in other *tesserae* the *hospes* receives the community *in fidem clientelamque suam*, apparently assuming the functions of both *hospes* and *patronus*.[36] It is precisely out of such documents, in which *hospitium*, *clientela*, *patrocinium* and other related concepts are equated, that misunderstandings could arise. Hence, it may be that the *foedus patrocini* referred to by the Baetici was, in fact, one or more pacts of *hospitalis* (with or without reference to *clientela**) or *tabulae patronatus* with individual communities. To help some, Pliny felt obliged to help all.

Pliny's contacts with the Baetici may be summarized as follows. In 93, he served as *patronus causae* in an action on behalf of the provincials.[37] He

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[32] *AE* 1936, 23; 1969/70, 746 and *ILS* 6108. Note also Nicols, *Tabulae*, and here in Chapters 6 and 7.

[33] Harmand, 411ff.; Nicols, Provincial Patrons', *ZPE* 80 (1990) 101, 105ff.

[34] This issue is treated more fully in the Chapter 5, and in Provincial Patrons. On Nonius' career, see L. Schumacher, Das Ehrendekret fur M. Nonius Balbus aus Herculaneum, *Chiron* 6 (1976) 165–168.

[35] *ILS* 6096, 6104, 6102.

[36] *AE* 1962, 287; 1961, 96; 1967, 239; and *ILS* 6097; Nicols, *Tabulae*.

[37] 7.33. It is not clear why Pliny would have been chosen for the prosecution. He had, as far

seems, at first, to have reckoned his relationship as having terminated with the end of the trial. But, soon thereafter and on the urging of his friend Herennius, he was again active on their behalf and, for reasons which he does not make clear, may have continued to be so over the next several years if the expression, made in 97 about his services to the Baetici (... *tot officiis, tot laboribus*, 1, 7.2), is to be understood as a reference to events beyond those of 93. Following the trial, one or more communities may have severally coopted him as patron. Hence, at least some of the Baetici could argue that some kind of formal agreement existed in 99.

It appears then, that, when a province or a municipality was in need of assistance, the usual procedure was to request the services of a senator who might be bound to the community by natural or acquired ties. Pliny's colleague in the prosecution of Baebius Massa in 93, Herennius Senecio, is a good example of both. As Herennius told Pliny when the latter was prepared to terminate his relations to the province after the completion of the trial:

> *Tu quem voles tibi terminum statues, cui nulla cum provincia necessitudo nisi ex beneficio tuo et hoc recenti; ipse et natus ibi et quaestor in ea fui* (7, 33.5).

That is, it was customary for the community to enlist the support of those senators who were connected to it by natural bonds. By 99, Pliny, through his services and labors on behalf of the province, and perhaps too by admitting some communities into his *hospitium* and clientele had achieved something like that status. All these factors plus the appeal of the Baetici to his *fides* and their celebration of him in the Senate point to a general, but informal, patronage of the province. Or, in other words, the relationship between the two parties consisted of a variety of formal and informal ties in which Pliny was clearly the patron and at least some of the Baetici may have been his formal *clientes*. This conclusion should not, however, be construed to mean that the commune of Baetica formally coopted him as its patron, though resolutions may have been passed urging that he be appointed *patronus causae*. This state of affairs is comparable to the traditional practice of the institution in the late Republic.[38] Now that Pliny's status has been established, the attitudes governing the exercise of patronage may be considered.

Regarding the motives of the two parties, the first question to be considered here is: Why did the Baetici seek out Pliny in 99 instead of a native son like the now dead Herennius? There can be no doubt about the fact that

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as we know, no previous contact with the province. Pliny the Elder had served in Spain, but apparently in the Tarraconsis, not in Baetica.

[38] Cf. Gelzer, 89 f.

there was a sufficient number of senators from Baetica in the Senate at this time.[39] Indeed, the emperor Trajan came from Italica, a community in that province. The imperial family would not then have been disinterested in the selection of any *patronus causae*; indeed the emperor must have allowed or even encouraged the Baetici to seek out Pliny, which, if true, may well account for the latter's wish to preserve appearances by having the Senate legitimize his status.[40]

Pliny's reputation for forensic oratory and standing in the Senate may also have been relevant. In ca. 159, Fronto was asked by his *patria*, Cirta, to recommend a patron. Fronto neatly side-stepped this indirect request that he assume the role himself (Pliny, in a response to Junius Mauricus, does the same thing with a marriage proposal, 1, 14) and recommended that the town select patrons from those who were the leading orators of the day: *qui nunc fori principem locum occupant*, *ad am.* 2, 11. This link between patronage and oratory is confirmed in the literary evidence (e.g., Hor. *carm.* 4, 1, and also by Caesar at *BHisp* 42) and in numerous inscriptions, for example, *CIL* 8, 26597, 9, 2354, and especially 14, 2516, a dedication by two provinces to their: *oratori praestantissimo defensori clientium*. In this sense, the Baetici are responding in the same manner as did the Sicilians toward Cicero (Ch. 5.3). Another factor mentioned by Fronto is consular status. Though Pliny was not yet consul, it was probably known that he was *designatus* for the following year.[41]

The reasons which Pliny openly and officially professed for undertaking the prosecution of Caecilius are not only traditional but also reflect the new Augustan and Stoic ideals. As such, they suggest much about the conflicting attitudes toward patronage of communities during the principate. He says:

> *Compulit autem me ad hoc consilium non solum consensus senatus, quamquam hic maxime, verum et alii quidam minores, sed tamen numeri. Veniebat in mentem priores nostros etiam singulorum hospitum iniurias voluntariis accusationibus exsecutos, quo deformius arbitrabar publici hospitii iura neglegere. Praeterea cum recordarer, quanta pro isdem Baeticis superiore advocatione etiam pericula subissem, conservandum veteris officii meritum novo videbatur* (3, 4.5–6).

[39] B. Stech, *Senators Romani qui fuerint inde a Vespasiano usque ad Traiani exitum* (= *Klio Beiheft* X), Leipzig 1912, 167–170, and, more recently, R. Wiegels, *Die römischen Senatoren und Ritter aus den hispanischen Provinzen bis Diokletian*, Diss. Freiburg 1971. There are at least ten from Baetica. Fronto deals with the same issue in *ad am.* 2, 11, discussed below.

[40] Senatorial appointment in such trials was routine, as Pliny indicates elsewhere (10, 3), but he appears to have considered this appointment to be something special.

[41] On the chronology of the trials and consulship, Sherwin-White, *Letters*, 58 and 78.

Hence, the official reason for accepting was the unanimous feeling in the Senate (*consensus senatus*); that is, the good citizen yields gracefully to the authority of the Senate (why the Senate should urge this task on him is not clear; it is likely that the *consensus* was not as spontaneous as Pliny suggests, but, rather, conformed to what the emperor, the provincials and Pliny all wished). This theme, that the good citizen should undertake such actions on behalf of provincials, is firmly rooted in Roman tradition: *Veniebat in mentem priores nostros etiam singulorum hospitum iniurias voluntariis accusationibus exsecutos* (3, 4.5; cf, Cic. *ad Q.fr.* 1, 1).

Pliny then continues his explanation with a statement that is central to the understanding of Roman patronage:

> *Est enim ita comparatum ut antiquiora beneficia subvertas, nisi illa posterioribus cumules. Nam quamlibet saepe obligati, si quid unum neges, hoc solum meminerunt quod negatum est*
>
> '… past benefits cease to count unless confirmed by later ones; for if a single thing is denied people who have every reason to be grateful, the denial is all they remember.' 3, 4.6.

Pliny does not specify here whether the *beneficia* result from the actions of a formally designated *patronus* or from those of a benefactor, but the attitude described applies equally to both. The duties of each party are clear. The beneficiaries (or *clientes*) are expected to remember and memorialize the benefits received and the benefactor (note §1 in this chapter). Conversely, the disappointed client readily forgets past achievements and memorializes instead the rejection. Thus, as argued above, the services of the patron and benefactor are exchanged against the enduring celebration of his name and generosity. The Baetici praised Pliny's past services to them in the Senate, thereby honoring him. It would diminish his reputation and *fides* to refuse their request. His words then are consistent with the general notion that patronage is rooted the continuous performance of mutual duties and services. To deny even one request could result in a serious loss of prestige and *clientela*. This sense of continuing obligation, that we have observed with Q. Oppius and with Caesar, Representative Texts, J and L, persists into the Principate.

Pliny admits that two other considerations also moved him to undertake the prosecution:

> *Ducebar etiam quod decesserat Classicus, amotumque erat quod in eiusmodi causis solet esse tristissimum, periculum senatoris. Videbam ergo advocationi meae non minorem gratiam quam si viveret ille propositam, invidiam nullam. In summa computabam, si munere hoc iam tertio fungerer, faciliorem mihi excusationem fore, si quis incidisset, quem non deberem accusare. Nam cum*

> *est omnium officiorum finis aliquis, tum optime libertati venia obsequio praeparatur* 3, (4.7–8).

This statement illustrates the contradiction involved in the exercise of patronage. Whenever one acts on behalf of one's clients, particularly when it is against another senator, one risks incurring the *invidia* of one's colleagues; Fronto expresses the same concern.[42] This *invidia* is the consequence of the tendency of a privileged class to view an attack on one of its members as an attack on all. As Pliny writes, the most painful aspect of the situation would have been the *periculum senatoris*. To ally with the provincials and to prosecute a fellow senator meant that the *patronus* (*causae*) would not only earn the enmity of the defendant, but also antagonize many of the defendant's friends (or at least those senators who had obligations to Classicus and would now have to act on his behalf).[43] Consequently, to prosecute Classicus would create an uncomfortable situation in the Senate, would incur the displeasure of many of Classicus' friends, and, in particular, would enrage those who were friends of both Pliny and Classicus. The third situation, the conflict of coinciding obligations, is not an uncommon one; Pliny devotes a number of letters to resolving such painful choices.[44] Thus, a Roman senator, especially a senior one who was sensitive about his good reputation, would proceed with great care in such situations so that, in upholding his patronal responsibilities, he would not unnecessarily jeopardize other connections.[45]

Finally, there is the idea of patronage as a burden. *Nam cum est omnium officiorum finis aliquis* ('for all obligations have some limit', 3, 4.8), Pliny writes. When he has accepted a certain number of such requests, he may, without losing his status as patron, free himself from some burdens, especially if the new requests conflict with other responsibilities. This idea would appear to contradict the statement made above; namely, that the patronal relationship had to be exercised continuously in order to be maintained. The contradiction is a real one and is essentially between patronage in theory

[42] Discussed in §1. Cf. Caes. *Bell. Hisp.* 42, 2 and Cicero's recognition of the problem discussed in Chapter 2.

[43] Cf. *ep.* 7, 33, 7: *non advocati fidem sed inimici amaritudinem implesse.*

[44] E. g., *epp.* 1, 7 and 4, 17.

[45] Recall Fronto's statement that it is difficult to speak against another senator without giving offense; it can however be done, *ad Antonin. imp.* 2, 8 and *ad M. Caes.* 3, 3. The situation might be quite different for an ambitious junior senator hoping to make a name for himself. A good example is Aquillius Regulus (*PIR*^{2} A 1005); see also R. Syme, *Tacitus*, Oxford 1958, 100–101.

and patronage in practice. Theoretically and ideally, a patron is obliged to defend and protect his client under all circumstances; in fact, however, as Pliny recognizes, situations will arise when his responsibilities to Baetica may conflict with his duties to other friends and clients.[46]

There is, furthermore, an element of impatience to be found in this letter. Pliny is being called upon to instigate a major trial on behalf of his litigious clients for the third time in six years.[47] Not only that, but he can also easily envisage a fourth case in the near future (3, 4.3). Their demands have become a burden to him.

This conclusion raises the question of what return Pliny received for his investment of time, talent and energy. There is no indication that Pliny received any material advantage from his actions (though he may have taken the standard 10,000 HS that prosecutors could claim, Tac. *Ann.*, 11, 7–8). Nor could patrons gain any direct political advantage from the client-community as they had in the late Republic. He does state specifically that, in acting for the provincials, he will earn their *gratia*, a feeling that was traditionally expressed in statues and commendations. Pliny also stresses that he has won the *consensus* of the Senate, the universal approval of his colleagues. Hence, enhanced prestige in the client community, in the Senate, and before the emperor has to be viewed as the compensation.

This discussion of *ep.* 3, 4, has suggested a number of conclusions about the nature of patronage of communities in the Principate. First, the patronal relationship consisted of a variety of formal and informal ties. Secondly, the formalization of the relationship depended upon a number of factors, among which the status and origin of the prospective patron appear to be the most important. Thirdly, Roman tradition as well as the Stoic and the imperial ideology assigned the patronage of communities to the duties of the good citizen toward his state and society. Fourthly, though patronage was sometimes a necessary burden, it did enhance the reputation (*gloria*) of the patron and, thereby, might have provided the patron with some political advantage in dealing with the emperor and his senatorial colleagues.

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46 Cf. *ep.* 6, 18. Fronto gives other reasons discussed below in this chapter.

47 Cf. *epp.* 1, 7; 3, 9; 7, 33. We do not know enough about the pattern of trials to state with any certainty that this number, three or four over a ten year period, is normal or abnormal. Bithynia appears to have had a particular problem which may have been tied to its exceptional provincial charter. On these issues, Brunt, Maladministration; Nicols, Greek Patrons, and here in Chapter 5.

4.2.3. *Pliny and Firmum*

To this point, we have seen Pliny functioning in a formal relationship (as *patronus Tiferni Tiberini*) and in a relationship with the Baetici that had formal and informal aspects. But, whether formal or informal, both connections appear to belong to a general patronage of communities. One of the formal aspects of Pliny's relationship to the Baetici was the office of *patronus causae*. Pliny also served as the *patronus causae* of another community, Firmum, about which he writes in a letter to (Statius) Sabinus:[48]

> *Rogas ut agam Firmanorum publicam causam; quod ego quamquam plurimis occupationibus distentus adnitar. Cupio enim et ornatissimam coloniam advocationis officio, et te gratissimo tibi munere obstringere. Nam cum familiaritatem nostram, ut soles praedicare, ad praesidium ornamentumque tibi sumpseris, nihil est quod negare debeam, praesertim pro patria petenti. Quid enim precibus aut honestius piis aut efficacius amantis? Proinde Firmanis tuis ac iam potius nostris obliga fidem meam; quos labore et studio meo dignos cum splendor ipsorum tum hoc maxime pollicetur, quod credible est optimos esse inter quos tu talis exstiteris* (6, 18).

In this letter, we find two different relationships to the community of Firmum. Sabinus was born in Firmum; this may be deduced from Pliny's notice that Sabinus is interceding with him on behalf of his *patria*. Sherwin-White has suggested that Sabinus 'may well be *patronus*, like Pliny at Tifernum'.[49] Perhaps, but there is no need to make such an argument as his obligation to (or patronage of) Firmum was natural, being determined by birth. It was, in fact, parallel to the situation of Herennius Senecio toward Baetica and required no formalization.

Pliny's status is more ambiguous. First, he has agreed to act for the community as advocate or *patronus causae*(?) (*ut agam Firmamorum publicam causam*). His relationship to them is then comparable to the one that he enjoyed in his early dealings with the Baetici; namely, the conclusion of the legal issue would also terminate the formal relationship. He does suggest, however, that he might have had a somewhat more enduring relationship in mind, for he writes: *Proinde Firmanis tuis ac iam potius nostris obliga fidem meam*, suggesting thereby, that his relationship to the Firmani is comparable to that of Sabinus. Nevertheless, should Pliny's position in respect to

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48 Sherwin-White argues that he must be Statius Sabinus and the same person who is also addressed in 4, 10; 9, 2 and 18. All four letters reveal a close personal relationship (*familiaritatem nostram*, 6, 18.2), one in which Sabinus appears as the admirer.

49 Sherwin-White, *Letters*, 375.

the Firmani develop from that of *patronus causae* to that of *patronus municipii*, it would, in contrast to Sabinus' situation, probably be formalized.[50] As this letter complements so perfectly one that Fronto wrote to Cirta urging his *patria* to coopt his three consular colleagues as patrons (discussed below), it is entirely believable that the Firmani might have reacted to Sabinus's prompting by sending a coopting decree to Pliny, just as Fronto urged the *ordo* of Cirta to do to his candidates.

Pliny's attitudes toward his potential clients and toward the bond itself are revealing. By his own admission, he is fully occupied with other duties; this will be an additional burden. He is, however, willing to accept, he writes, because a friend has petitioned him to do so and the duties of friendship are binding. Here again, Pliny notes the burdensome nature of the service and, at the same time, stresses the typical features of a patronal relationship: He has voluntarily accepted because the Firmani have merited his services and because Sabinus' request is an honorable one; the Firmani will become *nostri* (intimacy). Good citizenship, the moral equivalency of fulfilling obligation, is stressed then on all sides.

4.2.4. *Pliny and Comum*

Pliny's benefactions to his hometown of Comum are well attested both in his own letters and in the inscriptions that have been found there.[51] Though both varieties of evidence provide considerable detail about his career in the imperial government and his numerous benefactions to the municipality, it is nowhere stated in these documents that he was, in fact, a *patronus* of the community.[52] As a consequence, there is no compelling reason to believe that Pliny enjoyed a formal patronage of Comum.[53] Indeed, there is no compelling evidence for the hypothesis that it was at all customary for senators (note the limitation) to become *patroni* of the *patriae* in the first century of the Principate.

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50 As this was not a maladministration trial, the Firmani had the choice of *patronus causae*.

51 *Epp.* 1, 3, 8; 2, 8; 3, 6; 4, 13; 5, 7, 10; 7, 11, 18 and *CIL* 5, 5262–5263; 5667; and *AE* 1972, 212.

52 The critical and most complete inscription is *CIL* 5, 5262. It is testamentary in character; Pliny himself is the subject; i.e., it is not in the dedicatory dative. Unfortunately the inscription is not complete, and breaks off where one often finds reference to patronage. It is also possible as we have seen with Nonius Balbus, that the word *patronus* might have appeared in another inscription that does not list benefactions. See the references to Nonius in Representative Texts and at various points in the monograph.

53 As has been suggested by Sherwin-White, *Letters*, 375.

Let us first, however, consider Pliny's benefactions to Comum. As these are well known and frequently discussed a simple enumeration should suffice.[54] He spent HS 1,100,000 for the construction and maintenance of a library. He built public baths for the town the cost of which is unknown though he does add that he contributed an additional HS 300,000 for their decoration plus capital of HS 200,000 the interest on which should be used for maintenance. He set up an *alimenta* program for the support of boys and girls of poor families in Comum, and an additional HS 1,860,000 for the upkeep of those slaves freed by his testament. He also provided capital sufficient, through interest earned on it, to pay one third of the salary of a teacher of grammar and literature. There were other smaller donations that need not be mentioned here. The magnitude of the benefactions does not, of course, prove that Pliny was the *patronus* of Comum, but it certainly suggests that he was a major benefactor and, by implication, that Comum celebrated him in the appropriate manner. As Pliny comments when making a gift to Comum: *nihil gratius* (*praestare*) *patriae potestis* (4, 13.9).

Hence, both the fact that he confers benefactions on Comum similar to those conferred on Tifernum, where he was officially *patronus*, and the use of the vocabulary of patronage to describe his generosity suggest that the relationship was essentially patronal even if he did have the formal title.

4.2.5. *Patronage and Benefaction in Pliny's Letters*

This conclusion raises the problem of the distinction between patronage and benefaction. These letters indicate a good range of benefactions a senator might provide either as the formal patron or as the benefactor of a community. The letters on Tifernum and Comum illustrate how the wealthy ought to use their fiscal resources to enhance a community: The construction of a public building and the establishment of an endowment to support education are appropriate and ought to serve as models for others. The letters on the Baetici point to a different but equally valid benefaction, namely oratory in the defense of a community. In the latter case, however, the distinction between the more limited obligation associated with the *patronus causae* and the more generalized formal *patrocinium* needs to be stressed.

More generally, Pliny characterizes his relationships in the usual and widely recognizable vocabulary of patronage: Intimacy, voluntarism, continuing benefaction and moral equivalence in obligation (reciprocity) are

[54] Duncan-Jones, *Economy*, 29 ff.

all central to the behavior of both parties. Pliny also appears as a patron who is as an important benefactor in his own right. And though the record does not record specific examples of brokerage with the central government, he did support individuals and communities in his clientele. There is, finally, no indication in these letters that the provincial clientele of Pliny or of Herennius was or could be calculated as constituting any kind of armed support for the patron. Peace, and the Augustan system, had removed this assumption from the vocabulary of patronage.

4.3. *Fronto and Cirta*

In about 157, the *IIviri* and *decuriones* of Cirta requested help from Fronto. Their request does not survive; Fronto's response is unfortunately fragmentary at critical points.[55] Nevertheless, it is apparent that the *ordo* had asked Fronto for his advice and/or assistance on some combination of the following: Either that he himself undertake some legal action on behalf of his *patria*; or, second, that he recommend individuals who might be adopted as patrons.[56]

Fronto writes:

> *... multoque malim patriae nostrae tutelam auctam quam meam gratiam. Quare suadeo vobis patronos creare, et decreta in eam rem mittere ad eos qui nunc fori principem locum occupant ...*

The issue is the *tutela* ['guardianship'] of the common *patria*. To maintain that *tutela* Fronto urges the *ordo* to acquire (*creare*) patrons. The infinitive in this context has a technical meaning indicating a formal election or appointment of magistrates.[57] Fronto's description of the appointment process is consistent with what will be discussed in Ch. 4.3 and 6.2 of this monograph; namely, the *ordo* votes (in accordance with the provisions of its municipal

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[55] *Ad am.* 2, 11. For the chronology of the letter and its general significance, E. Champlin, The Chronology of Fronto, *JRS* 64 (1974), especially 153–154. Champlin calls this letter "one of the most important in the collection." Also by the same author, *Fronto and Antonine Rome*, Cambridge MA 1980, 10–13.

[56] Ibid. It is not clear from the context whether the *ordo* sought patrons in general or whether it had a specific issue to cope with. Champlin suggests the case involved the Licinian family, the family of one of his beloved friends, Licinius Montanus (*ad am.* 1, 3); hence, Champlin intimates, an 'embarrassing' familiarity, rather than poor health, may be the reason for nominating alternates and outsiders.

[57] Hence, Fronto is not dealing with the appointment of a *patronus cause*, for such appointments are made (as Pliny indicates) by the Senate or the presiding judge and jury.

charter) to adopt an individual as a patron and sends legates bearing a copy of the decree (a *tabulae patronatus*) to the prospective patron.

Most interesting is the statement that the *tutela* of the *patria* can best be maintained by selecting as patrons those individuals who 'now hold a leading place in the forum', that is who are the leading forensic orators. The *tutela* of a community is protected by patrons whose primary benefaction is their ability to represent the interests of the community in legal disputes.

Fronto then describes his first candidate for the honor:

> *Aufidium Victorinum, quem in numero municipum habebitis, si di consilia mea iuverint; nam filiam meam desponi ei nec melius aut mihi in posteritatem aut meae filiae in omnem vitam consulere potui quam quom talem mihi generem cum illis moribus tantaeque eloquentia elegi …*
>
> You should send coopting decrees to Aufidius, whom (as patron?) you will have in the number of your citizens, if the gods aid my plans; you should know that I have promised my daughter to him, nor have I been able to come to a better decision either for myself in the matter of posterity nor for my daughter in the matter of her whole life than when I selected a son-in-law for myself with such morals and so much eloquence.

There is a problem here: will Aufidius be numbered among the citizens because he has married a citizen (as is implausibly suggested in the Loeb translation), or because he has become patron? The former would suggest that a husband acquired status in community through his wife (for which there is no evidence[58]). Or, is the sense rather that "if you ask him, you will have him [as patron] among the number of your citizens. I know that he will accept, because he is to become my son-in-law." Hence, the *nam* clause is not causal, but should be understood to explain parenthetically why Victorinus, of all the leading men in the forum, will agree to become patron. There is some evidence for this interpretation: The *album Canusinum* records as members of the *ordo* the names of all decurions and of all patrons, even if the latter were non-residents.[59]

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[58] My thanks to Susan Treggiari for discussing this problem with me.

[59] How *patronatus* might lead to 'citizenship' in the client community has been discussed in On the Standard Size of the Ordo Decurionum, *ZRG* 105 (1988) 716–718. The use of the emphatic *habebitis* twice may indicate that senators did not routinely accept all offers. Hence, Fronto appears to go out of his way to assure the *ordo* that in this case the offer will be accepted. It should be noted that the first *habebits* is an emendation of Niebuhr. It should be accepted because Victorinus came from Tuscany and had no connection with any African community at this time.

As to the person, Aufidius Victorinus is a well known.[60] He had already been consul for the first time (in an uncertain year) before this letter was written and went on to become proconsul of Africa, *praefectus urbi* and a second consulate in 183. He appears to have excelled in a number of areas, especially in the legal and oratorical. Fronto recommends him not only because of his forensic and moral excellence but also because he is engaged to marry his daughter, Cratia. As a formal patron, he will also be numbered among the citizens (*quem in numero municipum habebitis*)—a thought that pleases Fronto.

Servilius Silanus is also well known and, since he comes from the neighboring and friendly town of Hippo Regius, should also be addressed on this matter.[61] Fronto writes:

> *Servilium quoque Silanum, optimum et facundissimum virum, iure municipis patronum habebitis, quom sit ⟨e⟩ vicina et amica civitate Hippone Regio ...*
>
> (You should send a coopting decree) also to Servilius Silanus, an excellent and eloquent man, (whom) you will have as patron in accordance with the charter of the municipality, (you should send the decree to him) since he is from the neighboring and friendly town of Hippo Regius.

Once again Fronto stresses the shared values and eloquence of his candidate and once again indicates that Servilius will become the formal patron. Being from a neighboring and friendly town explains why Servilius will accept; it has little to do with the legality of the cooption. That is, the (in this case) *quom* clause depends on *mittere* and explains why Fronto believes this individual who is among leading forensic orators will accept. As patron, he too will presumably enter the *ordo* and acquire some legal status in Cirta. This statement is central for the discussion because it not only indicates the status of the patron in the community, but also because it suggests that communities were not always successful in recruiting senatorial patrons and that the legality of the cooption might be challenged. Both of these issues are prominent in other sources on civic patronage (discussed below).

It is not clear how status in the community would have been extended. The surviving decrees of cooptation (*tabulae patronatus*) do not specify that the patron will also be enrolled among the citizens. As Cirta was a Caesarian colony, the *lex Ursonensis* would be most relevant of the charters, but the

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60 *PIR*^{2}A 1393; Raepsaet-Charlier No. 282, for the most recent scholarship.

61 PIR^1 S 428; Raepsaet-Charlier, No. 901, for the most recent literature.

surviving sections, even those that specifically mention patronage, do not address the issue.[62] I suspect that Fronto was thinking of the right and power of the *duoviri quinquennales* to revise the list of citizens, that they are the ones who would have added the names of patrons to the list of citizens and also to the *ordo*. So much is also suggested by the *album Canusinum*.[63]

Similar reasoning is advanced for selection of the eloquent consular, Postumius Festus, who, Fronto writes, *et morum et eloquentiae nomine recte patronum vobis feceritis, et ipsum nostrae provinciae et civitatis non longinquae*.[64] "(You should also send a coopting decree to) Postumius Festus, (whom) you will make your patron according to the law; (he should be asked because he has a) reputation for moral excellence and eloquence, (and will accept because he is) himself of our province and from a not very distant town." As *recte* is parallel to *iure municipi* it too must have a legal meaning in this context.

The manuscript becomes fragmentary at this point, but suggests that Fronto cannot himself undertake any action because he no longer has the youth and strength, that the *patria* has in the past been aided by young and accomplished orators, and that a *virum popularem habeamus et virum consularem ius publicum respondentem*. That is, the community needs a man (a patron) who is both a 'native' and a consular.[65]

This last statement raises the question of whether the town needs or expects to find one patron or more, whether Fronto is providing a list from which the community might select, or whether he expects all three to be addressed. The public character of the letter suggests that Fronto anticipated that decrees (*decreta in eam rem mittere ad eos* …) would be sent to all three; moreover, it is reasonable to believe that he anticipated (and may already have arranged) that all three would accept. The use of the singular (… *virum popularem* … *virum consularem* …) should not be taken too literally.

The text should then be interpreted to mean that Cirta needs patrons who have admirable characters, are distinguished orators and consulars, that the *ordo* should send decrees to three men who will become patrons in

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62 Caesar distributed land to his veterans, but the colony may not have been organized until after 44 BC. On this issue, Vittinghoff, *Kolonisation*, 112–113.

63 Discussed in Ch. 8. The charters are incomplete and may not have been parallel. Cirta, for example, had *IIIviri* while Urso had *IIviri*.

64 *RE* 22, 95, Postumius 72; Raespsaet-Charlier, No. 601.

65 The Loeb translates *popularem* as 'well-known'; in this context, however, the word surely means 'of the same country'.

accordance with the municipal charter; they will also gain some unspecified status in the community. The three will agree to accept the community into their respective *clientelae* because they all have connections either with Fronto himself or with the region.

As the argument presented here regarding the status of the patron has not been advanced before, it is reasonable to ask whether Fronto's words are being properly interpreted. Though the text of the letter is fragmentary, it is fully preserved at the critical points. Moreover, Fronto's language is not only specific, but also (should there be any doubt) repetitive (note the use of *habebitis*[66]). Finally, the epigraphical evidence confirms the argument that the patron becomes (if not already) a member of the client community. In sum, the three may be 'outsiders' but they all have regional or familial ties to the city and, by becoming the formal patrons of the town, they would be reckoned *in numero municipum*; patronal status encouraged the *quinquennales* to make the patron *popularis* (native). This formulation is central to our understanding of the institution. Both parties stood to gain by this arrangement. The community found a way to incorporate and secure the services of a powerful outsider who had no regular or formal status; the patron, in so far as he had resources in the community, also gained, for by becoming a member of the community and of the *ordo*, he would achieve a status that allowed him to protect and develop his own interests in the community.

When we arrange this letter together with the earlier discussion of the letter sent by Pliny to Sabinus (on the Firmani) a more complete picture of the process of coopting a patron emerges. We have implicitly a letter from a community to an advisor/patron (Cirta to Fronto) asking for assistance; an implicit letter from the advisor/patron to a potential new patron (Sabinus to Pliny) testing the latter's readiness; an explicit letter from the potential patron to the advisor agreeing to serve (Pliny to Sabinus); and an explicit letter from the advisor to the community explaining who should be coopted and why (Fronto to Cirta). Finally, we also have the decrees of the community asking a new patron to accept the community as a client. It is hardly a revelation that this should be the process, but nonetheless comforting to have all the steps laid out.

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66 Niebuhr correctly restores *habetis* to *habebitis* (in reference to Victorinus). The usage then parallels the second *habebitis* (in reference to Servilius). The present tense would be meaningless in the first case as Victorinus comes from Umbria and has no connection with the province.

Cirta did have citizens who were also senators (*clarissimi*).[67] The surviving text (and perhaps Fronto himself) is not explicit about why individuals in this latter group should not receive the decrees. They may have lacked either the eloquence or the consular rank of Victorinus, Silanus and Festus. They may also have been too closely associated with the Licinian family (if that was the issue that immediately faced the *ordo* at Cirta).

In sum, Fronto and the decurions recognized the value of having multiple patrons of the highest rank, values and eloquence. In a particularly difficult case it was important to know not only who was able to prove for the *tutela* / guardianship, but that the petition would be accepted. Fronto provides both the candidates and the assurances. In respect to patronage in general, we find much the same vocabulary. Relations are characterized by intimacy, moral equivalence and voluntarism; the patron acts sometimes as a broker/mediator and sometimes as the true benefactor. Such benefactions may not have found their way into inscriptions.

4.4. *Epictetus and the Patron of Cnossos*

When he was a young man and beginning his study of philosophy, Flavius Arrianus (*PIR*² F 219; ca. 95–175) of Nicomedia in Bithynia spent time in Nicopolis (on the Adriatic coast) absorbing the wisdom of the Stoic philosopher, Epitectus (c. AD 50–138). The fruits of this experience were eventually published in the *Discourses* (*Diatribes* or *Dissertationes*). In Book 3, Discourse 9, Arrian relates the following episode that may be dated to the reign of Trajan. The title of the passage is: "To a certain rhetorician who was going to Rome for a law-suit"

> (1) When a certain person [a rhetorician] came to him, who was going up to Rome on account of a suit which had regard to his rank (… ἔχων περὶ τιμῆς τῆς αὑτοῦ), Epictetus inquired the reason of his going to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought about the matter. Epictetus replied: (2) If you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you will succeed or fail, I have no precept to offer about this. But if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have right opinions, you will fare well; if they are false, you will fare ill … (3) For what is the reason why you desired to be elected patron of the Cnosians (προστάτης … Κνωσίων)? Your opinion? What is the reason that you are now going up to Rome? Your opinion? And going in winter, and with danger and expense. "I must go." What tells you this? Your opinion … (6) And as now

[67] On their identities, Champlin, *Fronto and Antonine Rome*, 13 f.

> you are sailing to Rome in order to become patron of the Cnosians (προστάτης εἶναι Κνωσίων), and you are not content to stay at home with the honors which you had, but you desire something greater and more conspicuous (ἀλλα μείζονός τινος ἐπιθυμεῖς καὶ ἐπιφανεστέρου), (namely the title of patron), so when did you ever make a voyage for the purpose of examining your own opinions, and casting them out …
>
> … (16) but if you possess many things you have need of others: whether you choose or not, you are poorer than I am. (17) "What then have I need of?" Of that which you have not: of firmness, of a mind that is conformable to nature, of being free from perturbation. (18) Whether I am a patron or not (… πάτρων, οὐ πάτρων), what is that to me? but it is something to you. I am richer than you: I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me: for this reason, I flatter no man.[68]

The philosophical aspects of the discourse, while of much interest for understanding the interaction between politics and values in the Roman Empire, need not delay us. Epictetus emphasizes here as in other discourses his indifference to external goods and conventional honors and also urges the rhetorician to seek the true 'good' that is within him. What is of interest here is rather the explicit evaluation of the prestige associated with the practice of formal civic patronage in the communities of the Roman Empire.

The passage is credible in respect to the practice of civic patronage because it is consistent with the norms described earlier. Arrian was not only an historian, but also an experienced Roman administrator. He had been consul *suffectus* (ca. 127) and had served as an imperial *legatus* in several provinces in the eastern part of the empire and along the Danube (*PIR*^{2} F 219). He was then very familiar with the Roman cities in the eastern Mediterranean and with the way they were administered and administered themselves. Even though the passage is not directly concerned with civic honors and privileges, every detail in the story is consistent with what we know about the practice of *patrocinium publicum* throughout the Empire. The general credibility of the account then lends authority to his evaluation of the institution, namely that the honor of being the patron of a community was something "greater and more conspicuous" than other civic honors. For our purposes here it does not matter whether Arrian is quoting Epictetus directly or providing a gloss to the original conversation.

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68 Epictetus uses προστάτης and πάτρων interchangeably, as in §§ 3, 6 and 18 of this chapter. I am indebted to Sigrid Mratschek for pointing out this passage to me, also discussed in her book, *Divites et praepotentes: Reichtum und soziale Stellung in der Literatur der Prinzipatzeit*, Stuttgart, 1993, 363. On the spelling of Cnossos / Cnosos, see note 6 and the reference to the article by Angelos Chaniotis.

The rhetorician is clearly a man of prominence in his *patria*, presumably having reached the highest offices. His cooption as patron had run into difficulties. To judge by the municipal charters, there must have been some irregularities in the process, an inadequate quorum or some other procedural difficulty, which threatened to invalidate the process and led to the lawsuit.[69] The heart of the legal dispute was not, however, the procedural issue, but rather the often-fierce internal struggles within the community. During the late Republic, the armed conflicts between members of the Roman elite were paralleled at the local level. The divisions in Spain were particularly acute.[70] Similar stress can be seen especially in the letters of Fronto (the case of Licinian family mentioned above) and in the speeches of Dio of Prusa (e.g., *Discourse* 43). Though the title patron did not confer any special power, it was a reflection, as Epictetus confirms, of the highest prestige a community might offer and a decurion receive.[71] Hence, a local family might be expected to pursue the honor aggressively and also to oppose actively the honor for a rival.

As to patronage itself, several points need to be made. First, the patron (or would-be patron) does not appear to be of senatorial rank, but rather of decurial. Nonetheless, his background and political strength is in oratory. This suggests that forensic oratory was not only appreciated in patrons of senatorial rank, but also applied to patrons of the decurial. Inscriptions, though generally dating to a later period, confirm that this was the case.[72] Second, the passage indicates that the laws regulating the cooption of a patron were indeed enforced. There is nothing here to indicate that the dispute itself was unusual, or that the pursuit of the patronal honor was rare. Third, and most significant, is the fact that the title was perceived to be 'greater and more illustrious' than other civic honors a man of decurial rank might achieve. Again, the epigraphical evidence confirms this hypothesis: only a small number of decurions of the highest rank became patrons of communities and they are ranked before the *quinquennales* on the municipal *alba* [as on the *Album Canusinum*, Ch. 8.3.6.].

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[69] The legal guidelines are discussed in Ch. 6.2. Note that Fronto stresses that his candidates will be patrons in accordance with the law.

[70] Discussed in Ch. 2.3.

[71] Epictetus' characterization of patron as among the highest dignities a decurion might aspire to is confirmed by the *Album Canusinum* (Ch. 8) where the patrons of the town are listed before even the *quinquennales*; also note *ILS* 6110.

[72] Discussed in Ch. 7. E.g., *CIL* 2, 6597, 9, 2354, 14, 2516.

There are a number of common assumptions in these three literary passages. First, Pliny, Fronto and Epictetus all discuss the cooption of a civic patron as if it were a routine matter: Senators might be expected to have numerous formal client communities; equestrians and decurions also might be coopted. Second, in the selection of patrons, existing ties played a significant role. These connections were formed in several ways. The potential patron might come from a neighboring town (or, if a decurion, even from the community itself), the potential patron might acquire a significant estate in the town and, through the cooption, would find a formal and legal position in the community and in the *ordo*, the potential patron might also marry into a prominent local family and for that reason could be expected to accept the community into his clientele. Formal patronage offered then the institutional means to incorporate powerful outsiders into the citizen-body. It offered the means for a non-resident landowner to socialize with his near peers and to ensure that his interests would be respected.

Third, and in terms of benefaction, Caesar, Pliny, Fronto and Epictetus all make a close connection between oratorical ability and civic patronage. Clearly, this was one of the most significant benefactions a community might expect from a senatorial patron. This is not, of course, to suggest that communities did not expect to receive material benefactions. Despite his appeal to a higher order of values, Pliny obviously felt the pressure for such benefactions in his dealings with the Tiferni and also encouraged his grandfather-in-law to confer more of the same. Material benefaction, especially the construction of public buildings, was important, but, in the literary evidence, receives a lower profile.

Fourth, all these passages concern citizen communities. This is significant because it is completely consistent with the argument developed in Ch. 6, namely that Augustus intended to re-define civic patronage, to restrict the benefits of formal patronage to citizen communities, and to make it serve his urban policy. Finally, and in marked contrast to the Late Republic, there is very little emphasis on the role of the patron as an imperial administrator. This suggests that the honor no longer served the same function it had in the earlier period: it had now been recast as a voluntary form of civil service.

4.5. *Tacitus on the Limits of Civic Patronage*

Tacitus, though not mentioning civic patronage specifically, makes some highly suggestive statements about collectives as clientele. At *ann.* 3,55, he

turns to the subject of luxury and moral reform during the century following the battle of Actium:

> *dites olim familiae nobilium aut claritudine insignes studio magnificentiae prolabebantur. nam etiam tum plebem socios regna colere et coli licitum; ut quisque opibus domo paratu speciosus per nomen et clientelas inlustrior habebatur*
>
> Formerly rich or highly distinguished families often sank into ruin from a passion for splendor. Even then men were still at liberty to court and to be courted by the city population, by our allies and by foreign princes, and everyone who from his wealth, his mansion and his establishment was conspicuously grand, gained to proportionate luster by his name and his numerous clienteles.

It was love of magnificence (in respect to *luxusque mensae*) that had ruined the wealthy families, those of the nobility as well as those of distinction. Certainly in those days (before Augustus?) the elites had still been allowed to cultivate the plebs, the allies and kingdoms, and to be cultivated by them, but later (that is, by AD 22?) it was no longer advisable or perhaps even legally possible to do either.[73] The more a prominent man had been noticed in respect to wealth, household and furnishings, the more likely he would be to receive public honors and clients. As the context is a discussion of moral decline, it is no wonder that Tacitus stresses conspicuous display as the cause of ruin. These families might also have conferred benefactions of a more useful sort, but to mention them would not serve his purposes here. The point however is that appearances and benefactions of either sort were used to enhance one's reputation and this led to clientele. What was provided in exchange (*colere et coli*)? The plebs (Tacitus appears to mean the *plebs urbana*) was important as long as elections were the business of the 'people'; the *socii* and the kingdoms as long as they were free to confer honors and to 'contribute' their material and human resources to the political struggle. Augustus' laws on luxury and ambition (as well as his own actions) were intended to undermine potentially dangerous connections between the plebs and senators by discouraging public display and the distribution of money that had led to fame and clientele. A set of laws, recommendations and new exempla to be emulated may not have been consistently respected, but served ultimately to leave Augustus as the only patron of the plebs. The opportunity for exchange of services was reduced further when Tiberius transferred elections to the Senate in the first year of his Principate.[74] Moreover, the reference to restrictions on the interaction

[73] The force of *licitum* is discussed below.

[74] On the legislation on luxury, Gellius. 2, 24. 14–15, mentions a *lex Julia* of ca. 22 BCE and

between senators and the *socii* and *regna* reminds one of other restrictions, for example, the limitation on senatorial travel in the provinces (Dio 52, 42.6–7) and the edict of AD 11/12 limiting honors that peregrines could confer on their senatorial governors. Surely Dio's 'subject peoples' (discussed in Ch. 6) are the same as Tacitus' *socii* and *regna*. That is, by AD 22 (the date of the senatorial debate) it was no longer *licitum* for senators and peregrines to cultivate one another in such a way that it could lead to *clientela*.

The force of *licitum* needs some discussion. The *OLD* and Bergener, *Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Roman* agree that the word has a distinctly legal character 'gesetzlich erlaubt'. Bergener notes that it often stands for *iustus* or *legitimus*, two other words that also distinguish between what is legally possible and impossible. The word appears two other places in the *Annals* and each time the context is clearly legal and specifically what the law allows (3,24 and 11, 22). What is no longer allowed is less clear. It seems most improbable that we should understand the text literally and narrowly: *colere socios et regna* cannot mean that the leading families of Rome might no longer entertain peregrines in a lavish manner; or that *coli* should mean that the latter might not appear at the homes of the wealthy and renown.[75] Moreover, the place of interaction between the two parties was most likely to be in the provinces and at a time when a senator was governor. It was in the latter capacity especially that the *socii* and princes had something to gain by cultivating senators. As both Tacitus and Dio are vague on the nature of the legislation, it would be safe to conclude that, though the measure itself was vague about what was permissible and what was not, its intention was not: Peregrines were discouraged from cultivating Roman governors by conferring honors that might be construed as excessive. *Patrocinium publicum*, though perhaps not explicitly mentioned, virtually ceases in peregrine communities at this time. It is important to bear in mind that a whole variety of honors must have been explicitly or implicitly included here. Temples, games, etc. could no longer be dedicated to magistrates who had been deified; *soter* is no longer used in reference to senatorial governors.[76] In general

an edict of Augustus which were designed to limit the occasions and outlay for such dinners. Z. Yavetz, *Plebs and Princeps*, Oxford, 1969, 104–105, 152–153 describes the emperor as 'a kind of *patronus plebis* or προστάτης' and 'the emperors as in a sense *patroni* of the entire urban plebs'. Also: Dio 55, 5; Suet. *Aug*. 52.

75 So too is it unlikely that Tacitus meant only distributions of food on special occasions.

76 E.g., *SEG* 2, 549. A temple and games for Marcius Censorinus at Mylasa in Caria. Other examples are cited in Chapter V. It is significant for dating this edict that Suetonius

then Tacitus confirms the arguments to be made in Ch. 6, that late in the Principate of Augustus, and probably in conjunction with the transfer of power to Tiberius, there was legislation of some kind that affected and / or discouraged peregrine communities from cultivating their governors as potential patrons

The second passage of interest is the case of Valerius Asiaticus in *ann.* 11, 1. Messalina coveted the gardens of Lucullus, owned and recently embellished by Asiaticus. He was accused of plotting against Claudius and was vulnerable to the charge because he had been outspoken in not lamenting the death of Caligula (Jos. *AJ* 19, 159 and Dio 59, 30). Famous for that reason in the City and throughout the provinces he was (it was alleged) preparing a journey to the armies in Germany. Since he had been born at Vienna and was supported by many powerful connections there, he was easily capable of arousing the allies (*quando genitus Viennae multisque et validis propinquitatibus subnixus turbare gentiles nationes promptum haberet* = "Born at Vienna and supported by numerous and powerful connections, he would find it easy to rouse nations allied to his house").

These allegations all played on imperial concerns; indeed the allegation is to be taken seriously because the court could recall the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir in 27, and because it anticipates the revolt of Vindex in 68. Just as at *ann.* 3,55 Asiaticus (as had been the case for the older aristocracy) is wealthy and famous in the City and throughout the Empire. His close ties to the allies in Gaul represented a formidable clientele. Tacitus is reporting an allegation, and leaves it to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusion. Nonetheless, it is implicit and credible that Asiaticus had provincial *clientelae*, clients who potentially might support his leadership in the manner we observed in Ch. 2. This is exactly the situation that Augustus and Tiberius anticipated might happen during the transfer of power and, through the edict of 11/12, tried to prevent. The third Tacitean text (*Agricola* 21) will be discussed in detail in Chs. 6 and 7: Agricola attempted to convert the bellicose Britons to Roman ways by giving private encouragement and public aid to support an urban program. The native elites were encouraged to build temples and basilica; it was also a matter of prestige to educate their children in the Latin language and to adopt Roman dress. Agricola has to be seen as the model administrator. He is not formally the patron of Briton, nor does he have all

specifically mentions that Augustus was aware of the fact that such honors were customarily decreed for proconsuls and did little about it (*Aug.* 52). This points once again to the Tiberius as the source of the legislation. His opposition to excessive honors for himself is well known.

in Britons as his clients; rather he supported imperial policy by encouraging the local elite and newly Romanized Britons to confer civic benefactions out of their own resources and implicitly not to use their resources to maintain warrior bands.

While Tacitus does not provide much specific information on civic patronage, his comments, especially at *Ann.* 3,55, do support the argument made in Ch. 6 that some legal action had been taken before AD 22 to restrict the interaction between senators and peregrines namely that it was no longer legally permissible *colere ... coli* one another. *Colere ... coli* remained however possible between senators and citizens (excepting only the urban plebs).

4.6. *Conclusion*

The conclusions reached in this discussion fall into two categories. The first concerns the specific manifestations of the working of patronage in the variety of formal and informal connections; the second relates to the general structure of *patrocinium publicum* in the Principate.

As noted on several occasions, we find in the literary evidence of the Principate frequent references to the characteristic features of patronage systems found in other societies. In formal patronage, there is a clear distinction in status between the patron-benefactor and the client-beneficiary. This difference might have proven a handicap for communities in that it could have been impossible for an individual of rank and a member of a community to allow the community (including himself) to enter the clientele of an individual of lower status. Fortunately for the communities, ideology and practice did not discount the prestige of an individual because his community coopted someone of lower rank. Hence, communities were free to use the title to encourage generosity from individuals who had the material resources. Such considerations might, however, have made it more difficult to coopt very many decurions as civic patrons.

Despite the often-manifest differences in status (if communities and individuals can be compared on the same scale), there is a distinct and enduring stress on the moral equivalence of both parties in respect to obligation. Client communities were expected to honor the benefactor and to memorialize his benefaction, actual or anticipated. Moreover, public honors and celebrations, including that of becoming the formal patron, could and were used to secure the goodwill of the wealthy, talented and powerful. Because the actual or potential patron had accepted the honors, he was obliged to

reciprocate. Even so, an element of choice ('voluntarism') was preserved in that the patron had discretion about how and when he did so.

Two other qualities are also recognizable. The authors repeatedly give attention to the intimate nature of the relationship. The client-communities consist of people the patron knows or should know, people who share the same values and standards; indeed, they are always citizens. If Fronto's statement about the *lex municipi* of Cirta can be generalized, then all patrons became (if they were not already) members of the community. Moreover, the interaction between the parties is continuous. Once a relationship has been initiated, the patron-benefactor is expected to continue to maintain the *tutela* of the client, while the latter ought not to forget to celebrate the former. By implication the relationship ended when either side failed to respond as anticipated and the relationship fell into desuetude.

Patronage involves mutual exchange. Specifically, the patron provided for the *tulela* of the community through variety of means. Forensic oratory defended the community in the courts, mediation-brokerage allowed for the interests of the client to be represented before administrators or in conflicts involving competing members of the same community. Patrons also used their material resources to enhance the community. The primary function of client community was, as noted, to celebrate the patron-benefactor. Statues and honorary decrees were certainly the most visible aspects of the patron's *gloria*. If the potential patron also had investments in the community but had no legal status, then there might be other advantages to the title: Through cooption, the patron also became a member of the community and of the *ordo*.[77] He was then in a position to defend or expand his interests in the client community.

Probably the most striking feature of the literary evidence is the repeated emphasis on the desire of the community to have patrons of senatorial rank, and indeed to have many of them. Tifernum pursued Pliny, so, too, did the Baetici; the citizens of Comum and Firmum also sought Pliny's support, both material and oratorical. The citizens of Cirta solicited the aid of Fronto, and can be assumed to have done the same with those whom he nominated to become patron. The literary evidence indicates then that communities actively sought patrons (note the plural) from the ranks of senators and did so because of their wealth, oratorical talent and influence; in many cases, too, significant benefaction may have come to the commu-

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[77] That the patron was a member of the *ordo* has been noted in this chapter, but will be discussed more fully in Ch. 7.

nity only *after* cooption. Just because they sought senatorial patrons does not mean that communities were always successful. Indeed when one puts together the letters of Pliny and Fronto, it is apparent that efforts to gain patrons did not always succeed, or succeeded only with the help of an intermediary. The evidence is less certain about the desirability of patrons from other ranks. The patron of Cnossus clearly wanted the honor; Calpurnius Fabatus wanted to memorialize himself and his son. In both cases, the critical benefactions may have been conferred *before* cooption. That is, decurions became patrons only after conferring significant benefactions. Whereas Pliny, Fronto and their senatorial friends probably had many communities in their clientele, equestrians and decurions probably did not; indeed, the latter appear to have been primarily patrons of their respective *patriae*. The epigraphical evidence, discussed in the Ch. 7, lends support to these hypotheses.

In Augustus' 'restored republic' the exercise of patronage was regulated 'in the public interest.' Although Augustus was concerned to render such politically dangerous relationships harmless (that is, no pretender should base his claim to legitimacy on clientele), he did not want to destroy a traditional institution that might serve his urban policy. By acquiring control over elections, monopolizing the military, putting an end to open political contention and restricting access to public honors in peregrine communities, the emperors gradually but effectively deprived the patron of the traditional return on his investments (that is the opportunities for senators to cultivate and to be cultivated were sharply reduced).[78] There was, however, another side. The emperors and Stoic philosophy encouraged a new ideology in which patronage and benefaction could be defined in terms of civic virtue. Securing the *tutela* of a community through forensic oratory, generosity with one's material resources (*amor liberalitatis*, Plin. *ep.* 1, 8.9; cf. 6 34), and equitable administration of provinces (8 24; 10, 3a), the three benefactions that most commonly led to a formal or informal patronage, became the leading qualities of a senator and *optimus civis*. The same ideology was applied to the Emperor. In his *Panegyricus* to Trajan, Pliny remarks on several occasions that the *optimus princeps* (note the parallel to *optimus civis*) is one who accepts his position reluctantly, knowing full well the toils, troubles, difficulties and pains which await him, but committed nonetheless to the protection, enhancement and administration of the state (*Pan.* 2, 4; 7, 21, 79).

[78] On this point, see Premerstein, *Werden und Wesen*, 112–116.

Though the Emperor now controlled the traditional sources of patronal power and encouraged a new ideology stressing service instead of material and political benefactions, he did, apparently, find it necessary to support the ideology with more concrete incentives. In his *Panegyricus*, Pliny comments: *Prodest bonos esse, cum sit satis abundeque, se non nocet; his honores his sacerdotia, his provincias offers, hi amicitia tua hi iudicio florent* ('People find that honesty pays now indeed that they are convinced that it does them no harm; indeed it brings them honor, priesthoods, provinces from your hands, and they flourish in your friendship and favor' 44.7). In other words, the *optimus civis*, as demonstrated by his benefactions, derives material and/or political advantage not from the direct support of his clients, but from the emperor himself. As long as the latter was willing to support, encourage and reward the patronage of communities and other benefactions the values, as described by Pliny, would persist.

This conclusion should not be interpreted to show that, by exercising a formal or informal patronage of communities, an ambitious senator could expect to receive the consulate in due course. For, though the emperor might encourage senators to perform services, there was no commitment on his part. Nor was it necessary for him to make such a commitment as communities would naturally seek out those senators like Pliny who were known to have influence with him (*ILS* 6106), those who possessed useful skills (forensic oratory) or vast material resources. These qualities, fame, oratorical ability and wealth, though potentially dangerous to the old as well as the new government, were turned to the service and ornamentation of the state. They provide, indeed, the public justification for wealth and honors received at the emperors' hands, but would be useless to anyone who did not have the appropriate loyalties and connections. Finally, the attitudes described here explain in part the intellectual and moral background to the enormous (and virtually unparalleled) outpouring of private capital for public welfare in the second century. As Pliny says: *oportet privatis utilitatibus publicas, mortalibus aeternas anteferre* (indeed one must value public goods as more useful that private ones, and set the eternal goods before the mortals ones, 7, 18.5).

Did the system work? When one contrasts the role of client communities in the politics and rhetoric of the civil wars of the late republic with their role in the Year of the Four Emperors, one is immediately struck by how little attention is given to client communities.

CHAPTER FIVE

CIVIC PATRONAGE IN THE VERRINES

5.0. *Introduction*

Cicero's speeches against Q. Caecilius (*div. In Caec.*) and C. Verres (*Verr.*) constitute the most important evidence for the study of patronage of communities during the central period of Roman History (from the acquisition of the first province to the extension of universal citizenship). They are important not only because of the number and variety of indications, but also because the material is in a clear context and assumes a public audience.[1] The second point is especially significant because it forced the orator to limit his claims *inter alia* about the working of patronage to what conformed to accepted ideals and expectations.

In the *Verrines* (including the *div. In Caec.*), Cicero describes in considerable detail how civic patronage functioned, that is, how the relationship was initiated and how it was maintained. Moreover, the *Verrines* provide the basis for understanding the complex relationship between *patrocinium* and related social bonds (e.g., *hospitium*, *amicitia* and *necessitas*) and associated public honors (e.g., monuments, *legationes* and *laudationes*).[2] Finally, these speeches indicate, directly and indirectly, what were the values and expectations of both parties and allow us to measure actual performance against those standards.

It is immediately apparent in these speeches that Roman patrons sometimes frequently / sometimes occasionally failed to meet the expectations of their clients in respect to protection. Indeed, it has recently been argued that, because patrons failed so miserably to protect their clients, the institution had little practical value. P.A. Brunt indeed has concluded that

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[1] *Div. in Caec.* and *Verr. 1*, were delivered in court. *Verr. 2*, was not. Cicero did however publish both elements soon after the trial. On these questions, Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte Der Römischen Litteratur Bis Zum Gesetzgebungswerk Des Kaisers Justinian*, Fourth Edition, 1, 411 Beck (Munich 1959).

[2] It is frequently the case that the *Verrines* constitute the first and fullest references to these institutions. The inclusion of *hospitium* in this chapter is appropriate because many of the *tabulae patronatus* mention also *hospitium*. See Ch. 6.2.

patronage was 'ineffective' and that "the more tyrannical a governor was, the more prudent it became to shower honors [like *patrocinium*, gilded statues and festivals] on him, so long as he retained the power to do injury."[3] The failures of some senatorial patrons to protect some of their clients cannot be denied, but to stress the failures not only underestimates the significance of patronage, but also restricts our ability to comprehend the expectations of the two parties. That is, the public representation of a special relationship encouraged each partner to believe that it could manipulate the other and to influence the behavior of third parties. The very fact that individuals and communities entered such relationships at all indicates that the parties had expectations and that the expectations must have been fulfilled with reasonable frequency. The 'failures' may be accounted for as consequences of exploitation, and demonstrate that there was an elaborate network of sometimes competing relationships and interests. Patrons had to make choices about which clients and friends were to be supported and when. Clients sought assistance from all available patrons and protectors, actual and potential.[4] Hence, a 'failure' in one relationship may have been matched by a success elsewhere. In sum, if patrons and clients regularly failed one another, the institution would have disappeared, but that is clearly not the case as has been argued in earlier chapters and in what follows.

In analyzing Cicero's use of *patrocinium* in these speeches, one must also bear four points in mind. First, though patronage plays an important role in the *Verrines*, the explication of the institution was clearly not the orator's major purpose. Second, Cicero tends to be much more cautious about his claims to clientele in public statements than he is in his private correspondence. Third, modern scholars tend to use patronage and *patrocinium* indiscriminately. There is, of course, substantial overlap between claims made in public and private, between the modern and the ancient words, but the failure to respect the Roman distinctions has led to the misrepresentation of several aspects of the institution. Hence, we do best to measure the effectiveness of Roman patronage on its own terms and in its own context. Fourth, because modern historians have generally examined patronage against the background of the factional struggles at Rome, an unbalanced and even distorted impression of its dynamics has come to dominate the

[3] "Patronage and Politics in the Verrines" *Chiron* 10 (1980) 273 ff.

[4] T. Johnson and C. Dandeker, "Patronage: relation and system", in A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), *Patronage in the Ancient World*, London and New York, 1989, 230 ff.

scholarly literature. This chapter is primarily concerned with the question of how the Romans perceived and used civic patronage as an element of integration on many levels.

5.1. *The Working of Patronage in the* Verrines

Cicero makes several distinctions involving the forms of patronage in the *Verrines* and, indeed, three of Gelzer's four categories appear prominently.[5] To begin with, the *patrocinium causae* is discussed at length (especially in the *Div. in Caec.*). The patronage of communities also receives considerable attention, though here one must note that the community is sometimes a single one among the *civitates et nationes* of the island and sometimes it is the insular province as a whole. There is, third, the patronage of individuals. The distinctions made here serve an important function. If we are to analyze how a patronal network functioned, we must define the expectations and performance of each party in the relationship. There is a second set of distinctions based on the status of the parties. The working of patronage, the assumptions that each party could make about the performance of the other, varied depending on the status of the client community, whether citizen or peregrine. In this chapter the discussion concerns especially client communities of peregrine status. The first step is to identify patrons and clients mentioned in the *Verrines* and then to consider how they interacted with one another (the discussion of Cicero's relations to the Sicilians appears below). Table 5.1 summarizes the cases:

Table 5.1: Patrons and Clients in the *Verrines*

Patron	*Client*	*Reference: Text*
patroni	Diodorus	2, 4.41: *circum patronos cursare*
M. Claudius	Mamertini	2, 4.6: *Mamertini populi patronus*
P. Scipio	Segestani	2, 4.80: *clientes tui*
M. Mar. Aeserninus	Sicilia	2, 4.91: *patronum Siciliae*
C. Marcellus	Siculi	2, 4.89: *patronus*
Marcelli	Sicilia	2, 3.45: *patronos Sicilae*

[5] M. Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik*, Leipzig 1912; now in *Kleine Schriften* Wiesbaden, 1962, 1, 68 ff. and in English translation *The Roman Nobility*, by Robin Seager, Oxford, 1969 (for ease of use, references are to text at footnotes which are the same in *Kleine Schriften* and in the English edition). The one exception is the patronage of freedmen. Also discussed in Ch. 1.

Patron	*Client*	*Reference: Text*
Marcelli	Sicilia	Div Q. Caec 13: *patroni Siciliae*
Marcelli	Heraclius	2, 2.36: *patronos ... habuit*
Marcelli	Siculi	2, 4.89: *Siculorum ... patroni*
Cn. Lentulus	Sicilia	2, 2.103: *patronum Siciliae*
patroni	Caecilius	2, 1.28: *patroni Dionis*
C. Verres	Sicilia	2, 2.154: *patronum insulae*
C. Verres	Siculi	2, 2.114: *Siculorum patronum*

5.1.1. Patronus causae

As Gelzer has observed, the term *patronus causae* refers, formally and legally, to the men assigned to defend the interests of the *socii populi Romani ex hac lege de rebus repetundis*.[6] Generally speaking, the selection of *patronus causae* was made from among those, like Cicero, with some previous relationship (*necessitas*, *hospitium*, *patrocinium*) to the petitioning community or communities and, indeed, the *patronus* (or *hospes*, etc.) was, among his other duties, expected to defend the interests of his clients in court (cf. Dion. Hal., *Ant. Rom.* 2, 10). Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that there is a fundamental difference between the *patronus causae* and the formally coopted *patronus* of the community: The former was appointed by a Roman magistrate, probably the praetor, with the concurrence of a (senatorial) court, the latter was appointed by the community itself.[7] Although there is considerable overlap in the two institutions, they are distinct both in origin and function; as such they should not be confused.[8]

Patrocinium causae did not necessarily lead to the formal patronage of the community. Cicero and Caesar clearly had close relations with communities in Sicily and Hispania Ulterior; both had governed in the respective provinces and both, by their own estimation, had performed notable services [*tutela*] for various elements in each. Neither, however, claims to

[6] *Div. in Caec.*, 65, Gelzer, *Nobility* at n. 92. Cicero uses *patronus* loosely to refer to any pleader in both civil and criminal cases, but the context of the *causa* is usually clear, see A.H.J. Greenidge, *Legal Procedure in Cicero's Time*, London, 1901, 146 ff. and 474 ff. and F. Pontenay de Fontette, *Leges repetundarum*, Paris, 1954, 57–59.

[7] Gelzer, id.; *FIRA* 2 p. 87 and here, chapter 3. For the text and commentary on the *lex Acilia* (M. Crawford, *Roman Statutes*, 65 ff.) The law notes that the praetor assigned the *patronus*. In the *div. in Caec.*, Cicero addresses a jury of senators which presumably had the final authority to decide who would serve as the *patronus causae* for the provincials. Recall also the language used by Oppius and by Caesar in Ch. 2.

[8] The distinction is brought out emphatically by Pliny. Discussed in Ch. 4.2.

have become the formal patron of even one community. The younger Pliny, though referring to a later period, indicates that the situation was similar in the Principate.[9]

How effective was this form of patronage? Brunt, as noted above, believes that it was of little value to provincials, that the defense of provincial clients and friends was a tradition "which, though admirable, was obsolescent" and, that "in the late Republic the provincials obtained little benefit from the laws."[10] Cicero claims to be reviving a neglected institution, but he may be guilty of some rhetorical exaggeration. Gruen's lists of trials *de rebus repetundis* in the period between 104 and 78 BC, shows that there were regular trials throughout the 90's followed by a dearth, for understandable reasons, in the 80's. In the 70's, however, at least five governors were brought to trial and four of them were convicted. In two other cases Sicilians initiated proceedings against their governors.[11] In 79, the Metelli Celer and Nepos brought charges, apparently well-founded ones, against M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78) on behalf of the Sicilians, but soon abandoned the case. Sex. Peducaeus (pr. 76), on the other hand, may have been unjustly accused. Both cases must have been frustrating for the Sicilians and certainly must have generated low expectations about what could be achieved against Verres in Roman courts.

Even if one accepts Brunt's argument that these legal structures were weak or ineffective, the conclusion should not be that *patrocinium causae* was ineffective. The very fact that many of the Sicilians were ready to bring charges against Verres suggests that they expected that they would, or could, be vindicated in a Roman court. What protection there was depended, as it always had, on the ability of individuals and communities to find patrons or protectors who might defend their interests at Rome. Who were these patrons and how effective was the relationship?

5.1.2. *The Patrons of the Sicilian Communities*

> *ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent earum patroni essent more maiorum.* Cic. *de off.* 1, 35

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[9] The evidence is provided below and in Ch. 4.2. On Caesar, *BHisp*. 42 and in Representative Texts.

[10] Brunt, Patronage, 273, referring to *Div. in Caec*. 66–70 and to Tacitus (*ann*. 1, 2).

[11] E. Gruen, *Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts*, Cambridge MA, (Harvard UP; 1968), 258, 274, 298 and 308–309.

itaque Q. Fabio Sangae, quoius patrocinio civitas [the Allobroges] *plurumum utebatur ...* Sall. *Cat.* 41.

The Allobroges communicated the matter [the conspiracy of Catiline et al.] *to Fabius Sanga, the patron* (προστάτης) *of their state; for it was the custom of all to have a patron* (προστάτης) *at Rome.*[12] App. *BCiv.* 2, 4.

All three of these passages refer to that form of civic patronage in which the patron was a Roman notable and the client a peregrine community. It is significant that the basis of patronage was *mos maiorum* and not Roman law (as is the case with *patrocinium causae*).

The patrons of Sicilian communities may be divided into two categories, those who were considered to be patrons of the province and those who were patrons of particular communities. There is considerable overlap between the two groups.

5.1.3. *The Patrons of the Province*

The individuals whom Cicero formally designates as *patroni* of Sicily, *Siciliae*, or of the Sicilians, *Siciliorum*, are few.[13] Three different families claimed or are alleged to have enjoyed this title in the 70's BC.

It is well known that the family of the Claudii Marcelli was long considered the most important and the oldest *patroni* of the insular province; indeed, Cicero refers to their traditional connection on several occasions *antiquissimi patroni Siciliae,* (*Verr.* 2, 3.45; *Div. Q. Caec.* 13). Other ancient

[12] There may at one time have been an effective distinction between *patrocinium* and *prostasia* in that the former applied to relations between citizens of unequal status and the latter, a traditional institution among Greek states, to relations between citizens and peregrines. The three citations taken together indicate that by the Late Republic the two notions had merged to a considerable degree. Roman experience with the latter may have served to expand the definition of the former. Nonetheless, Greek communities do make use of the Hellenized Latin word during this period, suggesting that they continued to recognize a difference. The Cicero passage suggests that patronage *more maiorum* depended on being both defeated and being accepted *in fidem*. Eilers argues that Appian especially is not to be taken 'too literally' (his suggestions have come in personal letters). My reading of these and other passages discussed in earlier chapters (especially Ch. 2) indicates that the Romans certainly in the late Republic did believe that the subjects and allies could find patrons and/or *prostates* at Rome, nonetheless, the representation may have been more potential than actual. As was observed in Ch. 4.4, Arrian / Epictetus uses the words interchangeably

[13] I can detect no distinction in the use of these two formulae, see 2, 2.103, 114, 154; 3.45, 89 and 91. That *Sicilia* is equal to *provincia Siciliae* may be deduced from numerous statements like *clientelam ... illustris provinciae* (2, 4.90) and from the references to Verres as *patronus provinciae*. In some cases, *patronus Siciliarum* may be equivalent to "patron of many Sicilians and Sicilian communities". For a list of patrons, clients and *hospites*, see Tables 5.1 and 5.2.

Table 5.2: *Hospites* in the *Verrines*

Roman	*Provincial(s)*	*Reference*
L. Tullius	*domus Pompeii Percennii*	2, 4.25
L. Tullius	Syracuse	2, 4.145
M. Tullius	Cn. Pompeius Basiliscus	2, 4.25
M. Tullius	Syracuse	2, 4.145
M. Tullius	Sthenius	2, 2.117
M. Tullius	hospites multi	2, 2.118
C. Claudius	domus Heii	2, 4.6
C. Verres	Sthenius	2, 5.109
C. Verres	Sthenius	2, 3.18
C. Verres	Sthenius	2, 2.110
C. Verres	Sthenius	2, 2.83
C. Verres	Aristeus and Dexo	2, 5.110
C. Verres	Agathinus	2, 2.94
C. Verres	Dortheus	2, 2.89
C. Verres	Lyso	2, 4.37
C. Verres	C. Heius	2, 4.18
Marcelli	Sicilians	2, 4.89
C. Marius	Sthenius	2, 2.111
C. Marcellus	Sthenius	2, 2.111
L. Sisenna	Sthenius	2, 2.111
viri fortissimi	Sthenius	2, 2.111

sources and modern scholars are in agreement that the relationship of the Marcelli to that island was a special one and that it began with the activities of M. Claudius Marcellus, the conqueror of Syracuse.[14]

Problems arise, however, when one fails to make a careful distinction between the *clientela* acquired by Marcellus during the 2nd Punic War and the *clientela* enjoyed by his descendants in BC 70. On two occasions, Livy specifies that the *clientela* of Marcellus was over the conquered Syracusans alone (25, 29.6; 26, 32.8; cf. Plut. *Marc.* 23.7). It is manifest, however, that by Cicero's day the original *clientela* of Marcellus had been extended in two ways. First, it came to include the whole of Sicily (*Div. Q. Caec. 13; Verr.* 2, 3.45; 2, 4.89–90) and, second, it was enjoyed by all the descendants of Marcellus.

This observation raises the question exactly how did one become the patron of a province? As is generally recognized, conquest and surrender (*deditio*) was probably the most common form of initial contact (note the

14 See Münzer, *RE* 3, 2732 (Art. "Claudius"), M. Gelzer, *Nobility* at n. 57 ff. Also, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 7 and Harmand, 13.

quotation above).[15] In the case of Marcellus, it would appear that the Syracusans first, and then other communities in imitation, formally entered his *clientela* (or that of his descendants) by employing the same formula mentioned by Livy … *et in fidem clientelamque se urbemque Syracusas acciperet*.[16] The conquering general may well have acquired a potential *clientela* of the defeated *more maiorum*, but, if one may generalize from this one important case, the relationship was defined by the formal application of the vanquished. Over time (several generations) the patronage (formal or informal) may have spread to other communities through the practice of *hospitium*/*proxenia* and the Greek *prostasia*. Eventually the multiplicity and antiquity of the relationships may have come to be considered (at least by the provincials if not by the Romans) as the equivalent to a patronage of the whole province.[17] Alternatively, individual communities may have begun to honor one or more of the Marcelli as 'patrons of the Sicilians' in the same way that Greek communities much later and then only occasionally honored Roman dynasts as 'benefactors of the Greeks'. That is, the attribution of such a generalized patronage should not be construed to indicate that all Greek communities or (in this case) all Sicilian communities singly (or as a collective) passed degrees proclaiming their clientship, but that one community ascribed such relationship as applying to all.[18]

Cicero mentions four members of this family who were *patroni* of Sicily at the time of the trial of Verres: M. and C. Claudius Marcellus, M. Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus.[19] The source of the *patrocinium* of these men is apparent in their common name and connection. Two of these Marcelli were active on behalf of Sicilians. M. Claudius had tried (in the event, unsuccessfully) to restrain Verres during the latter's governorship. The services of C. Claudius to the Sicilians as proconsul

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15 This subject is discussed in the Ch. 2 in reference to Caesar in Gaul and Pompeius in Spain. Also, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 4 ff., and Gruen, *HWCR* 163 ff.

16 26, 32.8; also 25, 29.6. This formula is very similar to the one used in the *tabulae patronatus*, discussed here in Ch. 6.2.2.

17 On the extension of clientele to other communities, Christian Meier, *Res publica amissa*, 16, 34; and Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 156 ff.

18 There are many references to individuals as *prostates of all the Greeks*, but, as Tuchelt has observed, "… Patronat ist … stets auf eine bestimmte Stadt bezogen", 61 f. Admittedly his evidence points to a different time and place, but the possibility cannot be excluded that a community might have honored Verres (or anyone else) as the *patron of all the Greeks*.

19 *Verr*. 2, 1, 135; 144; 2.8; 103; 4, 91. On their careers, see Münzer, *RE* 3, "Claudius" nos. 214, 227 and 231 and *RE* 4, "Cornelius" no. 228. M. Claudius Marcellus, *cur. aed*. 91, Cic. *de off*., 1, 57 = *RE* No. 227, is not specifically called patron as are the others, but he fits the category of Marcelli, *patroni Siciliae*.

earned him honors, Cicero says, equal to those of his famous ancestor![20] The date of his governorship of the island (in 79) can hardly be coincidental. This was also the year in which the Sicilians had attempted to secure the prosecution of their previous governor, M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78). Even if the prosecution failed, the senate probably recognized that it would be sensible to send as governor a man whose name was trusted.[21] The fact that his *beneficia* were considered to be significant suggests that he may have been successful at restoring at least the good will of the provincials. The services of these two Marcelli illustrate how patronage (formal or informal) functioned outside the courts to protect provincial clients. As to the last two of the Marcelli, Aeserninus and Marcellinus were both very young men at the time of the trial, hence, it is not significant that Cicero fails to mention any of their *beneficia* in reference to Sicily. The antiquity of the relationship, clearly inherited, was surely the reason that motivated Cicero to mention them at all.

It is also noteworthy that Marcellinus (Cicero indicates) had retained his *clientela* despite becoming a member of the *gens Cornelia* (or perhaps that it continued to be ascribed to him by Romans and provincials). That this could happen demonstrates what has long been assumed, namely that clientele could be transferred not only to direct descendants, but also to collateral and adoptive lines, and that it could be claimed (by either party) despite adoption into another family.

In sum, the Marcelli were clearly the most important and the oldest patrons of Sicily and of Sicilian communities. This position and title could hardly have been based on any resolution of the *commune Siciliae*, which did not exist at this time (see below), but on the fact that the Syracusans and probably many others of the sixty or more Sicilian *civitates et nationes* had adopted the Marcelli as formal patrons (or at least reckoned the latter as their *prostates*). Cicero is careful indeed to give due recognition to their status and priority, and to excuse their absence from the prosecution (*div. in Caec.* 16). There may be other reasons for Cicero's care. The Claudii, as other aristocrats, were jealous of their reputation and clientele. They may also have resented the attempts of any senator, and a *homo novus* at that, to assume a function that was properly theirs. Finally, because court cases

[20] 2, 2.8. It is interesting to note how the first Marcellus had been "sanctified" in the memory of the Sicilians, cf. M. Finley, *History of Sicily*, London, 1968, 122. On the dates, Broughton, *MRR* 2, p. 79 and 84.

[21] Though provinces were usually assigned to magistrates by lot, the decision in this case appears to have been consciously made.

involved formal confrontations and inevitably produced enemies, they may also have preferred to defend their clients on an informal basis.[22]

That Verres was also a patron of Sicily is expressly stated by Cicero on several occasions: *patronus Siciliae* and *te* (Verres), *omnium Siculorum patronum, una Mamertina civitas ... publice laudat* (2, 2.114) and *itaque nunc Siculorum Marcelli non sunt patroni, Verres in eorum locum substitutus est* (2, 4.89) and *itaque eum non solum 'patronum' istius insulae sed etiam 'sotera' inscriptum vidi Syracusis* (2, 2.154). It is clear from the language, especially from the *inscriptum vidi*, that we are not dealing with oratorical exaggeration.

Was there a *commune Siciliae* that formally conferred this honor? Apart from the speeches against Verres, nothing is known about its existence or function in Cicero's time. Deininger identifies two spheres of activity, first, to honor Roman provincial officials (e.g.: *huic* (Verres) *etiam Romae videmus in basi statuarum maximis litteris incisum 'a communi Siciliae datas'*, 2, 2.154) and, second, to petition the Senate.[23] Theoretically, then governors could become *patroni provinciae* by a formal decree of the provincial assembly or koinon but it may also be the case that the decree of the Syracusan council ascribed the honor to him.

The issue is essentially whether the references to *commune Siciliae* in the *in Verrem* assume the existence of a formal organization or whether they are equivalent to such vague formulae as *omnes Siculi* or *Siculi universi* or *tota Siciliae* (*Div. in Caec.* 2 and 11; *Verr.* 2, 2.112 and 103, respectively), or whether the *commune* was invented by Verres to serve his purposes, but had no genuine reality. Deininger, who believes that a formal *commune* existed, finds no evidence of administrative activity datable to the Late Republic or early Principate and admits that the Ciceronian evidence is not definitive. If the *commune* was then functioning, Verres would appear to have been the only one to make use of it in the republican period. In fact, the next reference to it dates to the second half of the fourth century, AD! The conclusion has to be that there was, at this time, no corporate body constituted to confer the honor in the late Republic.[24]

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22 Caes *BHisp*. 42; discussed below.

23 On the commune, see J. Deininger, *Die Provinciallandtage der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Munich (Beck; 1965), 7 ff. and 13 ff.

24 Deininger, 13 ff., 34; W. Hörberg, *Die römische Provinzverwaltung auf Sizilien und deren Prinzipien bis zum Ende der Republik*, Ulm, 1966, 51 ff. A. Holm, *Geschichte Siziliens im Altertum*, Leipzig, 1898, 91–92, finds no evidence for a commune in the republic. If there were a functioning commune, then Verres would appear to be the first governor to become *patronus*

These observations suggest that Verres simply assumed the title *patronus Siciliae* and encouraged the Greek cites to inscribe the tile on the various monuments erected in his honor. It would not have been difficult for him to do so: he himself had collected the money for the monuments and was clearly concerned about the physical appearance of these honors. Moreover, Cicero expressly states that Verres did order equestrian statues of himself to be set up and provided them [the monuments] with inscriptions (… *poni inscribique iussiste*, 2, 2.167). The Sicilians, like other communities, evidently had no alternative but to accept the situation.[25]

The trial of Verres marks a turning point in the perception of *nobiles* toward provinces in respect to the patronage of units larger than city-states. Down through 70, as Badian notes, there was a spirited competition among the leading Roman families to establish a *clientela* over individuals and communities in any one province.[26] To realize the claim to an exclusive patronage of a province, analogous to that of the Marcelli in Sicily, was, however, difficult. Indeed, there are no other authentic examples before 70 BC, for what appears to be a formal *patrocinium provinciae*. The apparent incidents of this phenomenon are in fact either *patrocinia causae* or *nationis*.[27] In the 50's we begin to find frequent references to the patronage of a province (as distinct from that of a *populus, regnum* or *natio*). Cicero, in a letter designed to flatter Cato, assigns to the latter's clientele *Cyprus insula*. Caesar alleges that Pompeius had *clientelae magnae* in Hispania Citerior; so too might Pompeius have responded that Caesar had *tres Galliae* in his. The people of Cyrene honored Lentulus Marcellinus as their *πάτρον* and *σωτήρ* in 56; the same formula had been used to honor Verres in Sicily.[28] Nevertheless, as long

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of a province by this means. The examples cited by Gelzer, *Nobility*, text at note 220 ff., all date to after 70 BC. Indeed, even Pompeius, who is described by Caesar as having *clientelae magnae* in Hispania Citerior, is never described as patron of that province. This clientele is discussed in Ch. 2.3.

25 On Verres' concern, 2, 2.145–148. This pattern, discussed in the following chapter, will become more common in the last days of the Republic. Consider, also that the Syracusans had been compelled to provide a eulogy for Verres, 2, 2.152–154 and 4.141 ff.

26 Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 264. Also discussed generally by Gruen, *Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, 158 ff.; Chiranky, 461 ff. and in more detail now by Eilers, Ch. 6, on the incidence and effectiveness of civic patronage.

27 Gelzer does not make this distinction clear, *Nobility*, at note 218, cf. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* 157–158. This *patrocinium nationis* may, of course, develop into a *patrocinium provinciae*.

28 On Cato, *ad fam.* 15, 4, 15, this may be another example of Cicero making an exaggerated claim in private that he would not make in public. On Pompeius, *BCiv.* 2, 18, discussed in Ch. 2.3.1. On Marcellinus (identified above), *SIG*[3] 750, but it is not clear whether Cyrene refers

as the Republic existed, the *patrocinium* of a province was probably a rhetorical exaggeration based on the accumulation of honors and dependents. It is most unlikely that it was based on the act of some provincial organization.[29]

If this conclusion is accepted, then the continuing emphasis Cicero gives to Verres as *patronus Siciliae* is understandable. There is a dramatic contrast between the *patroni antiquissimi* and their *beneficia* and the *patronus novus* and his *maleficia*. Verres had used every opportunity to take the place of the Marcelli (*itaque nunc Sicilorum Marcelli non sunt patroni, Verres in eorum locum substitutus est*, 2, 4.89). The insult, Cicero suggests, is not only to the Sicilians and to the Marcelli, but also to Roman tradition.

Were there other patrons? If so, why were they not active? Regarding the first question, Cicero, on two occasions in the *div. in Caec.*, indicates that there were indeed others. At the beginning of the speech, he refers to *multi patroni veteres* and later to *omnes patroni* (cc. 2 and 16), but does so without providing details. Do these terms refer to the Marcelli or to others? Are the clients counted as individuals, cities or the province in general? Concerning them Cicero notes only that *tempus*, *valetudo* and *facultas* had prevented the patrons from taking an active role in the prosecution (c. 16), considerations which could apply equally to the Marcelli or to others.

There are other possibilities. Gelzer and L. Harmand argue that administrative activity was sufficient to establish *patrocinium*, hence, *omnes patroni* might include all former governors of the island.[30] The evidence, though slender, suggests otherwise. At one point in the *in Verrem*, Cicero refers to the large number of legations sent to Rome to complain about the activities of Verres:

> *quorum quanti conventus ad Marcellos, antiquissimos Siciliae patronos, quanti ad Cn. Pompeium tum consulem designatum ceterosque illius provinciae necessarios fieri soliti sint quis ignorat?* (2, 3.45)

Here Cicero makes the *patroni Siciliae* equivalent to the Marcelli; Pompey is indeed mentioned, not as *patronus*, but in reference to his impending magistracy. All others appear as *necessarii illius provinciae*. Although both of these words, *necessarius* and *patronus*, involve *Treuverhältnisse*, or relations

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to the city or to the province; if Tuchelt's rule (162) holds, that 'patron' consistently refers to cities, then the polis of Cyrene would be the agent. On the same formula for Verres, 2, 2.254, but it was used for other Roman officials, including Caesar (after Pharsalia), A.E. Raubitschek, "Epigraphical Notes on Julius Caesar" *JRS* 44 (1954) 65 ff.

[29] Note that similar broad claims were made about the clientele of Pompeius, discussed in Ch. 2.3.1.

[30] *Nobility*, see text at n. 220; Harmand, 39 ff.

based on mutual trust, they cannot be considered as exact equivalents. The examples noted by Gelzer and in the *OLD* suggest that *necessarii* are "closer" than *amici* (e.g., *pepercit homini amico et, quem ad modum ipsum dicere audivi, necessario*, *Verr.* 2, 3.153) and that distinctions of status implicit in *patrocinium* are not as strong in *necessitas*.[31] But, regardless of how one interprets the two words, it is clear, first, that Cicero chose to emphasize the general *patrocinium* of the Marcelli and that his audience accepted or expected such a formulation and, second, that an ordinary governorship was probably not normally sufficient to lead to formal *patrocinium* of a community either to be offered or accepted. The words of Q. Oppius provide some guidance here, Representative Texts.[32] On the other hand, many Greek communities may have reckoned that among their former governors and personal *hospites* they might find defenders at Rome who might represent and protect their interests.

Pseudo Asconius indicates that the Metelli were thought to have such a clientele (*Metellos, quorum familia proxime Siculis patrocinium praebuit*, Stangl, 187). The commentator does not connect the beginning of the relationship to any specific event, but refers only to the year 79, when the brothers Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (cos. 60) and Metellus Nepos (cos. 57) instigated a process against M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. 78) on behalf of the Sicilians. The course of the trial need not be described here. It is sufficient to note that the two brothers, despite the fact that the charges appear to have been well founded, abandoned the prosecution and their clients (perhaps at the request of their new ally, Pompeius?).[33]

There are several reasons why the Metelli should not be reckoned as *patroni Siciliae*. First, their record of *beneficia* to the province as a whole was neither distinguished nor significant; indeed, to abandon a client in the middle of a prosecution is an odd way of conferring a notable benefaction and, indeed, the demands of urban politics, not provincial *officia*, appear to be

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31 On the meaning of *necessitas* and its cognates, Chr. Meier, *Res publica amissa* 34, 37, and Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin*, *ad loc.* Saller, "Patronage and friendship", 53 f. tends to minimize the differences.

32 Though the *necessarii* were not literally patrons of the province, they may well have had clients there, both personal and collective, see below. Some governors evidently became patrons of towns, but it is not at all clear that all governors were equally honored even in the same province.

33 On the trial, Gruen, *RPCC*, 274 f. L. Caecilius Metellus, cos, 251, was active in Sicily during the 1st Punic War; Q. Caecilius Niger was quaestor there in 72. For the evidence, Broughton, *MRR*. This case has been discussed more thoroughly in "The Caecilii Metelli, patroni Siciliae?" *Historia* 30 (1981) 238 ff.

the motivating forces.[34] Second, and most significant, is the fact that Cicero does not give one hint in the *Verrines* that such a general clientele existed. Hence, the *patrocinium* described by Pseudo Asconius may be an anachronistic generalization based on a number of individual connections (not in doubt). Such relationships do not generally lead to a formal *patrocinium provinciae*.

Another possibility is that under *necessari provinciae* we should understand those who were connected to individuals and to communities of Sicily as *patroni* or as *hospites*. To this group may also belong Roman magistrates (probably including Cicero) whom the communities of Sicily had honored with the typical Hellenistic titles of *euergetes*, *soter* and *proxenos*. These cases, discussed in the following section, cannot be construed as evidence that the person honored was a patron of the island in any formal sense.

Cicero is consistent in his distinction between the *patroni* and the *necessarii Siciliae*. The former are the Marcelli, whose general patronage had been acquired and confirmed by time and *officia*. The *necessarii* consist of all others who are bound to individuals and to communities but who had not been able or had the opportunity or the desire to acquire such a general *clientela*. This conclusion is confirmed by two observations. First, as noted earlier, Cicero ascribes the *patrocinium* of Sicily only to the Marcelli and (ironically) to Verres and, second, when a Roman official acted on behalf of a community, as P. Scipio did for Halaesa, it was in consultation with the Marcelli and no others (2, 2, 122). In sum, one could become patron of various *civitates* and *nationes* by a variety of means, but Sicily consisted of numerous *civitates* and *nationes* and to be patron, even by ascription, of all was in 70 BC a unique distinction.[35]

5.1.4. *The Patrons of Communities*

Cicero, Sallust, Appian and other ancient writers basically agree that by Roman custom all communities of the empire had one or more patrons (or

[34] This is not to say that no trace of Metellan patronage is to be found. At least one Sicilian was enfranchised by Q. Metellus (*Verr.* 2, 2.20) and Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, notes two others, p. 302. These do not, however, compare to the provincial clientele of the Marcelli. On patrons abandoning their clients, see also Ch. 2.3.

[35] On this subject in the following period, Nicols, Patrons of Provinces, *ZPE* 80 (1989) 101–108. Cato Minor is later (in 50 BCE) said to have *Cyprus insulae* in his clientele (*ad fam.* 15, 4.15), but the statement occurs in a private letter as part of an attempt to flatter. On the distinctions between such attributions in public and private, see the discussion of Cicero's relations to the Sicilians in this chapter.

prostates) at Rome who could represent their interests.[36] During the Late Republic there were about 65 Sicilian states.[37] If these authors are correct, then each had at least one patron. The evidence on this question is very slender and may be divided into two categories. There are those senators who Cicero expressly attests are patrons of communities and there are senators whose experiences in Sicily might have led to the acquisition of a communal clientele by ascription (that is, in the eyes of Romans).

In the former category, Cicero notes (beyond the Marcelli) but two cases. P. Scipio Nasica (cos. 52) included the citizens of Segesta in his formal clientele (*adsunt Segestani, clientes tui*, 2, 4.80), a clientele inherited from the great Scipio Aemilianus.[38] His ancestor, Cicero notes, had (presumably at the end of the 3rd Punic War) restored a venerated civic and religious monument that had been seized by the Carthaginians (2, 4.74ff.). As is so often the case, Cicero makes no connection between a benefaction and the initiation of a patronal relationship, but the use of *clientes* probably suggested to a Roman audience that a formal arrangement existed. In other words, we do not know whether the benefaction was the consequence of an existing patronal relationship or the event that initiated it. As Scipio Nasica was a young man at the time of the trial, Cicero may be pointedly instructing him (and his audience) about the patron's proper duties. That the orator could make a public issue of the young man's 'failure' suggests that Cicero believed the Roman public demanded that patrons take their duties seriously.

C. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 92) was the *patronus populi Mamertini* (2, 4.6). Though the reference to *patronus* assumes that a formal agreement existed, it is noteworthy that Cicero attributes no particular benefaction to him in respect to this town. This suggests that Pulcher, too, had inherited the honor and probably from App. Claudius Caudex (cos. 264) who had come to the

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36 Appian may have taken this passage from Sallust and translated *patrocinium* as *prostasia* indicating some consensus about the equivalency of the words in the developed principate. It would be a mistake however to conclude that *prostasia* / *prostates* in reference to Romans are always equivalent to *patrocinium* / *patronus*. On some of the peculiarities, H. Schaefer, Art. 'προστάτης', *RE* Suppl 9, 1301ff. Claude Eilers suggests that Appian is not to be taken too literally (our correspondence). The relationships may have been more potential than actual.

37 On the number of states, *Verr.* 2, 2.133, 137; Plin *NH* 3, 8.88; U. Kahrstadt, "Die Gemeinden Siziliens in der Römerzeit", *Klio* 35 (1942) 258ff.; Mary A. Goldsberry, *Sicily at its Cities in Hellenistic and Roman Times*, Diss. UNC-Chapel Hill, 1973.

38 2, 4.79–80. He was P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (*RE* 4, "Cornelius" No. 352) until 64, when he becomes Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, (*RE* 3, "Caecilius" No. 99).

aid of the Mamertini and, thereby, initiated the 1st Punic War. Again it is not clear if there ever was a formal cooption, or whether the claim was based on perception and practice.

Claudius Pulcher had also, in accordance with a decree of the Senate, established regulations governing admission to the local senate of Halaesa, a task frequently assigned to the patron of a community. Nevertheless, he is not mentioned as a formal patron of this town though Romans might have considered him to be as much.[39]

Even with the inclusion of the Claudii Marcelli, this list is surprisingly short. Many families had been associated with the conquest of Sicily during the Punic and Servile Wars and, according to Cicero, they could be described as being *patroni* of the defeated states *more maiorum*. For example, Otacilius Crassus, cos. 263, had brought 67 *poleis* to an alliance with Rome and P. Rupilius, cos. 132, had ended the 1st Servile War and promulgated a charter for the province which was still valid in 70 (*Verr.* 2, 2.32 and 125). Valerius Laevinus, cos. 210, brought it about that forty communities *voluntaria deditione in fidem venerunt*.[40] Some of these families did not have any known senators at the time of the trial. Others, like the Valerii, remained prominent if only in the collateral line. Most noticeable is, of course, that Pompeius is not mentioned as patron of any community, not even of Thermai that he had so conspicuously spared (Cic. *Verr.* 2, 2.113; Plut. *Pomp.* 10.5). The discrepancy between the number of cases mentioned by Cicero in the Verrines and the general rule enunciated by the same author (in *de officia*) and by Appian (both quoted at the beginning of this section) is noteworthy and calls for explanation. If the various 65 Sicilian communities each had one patron (or *prostates*), and if the number of patrons was restricted to the group named in the *Verrines*, then the Claudii Marcelli must have found the maintenance of the clientele (even if limited to guardianship) to be a very time-consuming proposition.

Whether there were other patrons, formal or informal, is a question the evidence does not allow us to answer definitively. Two considerations suggest that there must have been more senators who might have had continuing relations with Sicilian communities and individuals. First, the epigraph-

[39] 2, 2.122. On his career, see Münzer, *RE* 3, "Claudius", 302. His family did have extensive connections with the island. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* 296.

[40] For the evidence on these generals, *MRR*. On the charter of Rupilius, *Verr* 2, 2.32 and 125. The number of states conquered is close to the total of Sicilian communities given by Cicero and the elder Pliny and, thereby, generates suspicion. There is, however no reason to believe that the number that was valid for the latter period was also valid for the earlier.

ical record in the Greek-speaking east indicates that many communities regularly acquired Roman provincial magistrates as patrons and or protectors, and that by the 70's some communities like Oropus had more than one. Nevertheless, though all states, as Appian suggests, may have had a *prostates*/patron at Rome, it does not necessarily follow that every one of the latter had been formally honored as the πάτρων of the city.[41] Second, Cicero also provides a short but analogous list of patrons of individual Sicilians, a list that cannot be construed as all-inclusive (Table 5.1). It is then reasonable to conclude that the various Sicilian communities, with close to two centuries of contact with Rome, may have had many *necessari*, including *euergetes* and *prostates* to whom they might turn for assistance. That Cicero does not mention their names may be a matter of strategy for the prosecution; that they do not survive in the epigraphical record may say more about the rate of survival than about the actual pattern. The actions of Verres and of the provincials indicate that at least some senators did encourage communities to honor them; the latter may, however, have had some choice about which honors were applicable, a decision that applied particularly to the choice of patron.[42]

Though Roman senators competed with one another to attach wealthy provincials to their clientele, it does not follow that they always or automatically sought a formal patronage of communities. Indeed, senators may have preferred to receive, and cities to bestow, the prestigious and traditional honors as *euergetes*, *soter*, *ktistes* and *theos*; moreover, many Romans may have deliberately avoided the obligations implicit in the formal assumption of the title *patronus*.[43] Hence, Caesar is honored much more frequently as *euergetes* and/or *soter* of Greek cities, and only occasionally as the patron.[44]

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41 *IG* 7, 268, 311. On this issue, G. Chiranky, "Rome and Cotys: Two Problems" *Atheneum* 60 (1982) 473ff., K. Tuchelt, *Frühe Denkmäler Roms in Kleinasien I* (= DAI Istanbul Beiheft 23), Tübingen, 1979, and J. Touloumakos, "Zum römischen Gemeindepatronat im griechischen Osten", *Hermes* 116 (1988) 304–324.

42 On this concept, J. Rich, Patronage and international relations in the Roman Republic, in (ed.) A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Patronage and Ancient Society*, London and New York, 1989, esp. pp. 123–130. Cicero sometimes appears to discourage honors, as in his relations with the Sicilians (discussed below). The reluctance may in part be attributed to posturing (here as a contrast to Verres) and/or to an attempt to avoid commitments that could be the consequence of accepting the honors.

43 The 'burden' of obligations is discussed in Ch. 4.2.1, but is implicit in the comments of Caesar and Oppius, Representative Texts J and K.

44 On the subject, J. Touloumakos, op cit.; Harmand, 55ff., 83ff. On the honors for Caesar, A.E. Raubitschek, op cit. There is, however, general agreement that patron is employed far less frequently than *euergetes* and *soter*. Caesar is mentioned on 82% of civic inscriptions

So, too, is Pompeius, who was certainly among the *necessarii provinciae* and who may well have been the *euergetes*, *soter* and/or *hospes* of at least some communities, was not thereby obliged to defend the Sicilians as were formal patrons like the Marcelli.[45] Note, however, that 'defending' the Sicilians did not necessarily mean defending them in court.

Cicero provides some information about the activities of patrons and other *necessarii*. They were certainly called upon to resolve internal difficulties. A frequent problem in the Sicilian communities, and one that absorbed both the Claudii and the Scipiones, involved the distinctions between the local senatorial order and the rest of the state. Hence, Romans were called upon to define the membership in the local senate by rewriting all or a part of the constitution at *inter alia*, Halaesa, Heraclea and Agrigentum (*Verr.* 2, 2.120–125). Though their selection for the task may have been a consequence of their patronal ties with Sicilian communities, none of those who carried out the revision of a town charter is known to have been the formal patron of that town, but to judge by the experience of citizen communities (discussed in Ch. 2.4 and in 6), it is reasonable to believe that patrons would have been solicited for this purpose. Again, it should be noted that traditional Hellenistic titles like *euergetes* or *ktistes* could also have provided the appropriate authority.

Because the Marcelli maintained patronal ties with many of the individuals and communities of the island, they must have been well informed about local conditions, or at least had access to such information. Though Cicero provides very little direct information on the subject, newly appointed officials may well have sought their counsel on conditions in the province and introductions to provincials who could ease the burden of governing.[46] If problems arose during a governorship, patrons might also be expected to mediate informally. Indeed, the Marcelli were certainly among those who spoke with the father of Verres about his son's governance and urged restraint (*Verr.* 2, 4.41; cf. 2.95). This episode documents two points. First, though they were not always effective with the completely unscrupulous, there were unofficial means available to restrain the acquisitive instincts of

as *euergetes*, on 65% as *soter* and on only 24% as patron. On the subject, Nicols, "Patrons of Greek Cities", 1989. It is not clear how a community decided what honors were appropriate for what circumstances. The pattern suggests that one or both of the parties had particular ideas on the subject.

45 Pompeius was on the island briefly and under difficult circumstances (to pursue Marians), but by 70 his reputation and prestige were sufficiently secure so as to attract the attention of would-be clients.

46 This may have led to *hospitium*, discussed in the following section.

governors. Second, the governing class was willing to tolerate a certain level of criminality among its members, but not so much that victims, individuals and communities, would come to Rome, create a public embarrassment, and force senators to make unwelcome decisions about competing obligations. The role of the patrons (and of *necessarii*) was then to keep the disputes out of the courts and to limit the abuse to a level that was tolerable for the exploited and satisfied the exploiter.

The contrasting success of C. Claudius Marcellus as governor of Sicily in 79 and the failure of M. Marcellus in 74 as mediator illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the system, the reality that *beneficia* were much more easily secured when patron and client had immediate access to one another and when the former was also a magistrate.[47] In order to retain some of the advantages of the relationship with an absentee patron, the client communities constructed monuments that served as "reminders" to themselves and to potential exploiters that they had formal protectors to whom they could appeal. If the reminders did not prove effective, the community, like the individuals discussed below, had no choice but to send representatives to Rome who could make a direct plea for assistance. In this case, the monuments that clients set up at Rome constituted a public record of the patron's responsibilities and, should the latter be neglected, a source of embarrassment to him.

Though most, if not all, of the Sicilian communities had formal or informal patrons, the former tended to come from a small number of senatorial families who had well-established ties with the province. These families all had extensive connections throughout the Roman aristocracy, connections they could employ to aid their clients without having to resort to the direct and unpleasant confrontations of the courts. As Caesar notes, the latter served only to create *inimicitiae* (*BHisp* 42). As a consequence, the Marcelli may have felt uncomfortable taking a lead in the prosecution of Verres; while the young and ambitious and still unconnected Cicero was ready to try the courts.

Patrocinium was, however, not the only honor conferred by the cities of Sicily. Many Roman nobles during the Late Republic must have been pleased to receive the traditional titles (*euergetes*, *soter*, or *ktistes*) given to distinguished men and to have been quite content to avoid the sometimes onerous duties associated with the Roman notion of patronage.[48] These

47 Caesar mentions the same problem in respect to the Baetici, *BHisp*. 42. On the success of C. Marcellus and the failure of M. Marcellus, see above.

48 On the burdens: Cic. *in Catil.* 4, 23; Caes. *BHisp*. 42; Cic. *de off.* 2, 64.

men, *necessarii provinciae*, may not have felt the same obligation as did the *patroni*, but they still could be expected to provide some assistance informally. During the course of the last century, BC, the incidence of formal patronage, to judge by the Greek epigraphical record, does increase (Ch. 2.5 and also 6.1 and 6.3). This pattern suggests that both parties came to believe that the formal arrangement was preferable to the informal.

The Marcelli were acknowledged to be the most important formal patrons of the Sicilian communities; they were not, however, the only ones. The oppressed found relief only because they could appeal to protectors of all kinds including *necessarii* and *hospites*. Though the formal patronage of Greek cities was clearly an established institution in the political process by 70, it was to become more common in the period after the trial of Verres. In part this pattern evolved because the institution was flexible and dynamic; the Romans had not yet regulated the way communities, especially peregrine communities, might confer the honor.

5.1.5. *The Patrons of Individuals*

Several examples of the patronage of individuals appear in these speeches. They are especially interesting because they involve individuals of citizen status. Cicero mentions three cases in which prominent provincials appealed to their *patroni* for assistance against Verres.

Diodorus of Melita (= Q. Lutatius Diodorus) was long a resident of Lilybaeum and a man of good character and great wealth. When Verres tried to rob him of the latter, he tricked the governor and escaped to Rome where *sordidatus circum patronos atque hospites cursare, rem omnibus narrare* (2, 4.41). Diodorus is a man then who not only had *hospites* at Rome, but also those who had formally agreed to protect him. We do not know the names or status of these men, though the name of at least one may be deduced from the *nomen* Lutatius, nor anything more than that there were several of them. Significant here is the fact that Diodorus was a client with a choice of patrons. His petition was successful, for Verres' friends and father urged him [Verres] to reconsider his actions in respect to this man.[49]

There is, too, the case of Q. Caecilius Dio of Halaesa, who Cicero says, was a Roman citizen by benefaction of Q. Metellus.[50] Verres having stripped his house of all valuables and defrauded him of HS 1,000,000. In order to pay

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[49] *Verr.* 2, 4.41. Münzer, *RE* 5, "Diodorus" 29.

[50] 2, 2.20. Q. Metellus Creticus (*RE* "Caecilius" No. 52) or Q. Metellus Piso (Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 302)

this sum, Dio was forced to borrow from *amici*, *hospites* and *patroni*, from men who were ready to testify on this matter during the trial (2, 1.28). Again, neither names nor rank are given. Significant here is the fact that a wealthy provincial and a Roman citizen claimed and needed *hospites* and *patroni*. Given the competing obligations of the Roman nobility, clients had to have a choice of patrons if they wished to have genuine protection.[51]

The fact that Cicero fails to mention specific patrons suggests that he preferred discretion. Neither the identities (of at least some of those involved) nor the reasons for discretion are mysteries. Two senior senators, Lutatius Catulus and Q. Metellus had sponsored citizenship for Diodorus and for Dio, respectively. Both appear to have been sympathetic to Verres.[52] Both men must have felt themselves to be in an awkward position of having to choose between their personal commitments to provincial clients and to the accused ex-governor.

Heraclius, the wealthiest and most respected Syracusan, was less fortunate.[53] He was vulnerable to Verres' greed because, as Cicero notes, *eum praeter Marcellos patronum, quem suo iure adire aut appellare posset, habere neminem* (2, 2.36). And, in fact, Verres had no difficulty using his [i.e., the governor's] own court to defraud the Syracusan (2, 2.36–44). Heraclius eventually fled to Rome for his life. The provincial, despite his wealth and family, did not have any (personal) patron beyond the Marcelli to whom he might appeal. When Heraclius returned to Sicily two years later in the company of the new governor, L. Metellus, he is described as being *bene commendatus* (2, 2.62), but who his supporters might have been as well as how and when they came to care for Heraclius is not disclosed. The language is ambiguous. Cicero may be suggesting that the only claim that Heraclius had to the protection of the Marcelli was that enjoyed by all Sicilians. There are several arguments in support of this conclusion. The context, and especially the fact that Heraclius returned to Sicily *bene commendatus* suggests that he had not enjoyed that status before. Moreover, in other cases involving patronage in the *Verrines*, the individuals are Roman citizens, which is not the case here. Note that the usual pattern is that a senator, e.g., Claudius Pulcher, was patron of the Mamertines but *hospes* of individuals within that town. If this interpretation is accepted, it would suggest that not all wealthy peregrines

51 On the question of client choice, R.P. Saller, "Patronage and friendship" in Patronage and Ancient Society, ed. by A. Wallace-Hadrill, op. cit., 52–54.

52 See Badian, op cit., 282–283.

53 Lenschau, *RE* 8, "Heraklios" No. 4.

believed that they needed to cultivate relations with Roman magistrates.[54] Alternatively, the passage may be interpreted to mean that a formal relationship did exist between the Marcelli and Heraclius. In this case, Cicero is suggesting that at least some members of the local elite believed that they could enjoy their wealth without cultivating an extensive network of Roman magistrates. It is implicit that the Romans accepted the fact that provincial citizens needed a number of patrons.

Here too the number of formal patrons is small but suggestive. Regarding the number, one should not conclude that the cases mentioned were in any way intended to be all inclusive: Individuals who received the franchise might reckon both their sponsors and the presiding magistrates as their personal patrons; others relied on ties like *hospitium* (discussed below) or, in extreme situations, appealed to the more distant patron of their community. Indeed, the most prominent and wealthy provincials, men like Sthenius and Heraclius, may well have preferred the implicit equality of *hospitium* to the overt inequality of *clientela*.

5.1.6. *Conclusions*

Though Cicero does not provide an inclusive list of the number of formal patrons of Sicilian communities and individuals, it is apparent that most communities and prominent locals had Roman *necessarii*. Sicily, as a collection of communities, enjoyed a special relationship with the family of the Marcelli. But this relationship, which began with the *applicatio* of Syracuse, had over many years been extended to other communities. Cicero and the epigraphical evidence indicate that down to 70's the formal relationship was not as commonly entered as it was to be in subsequent decades. Indeed, the provincials may have preferred to confer traditional Hellenistic honors as *euergetes* or *ktistes* and senators were probably flattered to receive the traditional honors accorded kings and other great men. The latter may also have been unwilling to assume the public responsibility for the protection of formal clients.

The cases discussed here appear to suggest (as Brunt has argued[55]) that there were limits to the protection afforded by a patron/*hospes*. The relationship that individuals and communities had with a Scipio, a Caecilius Metellus or with the Marcelli clearly did not defend them from someone as deter-

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[54] R. Bernhardt reaches a similar conclusion in reference to the civic elites of the eastern part of the Empire, *Polis*, 165 and the review of D. Braund in *JRS* 78 (1988) 220.

[55] Brunt, op. cit.

mined and unscrupulous as Verres. Why then did the provincials establish and cultivate such connections? First, we must distinguish between the failure of a unique relationship and the failure of a system. A Metellus may have found himself in a 'conflict of interest', of having to choose between the competing claims of Verres and his (Metellus) provincial clients. Because the patronal system allowed for clients to have multiple patrons (both formal and informal), the Sicilians had alternatives, Cicero among them. Hence, the best protection for provincials was to integrate themselves, singly and collectively, in the increasingly complex net of patronal obligations. The more patrons they had, the more likely they were to find one or more who might defend their interests. Second, there was no alternative: Roman laws and the courts offered the Sicilians hope of justice only through such intermediaries. Third, formal ties of patronage, especially those advertised on monuments at Rome (discussed below), did create a public responsibility that, if abandoned, placed the *fides* of the patron at risk. Fourth, though a patron might be reluctant to prosecute a colleague on behalf of his clients, he could provide various degrees of protection on an informal basis.

5.2. *The Working of* Hospitium

During the Republic, the relationship between Roman senators and peregrines, both individuals and communities, was regulated especially by *hospitium*. Generally speaking, *hospitium* involves guest-friendship, or a personal connection developing out of a guest-host experience. This notion of reception in the home of another is not only used by Cicero in the *in Verrem*, but is a fundamental feature of Roman social history.[56] In the Roman concept, as in other ancient cultures, *hospitium* belonged to *mos*; that is, it was not regulated by human law, but was sacred (*quod sanctissimum est*, 2, 2.110), being guaranteed by the gods to serve the interests of mankind. For our purposes, the primary interest of this material lies in the interaction between the patron, on one hand, and the members of the local elites who were in a position to influence the official policies of their communities. These were

[56] On this subject, Th. Mommsen, "Das römische Gastrecht und die römische Clientele", in *Römische Forschungen*, Berlin 1864, 1, 319 ff. and J. Marquardt, *Das Privatleben der Römer*, Leipzig, 1886, 195 ff., R. Leonhard, "*hospitium*", *RE* 8, 2493 ff. and T.P. Wiseman, *New Men*, 33 ff. For the earlier period, L.J. Bolchazy, *Hospitality in Early Rome*, Chicago, 1977. Elements of this section have appeared in Nicols, "*Hospitium* and Political Friendship in the Late Republic". *JourRomArch*, 2004.

the individuals who could be expected to secure decrees and, if necessary, assist in recruiting soldiers.

5.2.1. *The* Hospites

References to *hospitium* in the *Verrines* are frequent and sufficiently diverse to allow for an analysis. Table 5.2 summarizes the cases recorded in the *Verrines*.[57] The pattern of *hospitium* is quite different from that of *patrocinium*. In the seven of nine cases of *patrocinium* in the *Verrines*, the patron is an individual Roman senator and the client is a community; that is, in seven of the nine cases, we have *patrocinium publicum*. The reverse applies to *hospitium*: Of the eighteen cases, only three are *publice* and all the rest are *privatim* (i.e., both parties are individuals). Note, for example that C. Claudius Pulcher not only was the patron of the Mamertini, but also that he was the *hospes Heiorum*, a prominent family of that town (2, 4.6). The two institutions appear then to serve quite distinct though complementary functions.

Administrative activity in a province provided the most frequently used vehicle for initiating the relationship. Indeed, Verres seems to have acquired an extensive number of *hospites* in the course of his travels through his province. As will be shown, the formalization of the connection followed an invitation to dine at and/or to reside at the house of one party. This relationship is simple *hospitium* (e.g., 2, 5.108) and could be transferred to the descendants of both parties.[58] Whether or not simple *hospitium* developed into an enduring and politically useful connection was influenced by additional factors, namely by how often hospitality was extended, by the status of the provincial *hospes*, by his connection to other important Romans, and by the willingness of both parties to provide the needed services. One may make distinctions on several levels, between the regulating force of *hospitium* and that of *patrocinium*, between *hospitium privatim* and *publice* and on the nature of the relationship when *hospitium* is linked to notions of *amicitia*, *clientela* and *necessitas*.

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57 As traveling Roman magistrates regularly required the simple hospitality, it is likely that the list given here is incomplete. On this subject, Nicols, "*Hospitium* among the Romans", ed. M. Peachin, *Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World*, Oxford (University Press; 2011) 422–437.

58 These issues are discussed in Ch. 6.2.2.

5.2.2. *Equality and Inequality*

Hospitium, as Badian observes, "originally implies ipso facto, an equivalence or near equality between the hospitable arrangements awaiting each party."[59] Although this sense of theoretical equality was perhaps never lost, it is apparent that *hospitium* could also absorb relationships of inequality. This situation is possible because, in primitive societies, the person and property of a foreigner within the frontiers of another state had to be guaranteed by a local with suitable authority. Hence, *hospitium* provided not only for victuals and lodging, but also for protection. In the sense that Romans were received into the homes of provincials and provincials into the homes of Romans, the tradition of equality was maintained. Inequality, implicit in the formula *hospes atque cliens*, developed not simply because the Roman was more 'powerful' but because of the inequality of protection: The protection the Roman *hospes* needed in the provinces was not comparable to the protection needed by the provincial even in his own community. May one assume then that when the word *hospes* is connected with *cliens* or *patronus*, the relationship between the parties is more "unequal" than when *hospes* is connected with *amicus*? Badian, indeed, has argued that there is no need to distinguish between *hospitium* and *clientela*, that the former is little more than a polite fiction for the latter.[60] From the perspective of the Roman senator, this may well have been true, but was it a matter of indifference to the provincial whether his *hospes* was also an *amicus* or a *patronus*? The evidence suggests that Cicero and the provincials were sensitive to these distinctions.

Consider the case of the most prominent of the Sicilians, Sthenius of Thermae. He is consistently described as the *hospes atque amicus* of some of the most important Romans of his day including, C. Marius, Pompeius, Marcellus, Sisenna and other *viri fortissimi*. Indeed, he had many *amici* at Rome to whom he could complain about Verres (*rem ad amicos suos detulit*).[61] On the other hand, Diodorus of Melita, though of good family and character, does not appear to have been nearly as influential or as prominent as was Sthenius. As a consequence, he had to appeal to his *patroni atque hospites* for

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[59] *Foreign Clientelae*, 11; the same implications exist in *proxenia*, see F. Gschnitzer, "*proxenia*" *RE* Suppl. 13, 645.

[60] Badian, *Clientelae*, 154–155.

[61] On Sthenius' prominence, see 2, 2.103 where all the Sicilians petition on his behalf. See also Münzer, *RE* 3A "Sthenius" No. 2, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, 282. L. Cornelius Sisenna, the historian, *RE* 4, "Cornelius" No. 375. On the *viri fortissimi*, *Verr.*, 2, 2.110. On the complaints, 2, 2.95.

aid.[62] In these cases, the lower status of Diodorus in comparison to Roman counterparts is stressed by the linkage of *hospitium* and *patrocinium* and the near equality of Sthenius by the linkage of *hospitium* and *amicitia*.

Hospes is linked with two other words, *adfinis* and *familiaris*. In these cases, however, Cicero uses the formula in such an ironical and rhetorical manner that they can hardly be considered within normal usage. In the first case, the *adfinis* is used to emphasize the illicit relationship between Verres and the daughter-in-law of his new *hospes* (2, 2.89 and 94). In the second case, Cicero, having previously described how Verres had first violated and then renounced the *hospitium* between himself and Sthenius, now represents the latter not just as *amicus*, but as the still closer *familiaris et hospes* of the former (2, 3.18). Finally, Sthenius is prosecuted by his enemies not as an *amicus* but as the *familiaris* of Marius (2, 2.113). In sum, *hospitium* may have offered only the appearance of equality, but that appearance might have been very important to those affected. Indeed, Cicero defined the social status of the individual by linking the word with other qualifiers.

5.2.3. Hospitium *and* Proxenia

In analyzing the use of *hospitium* in the *in Verrem* an additional consideration must be mentioned. In the communities of Sicily and especially in Syracuse, Greek was the major language. Indeed, L. Metellus, the governor of Sicily when Cicero was collecting evidence against Verres, chides the orator: *quod ego* (Cicero) *in senatu Graeca fecissem, quod quidem apud Graecos Graece locutus essem, id ferri nullo mode posse* (2, 4.147). Moreover, when Greek cities sent inscriptions to honor of Roman magistrates the texts were written in Greek as, for example the reference to Verres as *soter* (2, 2.154). It is reasonable to believe then that when a Roman was offered the *iura hospitii* he received, in fact, the *proxenia*. That is, the Greek community gave the person honored a Greek text, one which used the word *proxenia*, not *hospitium*.

The relationship between *proxenia* and *hospitium* in modern scholarship has been discussed too briefly or with varying success, but in any case goes beyond the limits of this discussion.[63] Suffice it to say that Cicero never once in this set of speeches refers to the institution as *proxenia* or to an individual

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[62] 2, 4.37 and 41; surely, Q. Lutatius Diodorus of Lilybaeum and Diodorus … *Lilybaei … multos annos habitat* are one and the same.

[63] Gschnitzer's account in *RE* (see above) breaks off with the Roman period. Harmand's examples are dated primarily to the 3rd and 2nd centuries, 55 ff., especially 58–60.

as a *proxenos*. There is, moreover, reason to believe that at least Sicilian aristocrats were thoroughly familiar with Roman customs and institutions; they already had almost two centuries of intensive experience with Roman officials and within a generation of the trial Caesar deemed the island (or at least the elite of the island) to be sufficiently Romanized to receive the *ius Latium* (Cic. *ad Att.* 14, 12). It is then a reasonable assumption that Cicero made a complete identification of the two for his Roman audience.

5.2.4. Publice *and* Privatim

An additional problem of definition also requires discussion, namely, the relationship between *hospitium publice* and *hospitium privatim*. Cicero notes on one occasion that he is defending *multi hospites publice privatimque* (2, 2.118). The former of these *hospites* should be understood to refer to communities, the latter, to individuals. It is, for example, the Syracusan senate which decreed that Cicero and his cousin should receive *hospitium publice* (2, 4.145) and it is the Mamertini as a *civitas*, who are criticized for not doing the same (2, 4.25). In contrast, *hospitium privatum* refers to a personal connection between two individuals such as between Cicero and Sthenius (2, 2.117) or between Verres and Agathinus (2, 2.89). Moreover, it appears to be usual and proper for a Roman magistrate to be both the *hospes* of the community and of one or more individuals within the community.

This distinction between *hospitium publicum* and *privatum* was not exclusionary. While some communities had facilities for entertaining visiting dignitaries, it appears to be more usual for members of the local elite to take turns providing hospitality for public guests. Hence, Philodamus of Lampsacus protested that it was not his turn to provide services for Verres' associates (2, 1.65). When a city voted to provide hospitality, it meant that one wealthy member of the state would undertake the responsibility as a liturgy or *munus*.

5.2.5. *The Initiation of the Relationship*

Hospitium is extended by some formal invitation, by a decree of the local senate, if *publice*, or by the offer of lodging and victuals, if *privatim*. In both cases, the formula is clear: *invitare eum publice tecto ac domo* (2, 4.25) or: *eum domum suam invitare* (2, 2.89). Cicero observes that Sthenius collected objects of marvelous artistic value: *non tam suae delectionis causa quam ad invitationes adventusque nostrorum hominum, amicorum atque hospitum* (2, 2.83). This collection no doubt aroused the interest (and cupidity) of many

Romans and enabled him to acquire an illustrious group of *hospites* at Rome (2, 2.110).

Once the invitation had been accepted, the guest moved into the home of his new *hospes*. Cicero does not mention other formalities, but the sources indicate that some kind of *tessera* and/or a guest-gift might be produced to commemorate the occasion. It may well be that Verres' abuse of the *iura hospitii* is to be connected with this gift. Sthenius, for example, lost all those items which had been assembled for this purpose and: *verum tamen dolorem suum nemini impertiebat; praetoris iniurias tacite, hospitis placide ferendas arbitrabantur*.[64]

Verres might have been an exception in this respect, but it is clear that the material duties of *hospitium* were by no means minimal. Sthenius apparently could afford to entertain and to obligate a number of important Romans. Others were not so fortunate. Cicero was well aware of this burden. In Messana, for example, he had his cousin put up in another household, apparently in order to reduce the costs to his personal *hospes* (2, 4.25).

5.2.6. *The Duties of the* Hospites

The responsibilities of the provincial *hospes* were not simply material. Just as the reputation of a *homo clarus* could be enhanced by receiving *hospites multi* (Cic. *de off.* 1, 139), so too, Cicero characterizes his *hospes*, Sthenius, as one *quem ego in quaestura mea singulariter dilexissem, de quo optime existimassem, quem in provincia existimationis meae studiosissimum cupidissimumque cognossem* (2, 2.117). Along with this mutual concern for their respective reputations, the *hospes* was also expected to advise and to act for his Roman counterpart. Hence Verres encouraged his *hospes*, Sthenius, to secure several valuable *signa pulcherrima atque antiquissima*. When the latter refused, the governor renounced the *hospitium* between them and then urged his *hospes novus*, Agathinus, not only to secure the statues, but also to prosecute Sthenius on a trumped-up charge (2, 2.84–85, 88–89). The important point about these episodes is not their extortionate character, but the expectation on the part of Verres that his *hospes* would act as his agent. Provincial *hospites* then served a number of functions beyond providing housing. It was this role that linked individuals among the local elite to

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[64] On moving into the home, 2, 2.89. The expression *tessera hospitalis* is frequently used on early inscriptions of this kind, *ILLRP* 1064–1069. The variants are discussed in Ch. 6.2.2. On the guest gift, 2, 2.88 and Mommsen, "*Gastrecht*", 346. Also 2, 2.84 and Livy, 5, 28: *hospitum cum eo senatus consulto est factum donaque publice data.*

the Roman elite and generated the appearance of *praesidium* among client communities. The classic example is, of course, the case of Pompeius, Theophanes and Mytilene.[65] Similar responsibilities also apply to the Roman *hospes*. It is not stated whether Sthenius actually lived with Cicero or any of his other *hospites* during his lengthy exile in Rome, but the orator is emphatic about his obligations to defend *hospitis salutem fortunasque* and cites a series of precedents illustrating the virtue of such actions (2, 2.117–118; *Div. Caec.* 64). Such words served to convey to Roman audiences that Cicero (for example) had a substantial clientele in Sicily.

5.2.7. *The Violation of* Hospitium

One of the most persistent charges made against Verres is that, aside from transgressing Roman law, he has also offended the gods and Roman tradition by his frequent and flagrant violation of the *iura hospitii*. How Sthenius suffered in this respect has been discussed above (*quare de hospitio violato et de tuo scelere nefario nihil queror*, Cicero asks rhetorically, 2, 2.111). Cicero notes two other examples. Dexo of Tyndaris, the father of one of those captains unjustly charged with betraying the fleet to the pirates, appealed to Verres for justice: he was, Cicero says,

> *homo nobilissimus, hospes tuus. Cuius tu domi fueras, quem hospitem appellaras, eum cum illa auctoritate miseria videres perditum, non te eius lacrimae, non senectus, non hospitii ius atque nomen a scelere aliquam ad partem humanitatis revocare potuit? Sed quid ego hospitii iura in hac immani belua commemoro? Qui Sthenium Thermitanum, hospitem suum, cuius domum per hospitium exhausit et exinanivit, absentem in reos rettulerit, causa indicta capite damnarit, ab eo nunc hospitiorum iura atque officia quaeramus?*[66]

Again, the *iura hospitii* lie outside Roman law, no one can be prosecuted in court for violating them. Nevertheless, Cicero employs them effectively to condemn Verres as offensive to both gods and men. He who does not respect *hospitium* is no better than *fera atque immanis belua*.[67]

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[65] Plutarch, *Pomp* 42, claims that Pompeius gave Mytilene its freedom and other honors because of his close friendship with Theophrastus, a native of the town. On this subject, Barbara K. Gold, "Pompey and Theophrastus", *AJPh* 106 (1985) 312–327.

[66] 2, 5.108–109. See also 2, 2.116: (Verres) *ardebat amore illius hospitae, propter quam hospitii iura violaret.*

[67] 2, 5.109. The same notions recur in the *Philippics*, 2, 75; 3, 4; 5, 15.

5.2.8. *The Renunciation of* Hospitium

One of the most interesting aspects of *hospitium* mentioned in these speeches is the *renuntiatio* of the connection. Several authors describe the termination of personal connections of various kinds, but the *renuntiatio hospitii* is known only from one passage in Livy (25, 18.9) and from one in the *Verrines* (2, 2.84–85). The same formula is employed and the same disapproval is expressed in both narrations: *hospitium*, once established by honorable men, had to be maintained honorably. The renunciation of *patrocinium publicum* is not attested.

Although there are no references to renunciation of patronage or clientele in the period covered by this study, relationships did end. Neglect of obligations over the long-term, outright abandonment (in time of need), or even compelling necessity (as outlined in Ch. 2.3 and 2.4), may have been the primary causes. It is significant that the sources do not generally dwell on the phenomenon. Notable and instructive exceptions include the relations between Deiotarus, Pharnaces, Pompeius and Caesar (Ch. 2). Caesar's judgment is quite clear that compelling necessity was an adequate excuse.

It is repeatedly stressed in these speeches that it is not a concern of the state to punish those who violated the *iura hospitii*; all the references to *hospitium* in the *in Verrem* must then be seen as an aspect of the advocate's attempt to discredit the accused. Nevertheless, within this context, much can be learned about the functioning of *patrocinium* and *hospitium*. First, where the great majority of patronal relationships mentioned by Cicero are between individual Romans and communities, the reverse is the case with *hospitium*; namely, both parties to *hospitium* are generally individuals.[68] Second, *hospitium privatum* could be contracted with relative ease: An invitation to dine or to reside at the house of another was apparently sufficient. Hence, it is not at all surprising that Romans had far more provincial *hospites* than formal *clientes*. Third, though it may be true that a Roman senator treated his provincial *hospites* and *clientes* similarly, this should not disguise the fact the distinctions were important to the provincial. These provincial *hospites* were the leading men of their states; in fact, they were usually 'aristocrats' and surely expected or at least hoped to be treated as such by their

[68] The evidence is not sufficient for a definitive statement, but my sense is that formal clients tended to be citizens, while *hospites* tended to be peregrines. The distinction is complicated by the fact that the ancient authors continue to refer to *hospitium* even after the foreigner became a citizen. Note the cases here and the possibility that the father of Catullus, a *hospes* of Julius Caesar (Suet. *Jul.* 73), was given citizenship by or through a Valerius. The same might be said of Sextus Roscius (Cic. *Rosc. Am.*, 15). Cf. Gelzer, *Nobility*, at note 94.

Roman counterparts. Moreover, though a Roman *patronus* might hardly be expected, under normal conditions, to lodge and dine at the expense of his *cliens*, he could easily do so with a *hospes*. *Hospitium* was then, an essential institution through which the various provincial elites could be tied to the Roman. Fourth, *hospitium privatum* provided each party with a number of services beyond that of hospitality per se. The provincials employed their *hospites* as intermediaries between themselves and the central government and found a measure of personal protection in the relationship, while the Romans used their provincial *hospites* as intermediaries between themselves and the local population, as sources of information on local conditions and as promoters of their reputations and honors. Relations between *hospites*, insofar as they were known at or visible in Rome, constituted a significant element in the public perception of the power of the patron / *hospes*. The provincial partner was usually a formidable person in his own state. It was only reasonable that the Romans would conflate the individual and his state.

5.3. *Cicero and the Sicilians*

Cicero provides much information about the *patroni* and *hospites* of Sicily, but of all of them the most details concern his own relationship to individuals and communities of that island. The purpose of this section is twofold: first, to trace the development of the relationship and, in doing so, to test the validity of the concepts developed above.

The orator's first contact with the island and its inhabitants came during his quaestorship there in 75. Despite the fact that his official residence was in the western part of the province, in Lilybaeum, he apparently managed to see a great deal of the island.[69] By his own estimate, his administration was notably successful; so much so, he notes, that he was reckoned, along with the *multi veteres patroni* as a *praesidium* of the island's fortunes and promised that he would not be absent should the provincials need him.[70]

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[69] On his quaestorship, see Gelzer, *Cicero: ein biographischer Versuch*, Wiesbaden, 1969, 29.

[70] *Div. in Caec.* 2. Cicero is not equating himself with the traditional patrons of Sicily in this passage, but noting only that the provincial came to him for protection. The *praesidium* of a state (in this case of an island-province with many states and individuals) cannot be automatically equated with formal *patrocinium*. Note that L. Caesar is *patronus* of Pisae, but his brother is called a *praesidium* of the colony, *CIL* 9, 1421. This case is discussed below in Ch. 3.2.

Though he might easily have been honored as *euergetes* or *soter*, there is no indication that this first *beneficium* of good administration led to a formal *patrocinium* of the island or any of its communities.[71] Indeed, he claims that *tanta necessitudo*, which might easily include the *euergesia*, best characterizes the sense of obligation he felt for the Sicilians down to the beginning of the trial of Verres (*div. in Caec.* 6). The promise of *praesidium* must then be considered an important commitment but one that fell short of the formal obligations of the formal *patrocinium* of a significant number of communities.

In 71, all but two of the Sicilian communities sent *legationes* to Rome to complain about Verres' conduct. The Marcelli, the *consul designatus* Pompeius, and others were informed of the situation. Cicero specifies that there was a formal request for his services: *cuncti ad me publice saepe venerunt, ut suarum fortunarum omnius causam defensionemque susciperem*, and that the prosecution should proceed in a *iudicium de pecuniis repetundis*.[72] The situation is then clear. Each (or most) of the *civitates Siciliae* (but not the *commune Siciliae*) and individual *hospites* and *necessarii* made a formal request, an *applicatio*, for his services. Only after the *divinatio* might Cicero rightfully call himself *patronus causae*.

There appears to have been some reluctance among senators to claim a broader *patrocinium* (though they might happily enjoy one ascribed to them). Cicero and Caesar are both hesitant to claim the title of *patronus* for themselves.[73] When the former refers to himself in the *in Verrem* it is always as *defensor*, *ultor* or *actor causae* (*Div. in Caec.* 11; cf. 65) and never as *patronus*. Indeed, he notes: *lex ipsa de pecuniis repetundis sociorum atque amicorum populi Romani patrona sit* (*Div. in Caec.* 65). He is equally scrupulous in the avoidance of the word *clientes* to describe the Sicilians: *defendo enim multos mortales, multas civitates, provinciam Siciliam totam* (*Div. Caec.* 5)*; multique uno tempore a me hospites atque amici publice privatimque defendantur* (*Verr.* 2, 2.118).

When his position as *patronus causae* had been legally and formally confirmed, Cicero set out for Sicily to collect evidence.[74] Even then, he avoids

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71 He may, however, have become the patron of individuals, but there is not indication that this happened.

72 *Div. Caec.* 2–5, 11; *Verr.* 2, 2.117; 3.45 and 4.138. In general, see Gelzer, *Cicero* 36 ff.

73 On Caesar, see Ch. 2.3.2–2.3.4.

74 The powers he had were defined by an unnamed *lex* (2, 4.149), probably the *Cornelia*. On what is known about the law, Pontenay de Fontette, 88–91, and M. Crawford, *Roman Statutes*, 1, 65 ff.

the word *clientes* and refers to the provincials as *socii populi Romani* and to his own personal contacts as *hospites mei et necessarii* (2, 1.16). When Syracuse finally decided that it is safe to join the other communities in the process (2, 4.138 ff.), the city offered Cicero and his cousin, Lucius, *hospitium publice* (2, 4.145) and not *patrocinium*.[75] Moreover, when he speaks about the forces that bind him to the Sicilians, namely *fides*, *officium* and *necessitudo* (*Div. Caec.* 5, 6, and 11; *in Verr.* 2, 3.6), he persistently avoids labeling the Sicilians as his *clientes* or calling himself their *patronus*. Finally, when Cicero thereafter refers to the Sicilians in his public works, it is always in the context of being *patronus causae: cum igitur essem in plurimis causis et in principibus patronis quinquennium fere versatus tum in patrocinio Siciliensi maximum in certamen veni* (*Brutus*, 319; cf. *pro Scauro* 26).

There are some indications in his private correspondence to suggest that Cicero had become, or at least was perceived to have become, the patron of Sicily. In a letter to Atticus dated to 60, Cicero refers to a witty exchange with Clodius: "… when we were escorting a candidate he [Clodius] asked me whether I was in the habit of giving the Sicilian seats at gladiatorial games. '*Negavi*' '*At ego*' *inquit* '*novus patronus instituam* …'" (2, 1.5). Late in his life (in 44), and then in a private letter to Atticus, he appears to claim a general patronage of the Sicilians: *scis quam diligam Siculos, et quam illam clientelam honestam iudicem* (14, 12.1). Had he become the formal patron of Sicily by 60? In the first case, we can only accept the claim that Cicero was patron of the Sicilians if we accept that Clodius too was their patron. That is, it was an informal, ascribed patronage. Second, the passages allow for Cicero to have many individual clients among the Sicilians without being the patron of the collective.[76] Third, these exchanges are characteristic of the loose language and rhetorically exaggerated claims to patronage that appear in the literature of the late Republic. Note for example that Catullus, in comparing himself to Cicero, writes *tanto pessimus omnium poeta quanto tu optimus omnius patronus*.[77] As argued above, there are good reasons for questioning this claim. We have no record that the *koinon* was active in this period, hence there was no constituency to vote on the honor. Moreover (and again as argued above), patronage is consistently applied to cities, not to larger collectives (the case of the Marcelli

[75] It is not relevant here whether *proxenia* or *hospitium* was decreed, but that the delay was insulting. Cf. 2, 4.25.

[76] Clodius may be claiming a more generalized patronage, but that does not mean that it actually existed formally or informally.

[77] 49.5–6. These exaggerated claims are discussed in the following chapter.

and Sicily is a genuine exception). Hence, Cicero was probably not the formal patron of Sicily, though after the trial of Verres he may well have had many formal and informal clients. In the less than exact calculations that politicians of the era made, it is not surprising to find that a clientele would be ascribed to someone, even if there was no legal basis for it.

As to *hospitium*, Cicero and other traveling magistrates and senators, relied heavily on their private contacts.[78] He expressed indignation, for example, that the Mamertines did not on the occasion of his visit offer him *hospitium publice*, noting, however, that he would still have chosen to lodge with his personal *hospites* (2, 4.25). On the other hand, he claims not to have been concerned when the Syracusans also failed to offer it to him. Verres, also, seems to have preferred the company of his personal *hospites*, though again, his expectations went well beyond what Cicero reckoned as legitimate and may not have been typical.

The fact that Cicero avoids claiming the title of *patronus Siciliae* is not simply to shame Verres for his unprecedented and vicious assumption of an honor belonging rightfully to the Marcelli, but probably also in order to discourage any unflattering comparison. His relationship to Sicily was, indeed, a strong one, being based on *necessitudo, officium* and *fides*. More concretely, it was based on the fact that he enjoyed *hospitium publice* with many communities, *hospitium privatim* with numerous individuals and, in the end, had served the province well as *patronus causae*.

This conclusion should not be interpreted to suggest that Cicero did not receive public honors in Sicilian communities. It is highly likely that many communities commemorated his benefactions with statues and with the usual titles (e.g., *soter* and *euergetes*). Indeed, we do know that they (some communities? individuals?) provided him with the grain and animals when he was aedile (*Mur.* 40; *off.* 2, 58–59; Plut. *Cic.* 8.1).

5.4. *The Representation of* Patrocinium *and* Hospitium

Though *patrocinium* and *hospitium* were originally extra-legal institutions that had gradually taken on a public dimension, they had always had a public dimension in their representation. The establishment of the connection was traditionally commemorated by an exchange of gifts and/or by a *tessera*,

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78 Wiseman, *New Men*, 33 ff.

later a *tabula*.[79] In the west, the latter was frequently on metal and designed to be displayed. The relationships were also commemorated by statues, on inscriptions, in eulogistic decrees, at festivals and through honorary legations. All of these features appear in the *in Verrem*, though it will be immediately apparent that *patrocinium* and *hospitium publicum*, rather than *privatum*, predominate. Because prestige was conferred by these honors, their proper representation became one of the major benefits of the institution for both parties. For the patron, public monuments set up at Rome by grateful clients were critical components of his reputation and were probably of special importance to those who lacked senatorial or consular ancestors. For the client, the public display of the connection at Rome not only served as a means to encourage, to reward, and to warn those who had the power to aid or to harm them, but also recorded a commitment, the neglect of which could prove embarrassing. Cicero also notes that to receive an honor places an administrator under obligation to govern well and then continues to conclude that safety ultimately depends upon what others say about us (*ad Q.fr.* 1, 1.31 and 2.2).

5.4.1. *Statues and Inscriptions* (monumenta)

It was a regular feature of Greek and Roman municipal life to erect a statue to someone who had already conferred some conspicuous *beneficium*. At the base of the statue, there was the usual *titulus honorarius*, either as a dedication or as a decree. This idea of the statue as a *monumentum beneficiorum* is a frequent one in these speeches, though, as Cicero notes, the statues of Verres are negative examples (*monumenta scelerum, non beneficiorum*, 2, 4.139). In contrast, a bronze statue of Claudius Marcellus had been erected in the *bouleuterion* at Syracuse because, though he might have done otherwise, he had, in 212 BC spared and restored that building to the city.[80] Here, as in other cases, we should probably understand that Cicero is identifying benefaction and *euergesia*.

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[79] See above, § 3, and Nicols, "*Tabulae patronatus*". Cicero acknowledges that gifts between *hospites* are legitimate, but that Verres abused the idea, 2, 2.115.

[80] 2, 2.50. Greek employs the accusative for such purposes, while Latin usually requires the dative. Though Cicero does not expressly state that this text forms the base of a statue, one may suppose this to have been the case. On the background to the statues, Plin. *NH* 34,30, discussed in Ch. 7. See also W. Eck, "Öffentlichkeit, Monument und Inschrift" in *Monument und Inschrift*, 275–298, edd. W. Ameling und J. Heinrichs, Berlin/New York (De Gruyter; 2010) = *Akten 11. Int. Kongr. greich. u. lat. Epigraphik*, Rom, 1997, ed. S. Panciera. 1999 2, 53–75.

There is a persistent contrast in these speeches between the Marcelli as *patroni boni* (2, 4.89) and Verres as the very opposite. In light of what has been said above, it is hardly surprising that Cicero mentions that the statues of the Marcelli were to be found in *fora* throughout Sicily. Indeed, he indicates that the number of publicly decreed statues was a concrete measure of the power of the patron and of the expectations of the client (cf. Cic. *ad Q. fr.*, 1, 31 and 2.2).

It is manifest that the dignity and prestige of *hospitium* and *patrocinium* rest on a voluntary act (*sua voluntate*) of some kind, that the parties did indeed have some choice, however limited. In order to secure the good will of the conqueror, a defeated state, like Syracuse, might have had a powerful incentive to request admission to enter his *clientela*. The Syracusans honored Marcellus not because he defeated them, but because, when he was in the position to destroy their state *belli ac victoriae lege*, he elected to preserve it (2, 2.50). The Syracusans then wished to honor this *beneficium* and did so with a statue. In contrast, Cicero argues that Verres left the provincials with no such choice and still tried to destroy them (*si hoc voluntate sua nulla civitas fecit, si omnes imperio, metu, vi, malo adductae tibi pecuniam statuarum nomine contulerunt*, 2, 2.145, *nullam tibi statuam voluntate cuiusquam datam*, 2, 2.165). Indeed, as soon as Verres left his province, many of the communities threw down those statues and others would have done so had not L. Metellus prohibited it *imperio edictoque* (2, 2.161). The net result, however, was the remarkable petition of *omnes civitates: ut statuas ne cui, nisi cum is de provincia decessisset, pollicerentur*.[81] The criminal nature of Verres' actions would appear to be that he forced communities and individuals to allocate large sums for this purpose. It is also possible that the decree authorizing the construction of a statue out of public funds became a pretext for Verres to act officially. That is, he could then legally collect the money and, in doing so, also siphon off a percentage for his personal use. Here the title of *patronus* may have helped, for in reference to a later period, Dio acknowledges that patrons were easily able to extort decrees from communities.[82] Verres' offense, Cicero argues, was not simply that he committed extortion, though this was a criminal act, but it was also an insult to Roman tradition and values on two grounds. First, such honors and titles should be conferred

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[81] 2, 2.147, cf. 2, 4.148. The implications are discussed in Ch. 6.

[82] Dio, 56, 25.6. Note that what Cicero says in pro Sestio: *non recito decretum officio aliquo expressum vicinitatis aut clientelae aut hospitii publici aut ambitionis aut commendationis gratia …*

voluntarily and, second, they should not diminish the honors of others in a flagrant way.

Closely connected to the use of statues in order to commemorate *patrocinium*, is the use of inscriptions. There is, of course some overlap; statues had bases on which were recorded at least the names of the party honored and of the party dedicating the monument and, frequently, also the reasons for the dedication. Another group of inscriptions, like the *tabulae patronatus*, were displayed on public buildings of various kinds as well as in private houses and some of these incorporated portraits.[83]

Cicero refers on several occasions to the connection between statues and inscriptions: *huic* (*Verres*) *etiam Romae videmus in basi statuarum maximis litteris incisum 'a communi Siciliae datas'*.[84] And, somewhat later, in speaking directly to Verres, he notes: *statuae illae, quas … poni inscribique iussisti* (2, 2.167). In these two cases, the inscriptions seem to record only the minimum, namely the name of the person honored and of the donor. It is not clear whether Cicero is translating the dedication of the first document into Latin, but the location, namely at Rome, suggests that the original text may have been in Latin.[85]

In two places, Cicero notes that the inscription employed was a *tabula aenea*. In the first case, the reference is to Sthenius, *cuius de meritis in rem publicam Thermitanorum Siculosque universos fuit aenea tabula fixa Thermis in curia, in qua publice erat de huius beneficiis scriptum et incisum* (2, 2.112). This is very close, in language and in form, to the kind of document widely used in the Principate and illustrates how useful such documents could be in court.[86] In the second case, Cicero notes that the decree extending him *hospitium publicum* was recorded on bronze: *id* (the decree) *non modo tum scripserunt verum etiam in aere incisum nobis tradiderunt* (2, 4.145).

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83 Nicols, *Tabulae patronatus*, and more generally, A. Wallace-Hadrill, The Social Structure of the Roman House, *PBSR* 56 (1988)42 ff. Aspects of the problem are also discussed in Ch. 6.2, and more generally in Chs. 7 and 8.

84 2, 2.254, cf. *statuae Romae stant inauratae, a communi Siciliae, quem ad modum inscriptum videmus, datae*, 2, 2.114.

85 There is no way to resolve this question as Cicero clearly translates the Greek on some occasions. In Sicily, however, we can be reasonably confident that Greek was the language of the inscriptions. This may be deduced from the example cited in an earlier footnote in which Verres appears as *soter* of the island. *IGR* 1, 61 and 62 are nearly contemporary bi-lingual inscriptions found in Rome.

86 E.g., *CIL* 9, 3429. More examples are provided in Ch. 6.2 and illustrations may be found on the Campanion Web Site = CWS. It is not clear to what extent bronze was used for these purposes in this period.

In sum, there can be no question that statues and inscriptions honored *patroni, hospites* and *necessarii* of a community. Though there is no evidence that a statue of every *patronus civitatis* stood in the forum of the client or that every *hospes publicus* received a *tabula aenea*, some token recording the event was certainly prepared and those mentioned here, in stone and on bronze, may well have been the most common. It is significant that these items were set up not only in the community and in the atrium of the honored, but also in public places at Rome: … *Romae videmus in basi statuarum* (note the plural) *maximis litteris incisum* (2, 2.154; Plin. *NH* 34, 30). Such items were the material evidence of the power of the senator and of the influence of the community. Finally, the presence of such monuments especially at Rome, conveyed the perception of provincial clientele even if the monuments did not specifically refer to that fact.[87]

5.4.2. Laudationes *and* Legationes

Another frequently practiced and concrete manifestation of the relationship of *patrocinium publicum* is that of the eulogy or *laudatio*. The formula employed for this expression is *laudare publice* (e.g., *publice laudat*, 2, 2.114; *si te publice laudarent*, 2, 2.115), that is, the praise is authorized by some public body, in this case by a community.[88] Generally, this sanction must have been in the form of a decree that was entered in the public records. It is interesting to note in this respect, that Cicero does call the decree of the Syracusan boulé *illud legationes*.[89] The orator also has much to say about the Syracusan decree in honor of Verres: Some time before Cicero's arrival in the city, Verres had requested a *laudatio*, but nothing had been decreed (*nihil esse decretum*, 2, 4.14). Eventually the governor, L. Metellus, intervened and ordered the boulé to pass the appropriate resolution (*imperasse eum qui summam potestam haberet ut decernerent*, 2, 4.141). This intervention is not unparalleled, the Syracusans had earlier been anxious to provide Sex. Peducaeus with such a *laudatio* when they learned that Peducaeus had been indicted for extortion by his enemies, but Verres, then governor, had forbidden a resolution to that effect. These two episodes indicate that it was not unusual

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[87] For examples of monuments found at Rome that specifically connect governors and patronage, not the cases of Aelius Lamia, *AE* 1948, 93, and a certain Rufus, *CIL* 6, 1508. Both individuals appear on monumental inscriptions and, at least in the latter case, had become patron of at least six provincial communities. Eck, Öffentlichkeit, text at note 4.

[88] For example, the Mamertines, 2, 2.114 and 4.14. Note also Cic. *de div*. 1, 41.90: *hospes et laudator*.

[89] 2, 2.149. Note, again, the Latin translation of a Greek institution.

to request such eulogies and, additionally, that governors were prepared to intervene in such matters.[90] Although most of the examples of *laudationes* in these speeches involve Roman administrators, Cicero does mention such public testimonials for at least one provincial, namely, for Sthenius: *hunc civitates ex Sicilia permultae ... publice laudant*.[91]

The relationship between *laudatio* and *patrocinium* is not stated directly, but the former surely represented a significant potential benefit for the patron. Cicero points out in this respect how absurd it is that Verres, *omnium Siculorum patronum*, is eulogized by only one community. Indeed, *beneficia* conferred represent the raw material of any eulogy: *eum* (*Peducaeus*) *publice pro plurimis eius et maximis meritis laudare cuperant* (2, 4.142). This sentiment is frequently expressed in *tabulae patronatus* recording the cooptation of a patron.[92] The *laudatio*, then, belongs to the paraphernalia of patronage.

Eulogies or *laudationes*, once decreed, might be delivered in Rome by a legation appointed for that purpose. For example, when Messana sent a legation to eulogize Verres at his trial (*istum publice laudat*), the council appointed Heius, the *primus civitatis* to lead it and to speak on Verres' behalf: *princeps legationis quae ad istum* (*Verres*) *laudandum missa est* (2, 4.15; cf. 2, 5.47). It is not clear that this was always the case. The Syracusans authorized eulogies for Peducaeus and for Verres, but no *legatio* appeared at Rome to testify for either. Admittedly, all the circumstances surrounding these two episodes are not known, but there is no reason to believe that every honorary decree mandated a legation to Rome.[93] In sum, the examples cited here involve *laudationes* to be delivered in court on behalf of former magistrates who had been accused under the extortion laws. Indeed, they became a standard part of the defense.[94]

Just as *legationes* could come to testify on behalf of a former governor, so too could they initiate charges against him. In this oration, Cicero describes the process. First, representatives of the community or communities would approach their patrons, personal or communal, and explain what exactly they wished to have done (2, 2.103, 2, 3.45). It is noteworthy that, when Cicero describes these embassies, he employs the less formal title of *conventus*.

90 This was not the case in the Principate, cf. Tac. *ann.* 15, 20 and Ch. 6.

91 2, 2.114. For other honors for Sthenius, see 2, 2.112.

92 Cf. *CIL* 8, 10525, 3, 296, 2, 1054. For more on this subject, see Harmand, 357–358, and Ch. 6.2.2 here.

93 On the frequency, cost and legislation concerning legations, see Liebenam, 82 ff., and Ch. 6.

94 Verres could find only one of the usual ten (2, 5.57); see Greenidge, *Legal Procedure*, 491.

The use of this term suggests that the communities, in order to test the willingness of their patrons and *necessarii* to undertake the prosecution, sent groups of their citizens to explain the issue at an informal and non-binding level. In doing so they recognized that their patrons and protectors were reluctant to take their clients' complaints to court, that they preferred to resolve the problem without an open confrontation. The *necessarii* and the *conventus* played an important role in these informal proceedings.[95]

After agreement had been reached among the provincials and their supporters at Rome, the matter could be laid before the consuls and the Senate and the legal machinery of prosecution would be initiated. Only then were *legationes* officially sent to Cicero to ask for his *auxilium* and *praesidium* against Verres and only then was formal evidence brought to Rome (2, 4.138; cf. 2, 3.74). Here too, the *legatio* had another function beyond that of providing character references, pro or contra. Cicero's activities in collecting, editing and presenting the evidence against Verres were surely crucial, but the orator does acknowledge on several occasions that members of these *legationes* had been instrumental in securing the necessary documentation of Verres' crimes.[96]

Provincial embassies, whether the informal *conventus* or the formally designated *legatio*, had responsibilities beyond the praise and vilification of magistrates. *Tota Sicilia* (i.e., "many communities") denounced the treatment of Sthenius, a provincial, and had sent *legationes* to eulogize him publicly at Rome (2, 2.103; 114). Official legations were also sent to request the enactment of laws (2, 2.103; 146) and to petition Roman officials to take particular actions (*div. in Caec.* 14; *Verr.* 2, 2.10; 4, 138). Moreover, what is consistent with the restrictions mentioned above for eulogies, so too did governors often intervene in municipal affairs in order to secure or to prevent the approval of a resolution authorizing a legation.[97] Indeed, this last fact illustrates nicely the importance attached to such events.

Laudationes and *legationes* (or *conventus*) from provincial communities are closely connected to the institutions of *patrocinium* and *hospitium*.

[95] Again, it should be noted that the visits of such embassies to prominent Romans suggested that a clientelistic relationship existed even if no formal agreement had been made.

[96] 2, 2.161, 2, 3.74, 83–87, 106; 4, 139. On *testimonia publica*, see Greenidge, *Legal Procedure*, 489–491.

[97] Note the warning: *minari Siculis si decrevissent legationes quae contra istum dicerent, minari si qui essent profecti, aliis si laudarent benignissime promittere, gravissimos privatarum rerum testis, quibus nos praesentibus denuntiavimus, eas vi custodiisque retinere*, 2, 2.12. Cf. 2, 2.164.

In the *Verrines*, both were most prominently used by the provincials in the extortion court at Rome to obtain retribution from their enemies and to support their friends. Indeed, the appropriate speeches could be produced by different *legationes* for both the prosecution and the defense in the same case. Behind these dramatic appearances in court, it is manifest that relationships of *necessitudo*, *patrocinium* and *hospitium*, *privatum* and *publicum*, provided the means by which both provincials and ex-governors might defend their property and enhance their reputations, respectively.

In some cases, these statues, inscriptions, and legations may represent nothing more than attempts to disguise extortion (e.g., 2, 2.167–168); in others they represent expressions of legitimate feelings of gratitude toward a particular benefactor.[98] The *tabula aenea* at Thermae attesting the liberality of Sthenius toward his *patria* and toward all Sicilians was a legitmate *monumentum beneficiorum*; its destruction could also be cited by Cicero in court in order to illustrate the malevolence of Verres toward prominent provincials (2, 2.112) and to warn others of the danger of taking Verres as a model for behavior. The numerous Sicilian honors for the Marcelli secured the continuing good-will of the latter and warned potential exploiters that they (the Sicilians) enjoyed powerful protection. Communities were also prepared to provide *laudationes* for an ex-magistrate who, having once shown the provincials a measure of *benevolentia*, now found himself under attack by his enemies (2, 4.143). Verres, as Cicero notes, was well aware that these devices might disguise extortions and disarm his enemies; they could also suggest the existence of clientele.

5.5. *Conclusions*

The Verrines offer an abundance of *exempla malefiorum* in respect to patronage. Verres himself systematically robbed his clients and guest-friends and then used the honorable aspects of the relationships to cover his crimes. Moreover, the other patrons of communities and of individuals appear to have neglected their *officia*, and / or to have been ineffective at protecting their clients' interests. Indeed, during the trial some were active for the

[98] It is not usually possible to know which motive was most important, but consider Cic. *ad Q. fr.* 1, 31 and 2,2. In the first case Cicero stress that honors encourage one to govern responsibly; in the second, the interests and safety of rulers is said to depend on what others say about them.

defense while others remained silent. It is hardly a surprise then that scholars have questioned the effectiveness of the institution.

This judgment is too harsh. There are also numerous *exempla beneficiorum* in the *Verrines*. The Roman public and elite, when confronted with the evidence, abandoned Verres. Cicero proved himself to be an effective defender of his clients. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that at least some of the traditional patrons of the island preferred to act informally for their clients; admittedly it is extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness of their efforts. Two considerations suggest that, for example, the Claudii Marcelli had not abandoned their clients. First, Cicero records episodes in which they and others attempted to restrain Verres informally. Second, he never intimates that the Marcelli supported Verres or had failed to do their duty by their clients, something he does not hesitate to do with others. This strategy of informal mediation certainly appealed to the Marcelli and other noble families because it avoided the unpleasant confrontations of public trials. It suggests moreover that the role of the patron was to negotiate between exploiters and exploited, to find a level of "taxation" that was acceptable to the governors and tolerable to the governed. Third, if individuals and communities were systematically disappointed, they would not have continued to seek patrons or appealed to them for protection. The readiness to initiate a prosecution demonstrates that the system worked to a reasonable degree.

Though Cicero is here primarily concerned with the manner in which Verres abused and exploited his legal (as governor) and his extra-legal (as *patronus* and *hospes*) position, he also describes, by way of contrast, the manner in which the *officia* of these institutions might be honorably met. *Patrocinium* and *hospitium* provide for mutual protection (*praesidium*) and assistance (*auxilium*) in an extra-legal context. For a member of the Roman governing class, *clientes* and *hospites* provided for the physical comforts of himself and his staff while circulating through the province and, as members of his *consilium*, were advisors, agents and sources of information on local conditions and problems. Moreover, they provided, on the appropriate occasion, protection in the form of testimonials and eulogies and, through their numbers and visibility, constituted an important measure of his reputation and power. For the provincials, the Roman patron or *hospes* served as an arbitrator of their internal disputes, as a guarantor of their safety and fortunes, as their mediator with the central government, as a promoter of individual and collective interests and, finally, as a visible symbol of their influence and reputation.

Each of the 65 *civitates* of Sicily could probably reckon at least one protector, *patronus* (*publice* or *privatim*), and/or *prostates* among its *neces-*

sarii. Cicero indicates, however, that communities generally selected their patrons and protectors from a small number of families with well-established ties to the island. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the incidence of formal patronage was at this time still quite low in comparison to the norms of the very late Republic and Principate.

To accept the *patrocinium* of a community meant that the patron assumed a formal and public responsibility for the welfare of the community. The position demanded considerable *tempus*, *valetudo* and *facultas* (*Div in Caec*. 16) and could lead to embarrassments and *inimicitiae*. Hence, many Romans may have been not only quite content to avoid the honor and to receive instead the equally prestigious but unconditional honors awarded by Greek cities (e.g., to be honored as *theos*, *soter, euergetes*, etc.).

The presence of guest-friends and legations, of inscriptions and statues erected at Rome to honor prominent senators served to encourage the perceptions of an extensive clientele even if a formal one did not exist. Indeed informal patronage might even have been preferable for it brought all the advantages and none of the limitations of formal patronage—as Pompeius may well have understood.

In sum, clients hoped that formal patronage and associated honors would induce members of the Roman elite to respect their interests. It is not so critical that a client succeeded or failed to manipulate a patron in any one case. Given the complex nature of the ties among the Roman nobility, conflicts of interest must have been frequent and unavoidable. Hence, true protection could only be secured by having a number of patrons (and *necessarii*). The longer provincials were in contact with Romans the greater the number of opportunities they had, individually and collectively, to enter such relationships.

CHAPTER SIX

CIVIC PATRONAGE IN ROMAN LAW

In AD 11–12, Dio reports in vague terms that Augustus forbade peregrine communities to confer public honors on their governors.[1] Though the motivation for the reform is not mentioned by the historian, it is probable that the emperor had determined to regulate more closely the formal connections between peregrine communities and their governors. Specifically, the relationships should not be conditioned by the award of public honors. The epigraphical record indicates not only that the regulation covered a wide variety of honors (including *patrocinium publicum*), but also that it was respected to some degree at least through the reign of Trajan. As will be demonstrated below, the legal changes represent one aspect of a more general attempt to re-define the expectations and rituals associated with connections like that of civic patronage.

The legal evidence for the regulation of *patrocinium publicum* falls into three categories. First, there is the literary evidence including statements in the works of Cicero, Dio, Pliny, and Tacitus that refer to edicts and *consulta*. The language is, unfortunately, often obscure and usually imprecise. Second, there is the epigraphical evidence including:

- actual municipal charters which define how a patron is to be coopted (e. g., c. 61 of *Lex Malacitana*)
- contracts and decrees involving client communities and their patrons (e.g., *tabulae patronatus*)
- deductions made from patterns in epigraphical evidence, patterns which suggest that some kind of general regulation existed.

The legal evidence is central to our understanding of the working of patronage and not merely because it demonstrates its continuing importance. It is in large part through these charters and imperial decrees that Augustus and his successors channeled the energies and ambitions of the elite into activities that enhanced the cities of the empire and did so without generating

[1] The date of the edict is not certain. Eilers believes it must be 11, but the other events in this section of Dio (quoted below) do not lend themselves to precision.

a threat to the cities themselves or to the Princeps. In a very real sense, the evidence discussed here represents the means by which Augustus promoted urbanization and did so altering the expectations associated with civic benefaction and patronage. The dynasts of the Late Republic had attempted to use clients to fight their wars in the forum and on the field of battle; Augustus, to judge by his actions, hoped to restructure the expectations of the local and imperial elites to serve the needs of the empire. To secure that goal, he also had to provide the members of the elite with appropriate (but non-threatening) opportunities to distinguish themselves.

Because municipal patronage is closely associated with the conferral of other public honors (e.g., as may be seen in the CWS, over 70% of the epigraphical references to *patrocinium publicum* occur on statue bases and similar monuments) and because the literary evidence is not specific about what precisely is being regulated, it is essential, to consider *patrocinium publicum* in the context of the regulation of other public honors.

Of the many honors conferred by communities, *patrocinium publicum* occupies a special place in Roman law. Other public honors, like statues and their placement, may have been funded and authorized by municipal decrees (*pecunia publica* and *locus datus decreto decurionum* are but two of the many *formulae* employed for this purpose), but their allocation is not specifically regulated in the charters. The very fact that the adoption of patrons was specifically mentioned in the Julian and in the Flavian municipal charters demonstrates the continuing political sensitivity of the institution well into the Principate. We are not working with a formality as innocuous as extending the 'keys of the city' (as one commentator writes).

6.1. *The Regulations of the Central Government*

That honorary monuments and indeed monuments in a variety of forms and materials (stone, metal, wood) stood on the *fora* and public places of the cities of the Roman Empire is well known.[2] The purpose of these dedications to beings both human and divine is immediately apparent: The communities used the monuments to memorialize individual and collective achieve-

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[2] On these divisions, see J.E. Sandys, *Latin Epigraphy*[2] Cambridge, 1922, 94ff. On the appearance of the Forum Romanum, Paul Zanker, *Forum Romanum: Die Neugestaltung durch Augustus*. (Tübingen, 1972); G. Lahusen, *Untersuchungen zur Ehrenstatue in Rom: literarische und epigraphische Zeugnisse*. (Rome, 1983), esp. pp. 85–96 and K. Tuchelt, *Frühe Denkmäler Roms in Kleinasien, 1* = Istanbuler Mitteil. Beiheft 23, Tübingen, 1979, W. Eck, *Senatorial Self-representation*.

ments or, more practically, they used the honors to reward or encourage benefaction, to ensure the good will of the powerful, and to notify potential exploiters that they, the communities, enjoyed a measure of protection.

This practice was already widely accepted in the second century, BC. Pliny the Elder writes:

> *L. Piso prodidit M. Aemilio C. Popilio iterum cos (158B.C.) a censoribus P. Cornelio Scipione M. Popilio statuas circa forum eorum qui magistratum gesserant sublatas omnis praeter eas quae populi aut senatus sententia statutae essent (h. n.* 34, 30; cf. 34, 4.9).

During the 2nd Century, BC, official and unofficial monuments were erected on the Forum. Whether it was legally possible in the Late Republic for private parties or foreign communities to place monuments in public places without the permission of the Senate is uncertain, the evidence indicates, however, that it did happen.[3] What is important for this investigation is that already in the Middle Republic the Senate and People authorized public honors and regulated their allocation.

The epigraphical and literary sources of the Late Republic describe a wide variety of public honors conferred by communities on Roman senators and occasionally also on members of the equestrian order. These include statues, *laudationes* (also: *apud senatum*), legations, *hospitium/proxenia* and *patrocinium*.[4] The fact that they were official is confirmed by a variety of formulae, for example by the abbreviations *d.d.* (*decreto decurionum*), *p.p.* (*pecunia publica*) or *l.d.d.d.* (*locus datus decreto decurionum*). It has already been demonstrated how the collection of public honors served to enhance an individual's reputation and to legitimize his *auctoritas* (Chs. 2, 3 and 4). Because these honors also served as a convenient cover for exploitation and because there was a close connection between recognition and power it is hardly surprising that the extension of honors was abused by both parties and that the Romans eventually found it necessary to regulate the manner in which the honors were conferred.[5]

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[3] On the monuments, Mommsen, *Staatsr.* 2, 437, and Eck, *Senatorial Self-representation*, who notes that triumphs and public buildings required senatorial permission. It is not clear whether the statues businessmen and farmers set up at Rome in honor of Verres were officially allowed, Cic. *Verr* 2, 2.150, 168. Those statues that were set up with the consent of the senate or the approval of the people would surely have mentioned the authority. G. Lahusen, *Untersuchungen zur Ehrenstatue in Rom.* (Rome, 1983), 88 ff.

[4] On the forms, Liebenam, 121 ff.; 379, Lahusen, op cit., and Ch. 5.1.

[5] These issues are discussed in the previous chapter. Also: M. Gelzer, "Die Nobilität der römischen Republik," in *Kleine Schriften 1*, (Wiesbaden 1962), 89 ff., E. Badian, *Foreign*

6.1.1. *The Request of the Sicilians in 70 BC*

After the events of 158 BC, the next known attempt to direct how communities awarded public honors may be found in Cicero's *Verrines*. Among other memorable events, the orator describes a *novum*:

> *Primum igitur in hanc rem testem totam Siciliam citabo, quae mihi una voce statuarum nomine magnam pecuniam per vim coactam esse demonstrat. Nam legationes omnium civitatum in postulatis communibus, quae fere omnia ex tuis iniuriis nata sunt, etiam hoc ediderunt, 'ut statuas ne cui, nisi cum is de provincia decessisset, pollicerentur'.*[6]

The traditional honors and statues which communities had decreed for their governors in gratitude and at their own cost, had, in the hands of Verres, become the vehicles of extortion; so the Sicilians claimed. For this reason they have requested of the Senate, and for their own protection, that they should be legally forbidden to allocate such honors for their governors. Few other statements about Roman administration express the contrast between ideology and reality with such clarity. It is hardly surprising that a similar formulation finds a place in the municipal charters discussed below.

Although this request is expressly concerned with the erection of statues, Cicero, like the later legislation, does make a close connection between this element and other honors like patronage. At the end of the citation given above, he notes:

> *Etenim sic C. Verrem praeturam in Sicilia gessisse constat ut, cum utrisque satis facere non posset, et Siculis et togatis, officii potius in socios quam ambitionis in civis rationem duxerit. Itaque eum non solum* ***'patronum' istius insulae*** *sed etiam 'sotera' inscriptum vidi Syracusis.*[7]

Clientelae, 264–70 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), cc. 1 and 7, P.A. Brunt, "Charges of Provincial Maladministration in the Early Principate," *Historia* 10 (1961): 189 ff., and J. Deininger, *Die Provinziallandtag der römischen Kaiserzeit. Vestigia* 6 (1965), Munich. and I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*. (Bruxelles, 1975), 82, 86.

[6] 2, 2.59, 146. "In the first place I will call the whole of Sicily as a witness to this fact, her united voice demonstrates the forcible collection of a great sum of money for the nominal purpose of these statues. The embassies of all her cities in that general petition, nearly all of whose clauses have their origin in your injurius actions, make this claim that 'they not be allowed to promise statues to anyone unless that person has already left the province.'" The context is discussed in Ch. 5.1 and below in this chapter.

[7] 2, 2.63, 154. "It is surely well understood that Verres, governor of Sicily, finding it impossible to satisfy both parties, Sicilians and Romans, let his actions be directed rather by his sense of duty toward our allies than by his desire for the goodwill of our own citizens. That is why an inscription which I have seen in Syracuse describes him not merely as *patronus* of the island, but also as its *soter*." The combination of the divine '*soter*' with the human '*patronus*'

Though the request was made specifically to respond to the excesses of Verres, it is apparent that the problem was widespread. Indeed, Cicero later describes how frequent, expensive and burdensome these honors had become (*ad Att.* 5, 21; *ad Q. f.* 1, 1.26). It is then no coincidence that the earliest surviving epigraphical references to patronage and associated honors belong to this period.[8]

These episodes are important for two reasons. First, they demonstrate that down to 70 BC, there was no formal regulation that limited in any way the freedom of the allies to confer public honors on their Roman governors. Second, and the most important and enduring aspect of the Sicilian request, is its language, namely that the subjects should be forbidden to extend honors to current governors. This notion is frequently repeated in subsequent legislation.

6.1.2. *The* 'lex Julia repetundarum' *of 59 BC*

The *lex Julia repetundarum* of the year 59 BC is the first known attempt to provide a legal solution for the problem raised by the Sicilians. The relevant text here survives on a papyrus fragment among other writings of the jurist, Paul.[9] Section 2 reads:

> *Lege repetundarum tenetur quicumque in curia vel concilio auctor fuerit honoribus praesidi comitibusque eius decernendis decretumve super ea re fecerit faciendumve curaverit.*

There are a number of problems with this passage. First, neither the words *curia* for municipal council nor *praeses* for governor correspond to the legal language of the Late Republic, indeed, they only begin to be so used in the 2nd century, AD.[10] Second, it is not clear what the excerpter understood

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is, of course, attested in the Greek speaking parts of the empire. The Claudii Marcelli received similar or even the identical honors in Sicily (Cic. *in Verr.* 2, 2.21, 50–51 and 63, 154. Cf. *IGRR* 4, 305). On the connection between statues and civic patronage, G. Lahusen, *Untersuchungen zur Ehrenstatuen in römischen literarischen und epigraphischen Zeugnissen*, Rome, 1983.

[8] In the East, epigraphical references to civic patronage of Romans senators can be dated back well into the 2nd Century BC, the incidence of such attestations increases rapidly in the 1st Century, G. Chiranky, "Rome and Cotys," *Atheneum* 60 (1982): 473 ff. and J. Touloumakos, "Gemeindepatronat," *Hermes* 116 (1988): 304 ff. The data on the 1st Century is summarized in Ch. 2. The earliest cases in the West are ILLRP 364, 523. The close connection between patronage and statues in the Late Roman Republic is developed more fully by Lahusen, 84 ff.

[9] G. Archi, *Pauli Sententiarum: Fragmentum Leidense* (*Cod. Leid. B.P.L. 2589*), ed. G. Leiden, 1957.

[10] E. Levy, "Zur quellengeschichtlicher Bedeutung des Fragmentum Leidense" op. cit.

under *concilium*. If he is preserving the Caesarian sense, then the *concilium* would refer to the traditional *koina* of Hellenistic Greece and not to the later provincial *koina* of the developed Principate.[11] Third, this text appears to include all communities, citizen and peregrine; the Augustan regulation, in contrast, only involved peregrine communities. Fourth (as Brunt argues), if this regulation belongs to the *lex Julia*, Tacitus would surely have referred to it in the 'appropriate' place in his *Annales*, but does not do so.[12]

These considerations are weighty but not compelling. The fragment expressly states that § 2 is drawn from a *lex repetundarum* and § 7 expressly mentions the *lex Julia repetundarum*. Scholars have also identified a number of other connections between items of the fragment and what otherwise survives of the Julian law. Levy notes that the style and content of the citation more closely reflect the conditions of the Late Republic and, therefore, concludes that the author of these *sententiae* must have excerpted this fragment and employed words appropriate to his own period.[13] Moreover, one chapter of what was a later Julian regulation, the charter of Urso, has essentially the same contents; namely, a governor may not accept public honors during his term of office (discussed below). Finally, the silence of Tacitus on this regulation should not be overemphasized. In this connection, the historian also fails to mention the edict of Augustus of AD 11–12 (discussed below). There is then no compelling reason to abandon the late republican date; in this case *praeses* stands for the republican pro-magistrate, *curia* for the local senate and *concilium* for the Hellenistic *koinon* (and not the later provincial assembly).

The intention of the law is apparent. He who himself or through others secures honors from the *curia* or *concilium* for the governor or his companions may be prosecuted. The significant element here is that both communities now find their freedom to pass honorary decrees has been limited. In comparison to other regulations it is the most all-encompassing formulation of the official attitude governing the allocation of honors for governors.

Though Cicero praises this law with its 101 sections (*ad fam.* 8, 8.3), it is apparent that a number of its provisions were not enforced or enforce-

72–74, and n. 10. Levy believes (p. 64) that the *curia* referred to here is actually 'die Sektion der Bürgerversammlung in der der einzelne seine Meinung abgab und stimmte.' As the municipal charters always speak of *decreta decurionum*, it is my opinion that *curia* refers rather to the *ordo decurionum* and will be so employed in this chapter.

[11] On the survivals, Deininger and provincial patrons.

[12] Brunt, 198, 216.

[13] Levy, 61–62, 66.

able during the Late Republic. There is, for example, no indication in the epigraphical evidence that peregrine communities ceased to honor their governors or that anyone was prosecuted under this provision of the law.[14] It should not surprise then that subsequent legislation on the regulation of public honors was also not consistently enforced.

6.1.3. *Augustan Legislation of* AD *11*

Cassius Dio, in brief summary of the events of AD 11/12 writes that Augustus was concerned about how unscrupulous governors might abuse the public honors they had received from peregrine communities. Indeed, the concern was apparently sufficient to cause him to issue a regulating edict.[15]

> He (Augustus) also issued a proclamation (*prospareggeile*) to the subject nations (*hupekooi*) forbidding them to bestow any honors upon a person assigned to govern (*archontes*) them either during his term of office or within sixty days after his departure; this was because some governors by arranging beforehand for testimonials and eulogies from their subjects were causing much mischief (56, 25.6).

Dio's words are unfortunately very imprecise, but the provisions are very similar to the ones discussed above.[16] Under '*upekooi*' we should understand 'peregrines' including individual provincials, *civitates*, provincial assemblies or any combination thereof. This interpretation is supported by Dio's use of the word at 52, 5.4: Agrippa says, "... it is difficult, when so many enemies beset us round about, to reduce again to slavery the allies and subject nations ('*upekooi*'), some of which have had a democratic government from of old, while others of them have been set free by us ourselves."[17] '*Archontes*'

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14 It would have been a delicious irony for Caesar's opponents to try to prosecute him under his own law. It may be that Caesar himself avoided the use of the formal title in reference to communities precisely because he wished to avoid prosecution. This problem is discussed in Ch. 2.3.

15 The edict may have been intended to give new force to the older provision of the *lex Julia repetundum*, Nicols, Verleihung, op. cit., 246.

16 P. Garnsey, *Social Status and Legal Privilege*. (Oxford, 1970), 112, n. 5, referring to similar problems at the beginning of the next chapter in Dio, notes: 'Perhaps we have before us an amalgam of regulations issued at several times, and tied only loosely to A.D. 12.' These might have included the *SC de Cyranaeis* (or more accurately, *de iudicio repetundarum*) of AD 4, which did regulate some aspects of provincial administration. None of the known provisions, however, indicate an interest in the conferral of public honors, *RE* Suppl. 6, 809, with literature.

17 Translated by E. Cary for Loeb Classical Library. Other examples: 52, 27.1 and 30.1. On *upekooi*, see also D. Nörr, *Imperium und Polis in hohen Prinzipatzeit = Münchener Beiträge zur*

is equally vague in that it might refer to proconsuls as well as to legates of Augustus. But, as the number of procuratorial/equestrian governors was still minimal in this period,[18] it is reasonable to conclude that the governors in question were of senatorial rank. This interpretation is confirmed by the *lex Ursonensis* (discussed below). The sense of the regulation is then that senatorial governors should not receive honors from the peregrine communities they governed. Moreover, it was not necessary to include citizen communities because their municipal charters already included specific guidelines governing the allocation of at least some honors like *patrocinium* and *hospitium*.[19] The very fact that both citizen and peregrine communities were subject to different forms of regulation indicates how great the gap was between the two groups and how important civic patronage was considered to be. The fact that Augustus chose to issue an edict regulating what was already in the *Lex Julia* suggests again that the earlier legislation was not effective as it might have been, and also that the problem persisted.

Equally inexact is the key word '*prospareggeile*'. Brunt understands it as something like 'he secured a *senatus consultum*.' Mason notes that '*paraggelma*' does often stand loosely for 'edict', which seems to be close to what Dio suggests.[20]

What honors did Augustus have in mind? Though Dio specifically mentions only testimonials and eulogies, honors which would require the attention of other emperors, the context and the epigraphical record suggest that Augustus may also have been concerned about more general problems of provincial maladministration and the competition for those public honors that he felt defined his own position.[21]

If Augustus believed that maladministration would cease with the restoration peace and of the forms of constitutional government, he was disappointed and eventually had to take formal action to curb the behavior

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Papyrusf. und Rechtsges. No. 50, Munich, 1966, and B.M. Levick, *Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor*. (Oxford, 1967), 73, 79, and *JRS* 2 (1912): 86, No. 5.

18 Eck, Augustus' administrative Reformen, 116 ff.

19 *Lex Ursonensis*, cc. 97 and 130 and the *lex Malacitana*, c. 61. On the latter, J. Gonzáles, "Lex Irnitana", *JRS* 76 (1986): 218, with recent literature.

20 P.A. Brunt, "Charges of Provincial Maladministration in the Early Principate", *Historia* 10 (1961): 216. H.H. Mason, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions*. (Toronto, 1974): 128, stresses that *paragglema* has no technical meaning, but see Presigke, *Wörterbuch*, for examples: = "Erlaß des Königs" *PLond.* 904.36, "kaiserl. Edikt" *POx.* 1411.8, "Verordnung des Statthalters" *PHib* 78.19.

21 I have discussed this problem more fully in "Verleihung öffentlicher Ehrungen" and in "Patrons of Greek Cities".

of abusive magistrates.[22] For example: A *Senatus Consultum* of AD 4 had reformed the courts established to hear provincial complaints; there is, however, no indication that it also dealt with the award of public honors. Some years later, L. Valerius Messalla Volesus had been prosecuted and convicted for crimes committed as governor of Asia in about AD 10–11. Several authors stress that the case was notorious, and that Augustus wrote a letter (*libellus*) to the Senate condemning Messalla. Tiberius subsequently referred to this letter at the trial of another governor of Asia, C. (Junius) Silanus.[23] Hence, though Dio does not discuss the case in any detail, and does not make any connection between the trial and the Edict of 11–12, the temporal proximity of the two events suggests that the two may be related.[24]

There were however more general considerations that may have led Augustus to take this step. Titles like *soter*, *ktistes* and *theos* challenged the uniqueness of his own achievement and could not be allowed to senators. Agrippa's readiness to decline certain honors may have helped to set the tone and to ease the transition.[25] Of the traditional honors, only that of *euergetes* survived for general use. Bowersock suggests that the latter was permitted, because it indicated actual gift and because the implications of superhuman achievement were not as strong. Moreover, in terms of performance, it tended to be more retrospective than prospective. It is also possible that the title may have been so over-used that it had no viable political implications, that it had been reduced to the same tedious level as the *statua pedestris*.[26] Though *patrocinium*, as an import, was not a standard Hellenistic honor, it had been frequently extended to Roman magistrates during the Late Republic. Augustus, in issuing his edict, appears to be acting in accordance with well-established trends about public honors for serving magistrates. Civic patronage, a distinctly Roman institution, appears to have

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22 There are numerous parallels for this pattern, in general, Eck, *Admistrative Reformen*.

23 On Valerius Messalla, *PIR*[1] V 96; Hanslik, *RE* 8A, 170 f. The governorship was notorious for his cruelty, Sen. *de ira*, 3, 5.5. On the trial of Silanus, Tac. *Ann.* 3, 68; on his career, *PIR*[2] J 825. E. Varinlioglu, "Inscriften von Stratonikeia," in Carien, *EA* 12 (1988): 93, reports the discovery of a new inscription which proclaims a Silanus to be patron and *euergetes* of the city. If the inscription is imperial, as the author suggests, then we may have a direct link between the illegal use of the title and a prosecution. More likely the Silanus in question is the consul of 25 BC, who was, as Syme (*The Augustan Aristocracy*. Oxford, Claredon Press, 1968, 191) has suggested, proconsul in the teens. The text has not, however, been published.

24 The dates of governorship, edict and trial are not clear. The trial probably took place after the edict.

25 On his role in this respect, Eck, Senatorial self-representation, 139.

26 On the *euergeteia*, Bowersock, Augustus, 119. On the *statua pedestris*, Eck, id., 145–146.

been one of those honors that Augustus concluded was inappropriate for peregrine communities.[27]

If *patrocinium publicum* was understood to be covered in this edict (and in related legistlation), we would expect to see a particular pattern in the evidence. Specifically, those cases of formal civic patronage communities in the Greek speaking East after 11/12 should involve:

- patrons who were not senatorial governors in the province of the client community, or
- clients who were citizen communities.

With the exception of the Bithynia and Lepcis Magna (discussed below), this is indeed, the pattern in the evidence.

The epigraphical data suggests that regulation may have gone further than Dio reports. By implication Augustus allowed peregrine communities to select patrons from senators who were not their current governors. Nevertheless, peregrine communities only very rarely took advantage of this opportunity to acquire senatorial patrons and when they did so, their choice was limited to those who either had property or extensive contacts (through marriage, residence, or origin) with the community independent of their administrative experience. That they did not do so suggests that they (the communities) were particularly interested in short-term, administrative benefactions and, conversely, expected little in this respect from their former governors. Expectations as articulated by Q. Oppius and Caesar (Representative Texts, J and K) have indeed changed by this time.

There are other patterns in the evidence on public honors that are consistent with the case made for *patrocinium*.

- Nock and Bowersock have collected the data on the use of *soter*, a title that was frequently applied to Roman governors in the Republican and Augustan periods. After AD 11/12 and for the next century, we no longer find such cases, despite the fact that the title continued to be given to non-senatorial easterners.[28]

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[27] Cf. Ch. 3.3 and 3.4. It may be that Augustus felt that senators should use their resources in support of citizen communities and that the elite of the citizen communities, modeling themselves on the senatorial example, would provide the benefactions for native communities. This subject is discussed in greater detail by Eilers and by Canali de Rossi.

[28] A.D. Nock, "Soter and Euergetes" in *The Joy of Study: Papers presented to F.C. Grant*, (New York, 1951), 127 ff., especially 142–143 = *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Z. Stewart, Cambridge MA, 1972, II 732–733 and Bowersock, op cit., pp. 120–121. There are two cases in which a senator is called *soter* during this period: Julius Quadratus was honored

– I have argued elsewhere, senators do not become patrons of provinces or of their *patriae* in this period.[29]
– Eck's data indicate that peregrine communities did not set up monuments to senators at Rome during this period.[30]
– The last known cult for a governor (C. Marcius Censorinus) in his province dates to about 8 BC, a date that is somewhat earlier than might be predicted by my argument, but not inconsistent with it.[31]
– Though the evidence is incomplete and based on silence, peregrine communities ceased, or so it would appear, to vote statues for senatorial magistrates during this period. This does not mean that statues were not set up, only that private parties carried out the task.[32]

The consistency of these patterns indicates that some kind of legal (or even extra-legal) framework governing public honors may have been implemented late in the Principate of Augustus.[33]

There is, it may be argued, an alternative explanation for this pattern. Could it not be the case that, under the New Order, the peregrine communities did not seek patrons because they recognized that the title, patron, was meaningless?[34] This explanation should be rejected for two reasons. First, cases of senators as patrons of peregrine communities are frequent through the later Republic and early Principate, but cease abruptly in about AD 11/12. Second, the evidence from the *citizen* communities, East and West, and from Bithynia and Lepcis suggests that the communities of the empire did indeed wish to acquire patrons (especially governors) who were in a position to

apparently before he was adlected into the senate and Julius Polemaeanus at the time that he was governing another province. In both cases, the individual had close and long standing ties with the cities involved.

29 For provinces, Nicols "Patrons of Provinces in the Early Empire," "Pliny and the Patronage of Communities," *Hermes* 108 (1980): 365–385, and in Ch. 7.5.1.

30 "Ehrenmonumente" *Chiron* 14 (1984): 212. There are only two for the period in question, one from a citizen community to a senator, L. Cassius Longinus (*AE* 1930, 70; *PIR2* C 350) who apparently did not govern the province (not mentioned in this capacity by Pflaum, *Fast. Narbonen.*, or in *Laterculi*). The other, published by Bartolini, is very fragmentary and the identities of the parties honored and honoring are not clear, nor is the date, *Ep. e ord. sen.*, 1, 615. For the periods before and after there are respectively six and seven secure cases.

31 *Augustus. SEG* 2, 549.

32 Tuchelt has been collecting the evidence for the period, but it is still incomplete.

33 These restrictions on senatorial use of such titles, with the exception of the one on cults, begin to break down, as noted above, in the Trajanic period. The material is discussed more fully in a latter chapter.

34 P. Veyne, *Le pain et le cirque*. (Paris, 1976), 767. writes: "… car le patronat n' est pas une chose, une fonction formelle or informelle; c' est un titre honorifique …"

promote their individual interests. This is not, of course, to say that they were successful in their attempts to manipulate their patron-governor.

It is nonetheless perfectly clear that the provisions of Augustus are very similar to those formalized by Caesar and consistent with the expectations of provincials. Despite some inexactness, one sees that Augustus has merely extended by sixty days the Caesarian principle that governors should not receive public honors from peregrine communities in their jurisdiction.[35]

6.1.4. *The Epigraphical Record*[36]

The epigraphical record is strikingly consistent, first, that Augustus did indeed regulate public honors and, second, that his successors over the next century maintained the same policy with some success. To understand the nature of the Augustan regulation of AD 11/12, it is necessary to review the epigraphical record on civic patronage in the East and West for periods proceeding and subsequent to that date.

Greek inscriptions dating to the Late Republic indicate that many *poleis* claimed formal patrons among the Roman senatorial nobility. Moreover, and hardly surprising, most of these patrons were individuals who, like Lucullus and Pompeius, held special commands in the eastern part of the empire or who were at the very least, like Q. Oppius, governors. There does not appear to be any substantial change in this pattern during the first half of the Principate of Augustus.[37]

In Italy and in the western provinces, the epigraphical record for the Late Republic is, in terms of absolute numbers, still insignificant when compared to what survives in the East and indeed when compared to what survives from the 2nd Century, AD. Nonetheless, civic patronage is frequently attested in Italy and occasionally in the western provinces.

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[35] As will be seen below in the section on the *lex Ursonensis*, it is possible that c. 130 of that municipal charter was added to the original charter at this time in order to make it conform with the Augustan regulation.

[36] This discussion owes much to a lengthy correspondence with Claude Eilers and his conclusion appeared in his *Roman Patrons of Greek Cites*, 161–181. Eilers and I agree on the decline of senatorial patronage in the East, and on the exceptional status of Bithynia, but disagree on the cause.

[37] Cf. Ch. 3. For Lucullus, *IGR* IV, 701; for Pompeius, *IGR* III, 869; for Oppius, J. Reynolds, *Aprodisias and Rome*, (London, 1982). For more examples, Chiranky, 474–487, Touloumakos, 321, and Tuchelt, 61–63. The pattern for Augustus and Agrippa is also discussed in Ch. 3. Eilers (his Ch. VII) believes there was a gradual decline, but the data is not definitive in that one or two discoveries could equalize the periods.

The epigraphical record for civic patronage in the Age of Augustus has been discussed above and the results need not be repeated here. Suffice it to state that the same kinds of communities continued to choose the same kinds of patrons under Augustus as they had in the Late Republic. It is significant, however, that there is a fundamental break in that pattern in the period after AD 11/12, after the edict of Augustus on public honors. First, in terms of numbers, Table 6.1 demonstrates that after this date patronage was indeed less frequent in the East when compared to the West or even when compared to the East in the Republican and Augustan eras.

Table 6.1: Epigraphically Attested Cases of Civic Patronage
(No distinctions based on status of either patron or community)

	70–30 BC	30 BC to AD 11/12	AD 11 to 60
Eastern Mediterranean	38	25 + 10[38]	6
Western Mediterranean	4	13 + 16	29 + 1
Italy	6 + 6	19 + 19	12 + 1

Leaving Italy aside, references to civic patronage are at least five or six times more frequent in the East during the Late Republican period, equalize with the western provinces in the Augustan period, and then become decisively more common in the West in the Julio-Claudian period. The latter figure is particularly significant because the East was always more densely urbanized.

Second, the record for both East and West indicates that peregrine communities for the most part ceased to select patrons of senatorial status and that this is true also in areas, like western Asia Minor, where the tradition had been especially strong. Citizen communities, however, continued to coopt patrons. If the latter were senators, they tended to be governors, if equestrians, to be prominent locals. In other respects, however, the pattern of *patrocinium publicum* is not discernibly different, East and West, except in terms of absolute numbers. As there were more citizen communities in the West than in the East, it follows that the incidence of public patronage would be greater in the former than in the latter.

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[38] Senators plus members of the Augustan family. The numbers in this table will vary depending on who is counting and on how one judges the certainty of the individual case. That is, though I provide an actual count, the numbers suggest rather an approximate range of activity. For the specifics please see the database on the CWS.

6.1.5. *Patterns and Anomalies*

The major problem in the East is the evidence from Bithynia: the *patrocinia* of four governors, Cadius, Mindius, Pasidienus and Plancius appear to represent clear violations of the Augustan principle(s).[39] In the West, the major exception is Lepcis. The evidence, and it is inconclusive, suggests that these 'anomalies' may represent local exemptions (on this issue, see the discussion of a similar problem in Ch. 8.3) at least in respect to the cooption of senatorial governors as patrons of some peregrine communities.[40] After years of pondering the dilemma, namely that there is a general decline of senatorial patronage in the peregrine cities of the East and that Bithynia forms undeniable exception, I acknowledge that I have no new insight to offer here. What follows is what I believe to be the most plausible explanation, and is based on several general considerations. Others, like Eilers, prefer an alternative explanation.

The source of this anomaly in Bithynia may have been the *lex Pompeia* that was still the governing charter of the province under Trajan. In brief, Pompeius, probably by virtue of the *lex Manilia*, issued a charter for Bithynia in ca. 63, which was probably confirmed in Caesar's legislation of 59 and modified, apparently in minor ways by Augustus either in 29 (when he re-established the province) or in 20. In contrast to other Pompeian provincial settlements in, for example neighboring Pamphylia, this one had considerable permanence.[41]

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39 C. Cadius Rufus = *PIR*^{2} C 6; L. Mindius Pollio = *PIR*^{2} M 598; M. Plancius Varus = *RE Suppl.* 14, 485, No. 5; P. Pasidienus Firmus = *RE* 18, 2058. All are discussed thoroughly in "Patrons of Greek Cities" and all appear in the index to this volume. Most importantly one should consult Eilers perspective. Note that we agree on the exceptional status of Bithynia, and that the exception might be related to the prominent minting activity of the governor / patrons, but disagree on the reason.

40 On this issue, see the discussion of a similar problem in Ch. 8. In the early 3rd Century, Ulpian allows the local municipal charters discretion in the arrangement of patrons and decurions on lists like the *album Canusinum*.

41 Ibid. In general on Bithynia: A.H.M. Jones, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces.* (Oxford, 1971): 159; A.N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, Second Ed., (Oxford, 1973): 303; on Plin. *Ep.* 10, 114, and 376; A.J. Marshall, "The Greek City in the Roman World: Pontus and Bithynia", *Praktika of the H' Congress for Greek and Latin Epigraphy.* (Athens, 1984): 120–133. Also, Abbott and Johnson, 72. On ratification, Sherwin-White, *Letters of Pliny* (Oxford, 1966) on 10, 79. On Augustus' re-organization in 29 and 20 BC, *Dio* 51, 20.6 and 54, 7.5; on his edict, Plin. *epp.* 10, 80 and 84. More generally, Eilers, Roman Patrons, Chapters 6 and 7. On the relative permanence of the settlement, Strabo, 12, 3.1 and Jones, 166, Antonius was especially disruptive.

The charter established twelve *poleis* in the province (*Plin. NH* 5, 14.3) and introduced at least some Roman usages into their civic administration. For example, admission to and tenure in the local *boulé* followed the Roman model with permanent senates enrolled by censors.[42] Among other provisions, it may also have established norms by which the twelve cities of the province might acquire patrons. As noted above, such provisions are characteristic of the charters of cities established on the Roman model. That Pompeius would include a section on civic patronage in his law is consistent with his well-known pride in his many *clientelae* (e. g., Cic. *ad fam.* 9, 9.2: *regnum ac nationum clientis quas ostendere crebro solebat*). Moreover, the epigraphical record supports the hypothesis that the cities of Bithynia had a notable interest in acquiring patrons. A good example is the enormous monument (over 9 m. long) that at least nine Bithynian communities set up at Rome to their proconsul and patron, Rufus. Though it cannot be dated exactly, it probably belongs, as Eck has suggested, to the triumviral period. Notable is the fact that, though the monument is a unit, each individual city claims Rufus as a patron.[43]

Even if this interest in civic patronage is manifest, it is not clear, as noted above, that Bithynia simply disregarded the provisions of the edict of A.D 11/12 or, alternatively, was exempted because its provincial or civic charter allowed it, or for other unknown reasons. There is evidence for both hypotheses, but the latter would appear the more likely. It has long been recognized that at least some sections of the *lex Pompeia*, e.g., the ban on plural citizenship, were not being enforced in the time of Pliny, just as provisions of the *Lex Julia* may have been unenforced. Moreover, Pliny's correspondence indicates "the proconsuls were very much left to themselves in the century before Nerva's accession" and they may not have been concerned to enforce provisions the provincials felt were "unnatural".[44]

The more plausible hypothesis is that among the Roman models introduced by the *lex Pompeia*, there was also one that regulated the appointment

[42] Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, 303 and 376; Jones, *Cities*, 159.

[43] On the date, Eck, Ehrenmonumente, 209. Though the *koinon* is not mentioned, the unitary character of the monument does suggest collective action. This does not necessarily mean that Rufus was the *patronus provinciae*.

[44] On un-enforced provisions, Plin. 10, 114, and Sherwin-White, ad loc. On the independence of governors, Sherwin-White comments to Plin. 10, 73. Unfortunately, Sherwin-White does not make it clear whether this was characteristic of Roman provincial administration, in general, or of Bithynia, in particular. On the unnatural character of some of the provisions, Sherwin-White, *Citizenship*, 303.

of patrons and that this provision may have followed the lines that the Julian charter of Urso adopted [see below]. Augustus and his advisors must have accepted this section of the charter(s) when he reviewed the provincial organization in the 20's BC, that is, at a time when he had no open misgivings about governors becoming the patrons of peregrine communities. Even so, would Bithynia have been exempted from the edict of AD 11/12? This may well have been the case if indeed my analogy discussed in Chapter 8.3 holds. But there are other indications. Trajan, in responding to a request from Pliny for a ruling on the applicability of one item of imperial legislation in the latter's province, notes: *sed inter eas provincias, de quibus rescripsit, non est Bithynia* (*ep*. 10, 66.2). Indeed, Pliny and Suetonius indicate that, in the first century, AD, there was considerable variety in the details and privileges of each city's constitution.[45] Finally, a comparison with the province of Asia, which had a long and rich tradition of Roman patrons, is instructive: Civic patronage for governors, men who were among the most important of their age, virtually ceases at this time.

Hence, the most plausible explanation (I believe) for this dilemma may be that the *lex Pompeia*, which remained essentially unchanged in Bithynia from 63 BC through the reign of Trajan, also defined the manner in which patrons might be acquired by cities. Such criteria may have been fairly similar to what we find in the *lex Ursonensis* (e.g. senators must be *sine imperio*). It may well be that Pompeius included the same provision in other provincial charters, but, for one reason or another, the latter were revised and/or rescinded. Hence, we find a clear epigraphic and numismatic record of civic patrons in the peregrine communities of Bithynia in the period from Augustus to Trajan, but nowhere else in the eastern provinces.

If the edict(s) of Augustus were valid throughout most of the East, we should also expect to find traces of the same pattern in the West. In the Companion Web Site one can find (also in Eilers, Appendix 6) a list of reasonably certain cases of civic patronage in the Western Provinces for the same period (AD 13 to 117). It is immediately apparent that the same pattern also prevails there: Citizen communities coopt patrons. Most of these were senators who are known to have governed in the province of the client; those of equestrian status were either prominent locals or imperial officials known to have served in the area.

As in the East, there is also a notable exception in the West. Lepcis Magna, a peregrine community, secured the patronage of many of the governors of

[45] Plin. *ep*. 10, 84: *concessa ... a divo Augusto* to the Nicaeans, also 10, 109. Suet. *Vesp*. 8.

Africa *proconsularis* between AD 13 and 117. The status of the city has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. There is general agreement that Lepcis, as a *civitas*, re-organized itself and adopted a constitution on the Roman model probably as early as 5 BC. At that time it acquired a number of privileges, including the right to issue its own coins (*ius feriendi*). By the time of Vespasian, there are indications that Lepcis might also have become a genuine *municipium*, or at least had the right to call itself one.[46] During the reign of Trajan, it achieved colonial status (*IRT* 353). Even if we accept the argument of di Vita-Evrard that it was a Flavian municipality, we still have to explain how it was that Lepcis acquired at least four patrons in Julio-Claudian period. The answer, as with Bithynia, may be that her charter allowed her to coopt patrons, and that this privilege may have been guaranteed in the provincial charter and was not rescinded by the edict(s) of AD 11–12. It should be stressed that the critical factor here was not that Lepcis was a *civitas*, there are many cities with this status that do not have patrons, or even that it enjoyed a number of privileges. Significant is that it had adopted a Roman style charter, a charter which must have contained a section similar to those found in the *leges Ursonensis* and *Malacitana* and one which defined how patrons were to be appointed (specifically, c. 97 and 61, respectively). That patrons could be important to peregrine communities is demonstrated by the fact that Lepcis acquired ten of them during the first century, the highest number by far during this period.[47]

In general, there are very few cases of patronage of peregrine communities after the Principate of Augustus. The fact that Nicomedia, Nicaea and Lepcis regularly secured the patronage of the provincial governor through the first century AD, suggests that their charters and status may have allowed them to continue a well-established practice and that other peregrine communities would have done the same, had they had been allowed to do so. As Fergus Millar also points out, communities were very conscious and protective of the rights and privileges that that they had been granted by their

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46 M. Grant, *FITA*, 371; J. Reynolds, *IRT* 79 f.; Sherwin-White, *Citizenship*, 363; H.E. Herzig, “Die Laufbahn des Lucius Septimius Severus, Sufes”, *Chiron* 2 (1972): 394–404; G. Di Vita-Évrard, “Muncipium Flavium Lepcis Magna,” *Bull. Arch.= BCTH* 17-B (1981): 198–209. Herzig argues that it had the right to name itself a *municipium*, 400; Di Vita-Évrard, that it was a “municipe latin dans la pléntitude du terme”, 209. A similar problem is discussed at Ch. 8.3.6 and 8.4.

47 They are evenly divided between the Julio-Claudian and Flavian periods. Thugga had five, but they are all members of the local aristocracy, though note Licinius Tyrannus, a *libertus*, C. 8, 26518. Hippo regius had three, all were senators and at least two were governors.

governors, by the senate and people of Rome and by the emperors.[48] Nonetheless, the overall trend is that citizen communities continued to coopt senatorial governors as patrons and peregrine communities did not. Whether this pattern is due to a general decline in *patrocinium publicum*, as Eilers believes, or due to the Augustan regulation as this author argues, or to some other unrecognized factor cannot be determined with any certainty.

6.2. *Other Regulations*

6.2.1. *The Regulations in Municipal Charters*

If these imperial regulations did not affect citizen communities in the provinces, it is probably because their municipal charters already had provisions governing the award of public honors. Because all the surviving municipal charters come from Baetica there may be some doubt about how standardized they were even in the Latin speaking west.[49] Nonetheless, because the pattern of municipal patronage in Baetica and elsewhere is not discernably different, it is reasonable to believe, indeed it is generally assumed, that these provisions had a wider application. The two most important of these laws are the Julian *lex Ursonensis* and the Flavian *leges Malacitana* and *Irnitana*.

In the charter of Urso, there are two chapters that regulate the conferral of *patrocinium publicum*. In chapter 97, it is stated:

> *ne quis IIvir ne quis pro potestate in ea colonia facito neve ad decuriones referto neve decurionum decretum facito fiat, quo quis colonis coloniae patronus sit atopteturve praeter eum, cui colonis agrorum dandorum atsignandorum ius ex lege Julia est, eumque, qui eam coloniam deduxerit, liberos posterosque eorum, nisi de maioris partis decurionum qui tum aderunt per tabellam sententia, cum non minus L aderunt, cum ea res consuletur. qui atversus ea fecerit HS 5000 colonis eius coloniae dare damnas esto … FIRA*[2] 1, 21 = *ILS* 6087:
>
> *No IIvir or anyone with potestas in that colony is to act, or raise (such matters) with the decurions, or see that a decree of the decurions be passed, to the effect*

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[48] *The Emperor at Work*, 342–343, quoting an unpublished document from Aphrodisias, namely; 'the freedom and autonomy and other privileges granted by the senate and by the emperors before me …'

[49] On the literature, M. Koch, "Ausgewählte Bibliographie zur lateinischen Epigraphik", *ANRW* 2, 1 (1974) 837, and J. Gonzáles, "The *Lex Irnitana*: A New Copy of the Flavian Municipal Law," *JRS* 76 (1986) 147–243, and H. Galsterer, Municipium Flavium Irnitanum: A Latin Town in Spain, *JRS* 78 (1988), 78. On the *lex Ursonensis*: M. Crawford (ed.), *Roman Statutes*, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Supplement 64 (London, 1996), Vol. 1.

> *that anyone be or be adopted a patron of the colonists of the colony, except the person, who is the curator for granting or assigning or adjudicating lands according to the Lex Iulia, and the person who shall have founded the colony, their children and descendants except according to the opinion by ballot of the majority of the decurions [who] shall [then] be [present], when not less than fifty shall be present, when that matter shall be discussed. Whoever shall have acted contrary to these rules, is to be condemned to pay 5000 sesterces to the colonists of that colony, and there is to be a suit for that sum by whoever shall wish of the colonists of that colony (Crawford translation).*

This section describes procedures by which new patrons (i.e., those who were not ipso facto patrons at the time of the foundation of the colony) might be coopted. An individual becomes a patron by an official action (*decretum*) of the town councilors (*decuriones*). No magistrate may confer the honor on his own. Moreover, fifty [of 100?] of the decurions must be present when the matter is decided, the vote must be secret, and the majority approve. Finally, provision is made for taking action against violations, and a fine of HS 5000 is established (a significant amount, though not the highest noted in the document, see below).

Chapter 130 of the Julian law covers the same material but deals with cases in which the patron is of *senatorial* status and appears to focus more on the activities of the decurions.

> *Ne quis IIvir aedilis praefectus coloniae Genetivae Iuliae quicunque erit ad decuriones coloniae Genetivae referto neve decuriones consulito neve decretum decurionum facito neve de ea re in tabulas publicas referto neve referri iubeto neve quis decurio de ea re, qua de ea re agetur, in decurionibus sententiam dicito neve decretum decurionum scribito, neve in tabulas publicas referto, neve referundum curato, quo quis senator senatorisve filius populi Romani coloniae Genetivae patronus atoptetur sumatur fiat nisi de trium partium decurionum decreto sententia per tabellam facito et nisi de eo homine, de quo tum referetur consuletur, decretum decurionum fiat, qui cum ea res agetur, in italiam sine imperio privatus erit. Si quis adversus ea ad decuriones rettulerit decurionumve decretum fecerit faciendumve curaverit inve tabulas publicas rettulerit referrive iusserit sive quis in decurionibus sententiam dixerit decurionumve decretum scripserit inve tabulas publicas rettulerit referendumve curaverit, in res singulas, quotienscumque quit adversus ea fecerit, is HS CCICC colonis coloniae Genetivae Iuliae dare damnas esto, eiusque pecuniae cui eorum volet reciperatorio iudicio aput IIvirum interregem praefectum actio petitio persecutioque ex hac lege ius potestasque esto.*

What is significant about this chapter, Crawford notes, is the minimum requirement for a quorum and a majority, both of which are unusually high. Moreover, and more striking is that the fine is set at HS100,000, five times the next highest amount mentioned elsewhere in the charter (cf. chps 61

and 93 where HS20,000 is given). All of these conditions are unusual and suggest how important it was to have consensus for the appointment of a civic patron.

The Flavian municipal law, as represented by the *leges Malacitana* and *Irnitana*, also specifies how a patron should be coopted.

> *ne quis patronum publice municipibus municipii Flavii Malacitani cooptato patrociniumve cui deferto, nisi ex maioris partis decurionum decreto, quod decretum factum erit, cum duae partes non minus adfuerint et iurati per tabellam sententiam tulerint. qui aliter adversus ea patronum publice municipibus municipii Flavi Malacitani cooptaverit patrociniumve cui detulerit, is HS X* (*milia*) *nummum in publicum municipibus municipii Flavi Malacitani dare damnas esto; et is, qui adversus hanc legem patronus cooptatus cuive patrocinium delatum erit, ne magis ob eam rem patronus muncipium municipii Flavi Malacitani esto. ILS 6089 = FIRA² N° 24, c. 61:*

> *No one is to coopt a patron publicly for the citizens of Malacitana or to confer the status of patron on anyone, except by a decree of the majority of the decurions, which decree shall have been passed when not fewer than two-thirds of the decurions are present and they have cast their votes by ballot under oath. Whoever in violation of this law shall have conferred the status of public patron shall be condemned to the citizens of the municipality of Flavian Malacitana a fine HS10,000*

There are several differences between the three chapters in the two charters. Those defining the quorum are minor. More significant is the amount of the fine and the fact that there is no clause in the Flavian law authorizing *actio, petitio, persecutio*.

Concerning the latter, Roman lawgivers did employ apparently repetitious combinations of formulae in order, for example, to prevent the circumvention of the regulation or to ensure its enforcement. That they did so may be observed in chapter 97 of the *lex Ursonensis* cited above. Though there is no reference to a distinction between *patronum cooptare* and *patrocinium deferre*, this chapter does regulate two distinct formulae (*patronus esse* and *patronus adoptari*) that were apparently being used to designate patrons in contemporary *decreta*. It is, however, highly unlikely that the two expressions used here describe processes that were fundamentally different.

More significant for our discussion is the size of the fines in these charters for illegal naming a patron. In chapter 61 of the Flavian law, a fine of HS10,000 or *denarii* 2500. Given that a Roman soldiers and praetorians earned between 300 and 750 *denarii* per year, we must conclude that the fine was intended to be a substantial deterrent, and also that the process of adopting a public patron was an issue of great importance to the town. Though not as high as the fine of HS100,000 mentioned in c. 130 of the Julian

law for illegally 'coopting' a patron, this chapter nonetheless constitutes a significant reminder of how seriously the Roman community took the decision to adopt a patron and confirms the argument that the status of civic patron was indeed as prestigious as Pliny, Arrian and the texts of a number of inscriptions (e.g., *aput nos potissimus, ILS* 6110 *CIL* 9, 3429) suggest.[50] Hence, the fact of and size of the fine is consistent with other evidence and suggest that civic patronage was not evolving out of existence during the early Principate as Eilers argues.[51]

In sum: There can be no doubt about the intention of these sections. They are designed to prevent individual magistrates from awarding the title on their own and thereby reaping the benefits that might accrue from securing the honor for a governor. But what, we may legitimately inquire, were the circumstances that led to c. 130 (it is clearly an addendum) in the Julian law and to what extent was c. 130 to be found in the charters of other communities with similar charters? It may be assumed that Urso and/or the central government was responding to a problem that had developed during the wars between the Caesarians and the Pompeians when public decrees of support played an important role in the political perceptions.[52] Chapter 130 makes it manifest that the dangers were perceived to be particularly serious when the potential patron was a senator who held a provincial command with imperium. As this provision does not appear in the Flavian laws, we may assume either that some of the concerns had in the meantime been addressed in other ways or were no longer felt to present the same level of danger or that the restriction on senators with imperium was not part of the 'model' charter, but reflects a unique concern of Urso.[53]

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50 These issues are discussed in Ch. 4.2 and 4.4 in reference to Pliny and Epictetus. In reference to the epigraphical evidence, the position of the civic patrons on the *alba*, the two surviving *alba decurionum* place the patrons at the head of the list of decurions, see Ch. 8.3 here (Canusium *ILS* 6121 from Timgad).

51 *ILS* 6087: … by which any senator or son of a senator of the Roman people might be adopted, chosen or made patron of the colony of Urso unless three-fourths of the decurions shall have approved voting by ballot and unless the person concerned shall at the time when the issue is discussed be in Italy, without imperium, and a *privatus*.

52 Described at length in Ch. 2.3, also in M.S. Nicols, *Appearances and Reality*.

53 This is not the place to go into the difficult question of the layers of legal tradition in this law or the exact time when the text was inscribed in bronze. There is, however, reason to believe that c. 130 may represent a local attempt to incorporate the Augustan legislation described above. My thanks to Regula Frei-Stolba, Bern, who had made available in draft an article: "Textschichten in der Lex Coloniae Iuliae Genetivae Ursonensis—Zu den Kapiteln 66, 70, 71, 125–127 über die Spielveranstaltungen." Also: H. Nissen, "Zu den römischen Stadtrechten," *RhM* 45 (1890), 110.

Another consideration is relevant to this discussion. Sections F–I of the new Flavian law, the *lex Irnitana*, provide considerable detail about the selection of *legati* to be sent on public business. Specifically, they define how *legati* are to be chosen, what kind of excuses are acceptable, who is to determine the amount each legate may receive in compensation, and what the legate may do or say in his official capacity.[54] One of the duties associated with this *munus* we know from the *tabulae patronatus*. The *tabulae* regularly conclude with the names of the legates who brought to the prospective patron a copy of the decree of the decurions and the formal request to receive the community into his clientele. Given the costs of these embassies (that they were costly is implicit in the *lex Irnitana*), it was clearly preferable to the community to coopt such leading senators at a time when they were physically present in the town or at least in the same province. But it is also true that the use of *legati* and the cost of their travels reflect a reality in which the cooptation of a patron was a notable event.

Other honors associated with *patrocinium* were also subject to official approval. So for example, the legal expectations associated with the award of *hospitium publicum* are mentioned in c. 131 of the Julian law. And a *decretum decurionum* was probably necessary to authorize a statue in a public place.

It should be noted that we have information about a legal action that was a consequence of these decrees. Epictetus reports that a *decurio* and *patronus* of the Julian colony at Cnossos (presumably with a charter similar to the one at Urso) became involved in a dispute about his cooptation. The few details given suggest that his claim to the title was in doubt and that he hoped the emperor would rule in his favor.[55]

6.2.2. *Municipal Decrees*

The municipal charters specify that the designation of a patron of the community be confirmed by a *decretum decurionum*. A number of these honorary decrees, known as *tabulae patronatus*, have survived. Although the form and the texts of the individual *tabulae* vary considerably, they are generally inscribed on bronze and record that the community coopted someone as its patron and that he (or she) has received the community *in fidem clientelamque suam*. The classic examples of the format come from Italy.[56]

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[54] Gonzáles, "Sicily," 159–160.

[55] Arr. *Epict. diss.* 3, 9. The Greek text uses the terms *prostates* and *patron* interchangeably. The passage is discussed more fully Ch. 4.4 and in my article in *Historia*, 2010 and in this volume at Ch. 4.4.

[56] On this form, R. Cagnat, *Cours d'Epigraphie latine4* Paris 1914, 330, L. Harmand, *Le*

An inscription from Peltuinum dating to 242, bears a *decretum decurionum* in honor of Nummia Varia:

> *... ut merito debeat ex consensu universorum patrona praefecturae nostrae fieri ... placere universis conscriptis Nummiae Variae ... pro splendore dignitatis suae patrocinium praefecturae nostrae deferri ... et singulos universosque nos remque publicam nostram in clientelam domus suae recipere dignetur ...* (*CIL* 9, 3429 = *ILS*.6110)

All the characteristics of a senatorial decree are present in this text.[57] Note, too, as argued above, that the authors of the decree considered *patrona fieri, patrocinium deferri* and *in clientelam recipere* to describe the same relationship.

In the western provinces, especially in North Africa and Spain, the *tabulae* took a somewhat different form. Where the Italian model replicates the form and wording of the original decree, the provincial model reduces it to its essence and allows each of the two parties to confirm the relationship. The Companion Web Site (=CWS) has a set of images of many of these *tabulae*. For example, a *tabula* from Banasa in Mauretania (of AD 162) records:

> *Q. Junio Rustico II L. Titio Plautio Aquilino cos / kal. Februaris / Aurellii Banasitani ex decreto splendidissi / mi ordinis Q. Claudium Ferocem Q. / filium Aeronium Montanum patronum / sibi liberisque ac posteris suis cooptaverunt. / Q. Claudius Ferox Q. fil. Aeronius Montanus it(em) / patrocinium in se recepit egerunt legati / M. Domitius Tingitanus IIvir Sex. Saen. Caecilianus / L. Flavius Saturninus Dec. Iuvent. Saturninus / Q. Julius Martialis* (*AE* 1948, 115)

Equally common is the one sided variant. For example, *CIL* 8, 8837 from Mauretania reads:

> *Nerone Claudio Caesar / Aug. Germanico L. Antistio Vetere cos / K. Augustis / Q. Julius Q. f. Qui. Secundus legatus pro / praetore hospitium fecit cum / decurionibus et colonis colonia / Julia Augusta Legionis VII Tupusuctu sibi / liberis posterisque suis eosque pa/ trocinio suo tuendos recepit / agentibus legatis / Q. Caecilio Q. f. Palatina Firmano / M. Pomponio M. f. Quir. Vindice /*

In these two *tabulae* (and they are typical for what one finds in Spain, too), the wording of the original decree of cooptation has been reduced to the minimum but is still recognizable. Even when the two parties are clearly

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Patronat sur les collectivités publiques. (Paris, 1957): 332ff., Nicols, *Tabula patronatus* and "Indigenous Culture and the Process of Romanization," *AJPh* 108 (1987): 134–139. The most recent and up-to-date collection of *tesserae/tabulae* may be found in M. Dolores Dopico Caízos, *La Tabula Lougeiorum*. (Vitoria, 1988), 66–72.

57 On the form of such *decreta*, Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsr*. 3, 1007. Note also *CIL* 6, from Ferentinum and CIL 6, 31629 from Thrace.

peregrine (as in *AE* 1961, 96, between Castellum Toletum in the Tarraconsis and a certain Tillegus Ambati f.), this format is preserved.

Regarding the charters and the *tabulae* some conclusions are in order. First, citizen communities had procedures to confer the honorary title *patronus municipii/coloniae*. Second, the title could only be conferred by a *decretum decurionum*; the People had apparently no part of the legal process and magistrates were not allowed act on their own.[58] The sense of the latter restriction was surely to guarantee that the advantages of the relationship accrued to the community and not to individuals. Third, the charters regulate only the cooptation of patrons and place few restrictions on the conferral of other honors.[59] *Patrocinium publicum* then occupied a special place among public honors. It is, moreover, reasonable to believe, as inscriptions indicate, that the other honors like statues and *tabulae* were often offered at the same time.[60] Fourth, though the charter of Urso may have had a special restriction on the cooptation of senatorial governors, the Flavian do not. Whatever anxieties were associated with coopting patrons from this group during the late republic appear to have been alleviated by the time of the Flavian emperors. Even so, the terms of cooption, the size of the fines for violations, the procedures for concluding the process of adopting a patron, and what the inscriptions themselves record all suggest that civic patronage was remarkably vital well into the Principate.

6.3. *The Effectiveness of the Legislation*

Regarding the effectiveness of this legislation, scholarly opinion is inconsistent: The regulations were not consistently enforced.[61] This conclusion is based on two considerations: First, there is a substantial list of violations

[58] There are cases in which the inscription mentioning the fact of patronage was set up by the *urbani*, or a *vicus*, or *municipes*, or *plebs urbana*. In such cases the collective authorized the inscription but did not select the patron.

[59] In the *lex Ursonensis*, the conferral of *hospitium* is indeed mentioned (c. 131) and in a manner which makes it virtually parallel to *patrocinium*. The Flavian law appears to have dropped the provision.

[60] Note the discussions above and Lahusen. The inscriptions mentioning patronage regularly appear as or on statue bases. The online database in the CWS provides the specifics.

[61] Th. Mommsen, *Lex coloniae Juliae Genetivae Urbanorum sive Ursonensis*, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1904, 1, 239; E. Kornemann, Art. 'Concilium' in *RE* 4.1 (1900): 816; W. Liebenam, *Städteverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreiche*. (Leipzig, 1900), 85; Brunt, 215 ff.; Deininger, 167.

of these regulations and, second, we have no substantial record of any legal actions being taken to punish the offenders. This pattern has led some, Eilers included, to conclude that phenomenon of civic patronage especially was waning, that communities, especially peregrine communities, tended to look instead to the emperor. These conclusions need to be modified.

In order to judge the effectiveness of the regulations, two methods will be employed. First, we need to know whether the provisions themselves allowed for measures to be taken to bring the guilty to justice. Chapter 97 (and 130) of the *lex Ursonensis* does indeed give each citizen the right to take legal action in respect to the violation of the law (*cui volet … actio petitio persecutioque ex hac lege ius potestasque esto*). Chapter 61 of the *lex Malacitana*, on the other hand, does not state so much formally, but as a fine is specified, it is implicit. As to the fragment of the *lex Julia repetundarum* there is no direct mention of an *actio*, but the numerous prosecutions under this law in the late republic indicate the existence of a *quaestio* and also of a penalty.[62] As the evidence for the regulation of AD 11/12 is essentially literary, the authors may not have felt it necessary to include such formal technicalities.

The second method is more promising, namely, we can examine the application of the regulations in individual cases. To do so we must again review the various attempts, but this time in respect to their effectiveness in practice. The evidence suggests that the central government was aware of the dangers associated with such honors, but also that it was in the interests of the communities and of the governors to seek allowances that would allow them to claim the support and protection of members of the Roman elite.

Consider the situation of the communities. The *lex Julia* forbade the *curia*, that is, the senate of a peregrine community, to confer public honors on the current provincial governor. The same provision is found in the *lex Ursonensis*.[63] In the regulation of Augustus peregrine communities were affected. The question here is: To what extent is it true that communities did confer public honors on their current governors? First, the sources (in

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[62] Mommsen, *Röm. Strafr.* (Leipzig, 1899), 704 ff., and especially 709, n. 3.

[63] Specifically the law forbids the cooptation of individuals who meet three conditions: they are senators, have imperium and are not in Italy. These conditions apply to a larger group than "governor" of the province. De facto the current governors would be most likely candidates for the honor. The provision may have represented an attempt to restrict the cooptation of the *legati* of dynasts. Again, this prohibition may not have been included in other charters.

this respect they are epigraphical) are usually not informative about the exact time when the honor was conferred. Second, even if we know the date of cooptation, the exact dates of administration may not be known. Two examples may illustrate the problem.

The *tabula patronatus* (*ILS*.6109) for Marius Pudens reads:[64]

> *imp Caes. M. Aur.Severo Alexandro cos. eidib. Aprilibus concilium conventus Cluniens. G. Marium Pudentem Cornelianum leg. leg., c. v., patronum sibi liberis posterisque suis cooptavit ob multa et egregia eius in singulos universosque merita, per legatum Val. Marcellum Cluniensem.*

The date of the cooptation here is clear, 14 April in the year 222; it is not clear, however, when (or even that) Pudens served as a *legatus legionis* in Spain. That is, though the *beneficia* may refer to his administrative activity, the cooptation might have taken place after he had left office.[65]

The case of Marcius Barea illustrates the other aspect of the problem:[66]

> *Ti. Claudio Drusi f. Caesari Aug. Germ. pontif max tribun. potest. iterum imp. III, cos. II, p. p., senatus populusque Hipponensium Regiorum pecunia publica. Q. Marcio C. f. Baria cos. XVviro sacris faciundis fetiali procos. II patrono, Q. Allius Maximus leg propr II patronus dedicavit* (*AE* 1935, 32)

and:

> *Dis Augustis Q. Marcius C. f. Barea cos. XVvir s. f. fetialis procos. II patronus dedicavit, Iddibal Magonis f. Tapapius Lepcitanus de sua pecunia fecit* (*IRT* 273)

From these two texts we may deduce the exact time when Barea was proconsul of Africa (42), but we cannot say whether Barea was coopted patron before or during his governorship.[67]

Despite these difficulties, Mommsen has identified three cases in which the regulations were violated; Brunt lists three more (from the 2nd century) and expresses doubt about an additional five.[68] What appears to be decisive is the following: Almost all senatorial patrons of the various provincial

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[64] On his career, see the prosopographical index in the online database = CWS.

[65] This example is given to illustrate the chronological problem only. Even if it were the case that Pudens was currently in Spain (a reasonable assumption), he was not the governor of the Tarraconensis, did not have imperium, nor, as argued above, was it forbidden for citizen communities to coopt senators as patrons.

[66] On his career, see the prosopographical index in the online database.

[67] Again, it is reasonable to believe that Barea became patron during his governorship, but he might have, for example, already have defended the provincials in court before he became governor.

[68] Mommsen, *Lex Ursonensis*, 239. The three are *ILS* 6095, 6103 and 6109 (given above); Brunt, 216, n. 82b.

communities were governors in those provinces and nothing indicates that their patronage existed before they became patrons. It is then reasonable to conclude that their administrative activity was in some way the cause of their cooptation. For example, between AD 30 and 80 the names of nine proconsuls of Africa are known through inscriptions on buildings. All nine had, as proconsul of Africa proconsularis and patron of Lepcis Magna, restored or dedicated the buildings in question. It is hardly probable that all nine of these governors were already patrons of the communities before they became governors.[69] Hence, either the honor was conferred during the time when the individual had been appointed proconsul but had not taken up the office (not against the letter of the law but certainly against its spirit) or, more probably, it was done during or after the period of administrative activity.[70]

This analysis is however faulty in that it does not consider the exact language of the provisions. The Augustan regulation was, as argued above, restricted to peregrines; their own charters guided citizen communities. The Flavian charters are quite clear: Anyone, apparently even a sitting governor and senator, may be coopted.[71] As has been demonstrated earlier, there is evidence that these regulations governing the award of public honors [including civic patronage] were respected in some places and 'violated' by peregrine communities in other places where local traditions and privileges may be the basis for the anomalies (a similar problem is discussed at Ch. 8.3.6 and 8.4).

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69 See attached table on African governors. I am making a distinction between these individual cases and the more significant exceptions from Lepcis and from Bithynia discussed above. But the point remains: just because there was an edict that does not mean it was consistently followed. See also 8.3.6 and 8.4.

70 This problem has been discussed more fully in two of my articles, "Verleihung," p. 255, and in "Patrons of Greek Cities in the Early Principate," *ZPE* 80 (1990): 81 ff. The first of these inscriptions may have been set up after the event. Note too that laws, decrees and edicts were not consistently reinforced. Consider the case of the legislation governing the fees that advocates might claim: The first regulation dates to the middle Republic, the *lex Acilia*, is discussed in the Senate under Claudius, Tac. *Ann.* 11, 4–7, and by Plin. *Ep.* 3, 9, a half century later.

71 There is no evidence for the proposition that c. 130 of the *lex Ursonensis* was generally applied in (Julian) colonies. The epigraphical evidence indicates that a significant proportion of senatorial patrons did exercise imperium in the province of the client community. Note however that the chronology is not always certain; it may be the provision was respected and that the patrons assumed the honor after they had left office and had returned to Italy.

When we consider the situation of the provincial assemblies in terms of the effectiveness of the Augustan regulation we come to a similar conclusion. The first securely attested patron of a province after 20 BC, is M. Vettius Valens, who became the patron of Britannia in about AD 135.[72]

More specifically, analyses of the effectiveness of the *senatus consultum* of Neronian date, AD 62, have also come to a consistent conclusion that the imperial authorities wanted to regulate and limit the award of honors to governing magistrates. Tacitus reports that after lengthy and inconclusive debate on the issue the senate decreed (*senatus consultum*, *Ann* 15.22) that "no one was to propose to any council of our allies that a vote of thanks ought to be given in the Senate to propraetors or proconsuls, and that no one was to discharge such a mission." This SC was never, or only briefly, enforced.[73] Note the following: In comparison to the regulations of Caesar and of Augustus, this regulation affects only the provincial assemblies; communities are not mentioned probably because the Augustan edict and municipal charters already nominally regulated such awards (including that of *patrocinium publicum*?).[74] Finally, only legations with offerings of thanks to be read in the Senate are forbidden; nothing is mentioned about such to the Princeps. Finally, only governors of senatorial provinces are affected.

Once again, as with the edict of 11 BC, we see that the Roman elite was well aware of the problems associated with the award of public honors to serving governors and willing to take action to limit the damage, but also it is equally clear that the Senate and the Emperor had greater difficulties exercising a consistent policy of enforcement. Hence, while an examination of the literary and epigraphical evidence fails to turn up significant cases of violations, there are a good number of exceptions and anomalies.[75] We find the same kind of problem with the regulation of fees for advocates (Tac. *Ann.* 11, 4 ff.)

If the SC 62 does appear to be consistently respected it may in part be because Vespasian issued an edict that modified the *consultum* and set the

[72] I have discussed the evidence in detail in "Patrons of Provinces in the Early Principate: the case of Bithynia," *ZPE* 80 (1990): 101–108. On Valens, *CIL* 11, 383 = Birley, *Fasti Britan*. p. 215 = PIR[1] V 344 = No. 674 here.

[73] Brunt, 216; Deininger, 166–167; Millar, 247.

[74] On the regulations governing embassies in the municipal charters, see J. Gonzales' commentary to the lex Irnitana, sections F–I, in "The lex Irnitana," *JRS* 76 (1986): 185 ff.

[75] This issue has been thoroughly discussed in the *Chiron* article, 9 (1979): 257–259, and need not be repeated here.

legal number of legates that the provincials might send to Rome (Marcianus, *Dig.* 50, 7.5.6). Later Antoninus Pius might have revised or further refined the regulation.[76]

6.4. *Conclusions*

The foundation of the argument presented in this chapter is the following. Because public honors appeared to provide a cover for extortion and / or might be reckoned as symbols of power, the Roman Senate and latter the Emperors wanted to manage the award of honors. Though the core of the regulations is consistent, the very fact that the regulations had to be issued many times suggests that it was very difficult to manage the expectations of all parties. Hence, we may observe trends, for example that the Senate and Emperor wanted to limit the civic honors a governor might receive from a peregrine community, but we also need to recognize that governors and communities had good reason to tolerate and / or to seek exceptions for themselves. Patterns are readily apparent; that there are exceptions and anomalies does not mean that the pattern is useless as a tool of historical analysis; rather they [the anomalies] might be construed as evidence of the vitality of civic patronage and other honors in the Principate.

There is good reason to believe that the Augustan regulation of public honors (in respect to *peregrine* communities and down to the reign of Trajan) was generally but not systematically respected. Citizen communities, acting in accordance with their charters that were surely compatible with Roman administrative law, clearly did coopt senatorial patrons even when the senators were governors.

Provincial assemblies, however they were constituted, continued to respect the regulations until the middle of the second century. This situation is realistic. The proper honoring of the emperor was the responsibility of the provincial assemblies rather than of the communities; it was the former who propagated the imperial cult, sent congratulations and the like.[77] Clearly it was not in the interest of the emperor to share this devotion with governors. On the other side, the former could allow the senators to satisfy their pursuit of honors in a municipal context while at the same time allowing the communities to express their feelings of gratitude and to secure the goodwill and services of powerful patrons (recall that after AD 2, members of

[76] Williams, 470–483, Millar, 380.
[77] Deininger, 158.

the imperial family did not become municipal patrons). Under normal circumstances (that is, governorships of one to three years) these civic honors, including civic patronage, from citizen communities could not constitute a danger to the emperor.

The regulations in the charters and the *tabulae patronatus* provide the indications about the procedures involved in the selection of a civic patron. First, there must have been some formal contact between the two parties. Second, there must have been a perception at least on the part of the community, that it would be useful to formalize the relationship. Third, there may have been informal discussion between the two parties about expectations. This was certainly a critical phase, for it would be enormously embarrassing if the prospective patron rejected the petition of the community.[78]

Once the informal arrangements were complete and both sides in agreement, then an individual, probably one or both of the *duumviri*, might introduce a motion that the town council, the *ordo decurionum*, pass a decree requesting the prospective patron to admit the community into his clientele and that of his descendants. The motion, to judge by some of the *consulta* that survive, frequently included broadly worded references to the patron's *benevolentia* toward the community, perhaps also to benefactions conferred in the past, or to the expectations of the client for the future. In all cases however the language of the motion avoided specifics—the best examples are the *tabulae* for T. Pomponius Bassus (*CIL* 6, 1492) and for Nummia Varia (*CIL* 11, 3429).

During the Principate it is probable that, when the patron was a Roman senator or important imperial official, the motion passed unanimously or with comfortable majorities. When however the prospective patron was a member of the *ordo* of the town, there might be divisions within the council as we have seen in Ch. 4.4. It is evident from the *album Canusinum* that only a select few of even the *quinquennales* became the formal patrons of their town or a neighboring community. Arrian relates an episode in which Epictetus was visited by a decurion from Cnossus. The latter was involved in a lawsuit that challenged his claim to the formal patronage of the *colonia* (*Diss*. 3, 9). The competition for the title clearly remained intense at the local level (cf. Ch. 4.4).

The decree included references to legates who were designated to present to the prospective patron a bronze *tabula* bearing the *consultum*, and to

[78] Discussed in Ch. 4, but the best example if provided by Q. Oppius quote in Representative Texts J.

request him formally to admit the community to his clientele. Once the patron had accepted, the *tabula* might be mounted on a wall in the atrium where it advertised his *fides* and reputation and a copy preserved in the client community.

In sum, there was a substantial body of legislation on *patrocinium publicum* and other public honors; it is also immediately obvious that this legislation does not survive in the *Digest*. I would like to suggest that it (the legal evidence) did not find its way into the Digest for two reasons. First, the practice of *patrocinium publicum* does change in late antiquity, as Jens-Uwe Krause has elucidated, and second, precisely because the Augustan system worked so well.[79] Augustus's reforms, both formal and informal, did succeed in changing perceptions about patronage. That is, civic patronage retained its traditional role in mediation and reconciliation, but also came to be more closely associated with Greek *euergesia* / Roman *benefaction* and less so with dynastic feuds and calculations of armed strength. Because it was no longer perceived as a threat to public order, the excerpters saw no reason to incorporate material that was no longer controversial.

The variety and multiplicity of regulations, the size of the fines, the number of apparent violations all suggests that patrons had good reason to seek and communities had good reason to confer such public honors as *patrocinium publicum*.

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79 J.-U., Krause, *Spätantike Patronatsformen im Westen des romischen Reiches*, Vestigia 38, Munich (Beck; 1987).

CHAPTER SEVEN

CIVIC PATRONAGE IN THE EPIGRAPHICAL RECORD

7.0. *Introduction*

There are two central questions to be treated in this chapter on the epigraphical material: First, what does the evidence suggest about the frequency and distribution of civic patronage in the high Principate? And, second, what does the extensive data reveal about the expectations and performance of the two parties?[1] Please note: An epigraphical database listing patrons, client communities, references to standard collections of inscriptions, and other characteristics features of the record is available on the Companion Web Site = CWS and may be found at http://hdl.handle.net/1794/13015 or at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7264/N3PC308P

Patterns may be identified, but they sometimes appear to be meaninglessly obvious, at other times to be so uncertain or ambiguous that one can render no substantial historical judgment. *Patrocinium publicum*, for example, is most commonly attested in areas of dense urbanization, a conclusion that will surprise no one. So, too, is it the case that the inscriptions do not consistently make explicit or even implicit connections between civic patronage (on one hand) and specific benefactions and/or services (on the other). Even the inscriptions that commemorate the establishment of patronage (the *tabulae patronatus*) yield virtually no details about the expectations of either party.[2] Nor does the evidence provide much

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[1] As civic patronage is hardly mentioned in the peregrine cities of the eastern part of the empire, this discussion focuses especially on the west. It should be noted however that many of the conditions in the citizen communities of the west applied also in the citizen communities of the east.

[2] The texts of the *tabulae* indicate that a bronze tablet was the usual token provided for the patron to commemorate the establishment of the relationship and that it was to be placed in the atrium of the patron. They express the intention that the relationship will be continuous unto future generations. Note the cases of T. Pomponius Bassus (cited in Representative Texts, F.2) and the group of *tabulae* from four African communities found on the presumed estate of Silius Aviola (*CIL* 5, 4919–4922). The community, for its part, commemorated the relationship in many forms including listing the civic patrons on the *album decurionum* (Ch. 8). Significant here is that neither *tabula* nor *album* provide specific information on performance.

information about the evolution of benefaction and civic patronage from the Late Republic to the Principate and from the Principate into the Dominate. Moreover, even when benefactions are epigraphically attested, we do not know what role, if any, formal patronage played in the conferral, that is, we do not know whether the benefactions noted were conferred prospectively, retrospectively, or even had no connection at all with the establishment of *patrocinium publicum*. It may be reasonable to assume, as the evidence given throughout this study indicates, that communities used the honor primarily to win the benevolence and protection of those who exercised some administrative function that affected their well-being; it may also be reasonable to believe that communities used the honor to secure the generosity and cooperation of those who had come to own significant estates within the territory of the city, but who had no other connection to the community. It may also be reasonable to assume that civic patronage was widely used during all periods of Roman history. Nevertheless, it is not certain that *all* communities, citizen or not, chose formal patrons; indeed it is not even clear that all wished to choose patrons or were free to do so. The reality is then that the evidence simply does not allow us to define in any systematic way what circumstances were specifically associated with the establishment or exercise of formal civic patronage.[3] Indeed, the most informative indication on the question of exchange is not to be found in the epigraphical evidence at all, but may best be observed in the literary evidence (discussed in Chs. 2 and 4).

Though the epigraphical evidence does not illuminate the causal connections of the relationship, it does provide an enormous amount of information on the broader context associated with the practice of the institution. For example, though the inscriptions that mention civic patronage only irregularly record the specifics of exchange, they frequently provide details about the career of the patron and about the status of the community. The pattern of these associations can be suggestive of the expectations associated with civic patronage.

Taken as a whole, the evidence indicates that the two parties were resourceful and flexible both in the use of the institution and about how the relationship should be commemorated. In some cases the communities could only (so they may have believed) gain a benefaction through the

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[3] Note the case of Nonius Balbus discussed at length in Representative Texts, G, and elsewhere in this volume. See the Index of Persons for the locations. One inscription records his benefactions but says nothing of his formal *patrocinium*; the other records the formal title, but mentions no benefactions. This pattern may have been common.

establishment of formal *patrocinium*. In other cases, the two parties may have reached an agreement without institutionalizing the relationship. So, too, the patron may have accepted the honor without feeling much obligation to do anything specific or, alternatively, the community may have felt it had gained something just by adding the name of the patron to its formal list of protectors and vice versa. In brief: the epigraphical evidence offers some indication about the range of patronal activity and about the needs of the client communities; it also offers some indication of the kinds of individuals communities sought as formal patrons and some indication of the kinds of communities members of the elite felt were worthy of their patronage. Even if there can be few definitive answers to the questions associated with expectation and/or performance, the study of the data has value in that it points to the ability of civic patronage to play many different roles in many different situations. Moreover, the collection of factors associated with patronage provides information on a variety of other questions about civic life and public honors. Finally, the epigraphical data on patronal activity balances and supplements that of the literary evidence. The treatises of Seneca as well as the letters of Pliny and of Fronto were written in an environment in which public service played a prominent role in the definition (and justification) of prestige and wealth in the Principate and many of the services provided are consistent with those described by Caesar and Q. Oppius in 2.3 and 2.5 (also in Representative Texts, J and K). The epigraphical evidence allows us to gain insight into how the Romans translated ideals into practice. That is, the literary and epigraphical evidence do complement one another. Just as Caesar's list of benefactions conferred on the provincials of Further Spain complements the words of Q. Oppius to the city of Aphrodisias, so, too do the benefactions recorded by Pliny and Fronto complement the epigraphical evidence discussed here.

7.1. *General Characteristics of the Data*

A word of caution is appropriate here on the specific numbers. As many of the inscriptions are incomplete and not consistent about what they record, different scholars will of course make different decisions about how dates and services are tabulated. I am providing here what appears to be exact numbers, but they cannot be construed as more than a momentary consensus. Other scholars, new discoveries and re-interpretation of known ones will inevitably yield different results. The reader does then need to understand that we are looking for patterns and not for exact figures. I have then



Table 7.1: Patrons by date (1 = Senatorial; 2 = equestrian; 3 = decurial status)

opted to give an apparently exact number, but to indicate the range of uncertainty with a ± sign. Hence, for example, 325 [±10] suggests that another tabulation might yield results between 315 and 335. Even given this range, the general trends in the data are recognizable.

Three tables illustrate different perspectives of this pattern. Table 7.1 has the data for incidence of civic patronage over time and by status. Table 7.2, on the "Epigraphic Habit", provides the context for understanding the changes over time. Table 7.3 arranges the data by time and place, comparing the patterns of Italy to the provinces.

It is readily observable in the epigraphical record (Table 7.1) of the Early Principate that there is a slow but steady rise in the absolute number of surviving inscriptions relating to civic patronage. In the third century, the curve peaks and then levels off.

In most cases we cannot be certain when an individual became the patron of a town. The *tabulae patronatus* do indeed give the specific year when a decree was passed to ask an individual to become patron. But such cases are rare. Moreover, the *cursus honorum* does not provide much guidance because the references to civic patronage generally stand outside the standard sequence of offices. Hence, even when we have confidence



Table 7.2: "The Epigraphic Habit"

This table is based on data provided by S. Mrozek and has been derived from a sample of 1680 dated inscriptions from all over the Latin speaking empire. Recorded here is the number of such inscriptions per year for various emperors.

about the date of a consulate we do not know when the relationship was established. Hence, the dates provided for senators (Category 1 in table 7.1) have to be expressed in terms of a lifetime ± 30 years.

This uncertainty is especially marked for non-senators whose dates are much more difficult to determine. The range for equestrians and decurions, Categories 2 and 3 respectively may be ± 40 years.

As to the context for these curves, Mrozek has studied the fluctuations in the "epigraphic habit" by examining a sample of 1680 inscriptions from the West.[4] His curve (Figure 7.2) indicates a slow rise in the number of dated inscriptions from the time of Augustus through the Flavians, followed by a sharper rise from 117 through the death of Commodus, and then a distinct 'peak' for the Severans, followed by a sharp decline into the mid third century. This pattern is reasonably consistent with the one identified above for civic patronage and suggests that the epigraphical recording of civic patronage is associated with the epigraphic 'habit'.[5]

[4] A propos de la repartition chronologique des inscriptions Latines dans le haut-empire, *Epigraphica* 35 (1973) 113–118.

[5] On the 'epigraphic habit' and the analysis of the data on civic patronage, see Eilers, Roman Patrons, 167–170, and the appendix to this chapter.

Table 7.3: Patrons by Period: The Numbers

Area/Time	I 27 BC–AD 37	II 38–117	III 118–193	IV 194–262
Italy	25	55	218	180
Provinces	29	45	124	116
Totals	54	100	342	296



The use of raw numbers, however, can be deceptive. Many of the inscriptions relating to civic patronage are difficult to date with certainty, hence arranging the cases by dynasty (7.1) compounds the speculative nature of the study. The arrangement in blocks of approximately 80 years (7.3) may be less precise, but more representative of the general trend. Even so, the material is biased in favor of senators (who can usually be dated more accurately) over decurions. Regardless of how one selects and arranges the data (here comparing civic patronage in Italy and in the provinces), one comes to roughly the same result: the number of surviving epigraphical attestations of patronage rises slowly during the first century, peaks in the second and then declines in the third, though to the level of the first century.

The most significant point is that there are four times as many epigraphical references to patrons in the period between Hadrian and the mid 3rd Century (Periods III and IV with 636 cases) as in period between Augustus and Trajan (I and II with 156).

It is important to bear in mind that there are whole classes of inscriptions that to do not conform to this distribution pattern. For example, dated imperial inscriptions from Italy and from Africa have, as Duncan-Jones has noted, distinctly different curves.[6]

[6] *Economy of the Roman Empire*, 351 ff.

There are three other indications that suggest that the epigraphical pattern of civic patronage was closely associated with the epigraphic habit. First, in those areas with a high concentration of inscriptions, in Africa and in Italy, the percentage of patrons constitutes about 1.35 % of the total number of inscriptions in *CIL* (Africa: 28085 and 403; Italy 35912 and 478). If the sample were restricted to Africa *proconsularis* and to *regio* I (areas with the greatest number of inscriptions), the percentages are still higher. Second, in those areas with a low incidence of (surviving) inscriptions, for example the Danube provinces from Raetia to Moesia, the percentage of references to civic patronage is about 0.26 % (5766 and 15). In Britain, there are no cases of patronage (1355 and 0). Third, in areas with intermediate concentrations of inscriptions, for example Iberia and Narbonensis, the percentages are also in the intermediate range 0.64 % (6350 and 41) and 0.35 (6025 and 21), respectively.

To generalize from these data, there is a relatively close correlation between the epigraphical habit, the incidence of patronage and the level of urbanization. Even if this broad pattern is clear and consistent, it does not follow that the epigraphical record on patronage and the actual practice of the institution were parallel. That is, it is possible that communities in some parts of the empire recorded the honor on more perishable materials, wood or metal, rather than on stone. With some caution we may nonetheless conclude that there was some connection between the incidence of civic patronage, the recording of that relationship on stone, and the epigraphical habit.

The data also reveal a number of specific characteristics. First, the overwhelming majority of the client communities were citizen communities. It has been argued above in Chs. 3 (on Augustus) and 6 (on civic patronage in Roman law) that peregrine communities may have been discouraged from appointing civic patrons or, alternatively, looked consistently to the emperor to provide the protection and benefactions they had once received (or hoped to receive) from their patrons. Admittedly, there are, as Longfellow and Zuiderhoeck have argued, many cases of 'civic patronage' in the Greek speaking cities of Asia Minor (Zuiderhoeck lists 514 of them), but we cannot say that they involve *patrocinium publicum* in the conventional Roman sense.[7] Whatever the case, the practice of *patrocinium publicum* as

[7] On this subject, see Ch. 3 (Augustus), Eilers, and Engelbert Winter, *Staatliche Baupolitik und Baufürsorge in den römischen Provinzen des kaiserlichen Kleinasiens*, Bonn (Habelt, 1996), and *Roman Imperialism and Civic Patronage: Form, Meaning and Ideology in Monumental*

civic patronage in the Principate was closely associated with, or even a characteristic feature of, citizen status of the community.

Second, the great majority of the inscriptions (about 70%) are honorific in character. That is, the inscriptions were erected in (and often by) the client community to honor the patron.[8] This is a significant point because it suggests that the public display of the fact of civic patronage was more important to the client than it was to the patron. Note, however, that the client community could and probably did provide the patron with a bronze *tabula* that could be displayed in the latter's *domus* (... *patronum ... se cooptari, tabula ... incisa hoc decreto in domo sua posita permittat*, *CIL* 6, 1492 = *ILS* 6106; note also the set of four bronze inscriptions found at one location in Italy but recording the African clients of Silius Aviola, *CIL* 5, 4919–4922). This is consistent with the ideas outlined by Seneca in respect to the appropriate response of those who have received a benefaction (Ch. 4.1).

Third, epigraphical references to the fact of civic patronage are typically placed outside the normal *cursus* and can take several forms.[9] This point is significant because it indicates that senatorial and equestrian patrons, though ready to record the names of their civic clients amongst other honors, did not consider the honor to be an element of their formal *cursus*. The consequence is that we have little or no indication of the date of cooption in the context of the patron's career (in contrast, *curatoria* of communities are placed within the *cursus* and are, therefore datable at least in a relative sense). That the attestation of patronage is frequently placed outside the *cursus* should not be construed to mean that the institution was of little importance to either party, but rather that it retained much of its flexible character and that the relationship could be initiated at any point in the career.

Fourth, there is good reason to believe that all patrons of the community also were considered members of the local *ordo*. This is demonstrated not only by the inclusion of patrons on the municipal *album* (which claims to list the decurions) of Canusium, but also by the fact that the verb *cooptare* is used to describe admission into the local *ordo decurionum*.[10]

Fountain Complexes, Cambridge (University Press, 2010) and *The Politics of Munificence in the Roman Empire, Citizens, Elites and Benefactors in Asia Minor*, Cambridge (University Press, 2009). Both Zuiderhoeck and Longfellow use the term 'civic patronage' to include all forms of benefaction and go well beyond the criteria employed for generating the data in the CWS.

[8] Duthoy, Observations, 295, and below sections 7.5 and 7.6.

[9] Duthoy, Observations, 299 f.

[10] This aspect of the problem is developed more fully in Ch. 8. *Collegia* also used the same term to describe a similar admission process.

Fifth, regarding the relative certainty of dates, even in the period when the number of cases is comparatively high, (after A.D., 118) only about 60% of the patrons can be securely dated within +/- 35 years (of 638 cases, 379), while 40% (257) can not. Within this period, senators are more easily datable than are decurions and equestrians; of 260 senators, 211 (81%) can be dated.[11] Of the 376 decurions and equestrians, only 168 (46%) can be so dated. The fact that patrons of decurial rank are decisively more difficult to date makes it somewhat problematic to compare the two groups based on 'certain date' alone.[12]

7.2. *Some Regional Variations*

Regarding the Italian pattern, Table 7.3: The most notable feature of the municipal patronage in Italy is the density of patrons in *regio I* (the area extending south of Rome to Paestum). Of the 478 Italian cases, 141 come from this area. This same pattern may be extended also to central Italy as a unit; for the *regiones I, IV, V, VI* and *VII*, we find 315 of the 478 Italian patrons. Note that 39 of the remaining 61 are recorded on the *Album Canusinum* (in *regio III*). That is, about three-fourths of the cases are from Central Italy, the most urbanized part of the peninsula.

Regarding the provincial pattern (and here the emphasis is primarily on what we observe in the Latin speaking provinces of the Roman Empire): There is a degree of consistency between the raw numbers and the incidence of patrons in the epigraphical record. In those areas where the former are high, so too is the latter. Hence, Africa has two-thirds of known provincial cases (203) of patronage and also a very high incidence (1.43% of all Latin inscriptions). Iberia has 41 cases and an incidence of 0.64%. It is less clear why other areas, *Belgica*, the Rhine areas of *Germaniae Superioris* and *Inferioris* and *Britannia* have no cases at all. That they were military districts with a particular connection to the emperor cannot be an explanation as *Numidia* and *Moesia*, for example, had a roughly similar status and do have cases of municipal patronage. That the level of urbanization was less dense than it was in other parts of the empire may be part of the explanation, but the Rhine valley was not, for example, less urbanized than other parts of the empire where patrons are attested. There are two other

[11] Includes the 31 senators from Canusium.
[12] On the criteria for dating inscriptions, see also the comments on Table 7.1.

explanations. Werner Eck notes that the Rhine area in general has few of the honorary inscriptions found, for example, in Italy and Africa. Hence, individuals may have been honored in the northern provinces in a manner that differed from the practise in other parts of the empire. It may well be that these areas preferred to use metal or wood for this purpose, that is, they used materials which have not survived.[13] In sum, the epigraphical pattern (or lack thereof) may reflect regional and/or native traditions in both the selection of material as well as style of commemoration. Alternatively, it is possible that municipalities in these areas simply did not feel the need for civic patrons. The latter explanation strikes me as unlikely: In other respects, Roman communities in the north emulated the civic institutions found in Italy, but substituted wooden *alba* for stone and bronze when the honored coopted patrons.

7.3. *Observations on the Rank of the Patron and Status of the Client*

During the middle and late republic, the patronage of communities involved primarily, but not exclusively, Roman senators as patrons and client communities of both peregrine and citizen status. Because the function of patronage was to secure for the community the *benevolentia* and services of a powerful outsider, it would hardly been necessary to make a fellow citizen the formal patron. What we find in the epigraphical record of the Principate is quite different.[14]

There are several striking aspects of the epigraphical material of the Principate. The first is the fact that, in strong contrast to the pattern of the late Republic, patronage of peregrine communities becomes comparatively rare. Indeed, as will be argued here, formal patronage was a *de facto* if not *de iure* privilege of citizen communities. This transformation may be connected to the Augustan reforms of AD 11–12, which apparently made it difficult for senators to accept at least some public honors from such communities. It was not until the end of the Severan period that the situation changed again.[15]

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[13] The former was susceptible to re-use and corrosion, the latter to disintegration.

[14] Though there are a substantial number of epigraphical references to in the Greek and Latin corpora, the evidence on the Republican tradition is based primarily, thought not exclusively, on the literary record rather than the epigraphical.

[15] An inscription (*AE* 1981, 640) dating to ca. 145 in honor of M. Sedatius C.f. Julius Rufinus Severianus, cos. suff. in 153 (here No. 679), identifies him as quaestor and as patron of a *civitas* Ca[durcorum?] in Aquitania. This is the first such case since Augustus of a senatorial

Second, about half of the epigraphical finds involve members of the equestrian and decurial order. As noted, we have no indication in the literary evidence of the Republic that there was any particular preference for patrons of these ranks (Ch. 2.4). Third (and what follows from points one and two) peregrine communities down to Severus usually adopted as patrons those who were members of the equestrian order. Fourth, formal patronage of peregrine communities is closely associated with the change in status of a provincial community. Fifth, the preference for patrons of a particular rank depends upon the legal history of the community within the empire. Each of these points needs some discussion.

The most difficult aspect of this discussion is the definition of the status of a provincial community at any one time. There is considerable scholarly debate about the exact meaning of such words as *municipium* and *civitas*, *pagus*, *conventus*, and *oppidum*, between full citizenship and the various shades of the "Latin right".[16] To review the material in brief: there is no question about the fact that a *colonia* consists of full Roman citizens. A *pagus*, too, included full Roman citizens settled among non-citizens. More difficult, and especially in the provinces, is the meaning of *oppidum civium Romanorum* and of *municipium*. Do these terms refer to urban centers of full citizens or of half citizens in an otherwise peregrine commune? Sherwin-White suggests that there must have been considerable variation not only between provinces, but also among communities within the same province.[17] Whether the community enjoyed the *ius Latii* or full Roman citizenship is not critical for this argument because the town council consisting of Roman citizens would have made the decision about whom to coopt as patron. Hence, for purposes of this discussion, "citizen community" must be taken broadly.

Citizen communities are, for purposes of this discussion, divided into three groups. First, there is a large group of communities who already possessed citizen status by the end of the Principate of Augustus and includes all the communities of Italy, regardless of their form or legal title. A second group embraces a number of communities in the provinces such as Italica in

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patron of what is apparently a peregrine community. The rest date to after 190, but note the arguments of Eilers, Ch. VII. On the status of Keltic communes, Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, 367 ff.

[16] On the problem, Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship* 337 ff. and M. Crawford, Roman Towns and Their Charters: Legislation and Experience, *PBA* 86, 421 ff. = *Development of Towns in Iberia*.

[17] Sherwin-White, 360 ff.

Baetica and Utica in *Africa proconsularis*.[18] The legal status and ethnic composition of these communities varied enormously—at least in terms of their origins. Some of these were well-established settlements of Italian immigrants; others were more recent and consisted primarily of veterans. Some of these communities were primarily composed of Romanized natives (like Gades); in others, the Roman citizens remained in a *pagus* with a (loose) association to the native *civitas* (Thugga).

Under the Flavians, the *ius Latii* was extended to those Iberian communities that organized themselves on municipal lines. In Africa the same process was initiated by Hadrian, if not earlier, and then advanced by the Severans. By 237, the overwhelming majority of African towns with patrons had at least the Latin right and many had achieved colonial status.

The pattern of cooptation varies with the status and composition of these communities. In general, those communities that had been established before the death of Augustus and that had a significant component of Italians and veterans, tended to coopt patrons from the ranks of their own citizens. Those communities that received citizenship later and had a large component of natives tended to prefer patrons of senatorial rank.

Some examples may illustrate this point. In order to make sense of the data, only those communities with at least three patrons are considered. In Africa *proconsularis*, Gigthis was a native *civitas* that had received the *ius Latii* from Hadrian and then became a *municipium* under Pius. Six patrons are recorded and all are senators. Half of them can be dated to the Principate of Pius, suggesting that they (the patrons) may have played some role in the acquisition of municipal status. Two of these three are certainly not natives. In the third century, we also have three senatorial patrons and at least two of them appear to be natives of Gigthis. This case is a good example of how the selection of patrons changes as the community Romanizes. To be able to coopt native sons as formal patrons, just as Italian communities had been doing, is the mark of *Romanitas*. Thugga was a wealthy *pagus* of Roman citizens under Augustus. It became a *municipium* under Severus Alexander and then a colony in 262. We know of twenty-two patrons from this town. All of them date to the period before Severus Alexander, all are locals and not one of them is a senator.[19] Clearly Thugga did not need to

[18] Surveyed by Sherwin-White, 344 ff.

[19] Uchi maius, also in *proconsularis*, had a similar history, composition and pattern of patronage.

rely on outsiders and senators to the same degree as did Gigthis.[20] Indeed, the needs of the community in respect to benefaction may have been quite different.[21]

These two examples do admittedly represent the extremes in the range of possibilities, but, it should be noted, other towns, like Bulla *Regia*, Bisica and Calama, have similar histories and a somewhat more even mix of senators and equestrians, of locals and outsiders.[22] What they have in common is the fact that no patron can be dated to a period before the community achieved municipal or colonial status.

In Numidia, the situation is very different. The colonies of veterans, like Thamugadi, Cuicul and Diana, have a clear preference for senators and senatorial governors, as does the older colony of Cirta.[23] Of the 50 municipal patrons of Numidia all but three are senators and all three date to the late second or early third century. There is, however, a good mixture of patrons of local and non-local origin. This pattern suggests that the history of the province as a military district may have been the decisive factor in establishing a pattern that favored senators. How this might have worked is however not at all clear.

The major towns of Mauretania, Banasa and Volubilis, achieved citizen status under Augustus and Claudius respectively. They too selected patrons from all three ranks. Notable is that patrons of senatorial status date to the period before 138 and patrons of equestrian and decurial status to the late second and early third century. This distribution may indicate a preference for administrative brokerage early, followed by a preference for material benefaction later and assumes that the benefactions of decurions were primarily material in character (buildings, etc.).

The evidence for the Iberian provinces is not as abundant as it is in Africa. Only Acinipo and Italica, both in Baetica, have at least three patrons.[24] The former is a *civitas* that achieved municipal status by 100. It has three patrons of decurial status and local origin but all date to the third century, that is to

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20 The *pagus* at Thugga had close ties with Carthage and may have used these connections to satisfy its need for mediation with the central government.

21 The Epigraphical Index in the online database (= Companion Web Site) provides a list of patrons and known benefactions for each community.

22 They have four, three and four cases of patronage respectively.

23 On this city and its history in this period, E. Champlin, *Fronto and Antonine Rome*, Cambridge (HarvardUP 1980), Ch. 1, esp. 10f.

24 Some communities have more, but the patrons include members of the imperial family and are not relevant to this section.

a time when Acinipo had had the Latin right for at least 150 years. Italica has patrons of mixed ranks but they also date to the third century.

For the Gallic provinces there are very few communities with three or more patrons. Lugdunum has three, Aquae Sextiae five, Vienna three. All of the cases date to the second century, have an even distribution by rank, and a clear preference for patrons of local origin.

The major cities of the Balkan and Danube provinces, towns like Sarmizegetusa and Salona, are Roman colonies with fairly even mixture of patrons by rank. The origins of these patrons are not known.

In sum, patrons of senatorial status are especially frequent in the period immediately after a peregrine community gained at least Latin status, or improved its status. It is likely that the patrons, prospectively or retrospectively, played some role in that process. Indeed, in the provinces this *officium* (and judicial representation[25]) may well have been one of the primary functions of patrons of senatorial rank with connections to the central government. Once the community had obtained at least Latin status, there was a gradual replacement of outsiders by locals and of senators by decurions. Those senators who were coopted tended to be of regional or local origin. As Romanization proceeded, there was a gradual narrowing of the differences in the pattern of cooptation as practiced in Italy and in the provinces.

For a variety of reasons (outlined here and in Chs. 4 and 6), most peregrine communities probably found it difficult to acquire senators as formal patrons. Instead, they relied, or were forced to rely, on the good will and services of equestrians with fiscal and political resources. It is important to recall that imperial legislation and the municipal charters nowhere mention any restriction on the cooption of equestrians. Even then, the number of surviving cases is small. At best nine cases may be produced, four of which are bronze *tabulae patronatus* and relate to one individual, Silius Aviola.[26] The question is: Is Silius typical or atypical? If the former, then it would appear that peregrine communities honored their patrons with bronze tablets summarizing the decree of cooptation and presented to the patron to display at his residence (e.g., *ILS* 6106: *tabula ... incisa hoc decreto in domo sua posita*). The lack of references to such patrons may then be governed by factors relevant to the survival of bronze and not to the rarity of this kind of connection and commemoration.[27]

[25] Note the arguments in Ch. 4.

[26] They were all found together near Brixia, perhaps at the villa of Aviola.

[27] It also raises the question of whether peregrine communities might have honored senatorial patrons in the same manner.

In terms of the larger historical implications, we can identify then two phases during which civic patronage affected the process of Romanization. During the Principate (and especially after Trajan), peregrine communities in transition to citizenship needed mediators of senatorial rank to secure a higher status; the primary benefactions then would have involved successful mediation at the central level and, once the status changed, could lead to formal *patronatus*. Thereafter, communities turned increasingly to patrons of decurial status and local origin; whose primary benefactions consisted of a variety of urban amenities (see below 7.5.2–4). The different patterns demonstrate the suppleness of patronage as an institution. Communities in various stages of urban and legal development looked, or were forced to look, to different kinds of individuals for protection and assistance. Individuals of equestrian and decurial rank, who apparently played a minor role in municipal patronage in the late republic, emerge in the empire as the near equals (at least in terms of numbers) of senators. The implication is that these individuals of different ranks provided different kinds of services. This issue will be explored more fully below in the section on benefaction (7.5)

By the end of the reign of Augustus, the communities of Italy had achieved, in comparison to provincial communities, a relatively high degree of cultural and legal homogeneity. It comes as no surprise then that the distribution of patrons by rank does not vary in any substantial way throughout the Italian regions. Though there are discrepancies between the evidence of the *alba* and of the individual finds, it appears that there was a rough parity of patrons by status. That is, there were about as many senatorial patrons as there were patrons of decurial and equestrian rank (as a group) throughout the Principate. In what follows, I intend to survey the evidence beginning at Rome and then moving to *Regio* I (from Rome to Salernum), to the two regions of southern Italy (II and III) and then to those of central Italy (IV–VII) and the north (VIII–XI).

Though a number of inscriptions relating to the patronage of communities have been found in Rome (that is, within the confines covered by *CIL* 6), there is, of course, no reference to anyone being the patron of Rome.[28] Note, however, that the title of *pater patriae* allowed the emperor to play this role.[29]

28 Note the references to this in the very late republic, Ch. 2.4.

29 This issue has been discussed in the Ch. 3.3.

Table 7.4: Patrons by Rank in the Italian *regiones* [data from the *album Canusinum* in regio III are included but given in brackets; estimated error: ±5]

Regiones	27 BC–AD 37		37–117		117–193		194–262	
	dec&eq	sen	dec&eq	sen	dec&eq	sen	dec&eq	sen
I	4	7	9	7	35	24	44	21
II–III	0	3	1	0	25	4	14 [31]	5 [8]
IV–VIII	5	6	12	10	74	16	35	14
VIII–XI	2	0	9	7	26	10	9	8

Regio I embraces about one-third of the total number of cases of municipal patronage in peninsular Italy. The epigraphical evidence reveals a slight preponderance of senators as the patrons of choice down to 37, equality between the two groups to 117 and then a distinct preference (by a 3:2 ratio) for decurions and equestrians to 262. Again, this pattern must be tempered by the data of the *alba* discussed in Ch. 8, and, hence, may (indeed probably does) under-represent the incidence of senatorial patronage.

Though the incidence of patronage may vary considerably between these *regiones*, the epigraphical pattern in the selection of patrons by rank is consistent with and supports the assumption about a relatively high cultural unity mentioned above. It should be noted, however, that the incidence of patronage is closely related to the density of urban centers in the various regions of Italy.

There is a pattern of particular interest here. Slightly more than half (251 of the 478) of the cases of Italian patronage involve individuals who were the patrons of their *patriae*. Of these, 62% of the decurions and equestrians who became patrons became patrons of their *patriae* (187 of the 303). The validity of these figures is confirmed by the fact that 5 of 8 (or 62%) patrons of equestrian rank at Canusium appear to be natives of that town.[30] These data suggest that the institution served equally to encourage the *benevolentia* of locals as well as to win that of outsiders.

For senators the pattern is strikingly different. Only 37%, or 64 cases of 175, involve senators who became patrons of their *patriae*. Moreover, very few cases can be dated to the period between AD 14 and 114. This phenomenon has been discussed earlier in connection with the significant

[30] Note again the importance of the album in providing a framework for the discussion of the individual finds.

benefactions that Pliny conferred on his *patria* without apparently becoming its formal patron (2.4.2). If senators and their *patriae* did not feel it necessary to establish patronal relations in the 1st cent., neither did they feel any hesitation in the second. Such a pattern suggests that the expectations about civic patronage were changing. The relationship was not just a way to secure the goodwill of outsiders, but also a device to reward and/or encourage the local elite to engage in supporting the community.

In general, there is, as argued in earlier chapters, good reason to believe that communities sought patrons of senatorial status and did so for the same reasons articulated by Caesar and Q. Oppius, Representative Texts J and K. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that communities of significance, like Canusium, were able to acquire a significant number of them (50% of the total; and up to 15 of them at any one time in the early 3rd century). Equestrians in the imperial service were also desirable as patrons; variations in rank, perceived influence, and resources probably determined the frequency with which they were coopted.[31] It was a much more difficult task for the decurion to acquire the honor and only a small percentage of them achieved it (for the specifics, please turn to the Companion Web Site).

7.4. *Municipal Patrons of Other Ranks*

To this point in the study, the emphasis has been on municipal patrons of senatorial, equestrian and decurial rank. These groups produced well over 800 epigraphically attested patrons during the period covered here. There are, however, another nineteen cases that involve imperial freedmen (2), client kings (3) as well as women of senatorial, equestrian and decurial status (14). These cases are of considerable interest because of the assumptions they make about the perception of municipal patronage. Each requires a separate discussion.

7.4.1. *Women as Civic patrons*

The epigraphical evidence indicates that women were major municipal benefactors in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds.[32] In terms of formal

[31] The relationship between imperial office and patronage will be explored below.

[32] The main points of this discussion are developed more fully in my article, *Patrona Civitatis*: Gender and Civic Patronage, *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History 5*, Bruxelles, 1989, 117–142. Also E.A. Hemelrijk, "City patronesses in the Roman Empire", Historia 53 (2004): 209–245. A useful list of benefactions of both men and women may be found in Duncan-Jones, Economy, Part 2.

patronage, however, we have no case of a municipal *patrona* before the Severan era. There are thirteen legitimate cases of this phenomenon and, though the chronology is often unclear, at least half of the cooptions probably took place before 262.

Geographically, these cases are restricted to central Italy and to North Africa. In light of the fact that the overwhelming majority of cases of municipal patronage also come from these areas, this might be expected. Indeed, there appears to be a loose connection between the frequency of patronage and the readiness to assume a patron with a non-traditional background. Significant, too, is the fact that in 3rd century Africa, one patron in eight was a woman (ten of eighty cases); in Italy, during the same period the ratio is one in twenty-five (four of one hundred cases). *Africa proconsularis* and *Numidia* would appear then to have a special conception of the function and position of the patron, one not shared perhaps by other provinces.

Regarding the evidence from *Africa proconsularis*, where the evidence is the fullest, all the cases involve women of senatorial status (*feminae clarissimae*) and most also bore the title *femina consularis*, that is, they belonged to the very highest level of the imperial and provincial elite. In Italy, on the other hand, the rank of the women is variously senatorial or equestrian and corresponds more closely to the divisions already noted for men of the era. The prominence of males in all these texts probably served to reinforce the dynastic claims of these elite families. For example, L. Accius Julianus, consul in an uncertain year in the 3rd century, his wife Gallonia and their two daughters are honored as *patroni perpetui* at Utica (see the online index, CWS, of patrons for more information).

But women were also honored for their individual achievements. Consider the magnificent bronze *tabula* recording the cooption of Nummia Varia at Peltuinum (*ILS* 6110). Though her parents are indeed mentioned in a vague way and not by name, the text praises her unique *benevolentia*.

It is not my intention to repeat the argument made elsewhere except to point out that the acceptability of women to receive this public honor suggests a shift in the perception of the honor and of who might be worthy to receive it.[33] That women were honored as municipal patrons may have been facilitated by the development of the office of *curator*. That is, the *curator* may have assumed some of the functions traditionally associated with civic patronage and allowed the latter honor to be interpreted more loosely (in terms of gender) than had been possible earlier. It is also noteworthy that

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[33] The case has been made in the above cited article on *patrona civitatis*.

the phenomenon appears first under the Severans, under that very dynasty which devoted so much public attention to the female members of the dynasty and that the phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the African provinces.

It is apparent then that there were regional variations in the practice of municipal patronage. What was fairly common in the Punic provinces of the 3rd century (*patronae*) was unacceptable, or more accurately, is unattested in the Keltic and Germanic ones. Cause and effect are however not at all clear. Epigraphical habit and local practice may well have been of greater significance than any underlying cultural differences.

This is not the only change in the practice of patronage datable to the Severan period. It is also, as noted earlier, the time when we find the first references to the title of *patronus provinicae*.[34]

7.4.2. *Freedmen as Civic Patrons*

Three freedmen are attested to have become patrons of municipalities.[35] The earliest is M. Licinius Tyrannus who dates to the reign of Tiberius and was patron of the *pagus* of Thugga in Africa *proconsularis*. The second one is a certain Natalis who became patron of Bovilliae in Italy at an indeterminable time probably during the reign of Hadrian.[36] The third is M. Aurelius Sabinianus, the patron of Anagnia sometime during the first half of the third century.

Though the number of cases is not great, the temporal and geographical distribution suggests that it was indeed possible for a freedman to become the patron of a citizen community. Two of the three cases (Natalis and Sabinianus) involve imperial freedmen who had adopted Italian towns of the *regio* I as their *patriae*. Both of these men probably owed their cooption to their personal wealth and to their connections in the imperial house—illustrating that the communities valued influence in high places. The third and earliest, Licinius Tyrannus, was neither an imperial freedman nor was he coopted by an Italian community. His generosity in restoring a temple at his own cost must have been the contributing factor. None of these men is known to have held any other significant municipal offices. Indeed, their status may have made this impossible.

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34 For a list, Harmand, 411. *CIL* 8, 9368; *AE* 1983 129 (C. Julius Silvanus Melanio).

35 Nos. 113, 388 and 719 in the CWS database.

36 The date depends upon the office he held, *a censibus*. Engesser, 191; cf. Pflaum, *procurateurs*, 60.

As is the case with *patronae*, the willingness of even a small number of communities to adopt a freedman as a patron testifies to the generally flexible perception of the institution in regards to the status of the person coopted. The number of cases is, however, very small. The reason why the phenomenon is rare is not difficult to guess. To have coopted too many freedmen might have reduced the prestige of the honor and made it more difficult to secure the services and resources of senators and equestrians.

7.4.3. *Client Kings as Municipal Patrons*

Three patrons of communities were client kings: Juba, the Mauretanian king and grandson of M. Antonius and Cleopatra, was the patron of his capital, Caesarea, and of Carthago Nova in the *Tarraconensis* during the latter years of Augustus' principate (Nos. 340 and 341). His son, Ptolemaeus (No. 559), was also patron of Caesarea until Gaius had him executed in ca. 40 (Dio 59, 25.1).

In this category the small number of cases is probably due to the limited number of client kings and princes in the western provinces after Claudius. During the Flavian period (and before) many of the chieftains of the subjugated tribes obtained *viritim* allotments of citizenship and would no longer have designated themselves as '*rex*' on inscriptions. A good example of this pattern was the infamous Julius Civilis. He was of royal descent (*regia stirpe*) and the commander of the Batavians cohorts during the disturbances of 69 (Tac. *Hist.* 4, 13). Tacitus mentions a number of other cases including Julius Paulus and Julius Classicus (*nobilitate opibusque ante alios: regius illi genus et pace belloque clara origo*, *Hist.* 4, 55).

In general, these cases suggest that one cannot presume that there were any hard and fast rules about the status of the patron of a community. There certainly are general patterns, but there are also enough variations to indicate that the Romans felt free to work on or beyond the limits of the usual. Patronage of communities was exercised with considerable latitude.

7.5. *Benefactions*

The central interest of any study of patronage is the definition of the goods and services exchanged by the two parties. Any discussion of this issue is however fraught with difficulties. It is a fundamental misconception to associate a particular benefaction with formal cooptation. For a variety of reasons, the system simply did not work that way. Consider the nature of the evidence. Well over half of the texts that refer to the fact of patron-

age give no direct indication as to what services had been performed by (or were expected of) the patron. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of inscriptions with references to patronage were not set up to commemorate cooption specifically. Many are funeral in character and, though they record proudly the titles of the individuals (including patronage of the community), they are not concerned to recount benefactions conferred on one or more communities. More significant is the possibility that many of the publicly authorized inscriptions may have been set up not necessarily to show gratitude for benefaction(s), but rather to encourage generosity. In the case of Pliny (Ch. 4.2) that the temple was offered only after years of public celebration of his person. Finally, when benefaction is mentioned, the formulations stress generalities rather than specific items of exchange.

In what follows the focus is primarily on material benefaction, on the construction of public buildings and monuments, etc. Nonetheless, services, such as those described by Caesar and Oppius (Representative Text, J and K) were equally offered by Pliny and by Fronto.

7.5.1. *The Preference for Generalities*

These points may be demonstrated by reviewing some typical examples of the surviving inscriptions.

> *L. Lollio L. f. L. n. L. pron. Cor. Lollio Marciano equo publico ornato patrono col. omnibus hon. functo Futia C. f. Longina mater filio piisimo …* (*CIL* 10, 110 from Croton, Italia III)

> *L. Naevio L. f. Vel. Frontoni pat. mun. et collegior. collegium fabrum et centonarior.* (*CIL* 9, 5653 from Trea, Italia V)

> *P. Metilio P. f. Fal. Tertullino Vennoniano c.v. Laur. Lavin. quaestori designato patrono plebs urbana Albingaunenses l.d.d.d.* (*CIL* 5, 7782 from Albingaunum, Italia XI)

> *M. Memmio Caeciliano c.v. patrono Gigthenses publice d.d.p.p.* (*CIL* 8,22718 from Gigthis in Africa *proconsularis*)

The first text is funerary and set up by the mother of the deceased. Though the patronage of the *colonia* is one of several important elements in Lollius' career, there is no indication of his benefactions. Naevius was the patron of Trea and of at least one *collegium*; it is the *collegium* not the community that provided the inscription. Again, there is no indication of his benefaction(s). The honors for Tertullinus and Caecilianus were authorized by decrees of the decurions and possess an official character different from the first two. Even so, there is no reference to benefactions. Tertullinus, to judge by the failure to mention other than junior honors, was at the beginning of his

senatorial career; hence it is probable that he, as Pliny at Tifernum, had been coopted in anticipation of benefactions. The text, however, provides no indication of services rendered or anticipated. The dedication to Caecilianus mentions the fact of senatorial status, but makes no formal connection between rank and patronage.

Even those texts that mention benefaction are vague on the specifics. For example.

> *Sex. Minio Sex. f. Ter. Silvano aed IIvir II quinquenn ... patrono ob merita eius l.d.d.d.*

This form, *ob merita eius*, is the most common reference to the services provided by patrons. It appears more than sixty times and in many variations (but only eleven times in reference to senators). Typically, it is not clear whether the monument is an expression of general appreciation of the achievements of Silvanus (more likely) or specifically to commemorate his civic benefaction (less likely).

Ob merita is not the only formula used to suggest repeated benefactions. C. Paccius Felix is thanked by his *patria*, Casinum, for his *immensa beneficia* (*CIL* 10, 5200) and a certain Aurelius Hortentius (?) of Luceria for his *beneficia innumerabilia* (*CIL* 9, 807). Noteworthy, and at risk of being repetitious, is the lack of a clear connection between the inscription, as an honor in its own right, *beneficia* conferred, and *patrocinium publicum*. That the three concepts are related is reasonable, even it is not demonstrable.

There are very few cases (indeed I know of only two) in which there is a direct connection made between services and cooptation. *CIL* 12, 59, from Brigantio in the Alps, notes:

> *... eundemque (Marius) Maternum ob honores IIvirat. et flamoni bene gestos patronum cooptarunt Brigantes.*

and another one from Spoletium in *Regio* vi (*CIL* 11, 4815 = *ILS* 6638) records that:

> *hunc (C. Torasius C. f. Severus) ob merita eius erga rem publicam ordo decurionum patronum municipi adoptavit.*

Even in these two cases, the language stresses repeated benefactions (*honores ... bene gestos* and *merita*), not specific ones (like the construction of a temple). These two cases indicate that the clients were fully aware of the possibility of linking benefaction and cooptation, but they preferred to formulate the link in terms of continuing services. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that both cases involve local decurions.

The lack of specificity regarding benefaction, whether it takes the form of omission or simply vague formulation, was surely intentional and is consistent with the ideology of benefaction as outlined in Ch. 4. It was designed to reinforce the notion that the relationship involved continuing responsibilities for both parties and to ensure for the community the long-range support of individuals with power influence and resources. This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that those inscriptions which refer to the initiation of the relationship, the *tabulae patronatus*, and which might be expected to make reference to specific benefactions, prospective or retrospective, are equally vague on the specifics of exchange and stress instead the continuing nature of the obligation for future generations.[37]

In this respect patronage differs from the more simple exchange in benefaction when, for example, an individual makes a specific commitment to the community in return for which he receives a particular office. Duncan-Jones provides two useful lists of this form of benefaction.[38] The formula is quite distinct: *hic ob honorem ... promisisset or hic pro ... in rem publicam dedit*. In these cases exchange is specific: a project is undertaken, or funds for such a project are promised, in return for some office or honor in the community. It is critical to understand that the relationship is confined to the terms of the contract and does not automatically assume that further benefactions are expected or will be offered. Hence, communities had the right to go to court in order to force procrastinators to fulfill the promises made for public honors (*Dig*. 50, 12.1–3). As the patronal contract was worded in very general terms (Ch. 6.2), there was no legal recourse for the disappointed.

It is worth noting that the 514 cases of benefaction discussed by Zuiderhoeck and the fountains discussed by Longfellow are in this sense quite different from the pattern of *patrocinium publicum* discussed here. That is, benefaction [*euergesia*] in Asia Minor takes on a public form quite different from the unspecific character of formal civic patronage in the Latin west. Such differences suggest that 'civic patronage' in Asia Minor is more akin to an evolved program of civic benefaction and *euergesia* that dates back to the Hellenistic period.

Comparative studies of patronage have demonstrated that the lack of specificity in respect to benefaction is a characteristic phenomenon of the institution.[39] Indeed, and what needs to be stressed here, is that the degree to

37 On the formula, Nicols, "Tabulae" in *ANRW*.
38 *Economy*, 108 ff. and 215 ff., for Africa and Italy respectively.
39 Eisenstadt and Roniger, 248 ff.

which the responsibilities of the two parties have been generalized is a characteristic of long term 'clientelistic' relationships.[40] In my opinion, however, we must distinguish between actual performance and expectation. That is (regarding the latter), communities might use honors in general and that of patronage specifically to generate a sense of obligation in the patron. In this case, the client community could not specify services because it hoped to secure advantages over the longer-range. Patrons may not have shared the same commitment. Alternatively, if the honor were used discretely, it could also serve as a reward for a series of benefactions. Clearly, the status and the wealth of the patron, and the nature of the benefactions actual or potential, were significant factors in both scenarios but in the former, benefactions could not be specified.

7.5.2. *From the General to the Specific*

Though the inscriptions do not provide much information about the nature of the benefactions conferred by any particular patron, we do have a body of data that indicates both the range of activities and the attitudes and offices of those associated with the honor. The material may be divided into five categories (Table 7.5 provides a summary of benefactions). First, there are the very rare cases (noted above) when there is a connection made between benefaction(s) and cooptation. Second, there are cases when the inscriptions indicate at least one benefaction, but there is no direct connection made between the monument and cooption. Third, there are cases in which the administrative activities of the patron directly affected the life of the community and might be construed as benefactions, actual or potential, even then there is no suggestion of a connection between office and patronage. Fourth, there are those cases in which we have only vague formulations of patronal activity, *ob merita eius* for example. Fifth, and most common (about half of all cases), there is no indication whatsoever about what might have led to cooption.

In general, the most detailed information about the activities of patrons relates to those of decurial rank; with senators there is a distinct tendency to avoid specific references. This point, that rank is a factor in the epigraphical representation of benefaction in *patrocinium publicum*, has been observed before but needs to be demonstrated. For decurions and equestrians, 28 % of the inscriptions have some indication of benefaction, from the

[40] Eisenstadt and Roniger, 250 ff.

Table 7.5: Benefactions (grouped by category)[41]

Service	Incidence
None noted; none implied	320
None noted, but administrative implied	389
Administrative highly probable	18
Quies, defense	11
Curatorial	50
Ob merita	61
Beneficia (generalized)	23
Benevolentia, etc	19
Amor, *adfectio*	18
Water related: aqueduct, baths, etc	24
Other building activity	38
Annona, food, etc	9
Games	3
Change of status of client	3
Justice/advocate	9
Miscellaneous	7
Total	978

vague *ob merita* to the enumeration of specific buildings and structures. For senators, however, only 14% have any such indication of benefaction despite the fact that the dedications for senators are generally of a higher quality, contain more detailed information on the patron and community, and were more likely to be publicly authorized. The list given above should be understood only loosely as indicating the actual range of patronal activity. Ideally, patrons provided a variety of goods and services and did so in a manner that was (theoretically) appropriate both to their own resources and to the needs of their clients (cf. Ch. 4).[42] The online index (=CWS) to this study contains a complete listing of all known benefactions.

What can be said about the 320 cases in which there is no indication of benefaction? In many cases the inscription is simply incomplete and no judgment may be rendered. But what might one deduce about the other

[41] As many inscriptions refer to more than one service, the total of services exceeds the total of certain cases of civic patronage. For the details on this table please see the database on the CWS.

[42] Other lists of benefactions may be found in Eck, Die Präsenz senatorischer Familien in den Städten des Imperium Romanan bis zum späten 3.Jahrhundert, Festschrift Vittinghof, 283, and Duncan-Jones, *Economy*, esp. Part II and the various appendices.

more complete inscriptions on which one might expect some information? In such cases, anticipated benefaction (as in the case of Pliny at Tifernum) may well have compelled silence. In other cases, the two parties may have been content with a generalized statement of "mutual goodwill" as might arise when a wealthy individuals acquired land (through purchase, marriage, inheritance, etc) in a community in which he had no formal status. In still other cases (like that of Nonius Balbus), the benefactions were recorded in other ways or deemed unnecessary on the surviving text.

7.5.3. *Administrative Activities of the Patron*

The Romans, as argued in the Introduction to this study, accepted the principle that it administrators, especially imperial ones, had considerable discretion in the allocation of public resources. It would then be only natural for communities to secure their benevolence and patronage of those who enjoyed administrative powers in areas of local concern as we have seen with Caesar and Oppius, and also with Pliny and Fronto. In this sense, it matters not whether the formal cooptation preceded benefaction or vice versa.

There are however some significant problems here. There is no evidence pointing to a disposition of communities to coopt every imperial administrator who had discretionary power in the community. There is also no evidence that administrators routinely declined, graciously or not, the honors offered to them. Moreover, my reading of the *lex Malacitana* c. 61, suggests that in the Flavian period the cooption of a civic patron retained a 'special' character that had to be justified before the decurions (Ch. 6.2). That does not mean that imperial magistrates might have been offered *hospitium publicum* (as Curvius Silvanus, *quaestor pro praetore* was in Munigua and shown on the cover of this monograph) in a more routine manner, only that patronal status demanded a more formal process. But we have unfortunately no idea what the criteria may have been. Personal connections between one member of the community and the Roman magistrate may have played a role in some cases. So, too, a community seeking to elevate its status or to resolve disputes might have elected to opt one or even several patrons as did Gigthis or Cirta [as Fronto outlines, Ch. 4.3]. In brief, the evidence, ambiguous though it is, suggests that communities did not routinely offer patronal status to every imperial magistrate, and that magistrates did not routinely decline such honors. Such a conclusion is consistent with the evidence we have seen in this chapter, namely that the institution remained vital in part

because it appealed to and supported the expectations of each party, yet did not introduce any compelling necessity to act. Goodwill was sufficient.

In sum, one may imagine that a magistrate did not visit every community in his jurisdiction, but on the occasion when he did arrive the community may well have wished to make a positive impression by conferring some honor. In some cases, this might have been an honorary inscription commemorating the occasion, but the circumstances of the visit, perhaps to adjudicate a matter of importance to a community, might have led to more serious effort to secure the goodwill of the magistrate. In this case, *patronatus* may have been appropriate.

As over half of the patrons held some kind of administrative post involving oversight of the community, it is reasonable to believe that communities of the Principate were every bit as eager to secure the good will of those public officials who had the power to affect their lives as had been communities during the Republic. For example, for the period between Trajan and the middle of the 3rd Cent., 21 legates of Numidia are known to have been patron of at least one community in the province.[43] Though the pattern cannot be demonstrated so firmly in other parts of the empire, it is reasonable to believe that citizen communities elsewhere sought the same connection and did so for the same reasons. The range of administrative activity listed on the inscriptions is enormous varying from provincial governorships to the curatorial, from the fiscal to the legal. As civic patronage was construed as a long-term relationship, it would appear that in some cases the administrative assignment might have been determined by an existing relationship to a region or city as frequently happened with the appointment of *curatores*.[44] In other cases, the administrative activity was short term (one to three years), and consistent with the theoretical principles of patronage only in the sense that both wished to continue the relationship. If a liaison was established, it may have been the result of some striking benefaction such as driving off an invasion of Mauri (No. 685 = *CIL* 2, 2015 = *ILS*.1354a). In still other cases, the community may have believed that the connection would secure the good will of an individual with prospects (as was the case with Pliny and the town of Tifernum and with Pomponius Bassus and Ferentinum, *ILS*.6106), or represent the situation Pliny describes in his relationship with Firmum or the Baetici (Ch. 4). One point is clear and significant:

[43] Francois Jacques, *Le privilege de liberté*, Rome, 1984, 682 f.

[44] E.g., Jacques, Curateurs, No. 3 = *AE* 1972 153 [T. Pri]fernius [Paet]us, and many others, see below.

Table 7.6: Administrative Activities of Civic Patrons of Decurial / Equestrian Status.

	Number of Cases	Benefactions Recorded
quinquennales	119	90
IIvir/IVvir	40	22
Aedilicii	9	7
Decuriones	9	4

not all officials became patrons of communities they administered, which suggests that something special, real or desired, intensified the relationship and made the formal connection appropriate.

The administrative activity of patron in the client community varied by the rank of the former. Of the 360+ patrons of senatorial rank, only 12 held an offices in the client community (11 as *quinquennales*) and but nine held priesthoods. On the other hand, some 21 senators were both patrons and curators of the client community.

Municipal magistrates who became patrons belonged to the elite of Roman communities: 181 patrons are recorded to have held one or another of the offices in the decurial *cursus* in the town in which they were patron.[45] Of these 181 cases, 119 are recorded to have been *quinquennales*, that is to have reached the highest office the community had to offer, one which was available once in every five years. Most interesting, however is the fact that in 90 of these cases there is no indication whatever of any benefactions. Yet, to be elected to this office, a candidate must have shown himself to be a generous supporter of the community. Note that in Canusium five of the eight patrons are of equestrian rank and four of the five are listed among the *quinquennalicii*. On the other hand, only five of the eleven *quinquennalicii* are patrons. These two arguments make it quite clear that the title of *patronus* was extended to only a very exclusive group of equestrians and decurions, to individuals who must have performed exceptional services even if we do not know what those services might have been. The fact that patrons included individuals who had reached lower offices is not an argument against this thesis. The individuals in question may have inherited their status and not yet have reached the higher offices. The important point is that, at the time that the inscription was authorized, over 70 % of municipal patrons had already reached the two highest offices their

[45] Table 7.6. There are 458 patrons of equestrian and decurial class but many were patrons in towns that were not their *patria*.

communities had to bestow, a conclusion that is consistent with the documents in Representative Texts, I.1–3).

When a patron of senatorial status is administratively active in a region (true of about half of the senatorial patrons), it is overwhelmingly true that the office is among the highest imperial offices appropriate to the region; that is the patron is typically a governor (if in the provinces) or holds one of the high imperial curatorships (in Italy). Cause and effect are not always clear in these cases, but in respect to the provinces, it is reasonable to believe that the patronage, whether prospectively or retrospectively conferred, was connected to the official activities of the administrator. Again this pattern is consistent with what Caesar and Oppius record.

The activities of equestrians were more varied. Equestrian governors, like P. Aelius Marcellus, was the *praeses Alpium Maritimarum* (No. 274) and patron of Cemenelum. Equestrians held a wide range of local and provincial priesthoods (e.g., nos. 206 and 283: *pontiff, augur* and *flamen divi Augusti*), held offices in different communities in the region (e.g., nos. 105, 622 and 864 in the CWS database) presumably where they had estates or other interests and a variety of curatorial functions at the local and regional level (e.g., nos. 327, 516, 705 in the CWS). In sum, patrons of equestrian rank typically had received honors in other communities; they were then members of the regional elite.

Patrons of decurial rank were much less likely to have honors in other communities. Whereas over 60% of the patrons of equestrian rank held offices and honors of some kind in the region, the same is true of only about 20% of the decurial class. Moreover, and even when they do have extramural functions, the offices tend to be far less varied than those of equestrians, typically serving as a municipal magistrates, curators, or priests (e.g., nos. 317, 448, 578 in the CWS).

One particular administrative service deserves more thorough discussion. A substantial number of patrons of communities had also served as the *curatores* of their clients. In no case, unfortunately, is it clear whether the individual was first curator and then patron or vice versa. Consider the following inscription from Casinum that is typical of the group:[46]

> *L. Luccio L. f. Ter. Hibero II vir iter q.q. patrono sacerdoti … cur. r. p. Interamnat. Liren. eorund. et patrono iudici CCCC selecto Casinates publ. ob merita eius d. d.* (*CIL* 10, 5197)

[46] F. Jacques, *Les curateurs des cités dans l'occident Romain de Trajan à Gallien*, Paris, 1983, lists all known *curatores*. Of the 85, 26 were patron and curator in the same community.

Hiberus is patron of his *patria*, Casinum, and of Interamna Lirens where he also served as *curator*. There is no indication whether his patronage of Interamna led to his *curatorium* or the reverse. Both explanations are plausible. Indeed Jacques repeatedly stresses that the evidence simply does not allow us to determine whether patronal connections preceded or followed the curatorial.[47] Nonetheless, and especially significant for this study, is the fact that there were substantially more *curatores* who were not recorded as patrons than there were *curatores* who were patrons of the town they served, indeed of 85 *curatores*, only 26 are known to have been patrons of the same community. There does not then appear to have been any necessary connection between the two positions.

7.5.4. *Other Forms of Benefaction*

Public buildings of all sorts were appropriate benefactions for patrons. The guarantee of the water supply of a client is the most frequently mentioned benefaction in this category. Of the 250 cases in which we have any indication of benefactions (including vague formulations like *ob merita eius*), twenty-four refer specifically to amenities involving water. Patrons are recorded to have restored aqueducts, tapped new sources, extended the delivery system to other parts of the community and held offices associated with the administration of the water supply.[48] The construction, decoration and restoration of public baths are frequently attested as activities of patrons.[49]

Patrons contributed to the cost of theaters and amphitheaters, an activity that was closely monitored by the governor.[50] Less controversial was the construction of temples. Sometimes the building was new (*CIL* 8, 26468), sometimes it involved the restoration, augmentation or decoration of an existing structure (*CIL* 8, 26471, 20429). All the buildings surrounding the forum became the focus of patronal activity. Markets and basilicas were constructed and decorated.[51] A gift of a *porticus* or statue might be of less practical value, but nonetheless contributed to enhancement of the physical appearance of the community.[52]

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[47] *Curateurs*, e.g., No. 3, but noted repeatedly throughout the individual studies.

[48] E.g., CWS Nos. 108, 235, 312, 315, 437, 447. For Asia Minor, see Longfellow.

[49] CWS Nos. 248, 356–358; 447, 469, 662.

[50] *CIL* 10, 4737, 11, 3112; cf. *Dig*. 50, 10.3.

[51] *CIL* 9, 2653, 11, 3014, 14, 2946; 11, 1185–1186.

[52] Note the benefaction of Calpurnius Fabatus, Pliny's grandfather-in-law, to Comum, *CIL* 5, 5267, Plin. *ep*.5, 11; 7, 32. *CIL* 8, 1548 involves the restoration of a *porticus*. For statues, *CIL* 8, 1548.

Several points need to be made about this list of patronal activities. First, the construction of new buildings, their decoration, augmentation or restoration (often after an earthquake), are widely attested in the epigraphical record. Indeed, Ulpian and Callistratus allowed individuals who restored buildings to place their names on their benefactions together with the names of those who had first built them.[53] Second, it should be noted that many of these material benefactions could also be used to satisfy the *summae honorariae*. The distinction between the latter and patronal activity lies in the fact that the *summae* were mandatory for the office holder while the benefactions of patrons were (theoretically) conferred voluntarily. The latter were presumably provided above and beyond any other obligation the individual had to his community. Third, and this should be clear from the *CIL* volume numbers cited as examples, the Italian inscriptions tend to be more specific on the nature of the benefaction than are the provincial ones. This suggests, once again, that there are regional variations in the representation, if not the exercise, of municipal patronage.

Patrons are also associated with a variety of social programs. A good example is the following inscription on a *cippus* from Reate:

> *L. Oranio L. fil. Quir. Justo ... plebs Reatina patrono quod is primus omnium HS CMN ad annonae comparationem municipibus suis dedit statuamque honore contentus sua pecunia posuit. L.D.D.D.* (*CIL* 9, 4686)

Note that here too the sense of the text is that these public honors (the *cippus* and the statue) were conferred on Oranius not specifically because he was patron, but in response to a particular benefaction. This is not to suggest that patronage was irrelevant, for it may well be that his decision to contribute to the *annona* grew out of his sense of patronal obligation. Unfortunately, such examples are very rare.[54]

There is also considerable a body of evidence indicating the range of "services" provided by patrons. These include benefactions provided by patrons as advocates and as *curatores*.

Regarding advocacy, Caesar, Oppius, Cicero, Pliny, Fronto and other sources indicate that communities were in constant need of representation and legal services. The literary sources understandably devote considerable attention to the services of senators, and only occasionally mention those

53 *Dig* 50, 10,2 and 10,7.1.

54 For example, *CIL* 9, 379 = D.6664 and *CIL* v. 1874 = *ILS*.1118. They should not be confused with the public *epulae* offered to mark special occasions.

of the lower orders. The epigraphical references make it quite clear that decurions and equestrians also represented their client communities in this manner. For example:

> *D.M. C. Scaefio C. f. Sulpiciano patrono municipi et colle. iii, iiiivir i.d. q.q.q.ii, advoc reip. Setoria Olympias coniugi incomparabili b. m.* (*CIL* 11, 5415, from Asisium).

Once again, the inscription is funerary and there is no explicit connection between the titles *patronus municipi* and *advocatus reipublicae*. Nonetheless, if patronage involved repeated services performed especially well, then it is probable that Scaefius earned the title, *patronus*, by this means.[55] There is also the case of the anonymous third century equestrian patron of five Italian communities who is also called *actor causarum* (*CIL* 5, 6991). Though there is no direct connection between the two titles, it is highly likely that this unusually large number of clients (for an equestrian) derived from his skills at the bar.

Closely related to this benefaction was the readiness to undertake legations on behalf of the community. This was clearly an important and arduous *munus* for many decurions and equestrians. Indeed the equitable distribution of the responsibility is referred to both in the *Digest* (50.7) and in the *Lex Irnitana* (sections G, H and I). To undertake an embassy voluntarily and to speak effectively on behalf of the community before the emperor, the senate or the governor certainly constituted special services that might lead to the title of patron.

One should bear in mind that all these benefactions are also listed among *munera civilia* defined in the *Digest* (especially at 50, 4). It is not clear then to what extent the specified services were performed voluntarily or as part of the compulsory responsibilities of a citizen of status and wealth. If the title *patronus* is to be related to these responsibilities, it must be because the patron carried them out in a particularly exemplary manner or on an unexpectedly lavish scale.

Before moving on to a discussion of the broader categories of activity, something more needs to be stated about the difficult category of civic patronage and military activity. During the republic, military activity had frequently led to the establishment of patronal relations between senatorial

[55] The title is found in other places, *CIL* 5, 3336 and sometimes more implicitly under the word *defensio* (*AE* 1922, 29).

governors and the communities in their province.[56] After 27 BC, the situation changes radically. In brief, senators no longer had the opportunity to acquire *clientelae* among defeated nations. Those who had such clients, or who like Valerius Asiaticus, were suspected of using such clients to seize power, were not tolerated.[57] Nonetheless, *quies* was an important benefaction. When, however, it appears in the sources, it is always associated with patrons of equestrian status. A good example of this phenomenon may be seen in two inscriptions from Baetica:

> *C. Vallio Maximiano proc proviniar. Macedoniae Lusitaniae Mauretan. Tingitanae, fortissimo duci resp. Italicens. ob merita et quot provinciam Baetic caesis hostibus paci pristinae restituerit* (*CIL 2, 1120* = *ILS.1354*; from Italica)

> *G. Vallio Maxumiano proc Augg e. v., ordo Singil. Barb. ob municipium diutina obsidione et bello Maurorum liberatum patrono* (*CIL 2 2015* = *ILS.1354a*; from Singilia Barba)

The career of Vallius is well known and thoroughly discussed by Pflaum.[58] The inscriptions refer to his successful defense of Baetica when by the Mauri (177). The first inscription, on a statue base, expresses appreciation but does not claim Vallius as a patron. The second one makes a close connection between the defense of the city and the cooption. Though the number of cases is not large, indeed only a handful survive, it is significant that not one involves a senator.

Another category of epigraphical reference to benefaction consists of stress on the particular virtue (or virtues) of patron. In descending order of frequency, these include (with numerous variations) reference to the achievements of the patron, *ob merita eius*, to the good will or affection felt by the patron for the client, to his liberality, to his integrity and to his energy. Examples of the use of *ob merita eius* have been cited above. The significance of this formula may be understood by the fact that it appears more often than all the other formulations put together, over thirty-five times for equestrians and decurions alone. The consistent use of the plural form emphasizes a point that has been made repeatedly in this study, namely that though events of singular importance might initiate the relationship, it was continuous and mutual benefaction that solidified the connection. Implicit, too, is the fact that *merita* suggests actual rather than potential benefaction.

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56 In general, Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, Gelzer, *Nobility*; this issue has been discussed in chapter 1.

57 Tac. *Ann.* 11, 1; Dio 60.29; RE 7A.2. 2344.

58 *Carriéres*, 221. Note also *AE* 1954 110, to M Maturius Victorinus and the dedication to Antonius Vitellianus discussed in chapter 5.

More ambiguous are the various formulations employing terms that emphasize the good will of the patron. These include such notions as *amor*, *benevolentia*, *adfectio* and *sollicitudo*. These formulations, like that for Q. Plotius Maximus, are fairly standard but un-informative:

> *ob eximium in municipes suos amorem* (*CIL* 9, 5835–5836 from Auximum, and dated to mid 2nd Century)

The language sometimes suggests that this affection may be measured by benefactions conferred, but it may, in contrast to the formula *ob merita*, also be a subtle form of encouragement. They reflect the language employed by Pliny and the other writers of his age. Note, for example, that Pliny, in justifying his gift to Tifernum does so by claiming that *vinci in amore turpissimum est* (4, 1).

More indicative of material benefactions may be the use of words like *liberalitas* and *munificentia* to describe the actions of the patron. For example:

> *T. Calvisio T. fil. Clu. Vero augur quinq ... patrono mun.* [*et*] *VIvir August ... ob plurima beneficia et munificentiam eius ...* (*CIL* 9, 4579 = *ILS* 6633)

This text (and others like it[59]) has a strong retrospective sense; that is, it assumes that significant benefactions have already been conferred.

The qualities of *innocentia* and *integritas* would appear to refer to the performance of administrative duties. Indeed all of those patrons who were honored with these terms had had served as *curatores* of at least one and sometimes several communities. Note, for example the late second century equestrian from Paestum who bears the name M. Tullius Cicero. Aside from being patron, he was probably also the *curator* of six different communities in the region.[60]

Also associated with administrative activity is the virtue of *industria*.[61] One text may be given in full because it exemplifies many of the points just made:

> *C. Clodieno C. fil. Stell. Sereno Vesnio Dextro equite Romano patron et pontif Urvinat. Met. patrono et curatori rei p. Forocornel., optimo iustissimo, splendidissimus ordo Forocornel. ob merita eius, quod industria sua statum reip auxerit ...* (*CIL* 9, 6061 = *ILS* 6648; from Urvinum)

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[59] E.g., *CIL* 8, 25515.

[60] *CIL* 10, 482–483; the text is not complete, but this is a plausible reconstruction. Also: *CIL* 11, 414 = *ILS* 6656.

[61] These virtues are the same ones that Sallust praises as critical to political success, *Cat.* 2–12.

Once again we do not know the chronological connection between his services and cooption. Nonetheless, we have an individual who was active in his own and in a neighboring community. He was both patron and *curator* of Forocornelium; through his energy he was able to enhance the status of the state. In sum, Clodienus voluntarily and successfully performed a number of services for at least two communities.

As to Asia Minor, it may appear artificial to exclude here the examples of 'civic patronage' documented by Longfellow and Zuiderhoeck on the grounds that we do not know if they were formally coopted as patrons. Again, as noted before there is significant overlap between 'civic patronage' and *patrocinium publicum*, and I have no reservations about suggesting that the practice of *euergesia* in Hellenistic and Roman East did indeed influence the evolution of the practice of formal patronage in the west. Indeed, the extension of benefaction from mediation and *praesidium* to include a variety of material benefits owed much to the Greek civic tradition and to Stoic influence. The methodological problem is that to include all such benefaction may also distort our understanding of how the Romans perceived the formal relationship. That the latter did have a particular concept of what a *patronus* should do and be is, as I have suggested earlier, confirmed by the requirement of Roman municipal law and imperial law, and indeed by the comments in the literary and epigraphical sources.

7.6. *Reflections on the Epigraphical Record*

Two issues are addressed in this section. In the first part, a summary analysis is provided of what may have motivated individuals to become patrons of communities. In the second part we consider the implications of civic patronage on Romanization and urbanization especially in the western part of the Roman Empire.

Given the paucity of direct indications connecting benefactions and honors and the often ample information on honors, historians have traditionally relied on the details of a public career to deduce the reason for the connection. Indeed, all studies of civic patronage make the same assumption that communities sought access to the resources that administrators could distribute—a phenomenon any academic can comprehend—and used public honors including patronage to influence that allocation. Equally important, though much more difficult to answer, is what motivated individuals to become the patrons of communities and how did they (the individuals) cope with the expectations of their clients? Roman literature, especially

the letters of Pliny and Fronto and the treatises of Cicero and Seneca provide some answers to these questions that range from the highly idealized and theoretical (e.g., Cicero's *de officiis* and Seneca's *de beneficiis*) to the more practical considerations that affected the way a potential patron allocated his time, talent and resources to address the (sometimes conflicting) needs of his clients.

Though some men of wealth and talent may have been influenced by these ideals to accept obligations, most were hard-headed and hard-hearted enough to calculate their own advantage. One may wonder what ultimately motivated someone as morally aware as Pliny to build a temple he describes for Tifernum, or, in reference to an epigraphical text, whether the public recognition of his power and influence truly motivated Pomponius Bassus to accept the Ferentini into his clientele (*CIL* 6, 1492 = *ILS* 6106). The issue remains: what factors influenced individuals to admit certain communities to their clientele and, presumably, to reject others?

Public deference and *public* recognition must have played some role, especially as senators only exceptionally enjoyed as much in the public places of the city of Rome.[62] The concern for public and official recognition is confirmed by the fact that close to 80% of the surviving inscriptions and statue bases were authorized by the community, sometimes in the form of a decree of the decurions (*decreto decurionum, ordo, decurions*, etc), or of decision of the citizens (*municipes, plebs, civi, incolae*, etc.) or of the two acting in concert (*ordo populusque, respublica*, etc).[63] Moreover, the monuments were typically erected in a public place designated by the community and at public expense (*loco dato decreto decurionum* and *pecunia publica*).[64] In sum, the only public places where senators might display their achievements, honors (like patronage) and titles were in the communities of Italy and the provinces. The accumulation of such monuments, while not comparable in impact to those set up at Rome during the Republic, could still be an attractive incentive to senators. For those of equestrian and decurial status, public honors in their *patria* and in neighboring towns distinguished them from their lesser competitors and provided thereby some incentive for pursuing and accepting honors and privileges like *patrocinium publicum*.

[62] On these issue in general, see Alföldy, G., "*Pietas immobilis erga principem* und ihr Lohn: öffentliche Ehrenmonumente von Senatoren in Rom während der Frühen and Hohen Kaiserzeit" and Eck, Präsenz.

[63] Table 7.5 provides the range of formulas employed and more information is available in the online database = CWS.

[64] Some of those honored covered the expenses themselves.

Though access to the public places of Rome might be limited, private places continued to offer opportunities for senators to celebrate their families and achievements. Here the evidence of the *tabulae patronatus* takes on particular importance. With their dramatic shapes and highly polished luster these inscriptions lent themselves to effective display in the "public" rooms and *atria* of private homes (low resolution images illustrating these inscriptions are collected in the online data base CWS mentioned at the beginning of this chapter). The Ferentinum *tabula* (in the form of a decree of the decurions) expressly requests that Pomponius accept the community into his *clientela*, allow himself to be coopted as patron, and permit a *tabula* bearing the inscription recording the decree be placed in his house (*tabula … in domo sua posita, permittat*, *CIL* 6, 1492). While it cannot be demonstrated that every patron received such monument, it is reasonable that they would have received a copy of the decree of cooption (typically recorded on bronze, cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 8). A collection of four such inscriptions was discovered at a house in Brixia and the texts commemorate the patronage of the equestrian Silius Aviola over four African communities (CWS database, nos. 428–431). A prominent senator like Bassus, might easily have filled his *atrium* with such testimonials to his *fides* and *existimatio*. Those senators without consular ancestors probably found these *tabulae* to be attractive testimonials that could even be displayed in Roman residences.

The monuments themselves were often significant structures. Over 40% of the surviving inscriptions associated with civic patronage whose shape and function can be determined are statue bases. That is, the public places of imperial cities displayed large numbers of statues commemorating their benefactors. The dimensions of these monuments vary considerably but the inscription itself averages about 1.00 × 0.80 m., if in stone, and about 0.50 × 0.30 m., if in bronze. The data is available in the CWS.

Potential patrons may also have been willing to assume the responsibilities of patronage as a way to advertise their family and promote their descendants. Here again the *tabulae* help us to understand motivation because they repeatedly stress the establishment of a relationship that will be continued by the descendants of both parties (*liberi posterique*). Though it is by no means the case that patrons and their relatives are always celebrated, about one third of the inscriptions mentioning patronage also refer to another relative usually father-son, but also other members of the family both male and female (e.g., CWS nos. 50, 79, 264, 314 and 581). That these familial connections were important is confirmed also by the fact that the *Album Canusinum* (Ch. 8) records a number of father-son-brother combinations

on the list of patrons and by the statement of the Ferentini that they valued the patronage of a *domus amplissima* like that of Pomponius Representative Texts F.2.

As the patrons of a community appear among the members of the local senate (as suggested by their position on the *Album Canusinum*, Ch. 8), wealthy outsiders with property in the community may well have valued civic patronage was a way to acquire an official position in the community without having to go though the decurial *cursus*. Hence, Pliny might have found it useful to accept the patronage of a town (Tifernum) in which he had significant estates in order to gain a position in the community to which he had no connection other than property. There is, unfortunately, no evidence that confirms that this was the case.

In sum, though the epigraphical evidence does not provide much direct evidence to explain why patrons accepted the position, we may well believe that this honor (and others like it) was perceived as a way to celebrate and to influence both the person and the family of the patron. The patrons received public honors (statues, inscriptions and other monuments) in the public places of Italian and provincial communities. Moreover, and especially through the *tabulae*, the patron received splendid monuments that lent themselves well to display in public rooms in private houses even in Rome itself. Finally, and more speculatively, by accepting the patronage of a community, the wealthy outsider with property in the community gained official status at the highest rank of the local elite. Though none of these advantages can be defined in categories that can be weighed or counted, they did bring prestige, access, and opportunities. That such benefactions also promoted the social peace in the increasingly stratified society, as Zuiderhoeck suggests at length in his Chapter 4, does not appear to me to have been an important factor in the Latin speaking areas.

All things considered, it is reasonable to believe that the hopes of the client in conferring the honor may not have been fully reciprocated by the senatorial patron coopted prospectively. Disappointment may have led communities to seek more patrons. As the number of senatorial patrons in a community grew, the sense of obligation felt by individuals probably declined. This conclusion does not demonstrate that communities in any way abandoned the search for protectors and benefactors. For equestrians and decurions, however, the formal patronage of a community remained a significant honor. Statues were placed in public places; the family was celebrated. Moreover, civic patrons enjoy a prestige in the community that transcended even that of *quinquennales* (as demonstrated by the position of the two groups on the *Album Canusinum*). In sum, there were significant

incentives for senators to accept communities as clients, but far more powerful ones to attract decurions and equestrians to become patrons.

The epigraphical record suggests that communities sought access to the wealth, influence and good will of the powerful. As the potential benefits were great, the former were ready to adopt a senator as a patron prospectively. Hence, the inscriptions tend to be vague about what was actually delivered. Because the title of patron transcended even that of the *quinquannalis*, communities could expect much more in the way of concrete benefaction from decurions; that is, they could adopt patrons retrospectively, after evaluating the benefactions. Hence, we have more information about what patrons of decurial status did to enhance the community.

The second question, what does the epigraphical record tell us about the process of urbanization and of Romanization especially in the western part of the Roman Empire? In general the evidence does support and supplement the notion that patrons and other benefactors contributed in significant ways to the well being of communities. Most visible would of course have been the construction of urban amenities. Admittedly, and for reasons discussed at length in this book and elsewhere in my publications, Romans preferred not to make direct connections between benefactors and their benefaction. Continuity of benefaction was, I believe, central to this pattern. Namely, the beneficiaries did not want to suggest that there was a one to one correspondence between the two.

Less visible in the epigraphical record are services that patrons performed to protect their clients in court and from extortionate and / or incompetent administrators. Nonetheless, whether constructing a public bath or balancing the accounts or representing the community in a process or arbitration, patrons promoted peaceful intercourse within their client communities. Resources could then be devoted to enhancing urban life and indirectly to becoming more Roman.

In sum, civic patrons and public benefactors contributed to that process by which many peregrines adopted the Latin language and Roman civic institutions.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PATRONAGE AND THE PATRONS OF CANUSIUM: A CASE STUDY

8.1. *The Problem and the City*

The most important single inscription for the discussion of civic patronage is the so-called *album Canusinum*. Not only is it a splendid bronze tablet, but it is also the only document surviving from the Principate that lists all the civic patrons of a Roman city at one point in time. The text is complete. Nonetheless, its skeletal structure and anomalies invite both speculation and skepticism about how useful the document is for understanding a number of aspects of imperial governance in general and civic patronage in particular.

The inscription is unambiguously dated to AD 223. It takes the form on a decurial decree listing the civic patrons and members of a town council. Altogether 164 names appear, ninety-five percent of which are attested in no other source. It has had, however, a major impact on a wide range of problems and as such has been published by Mommsen (*CIL* 9, 338), Dessau (*ILS* 6121), Abbott and Johnson (No. 136) and now most recently by Peter Garnsey, Marcella Chelotti and Benet Salway.[1] Its importance is easily measured. It is one of the most frequently cited inscriptions in Mommsen's *Römisches Staatsrecht* precisely because it represents, better than many other documents, the manner in which the Romans organized their civic institutions. It is also a fundamental source for the questions regarding *inter alia* the size of the *ordo decurionum* in the late Principate, the administrative structure of Roman cities, the changing status of the (praetorian) prefects under the Severans, and the date of the assassination of the great jurist, Ulpian. Moreover, if 95% of the names of the decurions are not otherwise know, it may also constitute an important indicator of what has been lost from the epigraphical record.

[1] Garnsey, P., "Aspects of the Decline of the Urban Aristocracy in the Empire", *ANRW*, 2, 1, Berlin, 1974, 229 ff.; M. Chelotti, et al., *Le epigrafi romane de Canosa*, 1, Bari, 1985; and B. Salway, "Prefects, *patroni*, and decurions: a new perspective on the *album* Canusium", in *The Epigraphic Landscape of Roman Italy*, ed. by Alison Cooley, London (Inst. for *ClassStud*, 2000), 115–171.

While all these subjects are of continuing interest and will be mentioned in this discussion, the central question here is the role of the municipal patrons. Thirty-nine of them are listed on Column I and, though we have no record of even a single benefaction by any one of them, some general conclusions may nonetheless be drawn about the needs and expectations of communities in respect to the practice of civic patronage. Such conclusions are particularly important because most previous studies have attempted to devise a model for this institution based on the collection and analysis of many individual texts and patrons. The *album* is in contrast the only pre-Dominate text that offers a list of all the patrons of a town at one moment in time; it serves then as an important control for interpreting inscriptions found separately (Ch. 7 and in the online database = CWS).

To understand the needs of the Canusini in regards to patronage, some information on the history, geography and economy is appropriate.[2]

Legend holds that Diomedes was the founder of Canusium (Strabo, 5, 1.9); and indeed, Greek language and culture long predominated there. The early history of the town is characterized by considerable prosperity and relative obscurity; at least this is what the archaeological evidence of the necropolis and the silence of the literary sources suggest.[3] In 318 BC, Canusium and Rome established diplomatic relations (Liv. 9, 20). In 216, the survivors of Cannae found refuge in the city and it remained loyal to Rome throughout the Hannabalic War (Liv. 32, 52–54; 27, 12). During the Social War, Canusium sided with the Italian allies and suffered as a consequence (App. *B.C.* 1, 42, 52, 89). It was reconstituted as a Roman *municipium* and was organized in the usual manner with *quattuorviri*. Strabo notes that in his day the circuit of the walls of the city suggested that Canusium had once been larger (6, 3.9); it is then probable that during the late republic the town had not recovered its earlier prosperity. By this time the Greek language may well have yielded its primacy to Latin and Oscan, if indeed that is what Horace means when he observes that the town was *more bilinguis*.[4]

The importance of the city surely increased as a consequence of the construction of the Via Traiana, a route that was somewhat shorter than the Via

[2] In general, see Hülsen, *RE* 3, 1501–1502.

[3] Ibid.

[4] *Sat.* 1, 10.30. The author thanks E.T. Salmon for indicating the possibilities. Chelotti et al. include several Greek texts in their collection. More suggestive, however, is the number of Greek names on the *album*.

Appia between Beneventum and Brundisium.[5] Under Antoninus, Canusium was one of three regional *municipia* that were promoted to colonial status: *colonia Aurelia Augusta Pia Canusium* (*CIL* 9, 344), perhaps under the guidance of Herodes Atticus.[6] Otherwise, the major event of the second century was the illness that struck Lucius Verus on his way to the east. It was at Canusium where the complications of over-indulgence induced a crisis serious enough to bring Aurelius to his side (*SHA*, *Verus* 6). Subsequently, Canusium enjoyed no little measure of prosperous obscurity well into the 6th century (e.g., Procop. *Goth.* 3, 18, 18).

The primary geographic feature of the city and its surrounding landscape is dryness.[7] Horace describes its lack of water, *pauper aquae* (*Carm.* 3, 30.11), Seneca its wastelands (*in desertis Apuliae, ep.* 87.7), Juvenal the cheapness of the land (4, 26–27). Even so, as K.D. White has observed, one must distinguish between two different climactic zones, the coastal plain, suitable for intensive cultivation of drought resistant crops, and the river-less virtually empty inland plateau.[8] The cultivation of wheat was not only possible, but, Columella observes, it was of excellent quality (3, 8.4); the size of the harvest, however, was no greater then than it is now. Apulia in general and Canusium in particular were best known not only for their aridity, but also for the quality of their wool and woolen products. These products were derived from the many flocks of sheep that wintered on the coastal plain and summered in the hills of central Italy. The unlikely combination of Columella (7, 2.3), Martial (14, 155), Juvenal (6, 150) and Pliny the Elder (8, 190) are in complete agreement that the wool of Apulia was *laudatissima*, especially that from Canusium.[9] Equally famous was the cloth produced from the wool; indeed, it became almost the generic term for "best quality". Suetonius, describing the extravagance of Nero's entourage, notes that even the muleteers wore Canusinian cloaks (30.3). Martial praises the cloth and clothing on five occasions (2, 46; 9, 22.9; 14, 127, 129, 155). Items like the *chalmys Canusina* were

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5 G. Radke, *Viae publicae Romanae*, *RE* Supplbd. 13, 90; R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, Berkeley, 1976, 132; Salway is more skeptical, 119.

6 On the "deduction", F. Grelle, *Canosa romana* (Rome, 1993), 120–143; Salway, 119, with other references.

7 For a general description, see A.J. Toynbee, *The Legacy of Hannibal*, London, 1965, 2, 563 ff. and T. Frank (ed.), *Economic Survey of the Roman Empire*, New York, 1940 = *ESAR* 5, 137 ff.

8 P. 73; cf. Strabo, 5, 19; *ESAR* 5, 137 and 145; Toynbee, *Legacy*, 2, 563 and K.D. White, *Roman Farming*, Ithaca, 1970, 73.

9 On this point, see J.M. Frayn, *Sheep-rearing and the Wool Trade in Italy during the Roman Period*, Liverpool, 1984.

particularly prized.[10] There is no way to know whether the *Canusina* label refers to items produced in and around Canusium, or to products done in the Canusinian style or both. Diocletian paid the ultimate compliment to its quality and reputation when he found it necessary to regulate the price of Canusinian cloaks (*edictum de pretiis*, 19, 38).

Historians tend to assume, and quite reasonably, that communities would seek patrons who might protect their interests and promote their well-being. In respect to Canusium, those interests were certainly related to the economics of wool production and processing, to the safety of the flocks and the distribution of finished products. Given the references to the quality of Apulian grain, there may have been a sufficient surplus for some export, but the constraints of soil and water may well have limited the amount. In either case, security along the drove roads and the Via Traiana would have been a concern. Hence, the Canusini (and others towns with similar concerns) would have sought patrons among magistrates responsible for public order and in communities along the drove roads, *calles publicae*. Canusium, as was the case with other cities of Italy and the empire, also sought patrons among the local and regional elites of southern Italy. Benefactions, prospective or retrospective, in the form of public works, mediation, protection, access to markets and resources, privileges, etc. were a concern to all. Traces of all these concerns may be found on the list of patrons preserved on the monument, and have generally encouraged historical speculation.

This brief survey is enough to suggest that the Canusini may well have sought the patronage not only of those who owned property in the city and might be expected to confer significant benefactions, but also sought the patronage of a variety of other individuals in and outside the imperial service who might facilitate the advancement and protection of the city, of its citizens and also protect the commercial interests of its entrepreneurs, shepherds and farmers. While this may appear to be obvious it does need to be stated clearly at the beginning. Moreover, we do well to remember that the *album* itself represents the constellation of patrons at a particular moment in time, but the cooptation of those patrons proceeded over time and individuals were added [and even deleted] from the list as the situation and needs of Canusium evolved.

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[10] *CIL* 13, 3162; Salway, 119–120.

8.2. *The Text and Its Characteristics*

The inscription under discussion is a bronze plaque, a *tabula aenea*, found just outside the wall of early modern Canosa, yet within the walls of the ancient city, in November 1675.[11] Contemporary accounts mention that it was discovered during the plowing of a low hill to the northeast of the town, an area that may have been part of the necropolis.[12] To judge by the discrepancies in the photographs published by Chelotti and Salway, someone has recently restored the lower right corner of the inscription, but the restoration is not in a textual area. There are two points of significance for this investigation. First, and despite its name in scholarly literature, the inscription nowhere describes itself as an *album*, and, second, it nowhere refers by name to Canusium. Nonetheless every internal indication is consistent with the conclusion that the text does indeed represent the members of the *ordo* of Canusium. Second, and of greater significance, there is no indication in the inscription itself or deduction to be made from the actual context of discovery about how or where the *tabula* was displayed or of how it came to be deposited in the place where it was found. Indeed, and contrary to the *communis opinio* its very survival may in fact be due to the fact that it may *not* have been displayed in a public place. Both of these points will be discussed below.

The inscription is roughly square in shape, measuring 0.66 × 0.735 m. The lettering is of high quality and the whole text (with the exception of one apparently deliberately erased name, see below) is complete.[13] The heading of the text specifies that the inscription was fashioned in the year in which L. Marius Maximus (for the second time) and L. Roscius Aelianus were consuls at Rome, that is, in AD 223, and that M. Antonius Priscus and L. Annius Secundus, the *duoviri quinquennales* saw to it that the names of the *decuriones* should be inscribed in bronze. What follows then is a register, or *album*, of all members of the local senate including resident and

11 Chelotti, op. cit., provides the first complete examination since Mommsen's in *CIL* 9, 338. Dessau's version in *ILS*, though is more frequently cited, is incomplete, inaccurate and misleading.

12 Salway summarizes the various accounts, 118 and n. 2.

13 The inscription has been photographed twice recently, first by Chelotti and then more recently by Salway. It is apparent that the *tabula* has been altered between the two publications: the two corners at the bottom have been restored and, more troubling, hooks and hangers added all around. Salway writes me that he reproduced the photo sent to him from Florence, where apparently the changes were made. A low resolution image has been posted on the Companion Web Site = CWS.

non-resident patrons.[14] The names are arranged hierarchically and distributed over four columns. In Column I, the thirty-nine patrons of Canusium are distinguished by rank as senators, *clarissimi viri* (there are thirty-one of them), or as *equites Romani* of which there are nine. Column II records the names of the *duoviri* of the *colonia*, III, those of the *decuriones* of aedile or of quaestorian status followed by the *pedani*, who had never held office and by the *praetextati* who were still too young to have done so.[15] The hierarchical principle appears to be clear enough, but as will be shown, there are uncertainties. Though reference to the names and divisions of Columns II–IV is unavoidable,[16] the principle concern of this chapter is with the group of patrons recorded on Column I.

The principle by which the *album* is regulated is cited in the *Digest* under the name of the jurist Ulpian. This is a particularly useful attribution: Ulpian was praetorian prefect under Severus Alexander and was killed by his own soldiers probably in the 220s.[17] Hence, his guidelines would appear to have been in force at the time the *quinquennales* completed their work. The passage in question is explicit; under the heading *de albo scribendo*, it is written:

> 50, 3.1: *Ulpianus* (*libro iii, de officio proconsulis*)*: decuriones in albo ita scriptos esse oportet, ut lege municipali praecipitur; sed si lex cessat, tunc dignitates erunt spectandae, ut scribantur eo ordine, quo quisque eorum maximo honore in municipio functus est; puta qui duumviratum gesserunt, si hic honor praecellat, et inter duumvirales antiquissimus quisque, prior is, deinde hi qui secundo post duumviratum honore in republica functi sunt; post eos, qui tertio, et deinceps; mox hi, qui nullo honore functi sunt, prout quisque eorum in ordinem venit. in sententiis quoque dicendis idem ordo spectandus est, quem in albo scribendo diximus* ... 50, 3.2: *in albo decurionum in municipio nomina ante scribi oportet eorum, qui dignitates principis iudicio consecuti sunt, postea eorum, qui tantum municipalibus honoribus functi sunt.*

The hierarchical principles specify that he should precede who has actually held the office and that the priority within each category should be assigned to the most senior office holder.[18] Thereafter should come the *pedani*, individuals who had held no actual office. In section 2, Ulpian determined that

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[14] Though the distinctions are somewhat arbitrary, I understand *tabula* to refer to the physical form of the inscription and *album* to the contents. Cf. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr* 3, 1016 and the definitions of the words in *OLD*.

[15] On these arrangements, see Nicols, 'Standard Size', and Salway at more length, 123 ff.

[16] For a discussion of the characteristics of these individuals, see Garnsey.

[17] See below, section 4.

[18] On the *adlecti* and their position on such an *album*, see Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr*. 3, 972.

priority should be awarded those who owe their offices to the emperor.[19] Note, for example, in Column II, the *quinquennales*, Antonius Priscus and Annius Secundus, the most junior of those of that honor, appear properly at the end of that section of the register. That the *quinquennales* adhered to these principles in arranging the *album* appears to be manifest; a closer examination reveals anomalies.

The fact that the *album* bearing the *nomina decurionum* includes the civic patrons, both resident and non-resident, suggests that the latter were indeed reckoned as members of the *ordo* and of the community.[20] To what extent this situation is comparable to republican practice as described by Cicero is a major problem that cannot be resolved here. What is important for this discussion is that the patrons appear to have been arranged generally according to the principles described by Ulpian; that is, patrons of consular standing precede those who were of praetorian standing and, within a given rank, have been placed according to seniority. Moreover, the *clarissimi* [*Patroni C.C.V.V.*] are placed before the patrons of equestrian rank [*Patroni E.E.Q.Q.R.R*].

Another hierarchical principle relates to the assignment of rank to those who have been adlected. A passage in the *SHA* (*Pertinax* 6) explains that the emperor specified that *adlecti* should be listed after those who had actually held the office. Some confirmation of this principle is found in the *album*; there is, for example, a distinction made between the *quinquennales* and the *adlecti inter quinquennales*. It is not clear, however, how widely this distinction was enforced. It was an unpopular measure and even at Canusium no other *adlecti* are mentioned in reference to other offices.[21]

Just as the names of the *decuriones* were arranged in a deliberate order, so too, have scholars assumed that the patrons of both categories (senatorial and equestrian) were arranged according to the same hierarchical scheme. There is some evidence that provides confirmation for this theory, but it is by no means as secure as one might wish. Indeed, it is fair to say that the anomalies in the text indicate either that the Canusini arranged some of the patrons according to principles we do not understand fully or that they were uninformed about the proper protocol. Moreover, some of these

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19 On this point, see Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr*. 3, 853, and W. Liebenam, Städteverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreiche. Leipzig (Duncker and Humblot, 1900). 230.

20 Nicols, "Standard Size", op. cit. The basic argument is that if these patrons were locals, their names would appear among the decurions.

21 The *pedani* and *praetextati* might be considered *adlecti*; the point here is that one does not find the word applied to individuals of other ranks.

principles may have conflicted with other. For example, should priority on the list be assigned to a patron who was on the council of the emperor, but who was an *adlectus* as consul? Or should the priority be assigned to the individual who had actually held the office as an *ordinarius*?

Before considering the specific problems associated with the names inscribed in Column I, it is necessary to resolve the question of whether this document, the sole survivor of its kind from the Principate, represents a document prepared to commemorate a unique and special situation. If this is the case, then as Salway has argued, the conclusions reached in the following discussion may be of limited value in respect to the practice of patronage in the Roman municipal structure. There are two major considerations relevant to this issue. The first is the nature of the inscription itself and the second relates to anomalies in the listing of the patrons of senatorial rank. Regarding the material itself: The major problem is to determine if such *alba*, on wood or bronze or fresco, were routinely posted in the cities of the Roman Empire. For the period from Augustus to the end of the empire in the west, only this *album* and one other, the fragmentary and stone *albus ordinis* of Timgad or Thamugadi, dating to about AD 365, survive.[22] Nonetheless, as publication of the *alba decurionum* was regulated by a *lex municipalis* and discussed by Ulpian, it is manifest that communities did perform such a census and publish it on a quinquennial basis.[23] If there is a unique quality, it may relate to the material, namely bronze, rather than to the content.[24] Here the very name, *album*, or whitened wooden tablet, suggests that the normal medium for recording the results may have been wood or even white stucco.[25] In this context, one might assume that such materials used for publishing the list may well have been destroyed or refurbished and / or archived after each census. The reuse of bronze and stone for this purpose is well known (e.g., *CIL* 2^2/7, 187 and 188). Alternatively, some unusual event may have induced the *quinquennales* to select bronze and the unusualness of that event might be reckoned as a constraint on any general application of the results of this investigation. While certainty is impossible, three considerations suggest that we may assume that the selection of bronze for the publication of the *album* was not unusual. First, the word *album*, despite its initial association with wooden tablets, had come to mean *inter alia* lit-

22 Chastagnol, *Timgad*.

23 On the question of the timing of the revision of the *album*, see Appendix 1.

24 The *albus ordinis* of Timgad is on stone.

25 For the use of wood for other purposes associated with patronage, see Nicols, *Tabula patronatus*, *ANRW* 2, 13, pp. 554–558, especially 558.

tle more than "register" and, indeed, is not even used in the inscription.[26] Second, the *Codex Theodosianus* specifies that bronze is one of the usual materials for publishing laws *aereis tabulis vel cerussatis aut linteis mappis scribta per omnes civitates Italiae proponatus lex*, 11, 27.1. That few survive may be attributed either to the fact that cities eventually reused the bronze or "updated" their *alba*. Third, there is little in the form of the document to suggest anything out of the ordinary, indeed the language of the heading, *nomina decurionum in aere incidenda curaverunt*, suggests a routine event. Unusual then is neither the form nor the material, but primarily that it survives at all.

There are some problems however associated with the list of patrons, particularly with those names that appear on places 2–5 in the upper left part of column I, in particular some of the patrons are listed in an order that appears to be a odds with what scholars expect.

The inscription informs us that it was the *IIviri quinquennalicii*, the censorial magistrates, supervised the preparation and publication of the document. The language used is conventional and formulaic. Surely the eminent local magistrates had good knowledge of how their members in the *ordo* ought to be listed, so we may assume that columns II, III and IV accurately reflect local conditions. But what about the arrangement of the patrons in column I? Who was a senator and who was an equestrian might appear to be straightforward [though we shall see some anomalies below]. But does the order presented in this column accurately reflect the imperial rank of each in the year the decree was authorized? Or was priority based on the date of cooptation? Or was it based some combination of the two? Were the local magistrates well informed about the protocol for listing each of their more prominent patrons? Were the presiding magistrates free to assign positions? Or were they arranging the names based on some principle that eludes us? Even if these questions cannot be answered with much certainty there is still much to be learned about expectations.

In what follows I will argue that we are well advised to follow what indications we have as to the ranking, but that there is nonetheless considerable uncertainty about how best to answer the questions posed above. Inevitably that means there will be ambiguity in the results. Even so, and even if we cannot be certain about the criteria employed to rank the patrons, it is important to recognize that the list reflects ***many*** decisions over a ***long period*** of time about whom the Canusini wished to have as a civic patron.

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26 See *OLD*, "*album*".

There is good reason to believe that the patrons listed on the *album* include only those who were actively engaged in the affairs of Canusium at the time, that is the list is unlikely to include the descendants of earlier patrons whose connection with the city may have lapsed through mutual disinterest or neglect. One must bear in mind, however, that the *tabulae patronatus* specify that the cooptation involved not only the individual but also all of his descendants, *liberi posterique*.[27] If all of the descendants of all the patrons were listed, the number of patrons would clearly be much longer than it is. Indeed, the list of patrons appears in this respect to be sensitive to current events.[28] It is reasonable to believe that when the *quinquennales* revised the list of names recorded they also removed the names of deceased patrons and of their inactive descendants.

Because the text begins with reference to the consular year, namely to the consulates of Marius Maximus and Roscius Aelianus, the year in which the inscription was authorized, if not actually fabricated, is known to be 223.[29] There are other indications that allow for a more exact dating and even suggest how long the text was displayed publicly.

Let us consider the chronology more closely. Appius Claudius Julianus might be first among the patrons because he had already been named *consul II designatus* for the year 224 and was, thereby superior in status to all others.[30] The date of such designations varies according to circumstances and is especially unpredictable following an imperial succession, but the appointment should place him before other consulars.[31] There are, moreover, other reasons for assigning him the first position; he was namely *praefectus urbi*; that is, he held the most prestigious of positions open to senators.[32] The list appears then to be composed in the second half of 223 or later, and before Julianus become consul in 224.

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27 Nicols, *Tabula patronatus*.

28 This issue is discussed at length in Prefects, Patrons and the Administration of Justice, *ZPE* in reference to the death of Ulpian. See also, J. Modrzejewski & T. Zawadzki, "Ulpien et la préfecture du prétoire", *Rev. hist. de droit fran. et étranger*, 45 (1967), 565 ff. Salway, as noted argues that the list may reflect the engagement of outsiders in the promotion of the size of the *ordo*, op. cit., 169–170.

29 See Degrassi, 1, *Fasti consolari*, Rome, 1952, 62.

30 See Pflaum, *Marbre*, p. 37 and R. Syme, *Emperors and Biography*, Oxford, 1971, 151.

31 On designations, see Sherwin-White, *Letters of Pliny*, pp. 23–27; the year 69 offers an instructive example of what can happen at such times, cf. G. Townend, The Consuls of A.D. 69–70, *AJPh* 83 (1962) 113.

32 See below, and the articles cited above.

8.3. *The Ranking of the Patrons of Canusium*

If Ulpian's principles were strictly followed in the arrangement of the text, then in those cases where the evidence is insufficient, we should be able deduce that the status of the individual in question is the same, or very similar to, that of the individuals who immediately precede or follow him. This assumption has allowed scholars to conjecture the existence of one praetorian prefect, four consulars and at least four *praetorii*, not one of whom is otherwise known to have held the office in question. But caution is appropriate here: we cannot know if the *quinquennali*, the scribe and engraver fully understood the status of each individual at the time when they assembled the list. The rankings of locals, as noted above, should not have caused a problem but having exact information about the rank, status and privileges of each of the *viri clarissimi* and of the status of the prefect / patrons might have been beyond their cognizance. Complicating this process may also have been the timing of the cooption. As patrons were coopted for many reasons and over a long period of time it is possible that in cases of doubt priority of cooption may have been a factor. In sum: the *album* has the form of an official document and was surely approved / authorized by the decurions, but whether the listing is truly in conformity with imperial guidelines in all respects cannot be known with any certainty.

Within the class of patrons of senatorial rank, the *clarissimi viri*, at least four distinct ranks may be identified. Nos. 1–5 are all imperial *praefecti*, that is they held their offices at the discretion of the emperor. Nos. 6–11 all appear to be of consular rank; Nos. 14–26 are presumably praetorian in rank and Nos. 27–31, are junior senators.

8.1.1. *Imperial Prefects as Patrons* (*Nos. 1–5*)

There is reason to believe that the first five patrons listed are all imperial prefects, and that Nos. 2–5 held senior positions open to members of the equestrian order. Nonetheless, they are listed on the *album* as senators and among the *clarissimi*. As will be shown below, it is a characteristic feature of the reign of Alexander Severus that, though prefects begin to be described as *clarissimi* during this period, it is not readily apparent why they appear on the list before consulars. Salway concludes that their position on the *album* may reflect 'their order of precedence on the imperial *consilium* … is the only plausible basis' for their position on the *album*.[33] Even so, it is not

[33] 168.

known when these individuals were coopted; indeed in earlier editions of the *album* they might have been listed lower in the column under patrons of equestrian rank. Moreover, being a prefect and serving on the *consilium* may indicate how the Canusini viewed their prestige and authority, but it is also clear that not all imperial prefects were coopted or even that all members of the imperial *consilium* became patrons of Canusium. In sum, the first five patrons constitute a distinct subset of patrons and their listing before consulars raises important questions about priority and practices.

Appius Claudius Julianus heads the list.[34] He is at this time clearly the most prominent and most senior senator, a *clarissimus vir* with an impressive senatorial *cursus*. He had already been consul in an earlier but uncertain year, probably under Caracalla. Around 220, he governed Africa *proconsularis*. He is surely the Julianus, *praefectus urbi*, to whom Severus Alexander wrote a letter recorded in the *Digest* (31, 87.3) and, if an emendation be accepted, his term of office covered the year 223. Even without the emendation, his position at the head of the list of prefects suggests that he was indeed *praefectus urbi* at the time the decree authorizing the inscription was approved.

About T. Lorenius Celsus nothing further is known beyond the fact of his name on the *album* and the implications of the position he has been assigned.[35] Because he is grouped together with other prefects, it has been accepted by many scholars that he too held that such an office, perhaps as praetorian prefect, and did so with Aedinius Julianus as a colleague. He is a good example of an obviously important imperial official about whom virtually nothing is known beyond what is implicit in his ranking on this one text: namely, scholars have assumed that his rank and offices are consistent with what we know about the others who are placed around him in this column.

The career of M. Aedinius Julianus is well attested in epigraphical, papyrological and legal sources.[36] Even so, there are a number of difficulties. Dietz, for example, despairs that all the questions can be resolved. For this

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[34] *PIR*^{2} C 901; G. Barbieri, *L'albo senatorio da Settimio Severo a Carino*, Roma, 1952, No. 158 (hereafter cited as Barbieri and by the number of the individual); A. Degrassi, *I Fasti Consolari dell'Impero Romano*, Rome, 1952, p. 167; R. Syme, *Emperors and Biography*, Oxford, 1971, 227; A. Jardé, *Etudes critiques sur la vie et la regne de Sévère Alexandre*, Paris, 1925, 60; Chelotti, 65, n. 26.

[35] H.-G. Pflaum, *Le marbre de Thorigny*, Paris, 1948, 40; *PIR*2 L 343; Barbieri, 1087/8; Modrzejewski and Zawadzki, 593; Syme, *Emperors*, 152; Chelotti, 65, n. 28, and Salway, 148.

[36] Barbieri, 923; *PIR*^{2} A 111; Howe, 38, Pflaum, *Marbre*, 35–39; K. Dietz, *Senatus contra principem*, Munich, 1980, 40; *P. Flor*. 3, 382; *P. Oxy*. 1, 35; *CIL* 13, 3162, Salway 149–151, 168.

discussion, the relevant facts are first, that he was *praefectus Aegypti* from late 222 through March 223, so much is attested in the papyri, and suggests a successful equestrian career. Second, he is listed on the *album* among the *clarissimi viri*. That he is so listed together with other prefects indicates that he may have been promoted to the praetorian prefecture probably in late 223. And, third, he was a praetorian prefect at the time that he wrote a letter recorded on the "Marbre de Thorigny". As the praetorian prefecture normally conferred senatorial status in this period, we may date his prefecture to 223, though that need not mean that he held the office in 223. He had then a mixed career and held important equestrian and senatorial offices. Why he appears where he does on the *album*, however, remains a mystery unless we accept Salway's argument that he was a member of the imperial *consilium* in this year and that membership conferred priority over consulars.

The lengthy career of L. Didius Marinus is also well attested.[37] Six different inscriptions from all parts of the empire, but especially from the east, provide a secure record of his movements down to 215. The final reference to his honors is the *album Canusinum* and, because it places him among the *clarissimi viri*, it has been suggested that he too had been promoted to the praetorian prefecture and that he held the office with Domitius Honoratus; Salway argues that he was "*praefectus* (*?*) *annonae*" in 223. At the very least however what we do know is that he was well connected to the Severan establishment and may have been a member of the *consilium*.

L. Domitius Honoratus also belongs to this group of prefects.[38] He is recorded to have been *praefectus Aegypti* on January 6, 222, which some believe would make him the predecessor of Aedinius Julianus. An undated inscription from Egypt contains a dedication to Honoratus, *praefectus praetorio* (*CIL* 3, 12025), perhaps the same man. Because he is listed among the *clarissimi viri* on the *album*, it is likely that he had been appointed to that office before November, 223. Salway, however, prefers to date the praetorian prefecture to about 226, to a date after the publication of the *album* and suggests that he was perhaps "*praefectus* (*?*) *vigilum*" in 223.

What we have then for places 2–5 on the first column are some serious anomalies. First, individuals appear among the *clarissimi* and indeed very

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[37] *PIR*2 D 71; Barbieri, 1013; Pflaum, *Carrières*, No. 295; Modrzejewski-Zawadzki, 593; Chelotti, 65, n. 29, Salway 148–149; 168.

[38] L.L. Howe, *The Praetorian Prefect from Commodus to Diocletian*, Chicago, 1942, 37; *PIR*^{2} D 151; Barbieri, 1018; Pflaum, *Marbre* 40; Jardé, 39; Chelotti, 65, n. 30.

high on the list, who, though they may have been prominent and may have been part of the inner circle of imperial government, may not have been *clarissimi* before or in 223; that is, several of them may not have been of the rank ascribed to them on the *album*. Second, and accepting the long held theory that praetorian prefects in this period might have been reckoned as among the *clarissimi*, it is not clear why the prefects of Egypt or *praefectus vigilum* are present, or why this group whose senatorial status may have been conferred as *ornamenta* or through adlection into the consulate would rank before those who had actually held the office. The position of these four on the *album* seems to violate the principles laid out above. What can be done?

It is important to note that the four anomalies are grouped together, suggesting that those who arranged the names did perceive the four as part of a constellation. Can one detect any principle behind the arrangement? Salway concludes that they must all be members of the imperial *consilium*, and that status would explain their priority before the consular. If one assumes that the editors of the *album* understood that the prefect of Egypt enjoyed the same privileges of senatorial status as the praetorian prefect, the ranking just after the *praefectus urbi* would make sense. We would also have to assume that the editors also believed that those offices and honors for the prefects were superior to the consular. That is, if the arrangement is indeed deliberate and informed, then at least those imperial *praefecti* who were members of the *consilium* at this time enjoyed a rank superior to the consulars. Note that No. 1 on the list, App. Claudius Julianus is not only *praefectus urbi*, but also ordinary consul for the following year; his colleague in the consulate, Bruttius Crispinus, No. 13 on the list, is placed well below. Whether the status as prefect or the second consulate determined the position of Julianus cannot be determined, but the arrangement does suggest that the prefecture /membership in the *consilium* may have been a consideration. The key words in this analysis are of course 'if the arrangement is deliberate and informed' and that is a question that we cannot answer. We will return to his issue below when the discussion turns to expectations about benefactions.

Though not mentioned explicitly, Ulpian is central to our understanding of this list and its implications. First, the fact that we can make sense of the list at all depends completely upon his discussion of seniority in *de officio proconsulis* as recorded in the *Digest*. Second, the jurist was appointed praetorian prefect very early in the reign of Severus Alexander and held the office until his death. As the Canusini apparently wished to have a good number of *praefecti* as patrons and as his name is conspicuously absent, it has been generally believed that he must already have been murdered by the

time that the *album* was authorized. Nonetheless, we need to understand as I have argued above, that the Canusini adopted patrons over a long period of time and probably for different reasons. There is then no compelling reason to assume that Ulpian's absence is best explained by assuming he had already been murdered.[39]

In sum, a good number of uncertainties remain about why these prefects are assigned the places they occupy in the document. The arrangement may appear to be deliberate even if the principle eludes us. The fact that several of these individuals are otherwise unknown constrains any conclusion. Nonetheless, the fact that they were coopted as patrons suggests that the Canusini were sensitive to the shifting trends and perceptions of political power in the imperial government and sought patrons who might protect and represent their interests and that they sought patrons with a variety of experiences. Nonetheless, and given that the cooption could have taken place at any time during the years before 223, it cannot be certain that their status [as members of the imperial *consilium*??] in that year was the defining criterion.

8.3.2. *Patrons of Consular Rank*[40]

The argument that the men assigned places six through twelve were consulars is based on the fact that Bruttius Crispinus, no. 13, became the *consul ordinarius* and colleague of Appius Claudius Julianus (no. 1) in 224.[41] Crispinus must then have been of praetorian status at the time the *album* was authorized. His brother, Bruttius Praesens had already been consul in 217; hence, the hierarchical principle suggests that among the patrons of Canusium, one brother represents the most junior of the consulars and the other brother the most senior praetorian. Though the evidence regarding the names is by no means defining, what there is confirms this hypothesis. This is an important proposition, for it means that scholars have been able to identify three consulars who are otherwise unattested and to assign approximate dates of "before 217" for their tenure in office. Note again, as in the previous paragraph, the presence of more 'otherwise unknowns'

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[39] Modrzejewski & Zawadzki, 592 ff.; Pflaum, *Marbre*, 36–45. In contrast, Salway 168–169, who position is similar to that outlined here.

[40] P.M.M. Leunissen, *Konsuln und Konsulare in der Zeit von Commodus bis Severus Alexander (180–235 n. Chr.)*: prosopographische Untersuchungen zur senatorischen Elite im römischen Kaiserreich, Amsterdam (Gieben, 1989), provides a good overview of those listed here.

[41] See below in this section.

constrains any conclusion about the status of individuals and why they might have been coopted.

The three otherwise unknown consulars include M. Antonius Balbus, L. Pontius Verus and C. Gavivius Maximus.[42] None of these finds a place in Degrassi's *Fasti consolari* but Barbieri and Leunissen list them as senators and as consulars. A local or regional origin is possible for all three, perhaps more so for Balbus as there are three other M. Antonii listed among the magistrates of Canusium. The name, however, is hardly rare. As to Pontius and Gavivius, one can only note that neither name is common in Apulia. Inscriptions provided in *PIR*^{2} 827–831, locate the Pontii Veri in Africa and specifically in Thamugadi. Given that senators had to own land in Italy (one quarter of their property in this period), origins may not have been a significant factor in the cooption, but ownership of land in Canusium might be.[43]

The others are better known. M. Statius Longinus (no. 7) was governor of Moesia *inferioris* in 217–218, an appointment which presumes consular status.[44] He is surely the father of M. Statius Longinus Iunior (no. 30) and M. Statius Patruinus (no. 29). The family is thought to be of Italian origin, but the argument depends in part on their *patrocinia* of Canusium.[45] In sum, Longinus is clearly an important senator, consul before 217, and an imperial governor, and the family may have had interests and / or roots in Apulia.

A. Betitius Pius belongs to a well-known family from the central Italian town of Aeclanum.[46] Betitius' ancestors had been appointed to numerous municipal offices in southern Italy, in Aeclanum itself, in Venusia and Nola. He, too, must have been consul before 217, indeed some years before that date.

B. Furius Octavianus (no. 11) is attested as a consular and as a *pontifex* (*ILS* 1169) and, we may deduce, he reached the former office before 217. Little else can be said about him other than that his family appears to have had large holdings in Moesia.[47]

The two Bruttii are members of an important consular family with imperial connections.[48] C. Bruttius Praesens had achieved a second consulate in

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[42] Barbieri, Nos. 39, 1138 and 1056; see also his note on pp. 6–7; Leunissen 167.

[43] P. Garnsey and R. Saller, The Roman Empire, Berkeley and Los Angeles [CalUP; 1967] 64–68; *SHA*, MA 11.8;.

[44] Stein, *Legaten*, 90–91; Degrassi, p. 228.

[45] Barbieri, 486, Leunissen, 171.

[46] Stein, *Ritterstand* 221; *PIR*^{2} B 118; Barbieri, 968.

[47] *PIR*^{2} F 580, Barbieri no. 256, Schumacher, 241.

[48] On the *praenomina* of the two brothers, see Appendix 3.

180, and his granddaughter had been married to Commodus. Her brother is probably to be identified with the *consul ordinarius* of 187 and his sons, the two mentioned here, became *ordinarii* in 217 and 224, respectively. Given this background, it is especially significant that the two occupy places twelve and thirteen. Given the hierarchical arrangement, those who precede Praesens would have held suffect consulships before 217. They cannot be *adlecti* for, according to Ulpian, *adlecti* are to be ranked after those who have actually held the office; that is, they would have to be ranked after Praesens. The family appears to be Lucanian in origin (*tribus Pomptina*), a consideration that would make it sympathetic to the needs of the Canusini. They had property in Amiternum and in the Appenine highlands.[49]

8.3.3. *The Ranking of Prefects and Consulars*

The expectations of the Canusini regarding these patrons will be discussed below, what requires comment here is the fact that not only are the prefects [who may have had the *ornamenta consularia* rather than the actual office[50]] listed among the consuls, but that they are placed before six patrons of consular status, an ordering then that is highly suggestive of how the Canusininian magistrates understood the official ranking accorded the at least some of the prefects during the Severan period.

To understand the nature and implications of the ranking of the prefects on the *album*, we must consider whether the prefects in question enjoyed actual membership in the senate.[51] This is a vexing question, one which Syme allows "can be waived in this place, otherwise there will be no end to the discussion."[52] The consensus, as represented most recently by Chastagnol and Fergus Millar, is that the prefects, at least until Alexander, were not senators *de iure*, remaining *viri eminentissimi* despite the fact that they enjoyed the *ornamenta consularia*. This illustrates once again, as Millar concludes, "the divorce of honor or status and function."[53] If this were the case

49 *AE*, 1981, 292. See below.

50 On the *ornamenta* for prefects, Salway, 157–158.

51 On this issue, Howe, 120–123, and R.J.A. Talbert, *The Senate of Imperial Rome*, Princeton, 1984, 160 and 367.

52 Syme, *Emperors*, 152.

53 F. Millar, *The Emperor and the Roman World*, Ithaca, 308; A. Chastagnol, *Recherches sur l'Histoire Auguste*, Bonn, 1970, 42–48; Salway offer a word of caution: "it is implausible that … Honoratus … Marinus … and Julianus should outrank … Balbus. It is inconceivable, according to the normal rules of precedence obeyed in the *curia*, that men of relatively recent senatorial membership should be considered superior to a senior ex-consul" 162–163, but this

during the reign of Severus Alexander, then it is clear that the Canusini misunderstood the status of their patrons, for they placed all the prefects among the *cc. vv.* [senators] at the head of column I.

There is a solution. Under Severus Alexander, that is, at the very time that the *album* was created, the status of the prefects may have been exactly what the Canusini claimed. The *vita Severi Alexandri* of the *SHA* records the following:

> *praefectis praetorii suis senatoriam addidit dignitatem, ut viri clarissimi et essent et decerentur; quod antea vel raro fuerat vel omnino nondum fuerat, eo usque ut, si quis imperatorum successorem praefecto praetorio dare vellet, laticlaviam eidem per libertum summiterent ... Alexander autem idcirco senatores esse voluit praefectos praetorio, ne quis non senator de Romano senatore iudicaret.* (21, 3–5)

Chastagnol, when comparing this passage to the *album*, concludes that the *SHA* does in this instance record a genuine item of information, namely that praetorian prefects were *clarissimi* in word and in fact. What must be explained, however, is the positioning of the prefects before six other consulars in the ranking. The answer, he suggests, is that the prefects must have been suffect consuls; it follows then, given the hierarchical principle discussed above, that those consulars on places six through eleven must have all been *adlecti inter consulares*.[54]

This is a plausible explanation, but there is an alternative that is more consistent with the data. Chastagnol does not mention the opinion of Ulpian discussed above, namely that those who held *dignitates principis iudicio* should have the highest priority. Here I believe we can identify such offices; they are the two *praefecturae* that carried with them the *ius gladii* in Italy, namely, the *praefecturae urbis* and *praetorio*.[55]

That the *praefectus urbi* would have the highest rank among the patrons poses no substantial difficulty.[56] This office went to a prominent senator and was often connected, as is the case here, with the honor of a second consulate. Tacitus regularly provides a necrology for the individual in question

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conclusion brings us back to the original uncertainty: if the ranking is 'informed' then we are missing information about how prefects were ranked; if the ranking is 'uninformed' then what we have is rather a representation of what the Canusinian magistrates thought was the reality of power.

54 Pp. 47–48.

55 Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.* 2, 967–968.

56 Howe, 16 ff. On the superiority, both in theory and practice, of the *praefectus urbi* to the *praetorio*, M. Durry, *Les cohortes prétoriennes*, Paris, 1938, 187.

and, thereby, confirms the high honor associated with the office.[57] Moreover, because he was responsible for order and justice up to the one-hundredth milestone from the city, he was the only senator with the *ius gladii* (i.e., he commanded troops) in Italy.[58] As will be shown, the Canusini had good reason to seek the benevolence of a man with such power and prestige.

That the prefects, and not all of them were apparently praetorian prefects, should stand on places two through five, before other consulars, may be explained as a reflection of the priority assigned to the imperial prefectures during the reign of Severus Alexander. Chastagnol's alternative explanation, that the prefects here mentioned actually were suffect consuls and that the patrons listed in places six through eleven were adlected, is not supported by the evidence. Degrassi, in fact, assigns suffect consulships to two patrons in the latter group.[59] Again, then we are faced with a conundrum. One may believe that the higher imperial prefects were at this time full members of the senate and that the ranking of the prefects reflects the special conditions of the reign of Alexander, and that this solution is completely consistent with the specification of Ulpian regarding the assignment of priorities on the *album*.[60] Alternatively, we can follow Salway and conclude that the distinguishing characteristic of these individuals was membership in the *consilium principis*, and the priority reflects that status. A third option is that the Canusinian magistrates organized their list idiosyncratically, recognizing imperial norms but applying their own sense of the true power relations, and arranged their patrons accordingly. Admittedly, the underlying assumption is that the Canusinian magistrates were well and accurately informed that imperial prefects were senators and that their rank was at least at this time considered superior to consular. The alternative is to recognize that they might not have been, or at the very least, that those who prepared the list believed that they had some discretion in the assignment of priority (see also the discussion of a similar problem in 8.3.6). We should also note that we have no evidence that dates the cooption of any of these individuals. That is, we cannot know if any or several had been coopted as patron already years before and how that fact might have affected the placement of individuals on the list.

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57 *Hist.* 3, 75; *Ann.* 6, 11 and 13, 30. See also Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.* 2, 1062.

58 Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.* 2, 969, 1067; Eck, 20 and 62; Millar, 339. Note also: *ut Romae quidem praefectus urbis solus super ea re cognoscat, se intro miliarum centesimem sit in via commisa. enimvero se ultra centesimum, praefectus praetorio, Collat.* 14, 3.2.

59 To Statius Longinus and to Furius Octavianus, pp. 61–62; cf. Chastagnol, *Recherches*, 48.

60 See above, section 3.2. Salway will not agree with this conclusion.

8.3.4. *The Patrons of Praetorian Rank*

The patrons of praetorian rank, including Bruttius Crispinus, number altogether fourteen. Of these, eleven names are unattested in other sources; the three of whom we know anything include Crispinus (no. 13), C. Petronius Magnus (no. 14) and L. Lucilius Priscilianus (no. 19). The significance of this figure, namely that only three of fourteen praetorians are otherwise attested, will be discussed below.[61]

It is generally agreed that C. Petronius Magnus was praetor under Caracalla (*Dig.* 22,3.20), patron of Canusium by 223, and then one of the conspirators whom Maximinus executed in 238.[62] There are problems with this arrangement. Petronius' name was erased on the *album* and other readings have been suggested.[63] The man killed in 238 is simply known as Magnus and is said to be of consular and patrician standing (Herodian 7, 1.4–7). With some caution, however, the linkage may be accepted.[64] As suggested by the hierarchical principle, Magnus was praetor shortly after Crispinus.

Lucilius Priscilianus (no. 19) was a gladiator and *delator*; he was adlected *inter praetorios* by Caracalla and then sent to govern Achaea. In 217, he was condemned by the senate and exiled. By 223, he had apparently been recalled. A number of inscriptions pertaining to his father suggest that the *patria* of the family was Ausculum.[65]

Structurally, what we find here is that Nos. 13–17 (at the most) served normal praetorships and, following Ulpian's principle, those patrons of praetorian rank who follow the *adlectus* Lucilius must also have been adlected into that rank. This phenomenon is not uncommon when emperors change by violence.[66] What is remarkable is the number of apparently related patrons at this level. No. 8, Pontius Verus, is probably the father of nos. 20 and 21, the Pontii Bassus and Mauricus; no. 6, Antonius Balbus may be the father of, or at least related to, no. 22, M. Antonius Crispinus; no. 26, Valerius Turbo is probably the father of no. 31, Valerius Turbo Iunior. The significance of these connections will be discussed below.[67]

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61 See section 8.3.5.
62 Pflaum, *Marbre* 46; Barbieri, 1645; Dietz, 188.
63 See Mommsen's commentary on the inscription.
64 See Dietz, 188, for the argument.
65 *PIR*² L 391, 392; Dio 78, 21.3.
66 See Nicols, *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, Wiesbaden, 1978, Section III.
67 On the general implications, 8.5.

8.3.5. *Patrons of Lower Senatorial Rank*

The last five patrons of senatorian status appear to be of aedilician rank or lower. Only one of the five (No. 27, L. Flavius Honoratus Lucilianus) is attested in other sources. His *patria* is the Numidian municipality of Cuicul and, judging by the fact that he was the consular governor of Lower Moesia in 237–238, he probably was still at the lower end of the *cursus* in 223.[68] Of the remaining patrons of senatorial rank, little may be added. The Statii (nos. 29 and 30) are apparently the sons of Longinus (no. 7).

In sum, it is manifest that the Canusini were not simply looking for senior and powerful senators. The range of rank among the senators coopted suggests that we do need to take the *liberos posterosque* formula seriously and / or that seniority and access to the emperor may not have been as important as other considerations in selecting an individual as patron.

8.3.6. *Patrons of Equestrian Rank*

The patrons of equestrian rank may be divided into two groups. Five of them are *decuriones* of the town of Canusium; they are then mentioned twice, once among the patrons and then once according to their municipal rank. The second group consists of three individuals who are not among the *decuriones*. They are presumably outsiders, but bear names that are found in other municipalities of southern and central Italy.

The three outsiders are P. Gerellanus Modestus (no. 32; he is the highest ranking among the equestrians), T. Munatius Felix (no. 34) and Q. Coelius Sabinianus (no. 39). The *nomen* Gerellanus is rare, hence it is highly suggestive that over eight of them appear on inscriptions from Uria and Brundisium.[69] All the Gerellani, as no. 32 here, have the *praenomen* Publius. The *patria* of Munatius Felix may be another *Regio II* community, Beneventum, whence come half of the Munatii of the region.[70] No such pattern can be deduced for Coelius. As we know nothing of the careers of these men, it is impossible to explain their ranking on the *album*.

The placement of equestrian patrons of local origin creates difficulties and has consequences. The five *decuriones* in question are T. Ligurius Postuminus (no. 33 on the patronal list, no. 1 among the *quinquennales*), T. Flavius Crocalianus (no. 35; no. 1 among the aedilicians), C. Galbius Soterianus (no. 36; no. 1 among the *adlecti inter quinquennales*) and the two Aelii, Rufus

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68 See Dietz, No. 38, who observes at n. 415 the possibility of Italian connections.

69 *CIL* 9, 49, 50, 122, 163, 224, 225, 6123, 5125; *AE* 1978, 309.

70 *CIL* 9 notes that 15 of 31 are recorded on texts from Beneventum.

and Flavianus (nos. 37 and 38; nos. 4 and 5 among the *quinquennales* in the second column). There are two problems with the rankings of these patrons. First, Crocalianus, as senior aedilician ought to stand, according to Ulpian's principle, after all *quinquennales*, but here he precedes three of them. Second, the *adlectus* ought properly to stand after those who had actually held the office, namely after the two Aelii, but he does not.[71] The implications of these apparent exceptions to the rule defined above are serious. Again, if we assume that the Canusinian magistrates were informed of these rules, then we must assume either that they had compelling reasons for adopting the solution they did; alternatively, they were not well informed and acted according to local tradition or perceptions of power. If, however, Ulpian's principle does not apply to the list of patrons, then much of Pflaum's interpretation of the *Marbre de Thorigny* collapses, the recently established date for the death of the jurist, Ulpian, is again open to question, an important principle of municipal organization and the dates of many consulates, indeed the consulates themselves, must be abandoned. For this discussion of the working of patronage, the implications are fortunately relatively unimportant.

Surely it would be better if there were no exceptions, but the impact is mitigated by several considerations. First, it is not clear how *adlecti* were actually appointed (by the *quinquennales* during a census? by the *decuriones* acting by decree?). Second, the ranking of equestrians is precisely where one might expect to have problems: how does one compare an outsider like Gerellanus Modestus to the most senior of the local *quinquennales*? Third, it is reasonable that some of the individuals in question had enjoyed *dignitates principis iudicio*, that Crocalianus' municipal career had been interrupted in order to assume an imperial appointment, one that might have enhanced his status when compared to that of the Aelii. Fourth, and equally possible, there might have been a local ordinance that regulated the arrangement; indeed, Ulpian allows for such variation when he specifies that **his guidelines be observed only when there is no *lex municipalis* to regulate the ranking**. Any number of considerations might then have affected the ranking: a local ordinance, imperial appointments, seniority of cooptation, the nature of the benefaction, or even mention of a special ranking in the decree of cooptation.[72]

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71 The proper order should be: 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 36, 35, 39.

72 See also 6.1.5 for two similar cases. The municipal charters do not refer to the ranking of patrons, nor is there anything in the *tabulae* that would indicate that a ranking was specified at the time of cooptation.

In sum, we are left with come compelling models for understanding the rankings on the *album*, but the apparent exceptions (cf. 6.1.5) suggest that:

- the Canusini either were better informed about the rankings than we are or,
- did not believe that they needed to comply with imperial norms and expectations, or
- their municipal charter allowed for discretion or recognized different priorities, or
- were unaware of the specific status of each individual on their list at the time the order was determined.

8.4. *The Needs and Expectations of the Client Community*

An assessment of the needs of the Canusini in respect to patronage is now appropriate. It is readily apparent, first, there is a clear preference for senators over equestrians, though this conclusion should be qualified if some of the individuals listed had in fact been coopted earlier in their careers and while still equestrian in status. Second, local and regional connections are of considerable importance, especially in the selection of equestrian patrons. Third, continuity is stressed by the cooptation of family members. And, fourth, as will be shown, there is concern for protection in all forms at law and for promotion of economic interests. Each of these points requires some discussion.

There are some important limits to this discussion. First, we have no specific evidence relating to the date of cooption or even to one benefaction conferred by these patrons. Whatever observations we may make regarding their services will have to be based on what we know of their careers and resources. That is, we assume that the Canusini pursued a rational and / or opportunistic policy in selecting potential patrons. Equally important is the recognition that patrons were coopted over time and for a variety of reasons; indeed some may have been coopted early in their careers and long before the date of the *album*. Though father and son might be coopted under the rubrick '*liberos posterosque*' and may be identified as such on the list, there is every reason to believe that the process of cooption was distinct for each patron. Even if the decree followed such well-established lines, there was a distinct document prepared for each cooption. So, too, it is reasonable to believe that the Canusinian magistrates may have grouped some patrons on the list because of similarities in career and / or resources or because they had property in Canusium or along the drove roads used

by Canusinian shepherds. Hence, the inclusion and ranking of the four imperial prefects may represent a response to the needs of a particular situation, as Salway and others have argued [above], but as we know of no case in which unrelated patrons were coopted as a batch, it seems more likely that that the cooptions were defined by circumstances perhaps similar yet surely particular to each case. The assumption in what follows is that the decision to coopt a patron was based on considerations that can best be described as opportunistic: the Canusini sought out individuals who were in a position to aid the community and that they (the Canusini) had reason to believe that the potential patron was positively disposed to fulfill those expectations. Fronto's letter to his fellow citizens in Cirta states the case precisely [Ch. 4.3], and there is no indication in that letter that the individuals mentioned were all coopted as a group. The critical point again is that we do not know the circumstances surrounding even one of the cooptations. To presume that there was a defining moment that brought all together at one moment is possible, but not demonstrable given the indications available to us.

Regarding the preference for senators over equestrians, the degree of preference is on the order of 4:1; 3:1 even if one omits the praetorian prefects. In comparing the data from Canusium with inscriptions discovered in Italy and the provinces,[73] one finds the following:

Table 8.1: Distribution of Patrons by Status, Location and Century

Century	Canusium senators/equestrians	Italy senators/equestrians	Provinces senators/equestrians
2nd	0/0	59/127	67/41
3rd	31/8	50/85	75/59

At first glance, the data suggests that Canusium is atypical in its preference for senators. On further consideration, the *album* may provide an important corrective. The distribution suggests that senators had many civic clients; too many to list on their own inscriptions. In this case I am reminded of an expression common in German academic circles for professors who have received honorary doctorates from many universities: *honoris causa multi*. Equestrians and decurions surely had far fewer clients and might

[73] These data are collected from Harmand, Engesser and the author's own research as presented in Ch. 7 and are available online in the CWS.

have been more inclined to record that fact to enhance their prestige.[74] Hence, the picture of patronage in Harmand, with the heavy emphasis on the equestrian element, may represent a biased sample. Some support for this proposition may be seen in the distribution of senatorial and equestrian patrons on the *albus ordinis* of Timgad, dating to about 360. In this text, six patrons are noted, five of them are described as *viri clarissimi* and one as an *eques*; the latter is listed among the local *sacerdotes*.[75] The ratio of 5:1 coincides then closely with that of Canusium. The norm, in sum, may well be the distribution found on in the *album*. However one interprets the general situation, the implications are clear that early in the 3rd Century, the Canusini, (and the citizens of similar communities) wished to have a good number of patrons who came from the senatorial order and who were members of the imperial elite. The collections of many specific examples from the epigraphical evidence must then be treated with some caution, for such collections may provide a misleading impression of the incidence of civic patronage from the perspective of status and rank.

What kinds of services did each party render? As noted, the *album* provides no indication of the expectations of either party. Did senators continue to accept the honor because it was an important way to demonstrate their status by displaying a good number of *tabulae* in their atria? Or was it a matter of indifference, given the many civic clients they might have had? For senators or equestrians who invested in sheep and wool, were there advantages in maintaining a formal relationship with a like-minded town as Canusium? For the Canusini, the preference for senators may well be based on the latter's prestige, wealth, access to the central authorities. But was the advantage significant in terms of protection, mediation and benefaction?

The general trend of the evidence (as argued in Chs. 4–7), both epigraphical and literary, indicates that senators were often coopted in a prospective sense and that services were expected, but not specified. A good example of this attitude is the famous inscription in bronze commemorating the cooptation of Trajan's *amicus*, T. Pomponius Bassus, by the Ferentini (*ILS* 6106): *ut tantae virtutis vir auxilio sit futurus municipio nostro*. A parallel case is the cooptation of Pliny the Younger by the town of Tifernum when he was still a very young man (4, 1) and, indeed, the letters of both Pliny and Fronto (2, 11) are quite emphatic that communities sought senatorial

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74 For an estimate of the number of client communities a senator might have had in this period, please see the CWS.

75 On the text, see Chastagnol, *Timgad*, 22 ff.

patrons not only because the senators had some local connection, but also because the communities hoped for material benefaction and anticipated a range of benefactions.[76] Equestrians, on the other hand, generally tend to be coopted as patron because they were of local origin and as a reward for concrete benefactions, benefactions that are sometimes mentioned directly or indirectly in the texts.[77] In sum, though patrons of both ranks were clearly important, Canusium (and probably other Italian and provincial towns) also felt a greater need for the less specific services and good will of senatorial patrons than for the more concrete benefactions of equestrians.

There is a prevalence of family connections among the patrons of Canusium. Twelve of the twenty-six senatorial patrons are apparently related (no. 6 with 20, 7 with 29 and 30, 8 with 20 and 21, 12 with 13, 26 with 31). This phenomenon is consistent with what is recorded on the *tabulae patronatus*, namely, the formal document of cooptation that extended the honor to the individual and to his *liberi posterique*.[78] Judging by the difference in rank, the combinations appear to be father and sons. Even the two Bruttii probably inherited their position from their illustrious, but now deceased father. All this suggests that the Canusini were interested in the continuity of benefaction over generations. Patronage [or clientele] is, of course, an inherited as well as an acquired relationship.

Local and regional connections were of importance to the selection of patrons. Five of eight equestrian patrons are also *decuriones* of Canusium and two of the other three are from nearby towns. This pattern is duplicated throughout the Latin west. As to senators, both Pliny and Fronto stress the importance of at least regional ties in the selection of patrons (Ch. 4.2 and 4.3). At Canusium, at least two of them do appear to have an Apulian origin. Others may have had local interests. Pliny's cooptation by Tifernum was apparently connected with his acquisition of a villa and property within the territory of the town.[79] Though it cannot be proven here, it is plausible that senators, like Varro, invested in the lucrative sheep and wool enterprises based in or around Canusium (*RR* 2, intro. 6: *habui in Apulia ovarias*). In such

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[76] Note the Representative Texts in Ch. 1.

[77] Harmand provides numerous examples, 358 ff. *ILS* 4815 is a case in point, as too was the cooptation of Pliny's grandfather-in-law by Comum, *ILS* 2721, cf. *ep*. 5, 11. This issue is discussed fully in Ch. 7.

[78] Cf. *ILS* 6094 ff. and the chapter on the *tabulae*. For the mention of specific relatives, see, for example, *CIL* 8, 1181.

[79] Discussed at length in the chapter on Pliny.

cases the municipalities surely assumed that the prospective patron was already positively disposed toward the town.

The *album Canusinum* provides, as noted above in 8.3, a list of thirty-nine patrons of the town, and it is reasonably certain that a good number of those non-resident patrons of Canusium came from communities along those very *calles publicae* used by shepherds. The main drove road runs from Canusium through Aeclanum, Ausculum and Beneventum and then into the *montes Reatini*. Specifically, C. Betitius Pius is associated with Aeclanum, L. Lucilius Priscillianus is connected to Ausculum and T. Munatius Felix probably with Beneventum.[80] Other drove trails led through the territory of Venusia, the *patria* of Junius Numidianus, and Luceria, the *patria* of the three Statii and a most important market for the products of sheep and shepherds.[81] As the Saepinum inscription makes clear, conflicts did arise between migrating shepherds and towns along the roads, hence it was certainly reasonable for the Canusini to secure protectors and mediators in those towns where their citizens might have need of such services. Indeed, the magistrates responsible for local order in the first instance were local officials; the prefects became involved only in continuing and serious cases, and even then reluctantly.[82]

Another regional connection, though much more speculative, is the fact that a number of the patrons of Canusium also had ties with Moesia. Statius Longinus and Flavius Honoratus were both governors of the province (about 217 for the former and after 236 for the latter[83]). What makes these governorships significant is the fact that the families of other patrons appear to have had estates in the area. They are Furius Octavius, the Valerii Turbones, the Ponti and Flavius Honoratus.[84] That is, of the thirty-one patrons of senatorial status, ten of them had some connection with Moesia. There is no direct evidence linking Canusium with this province, but it may be that the former's production of woolen products was distributed / marketed in the latter area. Moreover, as Frayn notes that it was not uncommon for wealthy Romans to own farms abroad and that some investors like Varro sent herds and

[80] On the Betitii, G. Camodeca, "Ascesa al senato e rapporti con i territori d'origine. Regio II (Apulia et Calabria)", in *Epigrafia e Ordine senatorio* (*Atti*), II, Rome, 1982, 131–132; Chelotti, op. cit., 50; on the Lucilii, Camodeca, 136, Chelotti, 51; on the Munatii, Chelotti, 52.

[81] On Junius, Camodeca, 147, Chelotti, 51; on the Statii, Camodeca, 146, Chelotti, 50; on the market at Luceria, Frayn, 142.

[82] Eck, *Organisation*, 12 and 20.

[83] Stein, *Legaten*, 90, Dietz, No. 38.

[84] *PIR*^{2} F 580; *AE* 1980, 811; *AE* 1981, 723.

animals both in and out of Italy.[85] It is possible that families like the Pontii had investments in both areas.

In sum, commercial, regional and local connections appear to be important in the selection of patrons of equestrian rank and of some importance in the selection of patrons of senatorial rank.

Finally, and perhaps most intriguing is the assessment of the significance of the *praefecti* on the list. Admittedly, their high placement at the top of the list of *viri clarissimi* may reflect the special status of the praetorian prefects during the reign of Alexander Severus; so too might it reflect a combination of local ignorance and local perception of how important the individuals actually were in imperial policy making. One may go further: the Canusini had good reason to solicit the *benevolentia* of these men. Ulpian's discussion of the *album* appears in a treatise entitled *de officiis proconsulis* and suggests that the provincial governor had the ultimate responsibility for regulating the *album* (cf. Plin. 10, 79). In Italy, this function was assumed by the *praefectus urbi*, if within 100 m.p. of Rome, or by the *praefectus praetorio*, if beyond.[86] It is doubtful however, that this could have been the main reason for the cooptation; we would then expect to find many more praetorian prefects as patrons. This is not the case, indeed, only two others are known from Italy in this period.[87]

The implication is then that Canusium required prefects among her patrons to address a particular problem, either momentary or continuous. As noted above,[88] there is no evidence in the text of the *album* that the former was the case, but, fortunately, some indirect evidence for the latter interpretation. The need for patrons of such a position and function ought to be connected to the herds of sheep which were owned by the Canusini (and others) and which formed the basis of the town's prosperity.

There are two sets of evidence that indicate the nature of the problem. Varro, who as noted above invested in this manner, writes:

> *nam mihi greges in Apulia hibernabant, qui in Reatinis montibus aestivabant, cum inter haec bina loca, ut iugum continet sirpiculos, sic calles publicae destantes pastiones.*[89]

[85] Frayn, 163–169.

[86] On this, see Liebenam, 230, Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.* 2, 967–968, Howe, 34 and Millar, 124 and 339.

[87] *ILS* 1142 = *CIL* 6, 1408; *ILS* 1332 = *CIL* 11, 1836. Admittedly, prefects were risky choices: half of those known in this period (190 to 240) came to violent ends, Howe, 68–79, and only four of them were in office for any length of time.

[88] See section 2.2.

[89] *RR* 2, 2,9; cf. iii, 17.9, and Toynbee, 2, 288.

That is, each spring, the great herds were moved to the mountains of central Italy from the lowlands of Apulia and then in autumn back again. This transhumance surely involved large numbers of animals and fiercely independent shepherds. The evidence indicates that incidents did indeed occur; MacMullen, for example, begins his *Roman Social Relations* with the narration of one such episode.[90] Central to his discussion is, however, the famous inscription of Saepinum (*CIL* 11, 2438) that documents an incident or continuing set of incidents involving sheep, shepherds and locals.[91] The issue was eventually forwarded to the praetorian prefect who issued a proclamation on the matter threatening stronger action if local magistrates could not resolve the problem. The praetorian prefect then clearly had jurisdiction here because Saepinum lies just beyond the 100 m.p. mark and his office was responsible for the maintenance of order in that sector.[92] Hence, the cooptation of praetorian prefects at Canusium (and at other towns) may reflect the needs of the town to secure the good will of those men who were responsible for law and order in the Appenines and who ultimately oversaw the safety of flocks and herdsmen on their migration along the *calles publicae* between summer and winter pastures.[93]

This theory may well account for the presence of the praetorian prefects on the *album*, but what of the *praefectus urbi*? And what about the presence of the *praefecti Aegypti*? The same principle applies in the former case, for, when one moves from the Apulian lowlands to the *montes Reatines*, one also crosses the 100 m.p. line and into the jurisdiction of the urban prefect. It is noteworthy that one of these *calles* appears to run from Canusium past Aeclanum, Ausculum and Beneventum, towns which had citizens who were patrons of Canusium, patrons who might resolve any difficulties or conflicts arising during the migrations.[94] What then can one deduce about the connections between the prefects of Egypt and the Canusini? If the Canusini were familiar with career patterns they may have perceived that at least some the prefects of Egypt were likely to end their careers as praetorian prefects, and hence sought to anticipate an appointment that would ultimately

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90 New Haven, 1974, pp. 1–4. There are other examples, note Bulla Felix and other *latrones*. I have discussed these elsewhere, Prefects, Patrons and the Administration of Justice.

91 On this text, see M. Corbier, "Fiscus and Patrimonium: The Saepinum Inscription and Transhumance in the Abruzzi", *JRS* 73 (1983) 126–131 and Frayn, Appendix.

92 In this case, the controversy involves locals, on one hand, and imperial shepherds and flocks, on the other. The problems described, however, apply also to herds in private hands.

93 Again, this has been discussed more thoroughly in Nicols, Prefects, op. cit.

94 On these drove roads, see Frayn, 50–52.

affect them, or alternatively, that they had been, like Pliny himself, distinguished by early promise for political preferment.

Benet Salway (reference above) has offered an alternative explanation for the presence of these prefects, namely that they were coopted as Canusium sought the status of Roman colony. In this case the assistance of those on the imperial council might have been critical. Given the uncertain nature of the evidence, this explanation is certainly reasonable, but I do not find it more so than the ones I have offered above.

In sum, the prestige and ranking of the prefects may have varied from one reign to another, and the Canusini may not known how precisely these prefects should be ranked among the *viri clarissimi* or were acting on priorities defined in their charter, nonetheless they were sensitive to the powers of the imperial offices. The shared interests for maintaining order along the drove roads was sufficiently constant to encourage the communities like Canusium to coopt patrons who might protect their interests and advance their status.[95]

8.5. *Conclusions*

Though little more than a list of names of mostly forgettable or otherwise forgotten individuals, the *album Canusium* has a bearing on a number of fundamental issues in Roman imperial history and is justifiably one of the most frequently cited inscriptions in Mommsen's *Staatsrecht*. It constitutes, for example, the most important evidence for the formal arrangement of municipal senates.

The major concern here has been with one neglected aspect of the document, the list of patrons on column I. The evidence of the *album* confirms many widely accepted notions of what communities wished to have from their patrons. What is distinctive is that it offers a unique opportunity to examine how one community assessed its need for benefaction and what steps it took to ensure its prosperity.

In 223, Canusium enjoyed the *patrocinium* of thirty-nine patrons and their inclusion on the *album* indicates that they were considered to be *decuriones* and responsible for the well-being of the community. It would follow then that the expectations associated with civic patronage were not perceived to be substantially different from those of the decurion.

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[95] Salway, op. cit. A more substantial case for this theory has been made in the article "Prefects, Patronage and the Administration of Justice".

The evidence of the *album* also suggests that senators were more highly valued than were equestrians. To assess the nature of the services a senatorial patron performed is, however, no easy matter. Surely, the prestige of having senators, and indeed of having a good number of them, should not be discounted. Perhaps more important, however, were the presumed or actual "imperial" connections, the willingness to mediate and the ability to protect the interests of their clients in the capital. Caesar and Q. Oppius list the services (Representative Texts J and K). Pliny documents others (Ch. 4.2). In this context, patrons of consular and praetorian status were particularly valuable and at Canusium they comprise the overwhelming majority. As communities were no doubt competing for well-connected patrons, it may be that they prided themselves on their ability to identify "promising young men" and to secure their patronage before they could become overcommitted and out of reach; hence the high number of junior senators among the patrons.

The imperial connection also clearly applies to the cooptation of prefects with the *ius gladii*. Canusium's property and reputation depended upon her sheep and shepherds, on her wool and cloth. The latter of the two were often the victims or perpetrators of violence and, as such, came under the jurisdiction of the prefects and other high imperial officials. To secure the good-will of these men made good sense.[96]

As to equestrians who became patrons, the services appear to be relatively more concrete. Native sons who had contributed to the well-being of the town beyond the ordinary may have been rewarded with this additional honor. Outsiders may have found favor by representing the interests of the Canusini elsewhere especially at towns along the *calles publicae*.

Other factors would have applied equally to both senators and equestrians. Investment in wool was profitable and surely attracted many investors like Varro. Such individuals would then have had a legitimate connection with the town. Regional connections, common interests and the continuity of benefaction (i.e., the availability of sons) were also important to both parties. More may generalize here and add that other Apulian communities, perhaps not as wealthy as Canusium, may well have adopted similar strategies to secure a variety of benefactions.

Regarding the arrangement of the patrons, it has been shown that the order was not as strictly hierarchical as has been widely believed; there

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[96] One may generalize from this situation, for the provincial evidence confirms that administrative activity was frequently the basis for cooptation; see Harmand, 287 ff.; 290. Also in Ch. 7.5.3.

are some notable exceptions. I do not wish to suggest that it would be appropriate to reject all conclusions based on such a principle, but attention must be given to the implications. The charter of Canusium might have provided the local authorities more guidance on this question and, as Ulpian allows, the local ordinance would have taken precedence over the imperial guidelines.

In sum, though it is difficult to measure exactly how useful patronage was to a community like Canusium, it is clear that the communities themselves ranked their patrons ahead of their own local magistrates and apparently also valued the institution. The placement of the patrons on the register even before their own magistrates suggests how important they perceived *patrocinium publicum* to be.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Revision of the Album

It is not specified in the *Digest* how often the *album* should be revised. Mommsen, in discussing the example of the *album senatorium* mentioned by Tacitus (*Ann.* 4, 42), suggests that the revision and publication (in essence, what we have here), was annual.[97] This may have been the case at Rome (though the evidence is very uncertain); in the various *municipia* of the empire, however, the revision would appear to have been part of the censorial functions of the *duoviri quinquennales*.[98] Moreover, as Ulpian discussed the issue in his book on the duties of the proconsul (*libri de officiis proconsulis*), the *album* would have been edited subject to the approval of the responsible imperial magistrate; for Canusium, this would have been the praetorian prefect.[99]

Appendix 2: The Bruttii

The *praenomina* of the two Bruttii have long been a problem. Pflaum (*Marbre*, 38, followed by *PIR*2 B 166 and 8, and Barbieri, No. 90) believes that the inscriber of the *album* incorrectly assigned "L" to Praesens and "C" to Crispinus. The solution creates, however, more problems than it resolves; hence I

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[97] *Röm Staatsr.* 2, 946.

[98] See Liebenam, 230, who cites *CIL* 9, 2998, as evidence; also Abbott & Johnson, 65 and Sherwin-White, 670 ff.

[99] See section 5.5.

am following Schumacher (p. 392, n. 338) who argues that there is only one error ("L") for Praesens and that both have "C" as a praenomen (cf. *CIL* 16, 189: App. Cl. Juliano II C. Bruttio Crispino cos. and Degrassi, p. 60).

Appendix 3: How Long Was the Album *Displayed?*

We cannot be precise about how long the text continued to be displayed publicly. One point is clear, however, and that is that the *tabula* was not destroyed or re-used at the end of the *quinquennium* for it was apparently still open to inspection in 238. At that time it became necessary to erase the name of C. Pompeius Magnus (No. 14. on the list of patrons, if indeed the erasure refers to Magnus) who then suffered *damnatio memoriae*.[100] This is significant because it suggests that such *tabulae* were not merely intended for the *quinquennium*, which would have ended in AD 228, but continued to be sufficiently "public" so as to make it expedient to erase Petronius' name fifteen years later. How the text was displayed and for how long cannot be determined.

[100] On this problem, see Dietz, 188, and Barbieri, 1645.

CHAPTER NINE

REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIC PATRONAGE

In this concluding chapter I focus especially on the evolution of civic patronage from the Late Republic through the High Principate, from 70 BC until AD 235. More specific conclusions to particular questions may be found at the end of each chapter.

We may begin with the observation that patronage in general and civic patronage in particular remained venerable and vital components of the social system throughout Roman history. It was honorable for the powerful, the patron, to provide *praesidium*, protection, in many forms. It was honorable for the client to recognize publicly the *benevolentia* and *beneficia* provided.

What any student of this subject must bear in mind is that, though there is significant overlap, *patrocinium publicum* and civic patronage are not identical. To the Romans, *patrocinium publicum* was the consequence of some formal action on the part of the community. Nonetheless, when contemplating the social dynamics and interactions of communities and individuals, both ancients and moderns have also recognized that there are shared characteristics and have ascribed a clientelistic relationship even when there had been no formal agreement. This study focuses primarily on *patrocinium publicum*.

While the resolution of routine problems and events of singular importance encouraged communities to seek patrons, it was continuous and mutual benefaction that solidified the connection. Consider the legal position of patrons and client communities. Though two parties, client community and patron, might begin the relationship with a formal offer in the form of a municipal decree and by the formal acceptance by the individual, this step remains the only aspect of the relationship that was legally defined. With impunity, patrons might 'abandon' clients; and clients 'betray' their patrons. Sometimes such actions occurred during war (Tac. *hist.* 1, 2–3 and Ch. 2.2 and 2.3), sometimes in peace. Nonetheless, client communities did not take their patrons to court for 'abandonment' nor did patrons seek legal remedies for 'betrayal'. For the most part the relationship ended when services ceased. Those decurions charged with vetting the *ordo decurionum* (the *quinquennales*) added and dropped names from the list (*album*)

of active patrons, effectively making this method the most commonly used device to terminate a relationship. Civic patronage was based on continued services and good will, and when those services ceased so too did the relationship.

But what was exchanged? As I have argued consistently in this monograph, the sources are deliberately vague about what was exchanged. The community did not want to suggest that the honor could be obtained for a specific 'price'; nor did either party wish to concede that the relationship ended with the single benefaction. Continuity of benefaction and continuity of celebration were important both to the theory and practice of civic patronage / *patrocinium publicum*. As noted above, patrons offered (or were expected to provide) *praesidium* in many forms including mediation, intervention, legal services in court, and securing financial and material advantages. So too and over time with increasing frequency did civic patrons provide their clients with the amenities of urban life. They built temples and baths, subsidized the rearing and education of children, provided for public banquets. Clients celebrated the arrivals and departures of their patron; they set up monuments and inscriptions to honor them. Clearly this was not a one-for-one exchange. The services and benefactions were neither of the same quality nor quantity, and often there was a significant temporal discrepancy between the two. Nonetheless that both sides valued the exchange is best measured by the fact that communities continued to seek patrons, and patrons continued to accept communities into their clientele. To facilitate exchange, communities used the honor associated with *patrocinium* in some cases to encourage benefaction and in other cases to recognize and acknowledge benefactions received. That is, the exchange could be both prospective and retrospective.

The exchange also generated mutual *benevolentia*, a phenomenon we observed especially in the correspondence of Pliny and in the treatises of Cicero and Seneca on *officia* and *beneficia*. In the Roman version of Stoicism, meeting expectations generated the *benevolentia* that constituted the basis of a peaceful social order.

To judge from the contracts and decrees formalizing the relationship, both parties assume that it will continue and will bind the children and descendants. So much is explicit in the *tabulae patronatus* and in the *alba decurionum*. In these documents we find patrons and their descendants listed. In fact, as Cicero and Seneca emphasize, the vitality and continuity of the relationships over generations depended on the readiness of both sides to continue to perform the services expected. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to believe that the municipal authorities, in revising the list of decurions, were

also empowered to drop such patrons (or their descendants) who were no longer actively engaged with the community.

Status differential was also an important characteristic of civic patronage. The very notion of patronage is rooted in recognition of the social and political superiority of the patron. Hence, clients seek the *benevolentia* of patrons; the powerful do not (openly) seek clients among the communities. Admittedly, it is difficult to claim that an important town like Canusium was on some social scale inferior to a junior senator at Rome, but that was surely implicit in the decision of Tifernum to coopt Pliny prospectively and to request that the community be allowed to enter the latter's clientele when he was still by his own admission a very young man. Nonetheless, the evidence that we have suggests that patrons of senatorial status were generally coopted prospectively, while patrons of equestrian and decurial status were coopted retrospectively.

In his account of the establishment of patronage in early Rome, Dionysius of Halicarnassus implies that each client had one patron. Even if true, it is apparent for our period not only that patrons had many clients, but also that client communities had a good number of patrons. Indeed the more patrons one had the greater the likelihood that one might be found to provide protection in any situation. More generally we may also believe that patronage implies that clients and communities had choice about whom they wished to have as patrons. Hence communities like Massilia had a good number of patrons including Caesar and Pompeius; so too did Canusium with 39 and many others.

Turning now to evolution of civic patronage in this period, it is manifest that though these patterns may be recognized throughout the period under discussion there were significant variations in the practice of civic patronage as it evolved during this period.

Though surely stressed by the turmoil and civil wars that characterize the Late Republic, civic patronage retained its venerable status and also served to enhance the prestige of those who could welcome clients in their *atria*, clients who could celebrate their persons on conspicuous monuments, and who might join their entourage on the way to the Forum. In short: for a politician / patron to have a good number of clients civic and individual, served also to generate the aura of legitimacy and authority in uncertain times.

During this period civic patronage retained its reciprocal character in that patrons were expected to provide protection in many forms: they mediated between the community and the central government, defended the community before the Senate, and in the courts, and especially interceded with governors. As noted immediately above, receiving legations of allies

and communities enhanced the perception of their authority and prestige. For the client communities there were distinctive advantages to be gained by securing the open good will of the powerful: such public honors (and *patrocinium publicum* is one of many) served as warning to exploiters that they, the communities, had powerful defenders; such honors also encouraged members of the Roman elite to cultivate good relations with their provincial clients. The good will of *socii*, *amici* and *hospitii* made governance easier for the magistrates and for the Roman state.

The sources are also consistent that the competitors for power, whether a Caesar or a Pompeius, reckoned that their client communities could be calculated as military assets, that their clients could be marshaled into armies. In this they were frequently disappointed. Adopting a dynast as a patron was a political statement that put a community 'on the record'. In making that statement, some members of the local elite stood to gain also the good will of and access to members of the Roman elite. Their local competitors may not have shared in the benefits. In brief, communities were divided and, with the army of the patron's enemy camped at the gates, communities in most cases opted to listen to their *prudentes*, rather than to their more partisan leaders and sought accommodation. Such behavior could be justified on the grounds that the patron had failed to provide support and had in effect abandoned the client in time of need. It is no wonder then that the municipal charters of the period regulate the process by which a patron could be adopted and set heavy fines for magistrates who acted alone. No community wished to face alone the wrath of their patron's enemy. The experience of Massilia offered an example of what could happen in these situations. Despite such complications, formal civic patronage continued to offered and sought because it conferred also an aura of legitimacy in uncertain times. The evidence is clear that contenders for power and authority in the Late Republic understood how civic patronage could contribute to their prestige.

Under Augustus and with the return of peace venerable institutions like civic patronage, institutions that might confer the aura of legitimacy and authority, had to be redefined to support the new order. Early in his career Octavian had used *patrocinium publicum* in the conventional way to generate legitimacy for his otherwise unconventional status. As Augustus he continued to allow *patrocinium publicum* to be used as a vehicle for enhancing the prestige and legitimacy of the junior members of the imperial family. As he grew in power and adopted the title of *pater patriae*, its cognate, *patronus* with it limitations, ceased to be used to define his own position, but remained nonetheless common for senators and for citizen communities.

Expectations also had to change. The traditional emphasis on mediation and representation before senate and in the courts did not end, but a new component was added: patrons (taking Augustus himself as a model) were now expected also to contribute to the enhancement of their client communities. The spirit of this policy found its voice in Vergil and among the other Augustan poets, but most notably the new expectations are defined in the well-known passage (*Aen.* 1, 419 ff.) when Aeneas ascends a hill and first sees Carthage in its glory. Law and order receive their due, but the emphasis is on large-scale construction in stone: the gates and citadel, harbor and theater, these are the activities that generate human happiness: *fervet opus redolentque thymo fragrantia mella. / "o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt!"*. Augustus and Agrippa took the lead and provided the resources for many communities to develop the amenities of urban life, and, we may suppose, it was the intention of the government that the enjoyment of those amenities would serve to pacify and Romanize. Tacitus, in praising the efforts of Agricola in pacifying and romanizing Britons, confirms this thesis (*Ag.* 21). *Aemulatio principis* played a role and encouraged members of the imperial and local elites to devote their resources, temporal and fiscal, to the same kind of projects. Civic patronage in the broadest sense of the term describes the process, but even if we take a narrow definition and limit ourselves to what the Romans understood as *patrocinium publicum* we find evidence that supports this conclusion.

In the High Principate, these trends continue and indeed are extended more widely especially among the members of the urban elites. As under Augustus, protection, mediation and forensic oratory remain, but patrons and benefactors not only in the senatorial order, but now also in the equestrian and decurial were, to judge by the epigraphical record, encouraged to support the imperial program of urbanization and Romanization, and surely expected to be rewarded for their efforts. The fact that many communities had multiple patrons and patrons of different ranks confirms how widely spread this practice was. Admittedly, most communities may not have had as many civic patrons as did Canusium (with 39), but even if most had a half dozen at one time, there must have been many hundreds if not thousands of cases of civic patronage in Italy alone.

During this period the Stoic justification for civic patronage, already articulated in by Cicero in his *de officiis*, found considerable support and development among the elites. Pliny's *Letters* and Seneca's *de beneficiis* treat the problem in numerous ways, and, though the latter does not specifically use '*patrocinium publicum*', much of the conceptual basis of the treatise applies to the practice of civic patronage in its sanitized and politically correct form.

Did civic patronage also promote social peace in the increasingly stratified communities of the late Principate and beyond? Zuiderhoeck makes such a case, but it is very difficult, I believe, to find evidence for such a thesis in the Latin speaking provinces. Many patrons and benefactors were surely hard-headed and even hard-hearted when it came to calculating their own advantage, and some may have realized that their benefactions eased the tensions in the communities in which they lived and did business. But if they had such thoughts they did not leave much of a record testifying to their intention. Nonetheless, as the letters of Pliny and Fronto reveal, many senators willingly became the formal patrons of communities and their names were surely inscribed on local monuments like the album of Canusium.

To what extent then did the system of civic patronage and *patrocinium publicum* promote urbanization and Romanization especially in the Latin speaking provinces? Some scholars have argued that civic patronage declined after Augustus and others that it was a largely meaningless though venerated institution.

Did patronage 'decline'? I believe it did not. Such a statement may have some validity when one considers that the proportion of known cases of civic patronage involving senators did decline as a percentage of the whole, but that is of course matched by the striking increase in the number of patrons of equestrian and decurial rank. Moreover, the appointment of a civic patron was important. It is the only civic honor that was regulated in the civic charters of the Flavian period. And both literary and epigraphical evidence are explicit that the honor of *patrocinium publicum* was the highest that might be conferred by a community.

How significant was the role of civic patronage in promoting urbanization and Romanization? If we understand the term in modern and sociological terms, then we may rightly include all forms of public benefaction whether the patron was formally coopted or not. By this definition patronage, though clearly not the only factor, played an important role in promoting the use of the Latin language, in improving the infrastructure of cities, and thereby in securing the peace. If, however, we limit the argument to what 'formal' patrons did, the case may not be so compelling. There is a reason for this uncertainty. Roman values on benefaction tended to play down the notion that there was a 'one for one' exchange, that the honor could be received for a specific benefaction. Instead, though inscriptions may be specific that *patrocinium publicum* existed, they are also vague about what was exchanged. Continuity of benefaction was more important.

In sum, the fact that *patrocium publicum* continues to be regulated in the Flavian municipal charters, that civic patrons appear at the head of the

list of decurions on the *alba* in the 3rd Century, and the many references in inscriptions and literary texts to civic patronage as *apud nos potissimus* (*ILS* 6110; *CIL* 9, 3429), all strongly suggest that civic patronage remained a venerable and vital institution in Roman history.

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